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This dissertation examines the thousands of Anglo-Americans who immigrated to Mexican Texas during
the years following its independence from Spain. Long assumed to be the forbears of Manifest Destiny, it
argues instead that these immigrants demonstrated a sincere desire to become Mexican citizens, that
they were attracted to that country as much for its political promise as for its natural resources, and that
they in fact shared more with their northern Mexican neighbors than with their compatriots in the
northeastern United States.
Drawing chiefly from the personal papers, diplomatic correspondence, and newspapers of Anglo settlers
and their Mexican allies, this dissertation exposes a political irony at the heart of the United States’
imperial rise - that it had to do with that country’s early political weakness, rather than Mexico’s, and that
the people most responsible for it were in fact trying to escape US dominion, not perpetuate it. It argues
that Mexico offered a viable and attractive alternative to the US. Rather than seeing Mexico’s commitment
to regional sovereignty and local autonomy as its chief failure, this project argues that it was precisely
what attracted these immigrants to Mexico and formed the basis of their loyalty.
Yet, if Mexico’s weak central government was its strength in the 1820’s, it would be the source of conflict
and secession by the 1830’s and 1840’s. But Mexico was not unique in this regard. Indeed, this project
recasts the US Civil War as part of a longer and more expansive experiment in extreme federalism by
arguing that Texans seceded from Mexico for many of the same reasons that they and the rest of the
South would ultimately secede from the United States. Thus, throughout the early part of the nineteenth
century, the dominant geopolitical arrangement of the northwestern hemisphere was not primarily
national. Rather, the southern United States and northern Mexico formed a semi-autonomous region
united by its inhabitants’ shared commitment to regional sovereignty, martial citizenship, forced labor, and
free trade; and one that presented the possibility of a geopolitical arrangement very different from that
which ultimately emerged.
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ABSTRACT

“CHILDREN OF THE GREAT MEXICAN FAMILY”
ANGLO-AMERICAN IMMIGRATION TO TEXAS AND THE MAKING OF THE
AMERICAN EMPIRE, 1820-1861
Sarah KM Rodríguez
Stephanie McCurry
This dissertation examines the thousands of Anglo-Americans who immigrated to
Mexican Texas during the years following its independence from Spain. Long assumed
to be the forbears of Manifest Destiny, it argues instead that these immigrants
demonstrated a sincere desire to become Mexican citizens, that they were attracted to that
country as much for its political promise as for its natural resources, and that they in fact
shared more with their northern Mexican neighbors than with their compatriots in the
northeastern United States.
Drawing chiefly from the personal papers, diplomatic correspondence, and
newspapers of Anglo settlers and their Mexican allies, this dissertation exposes a political
irony at the heart of the United States’ imperial rise - that it had to do with that country’s
early political weakness, rather than Mexico’s, and that the people most responsible for it
were in fact trying to escape US dominion, not perpetuate it. It argues that Mexico
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offered a viable and attractive alternative to the US. Rather than seeing Mexico’s
commitment to regional sovereignty and local autonomy as its chief failure, this project
argues that it was precisely what attracted US immigrants to Mexico and formed the basis
of their loyalty to that country.
Yet, if Mexico’s weak central government was its strength in the 1820’s, it would
be the source of conflict and secession by the 1830’s and 1840’s. But Mexico was not
unique in this regard. Indeed, this project recasts the US Civil War as part of a longer and
more expansive experiment in extreme federalism by arguing that Texans seceded from
Mexico for many of the same reasons that they and the rest of the South would ultimately
secede from the United States. Thus, throughout the early part of the nineteenth century,
the dominant geopolitical arrangement of the northwestern hemisphere was not primarily
national. Rather, the southern United States and northern Mexico formed a semiautonomous region united by its inhabitants’ shared commitment to regional sovereignty,
martial citizenship, forced labor, and free trade; and one that presented the possibility of a
geopolitical arrangement very different from that which ultimately emerged.
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1
INTRODUCTION
Just after the Louisiana Purchase of 1803, an acquisition which effectively
doubled the United States’ national territory, John Quincy Adams wrote that “The whole
continent of North America appears destined by Divine Providence to be peopled by one
nation.” After the United States acquired Florida from Spain in 1819, he wrote that the
world must be “familiarized with the idea of considering our proper dominion to be the
continent of North America. From the time when we became an independent people,”
Adams wrote, “it was as much a law of nature that this should become our pretension as
that the Mississippi should flow to the sea.” 1 Central to the imperial vision of Adams and
others like him were Anglo-American settlers themselves, especially small landholders,
whose rights and privileges were at the core of United States political tradition, and who,
many believed, would help pave the way for US continental domination. 2
Not long after Adams wrote his second correspondence, US citizens would, in
fact, begin slowly trickling across the eastern Louisiana border with New Spain, to settle
its far northern province of Téjas. Between 1820 and 1836, this region, nestled between
the Rio Grande and Sabine Rivers, attracted thousands of norteamericanos, most from
southern states like Tennessee, Kentucky, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Alabama. This, as
well as its geographic placement, rich natural resources, and seemingly sparse population,
convinced many US leaders that Texas would serve as the United States’ gateway to the
1

John Quincy Adams, Memoirs of John Quincy Adams (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott & Co., 1874-77), vol.
4, p. 439; Adams quoted in D.W. Meinig, The Shaping of America: A Geographical perspective on 500
Years of History Vol. 2 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 19913), 211.
2
Reginald Horseman, Race and American Manifest Destiny: The Origins of American Racial AngloSaxonism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), 81, 86-87.

2
rest of the continent, and that those Americans settling there would act as its primary
ambassadors. 3 Yet, while national elites may have envisioned US expansion through
population dispersal, most of those who were actually settling the region had no such
intent. Their aim was to escape US dominion, not perpetuate it.

The United States has long been a destination for immigrants, especially from
Mexico and other parts of Latin America. It is hard, then, to imagine US citizens seeking
new lives south of the border. But in the years following Mexican independence, this
was precisely the case. Traditionally, historians have interpreted their decision as
strategic not sincere. 4 How could it be otherwise? Mexico was still a monarchy when
these immigrants first set their sights on it.

3

Mattie Austin Hatcher, “The Opening of Texas to Foreign Settlement, 1801-1822”, University of Texas
Bulletin, No. 2714: April 8, 1927 (Austin, University of Texas), 277.
4
This is the view of most traditionalist scholars including Eugene C. Barker, “Mexico and Texas: A
Collision of Two Cultures” (Dallas: P.L. Turner, 1928), 1-5, 143-146. See also The Life of Steven F.
Austin, Founder of Texas (Nashville: Cokesbury Press, 1925), Chapter 16; T.R. Fehrenbach, Lone Star: A
History of Texas and the Texans, (Boston: Da Capo Press, 2000), Chapter 8; Laura Lyons McLemore offers
an excellent synthesis of this first and earliest group of Texas historians who cited Mexican political,
cultural and moral inferiority as the primary cause for the Texas Revolution in Inventing Texas: Early
Historians of the Lone star State(College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2004), Chapter 2. They
included such nineteenth-century amateur historians as Mary Austin Holley, Chester Newell and Frederic
LeClerc. This view was then extended into academic and popular knowledge by professional twentiethcentury scholars such as George P. Garrison, Walter Prescott Webb, J. Frank Dobie, Charles W, Ramsdell,
and Eugene C. Baker.
Many revisionist historians, however, have also failed to take seriously Anglo settlers’ declarations of
loyalty and in so doing have largely reinforced the notion of an inevitable incompatibility between AngloAmerican immigrants and Mexico. See Robert A. Calvert and Arnoldo de León ,eds. The History of Texas
(Harlan Davidson: Arlington Heights, 1990), Chapter 3 and 4; Arnoldo de León, They Called Them
Greasers: Anglo Attitudes Towards Mexicans in Texas, 1821—1900, (Austin: University of Texas, 1983);
David J. Weber, The Mexican Frontier 1821-1846: The American Southwest Under Mexico.
For an synthesis and critique of Texas historiography until 1991 see Walter Buenger and Robert A.
Calvert’s Introduction to Texas Through Time: Evolving Interpretations (College Station: Texas A&M
Press, 1991), ix-xxxv.
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Borderlands scholars have done much to advance our understanding of these early
immigrants to Mexican Texas. Rather than merely dismissing their Mexican nationalism,
scholars like Andrés Reséndez, Greg Cantrell and Andrew Cayton argue that these
settlers demonstrated a flexible and pragmatic nationalism, and insist that the story of
early Texas is essentially one of shifting allegiances at a time of national weakness for
both Mexico and the United States. But they stop short of acknowledging the full power
and appeal of the early Mexican political system to many Anglo southern frontiersmen,
nor the extent to which they participated in the early Mexican nation building project.
Eric Slereth’s recently argued that early settlers drew on the notion of “expatriation” or “a
natural right under international law to unilaterally exchange citizenship in one country
for that of another.” Although compelling, this interpretation fails to address the question
of “why Mexico?” 5 Was there anything about that nation specifically that attracted
thousands of US immigrants other than the fact that it happened to be just across the
border? This dissertation insists that there was.

5
For examples of works that point to the inherent flexibility of early national identities along the USMexico border see David J. Weber, The Mexican Frontier 1821-1846: The American Southwest Under
Mexico. Andrés Reséndez, Changing National Identities at the Frontier: Texas and New Mexico, 18001850 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), Greg Cantrell, Stephen F. Austin: Empresario of
Texas (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999). For an synthesis and critique of Texas historiography
until 1991 see Walter Buenger and Robert A. Calvert’s Introduction to Texas Through Time: Evolving
Interpretations (College Station: Texas A&M Press, 1991), ix-xxxv; Andrew R.L. Cayton, “Continental
Politics: Liberalism, Nationalism, and the Appeal of Texas in the 1820s” in Beyond the Founders: New
Approaches to the Political History of the Early American Republic, ed. by Jeffrey L. Pasley, Andrew W.
Robertson and David Waldstreicher (Chapell Hil: University of North Carolina press, 2004. Eric R. Slereth,
“Privileges of Locomotion: Expatriation and Politics of the Southwestern Border Crossing,” Journal of
American History, (March 2014), 995-1020, quote p. 997.

4
More recently, in their efforts to answer the question of just how the United States
came to replace Mexico as the geopolitically dominant nation in the Northwestern
Hemisphere, scholars of the US empire have pointed to non-state forces such as cotton
and powerful Native American groups who paved the way for US westward expansion by
compromising Mexico’s efforts at national consolidation, social cohesion and inter-ethnic
peace.

Yet these histories, however illuminating, do little to challenge the long-standing

assumption of Mexican political weakness and incompetence. In fact, in many ways they
reinforce it. 6

Yet, in failing to sufficiently interrogate the long-standing assumption of

Mexican political weakness and ineffectuality, scholars have missed a profound irony at
the heart of this particular stage of American expansion – that the United States’ rise to
continental dominance had more to do with that nation’s early political weakness, rather
than Mexico’s, and that the people most credited with perpetuating US dominion were in
fact trying to escape it.
Indeed, for some, especially those living on the frontier, Mexico appeared even
more politically viable than the United States. Just as the latter was falling under the
sway of an increasingly centralized government, seemingly committed to pursuing the
aims of a capitalist elite, the newly fledged nation to its south promised immigrants a

6

For the role of cotton in fueling US westward expansion see Andrew Torget, Cotton Empire: Slavery and
the Texas Borderlands, 1820-1837 (PhD. Diss. University of Virginia, 2009) and Walter Johnson, River of
Dark Dreams: Slavery and Empire in the Cotton Kingdom. For Native American power in the Mexican
North and its role in facilitating US westward expansion see specifically Brian DeLay, War of a Thousand
Deserts: Indian Raids and the US-Mexico War, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), Chapter 8;
Pekka Hamalainen, Comanche Empire (New have: Yale University Press, 2008), “Introduction” and
Chapter 4.

5
system more firmly grounded in the traditional republican principles they held most dear.
While there is no question that these immigrants played a crucial role in Texas’ secession
from Mexico, and that country’s subsequent loss of half its national territory to the
United States, neither such a result nor the settlers’ part in it were as predictable as many
have assumed.

Indeed, it could be said that at the time of Mexico’s independence, that

country, not the United States, appeared poised to dominate the continent.
This, of course, has significant implications for how we understand the United
States and Mexico, and their relationship with each other during this period. The case of
thousands of disillusioned Americans renouncing their homeland for its neighbor to the
south shows that the Jacksonian US was no stronger or more unified than Mexico. 7 Both
republics would, throughout the early nineteenth century, struggle with questions
surrounding national cohesion, citizenship, regional sovereignty, states’ rights, and, of
course, slavery. And both nations would be torn asunder, with the United States facing
one of the bloodiest civil wars of modern history – a war ignited by many of the very
same impulses that had attracted so many Americans to Mexico in the first place.
Indeed, as frontier southerners, Anglo-American immigrants and their northern
Mexican neighbors shared more in common with each other than they did with the

7

Most histories of Jacksonian America see it as the high point of American nationalism and cohesion. See
Sean Willenz, Chants Democratic: New York City and the Rise of the American Working Class, 17881850 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984); Charles Sellers, The Market Revolution: Jacksonian
America, 1815-1846 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); William Appleman Williams, The Roots
of the Modern American Empire: A Study of the Growth and Shaping of Social Consciousness in a
Marketplace Society (New York: Vintage Books, 1969), Chapter 2 and 3.

6
economic and political elites of their respective countries. This included a commitment
to regional sovereignty, local autonomy, and martial citizenship; an embrace of various
forms of forced labor; engagement in a lucrative transnational economy; and an
increasingly strained relationship with their respective central governments. In other
words, the American South and Mexican North formed a more or less politically,
economically and culturally coherent unit distinct from the emerging centers of national
power in both the northeastern United States and Mexico City, and one that presented the
possibility of a third geopolitical arrangement very different from that which exists now.
United States hemispheric domination was hardly a foregone conclusion.
***
Even as historians have by now long rejected the notion of inevitability, many
entrenched assumptions about the course of US westward expansion remain. Chief
among them is the tendency to see Anglo colonists, wherever they may settle, as effective
ambassadors of Anglo culture, values and institutions. Recent scholarship on settler
colonialism has argued that the nineteenth century saw the “rise of the Anglo world,”
with settlers from the United States to Australia effectively reproducing their own
societies abroad, and thereby paving the way for British and US imperial dominance. 8
The thought that white American men would choose to live under a Mexican
monarchy rather than a US republic may seem peculiar to some, but this was in fact the
8
James Belich, Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Anglo-World, 1783-1939
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. D.W. Meinig, The Shaping of America. While Meinig rejects
the notion of inevitability in theory, he too, largely accepts that US immigrants to Texas helped to
unilaterally facilitate US expansion, 39-41.

7
case. Indeed, this dissertation challenges the scholarly and popular assumption that US
republican democracy was always a preferred form of government to European-style
monarchy. In fact, this was not even the case for some white, property-owning men, the
very people we would assume to be the most fervent defenders of US republicanism. By
focusing on prominent figures like Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson, both of whom
articulated a faith in the superiority of their nation and a desire to either transport its
model abroad or adopt a policy of aggressive national expansion in its name, studies of
the early republic have tended to take US political superiority and appeal for granted. 9
Likewise, studies of early Mexico have tended to see that nation’s postindependence era as a time of disintegration and national humiliation. However, I would
argue that Mexico’s chief political characteristic - its provincialism – should be seen as a
source of viability, rather than weakness. 10 Indeed, this work argues that what we term
“strong” versus “weak” states is ultimately historically contingent and culturally
constructed. 11
9

For a discussion of Jeffersonian imperial ideology see Peter S. Onuf, Jefferson’s Empire: The Language
of American Nationhood (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2000) and for the most
comprehensive study of Jackson see Robert V. Ramini, The Life of Andrew Jackson: The Course of
American Empire, 1767-1821 (New York: Harper and Row, 1988).
10
For examples of scholarship that significantly reconsiders early Mexican politics and nationhood see
Timothy E. Anna, Forging Mexico, 1821-1835 ( Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998),
“Introduction” and Chapter 1; Jaime E. Rodríguez O., ed., The Independence of Spanish America (New
York: Cambridge, 1996), Chapter 3 and 5; Eric Van Young, Writing Mexican History (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2012), Chapter 3.
11
For works on the supposed “strength” of the early US republic in terms of its martial and economic
presence, especially in the West, see Bergman, William H. The American National State and the Early
West (London: Cambridge University Press, 2012). For work on the limitations and popular criticism of
the early state’s centralizing tendency see Saul Carnell, The Other Founders: Anti-Federalism and the
Dissenting Tradition in America, 1788-1828 (Chapel Hill, University North Carolina Press, 1999); Steven
Aron, How the West Was Lost: The Transformation of Kentucky from Daniel Boone to Henry Clay

8
Indeed, many frontier Americans saw in the United States a nation that had
betrayed many of its founding principles. And those who immigrated to Mexico admired
that country, first as a monarchy and later as a confederate republic, precisely for its firm
commitment to weak central government, regional sovereignty, and local autonomy. For
many in both Mexico and the United States, these principles constituted the lynchpin of
democracy. 12 At a time when the United States was rapidly centralizing in an attempt to
modernize and reform its economy and infrastructure, Mexico was founded on a
federalist promise at least as fervent as that which existed in the US.
For example, post-independence Mexico’s renewed commitment to the militia,
considered to be one of the primary bulwarks against political tyranny, particularly
appealed to US citizens who, by the 1820’s, were seeing their federal government slowly
move away from locally organized militias in favor of a professional army. AngloTexans embraced the Mexican militia, which relied on the leadership, authority and skill
of the local community, as not only a way to protect and ensure their rights in their
adopted nation, but as a means of demonstrating their loyalty to it.
Additionally, Anglo settlers, most of whom were from the South, felt at home in a
region whose inhabitants shared their commitment to a compulsive labor system – much
of it racialized. Whether it be chattel slavery or debt peonage, both American southerners
and their tejano neighbors saw forced labor as perhaps the only means to develop and
(Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1996). For a reconsideration of the supposed “weakness” of
the early Mexican political systems see Anna, Forging Mexico, “Preface” and Chapter 1.
12
Saul Cornell, The Other Founders: Anti-Federalism and the Dissenting Tradition in America, 1788-1828
(University of North Carolina Press, 1999).

9
enrich Texas, and they worked together to convince reluctant Mexican leaders to allow
settlers to admit their slaves as debt peons. This arrangement worked for some time until
slaves themselves managed to take advantage of their new status to have their contracts
manumitted under Mexican federal law.
Rather than seeing these settlers’ “southerness” as the root of their hostility
towards Mexico, this dissertation argues that it was precisely what attracted them and
facilitated their cooperation with tejanos. United States settlers were indeed invited to the
region to mitigate Indian attacks on Mexicans and introduce a southern-style cotton
economy replete with its slave labor force. Counter to how many American imperialists
assumed Anglo settler colonialism would work - and to how many scholars since have
assumed it did - American immigrants to Mexico demonstrated a flexibility and
willingness to conform to Mexican law and culture. When racial antagonism did
ultimately emerge between Anglos and Mexicans, it was the result not the cause of
conflicts like the Texas Revolution and US-Mexico War.
Far from feeling a tension between their American identity and Mexican
nationality, many immigrants believed that Mexico was in fact the only place where they
could truly be American. Time and again, they expressed the notion that only in Mexico
could they enjoy the kind of republican autonomy and independence that their
grandfathers had fought for in the American Revolution. Far from an imposition or
hindrance, they viewed the Mexican state as guarantor and protector.

10
Furthermore, they were deeply invested in the Mexican nation-building project in
a way that historians have not fully acknowledged. Texans certainly did not want to
evade the state, nor did they necessarily find it an imposition. 13 In fact, they strove to
make Mexico a more viable and lucrative republic by forging a vital transnational
network that linked the rugged deserts of the Mexican North with the lush plantations of
the US South and thriving metropolises of the Caribbean. And they saw their efforts as
in service of the Mexican state, not in contradiction to it. Yet, as much as they wanted to
help Mexico flourish, they wanted it on their terms. They decried Mexican efforts at
taxation and other kinds of regulation they saw as a hindrance, while at the same time
calling for increased infrastructure to enable foreign and domestic trade. They
proclaimed a commitment to Mexican industry, but continued to rely on the US for most
necessaries like food and clothing. While their claims may seem contradictory or even
hypocritical to a twenty-first century reader, the question of what exactly a republic was,
how it functioned, and its citizens’ rights and responsibilities within it were still yet to be
determined in the early nineteenth century. What may appear as hypocrisy was, perhaps
more accurately, the birth pangs of modern nation building. Ultimately, however, these
immigrants’ actions would undermine the national sovereignty and nation-building

13

Most borderlands scholarship has tended to represent national identity as more fluid and contingent than I
do here. For examples see Samuel Truett and Elliott Young’s Introduction to Continental Crossroads:
Remapping US-Mexico Borderlands History (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), 1-32. For examples
of influential borderlands scholarship on early Texas see Andrés Reséndez Changing National Identities at
the Frontier: Texas and New Mexico, 1800-1850 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004) and Greg
Cantrell, Stephen F. Austin: Empresario of Texas (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999.

11
efforts of both Mexico and the United States by posing a geopolitical alternative that
threatened the dominance of both nations.
Indeed, Mexico’s strength was its greatest weakness and, as the 1830’s
progressed, Mexican leaders experienced increasing difficulty holding their nation
together while honoring its federalist impulse. This resulted in a significant generational
shift in settler attitudes towards and relationship with Mexico, with those arriving after
the country’s move towards centralism demonstrating a more tentative loyalty than those
who came earlier. Americans who immigrated after 1830 would enter a nation that no
longer appeared the federalist Promised Land that earlier immigrants saw it as. While
members of the earlier generation held out hope that Mexico would one day return to the
principles that had attracted them, those who only knew it to be plagued by political
turmoil, violence and conflict, seemed more dubious.
It was members of this latter group that, in 1835, would push for independence
when it looked like Mexican federalism was finally dead. This was the year that Antonio
López de Antonio Santa Anna, in an attempt to save his country from political chaos,
instituted a sweeping set of administrative changes designed to centralize authority and
strengthen the executive. Yet independence was still not a desirable option for most
Texans. Instead, they joined with their Mexican compatriots in a nation-wide effort to
reinstate the beloved Constitution of 1824, to which they had pledged their loyalty when
they first immigrated. When this failed, after Santa Anna crushed the last federalist
stronghold in Zacatecas, Texans began a slow, reluctant and ultimately incomplete
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embrace of independence. Their move was brought on by the rapidly changing
demographics of wartime Texas, which saw a dramatic increase of recruits from the US
who, tempted by promises of cheap land, joined the fight aginst Santa Anna. For most of
these men, Mexican federalism meant little. Unlike earlier immigrants, they had no real
desire to leave the United States, a nation that under the leadership of Andrew Jackson
was beginning to return to its federalist origins, and they had no prior connection with
Mexico. Their only impressions of the country and its people had been formed in a time
of war.
Texan independence, rather than a momentary blip in the United States’ otherwise
uninterrupted westward march, ushered in a period of geopolitical experimentation,
whereby Texans entertained a variety of possibilities. These included joining the United
States, remaining independent, and even returning to Mexico. Although Texans would
ultimately annex themselves to the US, they would remain a part of that country for a
mere fifteen years before seceding for many of the same reasons they had seceded from
Mexico.
The United States, in fact, would face the very same set of geopolitical
challenges that Mexico had and, at least momentarily, it would meet the same fate. Just
after acquiring massive territory territory from its supposedly weaker neighbor, the
United States fell apart in 1861. 14 In many ways, the Civil War and the issues that
prompted it, extend far beyond the chronological and geographic boundaries that
14
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historians have traditionally awarded it. Furthermore, as the only southern state with a
history of secession, Texas would hold a special place in the Confederacy’s historic
imagination.
Indeed, this project points to the inherent southern character and history of the
American Southwest, challenging the longstanding assumption that the West was
somehow separate from the rest of the country. 15 Yet, while most studies of the
“Southern Empire” focus on elites, this one highlights the contributions of less
prosperous, sometimes wayward, southerners who turned their backs on the US much
earlier than their elite counterparts did, and who were far more interested in starting new
lives beyond the confines of their native country than in extending slavery or rectifying a
sectional power imbalance. 16

It is perhaps more helpful to imagine Texas as the nexus

of a region distinct from the American northeast and Mexico City, both of which, despite
their undeniable economic and political power, remained largely peripheral to the
imagined world of most inhabitants of the Northwestern hemisphere.
Yet, just as Texas occupied a central place in the hearts and minds of those who
lived there, it deserves to be at the center of the larger national history and historiography
of both the United States and Mexico. As Walter Buenger observes, Texas and US
15
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history have long constituted a kind of “dual provincialism,” 17 which is peculiar
considering how crucial Texas was to the larger story of US nation building and
westward expansion. Yet historians of Texas have nonetheless resisted integrating their
story into the larger national narrative, while historians of the United States have returned
the favor by mostly ignoring Texas. This dissertation, however, places Texas where it
should be - at the epicenter of the United States’ imperial rise.
This story begins in the early 1800’s with the first Anglo-American settlers in
northern New Spain and ends in 1861 with Texans’ decision to secede from the United
States and the onset of the American Civil War. Most of the sources are family and
personal papers belonging to US settlers in northern Mexico. These documents provide
the best insight into these immigrants’ politics, society and changing relationships with
each other and national officials. It also relies on the collected and personal papers of
northern Mexicans – principally tejanos - to understand their relationship with Anglo
settlers and their own central government in Mexico City, their reasons for inviting these
settlers into their country, and for joining the Texas Revolution and later the Civil War.
Newspapers, particularly in the later chapters, track how political opinion developed in
Texas as its status and demographics changed. Finally, municipal records, such as the
Béxar Archives, explain how Anglo institutions took shape on the frontier, and how
Texans’ relationship with both Mexican and US authorities changed as a result.
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Being that this is a national story of the US, Mexico and Texas, I also consult the
collected papers and diaries of US and Mexican national leaders like Andrew Jackson
and General Manuel Mier y Terán, as well as state documents and correspondence.
These documents reveal how national leaders understood and reacted to the events
surrounding Texas independence and annexation, and the national and international
debates surrounding these and other events.
The dissertation proceeds chronologically with the first chapter exploring US
immigrants’ perceptions of Mexico and particular political philosophy, one grounded in a
commitment to local autonomy and small federal government. I argue that this was
central to both their alienation from the US and their loyalty to Mexico. Chapter 2
explores the conditions they encountered in Mexican Texas, the lengths they went to
defend their adopted nation’s sovereignty in suppressing the Fredonian Rebellion, and
their relationship with the local tejano community. Chapter 3 explores how immigrants
reconciled themselves with Mexican laws regarding established religion and labor, often
adopting Catholicism and admitting their slaves as indentured servants. It also explores
how former slaves used this change in their status to pursue their freedom under Mexican
federal law and how this complicated the relationship between Mexican northerners, both
Anglo and tejano, and national leaders in Mexico City. Chapter 4 explores the vital
transnational economy that emerged in Mexican Texas - one that, although declared in
the service of Mexico, actually drew the region ever closer to the US, undermining both
Mexican and US leaders’ efforts to build cohesive nation-states. Chapters 5 and 6 offer a
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retelling of the oft recounted Texas Revolution and the Republic of Texas that it created,
arguing that the conflict started as an effort to re-instate the federalist Mexican
Constitution of 1824, not separate from Mexico, and that Texans embraced secession
late, reluctantly, and mostly as a means of attracting US support. Many in the United
States of the North, however, interpreted these events differently, contributing to the
notion that the United States was deservedly destined to dominate the rest of the
continent, a vision eventually consummated with the US invasion of Mexico and the
subsequent Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo. Yet, as I point out in Chapter 7, US
continental domination was still far from a forgone conclusion, as that country would
soon face the same fate that Mexico did when Texans, along with the rest of the slave
south, seceded from the United States. I conclude by arguing that popular
misunderstandings of US immigration to Texas, and the events that resulted from it, have
perhaps wrongly convinced that country of its own political strength and superiority over
other nations – an assumption that has informed US foreign policy well into the twentyfirst century.
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CHAPTER 1
“The Greatest Nation on Earth”
The Politics and Nationalism of the First Anglo-American Immigrants to Mexican
Texas
1820-1824

“[W]e may from this instant consider North America, with the exception of
Canada, as divided into two grand and important commonwealths,” wrote James Smith
Wilcocks on the occasion of Mexico’s independence from Spain in October 1821. The
soon-to-be US consul to Mexico went on to praise that young nation’s revolutionaries for
their “brotherly love, patriotism, disinterestedness, truth, and good fait[h],” and compared
their leader, General Augustín de Iturbide, to George Washington. Assuring his
correspondent, John Quincy Adams that the new Mexican monarchy was “established on
a sure and solid foundation,” Wilcocks predicted that the two young nations would
cooperate to “give the law to the opposite continent.” 18
Yet not all United States leaders were as excited about the prospect of sharing
control of the continent with their newly independent southern neighbor. In fact, as early
as 1786, when the United States was still just a decade old and did not yet extend past the
Appalachian Mountains, Thomas Jefferson wrote that “our Confederacy must be viewed
as the nest from which all America, North and South, is to be peopled.” 19 Indeed,
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Americans leaders not only specifically looked to the expansive northern frontier of New
Spain as ripe for conquest, they identified US settlers as its primary agents. Jefferson
wrote that he looked forward to a time “when our rapid multiplication will expand itself”
to “cover the whole northern, if not the southern continent, with a people speaking the
same language, governed in similar forms, and by similar laws.” 20
This determination to populate and control the rest of the continent, if not
hemisphere, persisted well into the nineteenth century, gaining confirmation with the
Louisiana Purchase, which effectively doubled the United States’ national territory. It
was confirmed again with the Adams-Onís Treaty in 1819, which transferred Florida
from Spain to the United States. Still not satisfied, US leaders began to set their sights on
the Spanish province of Téjas - a vast, fertile region that, many believed, could serve as
their nation’s gateway to the rest of the continent. Criticizing the “imbecility and
malignity” of Spain for not surrendering the region to the United States as it had Florida,
Jefferson expressed little doubt that Texas would inevitably fall into US hands, making it
“the richest state of our Union.” 21
News that the Spanish Empire might be on its last legs only heightened
expansionist interest. Six months before Wilcocks penned his correspondence to Adams,
Henry Clay spoke of the need to populate the newly independent nation’s northern
frontier with Anglo-American settlers:
20
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The question was by what race shall Texas be peopled? In our hands it will be
peopled by freemen and the sons of freemen carrying with them our language, our
laws, and our liberties; establishing on the prairies of Texas, temples dedicated to
the simple and devout worship of God, incident to our religion, and temples
dedicated to the freedom which we adore next to Him. In the hands of others it
may become the habitation of despotism and of slaves, subject to the vile
dominion of the inquisition and of superstition. 22

Expressing none of the admiration that Wilcocks did, Clay’s words demonstrate his belief
that few US leaders had any intent of sharing control of the continent with their newly
independent neighbor. Clay not only believed in the inherent superiority of AngloAmerican society, especially when compared to that of the Catholic world, but he
expressed a firm conviction that US citizens themselves would pave the way for their
nation’s expansion by importing Anglo-American culture, laws, and institutions.
But men like Clay were wrong. Those who immigrated to Texas had little
intention of serving as the forbears of Manifest Destiny, nor was it evident to them that
the United States would emerge as the most geopolitically dominant nation in the
Northwestern Hemisphere. Indeed, for several centuries, while the US had remained a
marginal outpost of the British Empire, New Spain had enjoyed virtual unrivaled control
of the continent. The United States may have doubled its size a quarter of a century after
independence and gained control of the continent’s most important river network and
port, but the newly independent Mexican Empire remained the second largest nation in
the Western Hemisphere, encompassing two million square miles and spanning from
22
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present-day Costa Rica to Northern California. Strategically nestled between the Atlantic
and Pacific coasts, it possessed all manner of climate and topography, rich in natural
resources and with a population three times larger than that of the US. 23 Furthermore, it
had inherited a long tradition of provincial autonomy from Spain, meaning that as a
republic it possessed an unrivaled commitment to federalism and state sovereignty.
Historians and contemporaries alike have long considered Mexico’s commitment
to a weak central government to be its fatal flaw, the political characteristic most
responsible for compromising its political viability, territorial integrity, and national
cohesion. But for many norteamericanos, this was its most attractive feature, especially
for those in the country’s southwestern frontier, from which the vast majority of Texas
settlers came. In addition to being highly mobile, many of these early settlers had lived
under Spanish jurisdiction in Missouri or Louisiana, and had long benefitted from the
open, porous boundaries and inter-ethnic exchange that characterized the late eighteenthcentury borderlands. They therefore demonstrated a flexible and contingent nationalism,
often more influenced by pragmatics than ideology. But if they shared one thing in
common with their northern Mexican counterparts, it was a strong localist tradition that,
by the nineteenth century, rendered a complicated and often fraught relationship with
their respective federal governments. Many of these people saw in Mexico not just a
chance to start over in a nation blessed with fertile land and rich natural resources, but a
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nation that held as much political promise as economic. These immigrants did not so
much hope to see Texas absorbed by the US, as they aimed to contribute to the birth of
perhaps an even greater nation – larger, wealthier, and more politically viable. For many
of these people, especially Stephen Austin and his small cohort of several hundred
families who first settled the area, it was Mexico that appeared poised to become “the
greatest nation on earth.” 24
***
“In contrast to the congratulatory nature of most writing on the emergence of the
United States, historians appear diffident, almost embarrassed about the birth of Mexico,”
writes Jaime E. Rodríguez O. Commonly referred to as the result of an “unfortunate
revolution,” Mexico’s independence from Spain was long assumed to have ushered in a
period of economic decline, social conflict and political chaos that lasted for at least the
next four decades. “[I]nstead of interpreting the country’s political history as a process of
evolutionary change, as is the case in the United States,” writes Rodríguez, “historians of
Mexico often dismiss the nation’s first political structures and institutions as irrelevant,
while seeking ‘revolutionary’ transformations that presumably advanced the country’s
political development.” 25 The fact that Mexico ended up inheriting its earliest
institutions from Spain meant that the new nation was virtually doomed to fail. Such a
24

William Walker, 27 August 1822, Asbury Papers, Daughters of the Republic of Texas Library, San
Antonio.
25
Jaime E. Rodríguez O., “Introduction,” The Evolution of the Mexican Political System (Berkeley:
University of California, 1993), quote on pg. 1 and 4. For more on the changing historiography of early
Mexico see Timothy E. Anna, Forging Mexico, 1821-1835 (Lincoln, University of Nebraska, 1998),
Chapter 1.

22
conclusion, of course, assumes a universal preference for those institutions most
commonly associated with republicanism and overlooks the extent to which the United
States did not also inherit from Britain.
In fact, Moses Austin specifically cited the Spanish political system as the reason
for his decision to relocate to Texas in December 1820, when he was summoned before
Colonel Don Antonio Martínez, the Governor of the Province of Coahuila y Téjas, “in
order to obtain detailed information about the condition of affairs and movements on the
frontier of the United States.” 26 According to Martínez’s report, Austin claimed that he
“came to this province for the purpose of applying to the Government for authorization to
settle himself in it with his family.” When asked why he had not applied sooner for
settlement in New Spain, since he had obtained a Spanish passport in 1797, Moses
answered

[T]hat, since the year above mentioned, he went to reside at Saint Louis
(Missouri) which territory belonged, then to Spain; he had there lead mines, the
produce of which he exported to Havana, until the year 1800, when the American
Government having prohibited the working of mines by private enterprise, he lost
all the benefit of his labor.

Austin’s testimony points to several factors informing his and others’ decision to
emigrate to Mexico. Not only did he have experience living under the Spanish Empire,
but he specifically cited the Spanish political system as the primary impulse behind his
decision to immigrate. “[B]ut now, in view of the new system of Government adopted by
26
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Spain,” Moses continued, “he resolved upon applying for authorization to settle this
province.” 27 This remained the case after Mexican independence as that nation decided
to preserve, rather than discard, most of its colonial institutions.
But what system of government was this and why did some frontier AngloAmericans prefer it to that of the United States? Earlier to 1812, the Spanish Monarchy
had been composed of a series of kingdoms and provinces united only in their direct
relationship with the king. The Bourbon reforms of the eighteenth century reinforced
provincial identity among creole elites by giving each province its own administrative
government, thus permitting “the reinforcement of regional societies, by sponsoring local
economic development and the appearance of strong regional oligarchies opposed to
Mexico City.” 28
This long tradition of provincial power and autonomy explains the Spanish
reaction to the event that set the American independence movements in motion Napoleon Bonaparte’s 1808 peninsular invasion and capture of the Spanish King
Fernando VII. In accordance with Spanish law, which stipulated that in the absence of
the monarch, political power transferred to the people in the form of their corporate
entities, provinces throughout Spain independently began forming their own governing
juntas. Each province then elected deputies to represent them in a newly formed Cortes
that met in the southern Spanish town of Cádiz. In an act which elevated Spanish
27
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Americans to an almost equal status with their peninsular counterparts, the Cortes then
invited each of the American provinces to elect their own deputies to the Central Junta
based on a ratio of one deputy per 100 white male inhabitants. 29
The process of forming a new government based on the rule of the people
prompted a number of questions regarding Spain’s relationship with the Americas, not
least of which was popular sovereignty. On December 16, 1810, the day after the Cortes
opened, the American deputies presented a program of eleven reforms. These included
stipulations that the American provinces have twice the number of deputies to match
those of the peninsula; that natives, mestizos and Africans be included in representations;
and that free commerce be permitted throughout the colonies. The most noted advocate
of these reforms and the man perhaps most credited with leading the way towards greater
representation and enhanced local autonomy throughout the empire was none other than
the representative from the Eastern Interior Provinces, a recently designated
administrative department that included Coahuila, Nuevo León, Nuevo Santander, and,
Téjas. Indeed, as the sole representative of a region that had long suffered under
administrative neglect, incompetence and over-consolidation, Dr. Miguel Ramos de
Arizpe - native of Coahuila, cleric, and graduate of the University of Mexico - eloquently
expressed the longstanding creole desire for greater representation and local autonomy.
As a result of their relative remoteness “from the center of higher government,” Arispe
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complained that the interior provinces suffered from an “absence . . . of governing bodies
engaged in the administration of justice and the supervision of the political economy.”
Instead, they were controlled by “arbitrary” governors – many of them military men who enjoyed protection “from any responsibility whatever for their actions.” Such a
system, Arizpe insisted, fostered “despotism” and violated the empire’s principles of
limited and constitutional monarchy. As a remedy, Arizpe called for the establishment in
each province of “an executive council or a provincial deputation to have charge of the
government of its community.” These deputations would be composed of men elected
from the community itself and each body would enjoy a direct relationship with the
monarch. This, Arizpe insisted, was consistent with the principles of the monarchy and
indeed formed the very basis of the Cortes themselves: “When the orphan state of the
nation caused by the shameful imprisonment of our beloved King Ferdinand VII was
hardly known and the horrible plot of Napoleon to enslave us was still imperfectly seen,
the provinces, having determined to defend the national liberty and to rescue their king,
renounced the old government and established governing juntas.”
At the core of this system of government rested the principles of local autonomy
and popular democracy then sweeping the Atlantic. “Each community is an association
of freemen who are united[,] not to be despotically commanded by the strongest,”
declared Arizpe, “but by one or more prudent men, capable of being fathers of the
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republic.” 30 Here we see evidence of New Spain’s gradual and complex transition from
monarchy to republic. Rather than a dramatic break with its imperial past, Mexicans
looked to its legacy as they moved towards independence, first as an imperial monarchy
and later as a republic.
American demands resulted in a fundamental restructuring of the Spanish Empire
and contributed significantly to a new constitution - the Constitution of 1812 - established
on the principles of regional sovereignty, representative government and free enterprise.
It limited the monarchy, abolished viceroyalties and extended citizenship to all men except those of African descent. Finally, the Constitution of 1812 dramatically
decentralized power by creating provincial deputations consisting of locally elected
members. According to Rodríguez, “large numbers of people were incorporated into the
political process” for the first time in the empire’ history as part of a system that “appears
to have been more popular and democratic than those of most insurgent governments
then vying for power in the New World.” 31
Indeed, while historians have long argued that the impulse towards popular and
regional sovereignty that emerged in Spanish America in the years leading up to
independence came from France or the Anglo world, more recent studies argue that it
derived from a specifically Hispanic political tradition.
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provincehood,” as historian Timothy Anna has termed it, was perhaps its most marked
feature, and one borrowed directly from its colonial past. 32
***
A similar political impulse had been finding expression in the United States for
decades. Anti-Federalists may have technically lost many of their nation’s early
constitutional debates, but they would continue to influence its political discourse well
into the nineteenth century. As with Spanish liberals like Arizpe, the most definitive
aspect of their philosophy was their commitment to localism and suspicion of centralized
authority. Elements of the Anti-Federalists critique, according to historian Saul Cornell,
included the need for a Bill of Rights, the charge of “aristocracy” and exclusion among
the nation’s leaders, concerns about taxation, and anxiety over a standing army. But the
federal government’s underlying flaw, they contended, was its “consolidationist
tendency.” Anti-Federalists believed that “civil rights and states’ rights were one in the
same” and the states should operate as “the primary units of political organization and
contain the bulk of political authority.” These elements would not only serve as the
primary inspiration for American politics for generations to come, 33 but coincided with
many of the Spanish reforms of 1812. Central to both critiques was a desire to
decentralize power and enhance local authority.
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Perhaps no part of the United States better illustrated both the promise and perils
of a centralizing US government than the Kentucky-Missouri frontier from which the
majority of early US immigrants to Mexico came. Beginning in the 1790’s, Federalists
under the leadership of Alexander Hamilton unleashed an aggressive economic agenda
“designed to place the new government on a solid economic basis and forge strong ties
between the new government and financial interests.” 34 Part of his plan involved the
establishment of a national bank which promised to stabilize the new economy, attract the
support of wealthy creditors, and stimulate economic growth through lending. The First
Bank of the United States, however, received heavy criticism from Jefferson and the
Anti-Federalists who accused it of usurping the power of the states in claiming banking
as the exclusive right of the national government. 35 Anti-Federalists like John Taylor
criticized what he deemed an unholy alliance between the legislature and a “powerful
faction” of banking interests, whom he claimed “have no interest and feel but little
concern, in all those questions of fiscal policy which particularly affect the land-holder,
the merchant and the artist.” Instead, this group had redirected the government towards
“principles dangerous to the rights and interests of the community” and designed to serve
their own interests. According to Taylor, a group of “monarchic speculators,” had seized
upon the government’s legislative functions and “by virtue of this combination [of
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governing and banking interests] all regard for their constituents has been abandoned” so
that “the public can neither count upon the independence or integrity of the legislature.” 36
The Bank’s relationship with the citizenry was slightly more complicated,
especially in the West, where it facilitated land purchases among the less wealthy while
simultaneously opening the door to speculation. Even as it paved the way for greater
land ownership, the federal government failed to regulate purchases or adjudicate
competing land claims, sometimes permitting a single individual to purchase and hold a
large tract of land without living there, thereby depriving other less wealthy settlers.
Such practices were especially prevalent in places like Kentucky and Tennessee. By the
1790’s half of Kentucky householders were landless and the rest held only tenuous
claims to their property. 37
It was during this time that Anglo-Americans first began immigrating to Spanishcontrolled Louisiana and Missouri in the hopes of finding “a less complicated and more
democratic legal system.” Historian Andrew McMichael explains that, unlike their US
counterparts, “the Spaniards were fairly rigorous about their policy of not creating a class
of large-scale landholders.” In fact, the Spanish land policy operated under the dual
assumption that every man deserved enough land to sustain his family, and that the best
way to govern and protect the frontier was to populate it. While all one needed to do to
apply for a grant was swear allegiance to the Crown, an applicant had to inhabit and
36
John Taylor, “Examination of the late Proceedings in Congress, Respecting the Official Conduct of the
Secretary of the Treasury,” (Richmond, 1793), quotes on page 7,11, 12, 27.
37
Steven Aron, How the West Was Lost: The Transformation of Kentucky from Daniel Boone to Henry
Clay (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 82-3.

30
cultivate the land for at least four years before he could receive title to it. Plot sizes were
determined by family size so that recipients did not acquire more land than they could
realistically manage, and squatters who occupied and improved land for at least ten years
were permitted to purchase their plots outright. As McMichael explains, such a system
had two results: First, it guarded against rampant land speculation like that seen in
Virginia and Kentucky. Second, it promoted, indeed necessitated, actual settlement
since the landholder had to live on and work the land. 38
Thus throughout the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries the Lower
Mississippi Valley, where the Austin’s resided for nearly twenty-five years before
immigrating to Texas, was characterized by fluid borders, “multiple frontiers,” and
overlapping colonial systems as some frontier Americans who experienced a complex
and strained relationship with their central government opted to live under Spanish
jurisdiction. 39 “At one time or another and sometimes at the same time in the last half of
the eighteenth century [the region] played host to each of North America’s major colonial
powers: France, Spain, England and the United States,” writes Stephen Aron. 40 Some of
these jurisdictions offered significantly different political and economic systems,
especially when it came to distributing land grants. Borderlands residents could take
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advantage of imperial competition and the need to populate and settle vulnerable regions
to secure optimal conditions for themselves.
Scholars have observed that many US borderlands residents demonstrated a
pragmatic and flexible nationalism, motivated above all by an enduring desire to remain
economically self-sufficient. Aron explains that the independence that mattered most to
them came in the form of property ownership. For this reason the Spanish Empire
remained a periodically appealing alternative to the United States. When the Spanish
decided to close the Mississippi River to American navigation in 1784, leaders in
Tennessee and Kentucky entertained the possibility of seceding from the United States
and aligning themselves with Spain in exchange for access to the river and its outlet at
New Orleans. While the “Spanish Conspiracy” never materialized, the fact that it was
considered at all reveals not only the surprising political contingency of this time and
place, but a history of negotiation and cooperation with the Spanish while that empire
controlled much of the Louisiana Territory. 41
Before settling in Texas, the Austins established a mining operation at Mine à
Breton on the western side of the Missouri. There Moses and Stephen enjoyed a virtual
monopoly on the lead mining industry during the brief time that the Spanish held claim to
41

Aron, American Confluence, 71; McMichael makes a similar argument that Anglo-American loyalty to
Spain was motivated above all by economics. He writes that “As long as the Spanish Crown could
guarantee easy access to cheap land and a relatively stable regime, local residents willingly lived under
Spanish rule and swore allegiance to the king. When those guarantees failed, so did local loyalty. In that
sense West Floridians had little real political and national loyalty to Spain; what passed for allegiance to the
Spanish Crown was instead only the exercise of individualistic pursuits that for most of the period from
1785 to 1810 occurred within the context of allegiance to the Spanish Crown,” 4; For more on the Spanish
Conspiracy see Aron, How the West Was Lost, 17-19, American Confluence, 78-9.

32
the territory. In the first decade of the nineteenth century, however, the Spanish
transferred jurisdiction to the French who ultimately transferred it to the United States.
During this time the British and Spanish influence in the Missouri Territory all but
disappeared in the face of an onslaught of US settlers - many of them fleeing the
worsening situation in Kentucky – whose sudden presence threatened to disrupt the preexisting social hierarchy. Initially, the US government proved reluctant to shift its
military and administrative presence to the western theater, prompting frequent
complaints about the republic’s indifference and incompetence. However, by the end of
the decade, this had changed, although not necessarily to the benefit of pre-existing
settlers like the Austins. 42
Historians are now beginning to acknowledge the role that federal intervention
played in developing the trans-Appalachian West, and not just in terms of supplying
loans for land purchases. William Bergman has observed that the federal government
proved essential to protecting settlers and fueling local infrastructure: “Since 1789, the
federal government had deployed fiscal and military powers granted to it . . . to
transform the early western economy through land acquisitions, infrastructure,
commerce, and communication,” thereby expanding “its bureaucratic institutions into
the West, bridging geographic and political obstacles.” 43
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But for pre-existing settler populations – not to mention Indians - the state’s
growing presence could prove more problematic than its absence. In an attempt to make
way for a flood of US citizens then heading into Missouri, the Federal Land Claims
Commission decided not to honor the majority of Spanish land grants. While the Austins
managed to hold onto their property, others were not so lucky. Established settlers and
Indians now found themselves overwhelmed by the torrent of settlers backed by a federal
government that refused to honor their land rights. Furthermore, government failure to
regulate land speculation allowed for precisely the same circumstances that had occurred
in Kentucky - corrupt lawyers and legislators purchased large parcels of land on which
squatters had settled and then bid up the price. 44
The federal government’s increased presence in the west was accompanied by a
series of reforms designed to develop, modernize and integrate its economy. Many of
these reforms came at the behest of western elites eager to benefit from integration with
the eastern market. Arguing that nothing hampered Kentucky trade more than its
underdeveloped infrastructure, none other than Henry Clay became the champion of
federally funded canals, roads, and mines. Convinced by his time in the Kentucky House
of Representatives that federal funding was necessary for such large scale projects, Clay
advocated a modern, industrialized political economy in the name of agrarianism. 45
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But while the increasing presence of the US government certainly had its
benefits, it did not come without formidable costs. For one, the new system clearly
deviated from the principles of agrarianism and localism that had characterized the region
for decades, and pre-existing settlers such as the Austins no longer enjoyed the privilege
they had under earlier jurisdictions. 46 Indeed, throughout the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth century, localism and federal intervention existed in an uneasy marriage on the
frontier. While federal backing for agriculture and industry certainly aided and insulated
merchants, manufacturers, and settlers, and helped bring intra-regional trade and
commerce to the west, it also fueled the very kinds of speculation that westerners had
complained about for decades and introduced federal intervention into areas of the
economy that had once been locally controlled. Federal incorporation, of which Austin
specifically complained in his testimony before Gov. Martínez, was one of the most
controversial of the Hamiltonian reforms. While it gave people the opportunity to invest
in risky enterprises without the threat of considerable loss, skeptics argued that the
system favored insiders and was prone to corruption. 47
Predictably, the situation fueled the longstanding tension between federalist and
anti- federalist impulses. The central government’s increasing reach into commerce,
trade, law and infrastructure prompted fears that such measures “would stimulate
commercial interests unduly, undermine agriculture, centralize power, and violate the
46
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Constitution.” Many even feared that it would destroy state and local authority all
together. 48 Nothing, however, ignited criticism of the Federalist reforms more than the
collapse of the federal banking system in 1819. Rather than regulating the lending
practices of its state branches as the First Bank had done, the Second Bank of the United
States followed their example by over lending in paper money and then permitting the
notes of state banks to circulate as specie, rather than insisting that they be returned to the
bank for payment. By 1818 the bank had recognizing the recklessness of its lending
policies as well as the significant specie drain it caused in the east and began calling on
state banks to repay their debts. This, of course, forced many who had previously
enjoyed a policy of near unlimited lending, into bankruptcy and foreclosure. 49
The contraction was worse in the west where lending had been the most liberal.
There, the Panic took hold earlier, lasted longer and hurt more than anywhere else in the
country. As one legislator put it, “All the flourishing cities of the West are mortgaged to
this money power . . . They are in the jaws of the monster! A lump of butter in the mouth
of a dog! One gulp, one swallow, and all is gone!” 50 The unfortunate turn of events
reinforced the sense that monied elites had effectively usurped, centralized and corrupted
the federal government, and that the poorest and furthest from the seats of economic and
federal power were the losers. Their sense of betrayal was palpable. By 1824, men like
John C. Calhoun warned of a “general mass of disaffection to the government, not
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concentrated in any particular direction, but ready to seize upon any event and looking
out anywhere for a leader.” 51 Attempts by state banks to tax the central bank for its
failure to regulate or recall loans, failed. The landmark McCulloch v. Maryland
effectively shielded the central bank from state demands for monetary reparation and
“declared that national law superseded state law whenever the two conflicted. 52
The Austins experienced the devastating effects of the Panic first hand. By
March 1819, the Bank of St. Louis, which Stephen had helped establish, filed a credit
claim for $9,000, most likely in response to the sudden demand for payment by the Bank
of the United States. Moses assumed responsibility for the debt, but no sooner had he
done so than the struggling bank demanded he repay $15,000 that he had borrowed
earlier against the Mine à Breton property. By now, the only thing that kept the Austin
family from complete financial ruin was a $9,000 investment in Arkansas that Stephen
had made entirely on credit, making himself even more vulnerable to the pending
national economic collapse. When the Panic finally reached Missouri by the fall of 1819,
Moses and his son became the target of numerous creditors who had won civil judgments
in Missouri and began losing property to foreclosure. What is more, Moses struggled to
sell the Mine à Breton property which he had mortgaged to the now-insolvent Bank of St.
Louis. 53
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Despite the fact that the events of 1819 and 1820 were in many ways the result of
deregulation rather than over-centralization, they contributed to a renewed skepticism
regarding the power and influence of the federal government. Many, especially in the
west, began to express the belief that the central government’s growing influence,
especially in economic matters, had wrought more devastation than gain. The Panic,
however complicated its causes, lent credibility to the earlier claim that the bank and
other such reforms threatened the political rights of the community as well as its
economic wellbeing. Not only had it concentrated wealth in the hands of a few distant
lenders rather than harmonizing and increasing the wealth of the entire community, but it
replaced the locally oriented public sphere with a powerful central government that held
economic sway over its citizens, thereby undermining popular democracy itself.
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While for most Americans, the events of 1819 and 1820 would reignite an
agrarian anti-federalism coalesced around the philosophy of states’ rights, for still others
the transformation called into question the very viability of their young republic.
“When our rights are invaded it is of no consequence to the Citizen or Subject whether it
comes by the hand of an Emperor King or Demon in office under Republic. [T]hey are
alike destructive of all security to person and property.” This is what Moses Austin
declared in his formal address to the citizens of Jefferson County issued shortly after the
County Sheriff had besieged his home in pursuance of a debt. 55 Many men like Moses
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believed they could no longer rely on their government’s guarantee of “civil and religious
liberties,” nor on the political autonomy and protection of local authority. Austin
perceived what many Anti-Federalists had warned would happen - government
corruption so entrenched and pervasive that it extended all the way to the sheriff’s office.
So disillusioned was Austin with the turn of events in the United States, that he was
prepared to renounce the country of his birth: “[A]s I am, ruined in this [country], I
found nothing I could do would bring back my property again, and to remain in a
Country where I had enjoyed welth in a state of poverty I could not submit.” 56
But he might not have been so willing to do so had things not looked more
promising further west. Like many living on the frontier, Moses had followed the events
surrounding the Mexican independence movement since its inception in 1810. According
to Stephen, Moses first proposed the idea of forming a colony in Texas in 1813,
following the signing of the Adams-Onís Treaty which confirmed Spain’s possession of
Texas and helped pave the way for the authorization of Spanish land grants in the
region. 57 In February 1820, nearly a year after first proposing the project to his son,
Moses requested a copy of the passport that Spanish authorities had issued him in 1797.
With passport in hand, the fifty-eight-year-old Moses set off for Texas with nothing more
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than fifty dollars, a horse, a mule and a slave named Richmond. They were all
borrowed. 58
As for the younger Austin, he had little intention of joining his father in Texas.
Instead, Stephen fled to New Orleans and tried to rebuild his fortune there. But in the
summer of 1821, Stephen received news that his father had passed away shortly after
returning from a brief trip to Texas. During the trip, however, Moses had managed to
secure a land grant to settle three hundred US families along the Brazos and his last wish
was that his son Stephen “go on in the business in the same way he would have done had
not sickness and oh dreadful to think of perhaps death not prevented him from
accomplishing.” 59 Stephen could not ignore his father’s dying wish, and that fall he
departed for Natchitoches to take claim of the lands that Moses had applied for and
received from the Spanish Government. Determined to fulfill his father’s request,
Stephen quickly began recruiting colonists. 60
Despite his initial reluctance to emigrate, Stephen appeared pleasantly surprised
by what he encountered in Texas where a less imposing and restrictive government meant
greater economic prosperity and promise for ambitious immigrants such as themselves.
In a letter to prospective settlers intended for publication in the Arkansas Gazette, he
explained that
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The Constitution of Spain is in full operation at those provinces and recent
accounts state that the beneficial effects of it are already perceptible. The gold and
silver mines are getting into more extensive operation than they have for many
years. Money is becoming more abundant, a free trade is permitted, and the
restrictive system heretofore pursued in regard to foreigners has been superceded
by the most liberal encouragement. 61

Indeed, Stephen envisioned Texas as a place where not just he, but thousands of
disillusioned American agrarians like himself could start over. “Should you yet meet with
any Farmers of good character or mechanics, who wish to emigrate to this fine country
and participate in the advantages secured to my father by this grant you will oblige
them,” 62 he wrote to his cousin James. New Spain not only promised rich resources, but
made it possible for immigrants to benefit from them, to start their lives over again, in a
country where they would not be harassed or disadvantaged by a system that seemed
committed to serving the interests of a few at the expense of the many.
***
What the Austins never acknowledged in their writings, but what they may have
been aware of in 1820 was that the Spanish Empire was in fact on its last legs. The
formation of local governing juntas in the Americas paved the way for increased
democratization and, eventually, independence. The creation of provincial deputations
in accordance with the 1812 Constitution, consummated a pre-existing “sense of
provincehood.” According to Timothy Anna, “the provincial deputations made more
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explicit the preexisting tendencies of self-government.” 63 But many conservatives and
royalists feared what this “urge to provincehood” might render if carried to its logical
conclusion as had nearly occurred in 1810.
Originating in northern Mexico, a seedbed of radical provincialism, the Hidalgo
Revolt began as a call for greater provincial autonomy and quickly turned into a violent
demand for independence by the lower classes that carried echoes of the Haitian
Revolution. The rebellion was crushed with the aid of Spanish reinforcements, but the
autonomist spirit that sparked it was not. In fact, “By interrupting a political restructuring
that seemed to be moving toward a federated Monarchy, the royalists created the
condition that would ultimately destroy the Spanish Monarchy.”

64

When Fernando VII returned to the throne in 1820, many hoped for an
accommodationist arrangement that would entail greater political representation while
still honoring the legitimacy of the Crown. But this was not to be. Instead, Fernando
attempted to turn back the clock on Spanish political reform by re-implementing
monarchical absolutism. Not only did he abolish the beloved 1812 Constitution, but he
vigorously prosecuted liberal constitutionalists throughout the empire, brought back the
Inquisition, and appeared to make every effort to reverse the reforms made during his
absence. Many in Spain and the Americas struggled with how to go about restoring a
constitutional government under the new Monarchy. Northern New Spain again became
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a revolutionary flashpoint when a group of Spanish liberals, aided by a handful of creole,
British and US supporters, attempted to stage a constitutionalist insurrection there that
they hoped would extend throughout the rest of the empire. The expedition failed and its
leaders were eventually executed, but the constitutionalist impulse did not die. In the
words of one historian, “Regionalism succeeded where armed insurrection failed,” as the
provinces took advantage of such unrest “to restore the home rule granted them by the
Constitution of 1812.” 65
By 1820 there was a renewed desire for autonomy. This was particularly the case
in New Spain which had long been the site of some of the most vehement autonomist
sentiment and activism. Cities like Mérida and Veracruz were among the first to reinstate
the Constitution and call for elections. Rodríguez observes that political activity was the
most “intense” in North America where nearly all adult males were eligible to vote
regardless of literacy or property-owning status.

Elections for virtually every type of

municipal, provincial and imperial post throughout New Spain were held in late autumn
and winter of 1820 as Moses Austin was applying for land grants in Texas. Rodríguez
estimates that over 1,000 elections for ayuntamientos - or town councils - occurred during
this time. 66
Similar activity occurred in other parts of the empire, but to a far lesser degree
because of ongoing social violence, so that when the Cortes convened in mid-1820, the
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North American contingents dominated. They dutifully pushed the “American
Question,” demanding that provincial deputations be established in every intendancy in
the New World in an attempt to equalize representation for the Americans. The Mexican
deputies also proposed the creation of three separate American monarchies – in Mexico
City, Bogotá, and Lima – each with its own prince appointed directly by Ferdinand
himself. But the Cortes never took any further action and the proposal lay dormant. 67
Sensing that the degree of autonomy to which it aspired might not be possible
under the current regime, the independence movement back in New Spain began to pick
up steam again. In February 1821, a former royalist officer, Colonel Augustín de Iturbide
drafted a proposal that combined New Spain’s desire for an autonomous regency with the
Constitution of 1812. Although the Plan de Iguala was intended as a compromise that
left open the possibility of reconciliation with the Crown, the cause of independence was
rapidly gaining support, even among disillusioned royalist American officers including
Anastacio Bustamante and Antonio López de Santa Ana, both of whom would later serve
as president of Mexico. 68
Eventually Iturbide drafted the Plan de Iguala which declared New Spain to be “a
sovereign and independent nation” with a representative constitutional monarchy.
Scholars have observed that the Plan’s success rested chiefly in its conservatism. As one
noted historian writes, “Eleven years of rural insurrection and guerrilla warfare were
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preempted by a movement created and led by urban creoles and Spanish elites that,
though not a counterrevolution, represented nonetheless a distinct moderation of the goals
of the revolution.” The Plan protected the peninsulares and royalists from reprisals,
affirmed the primacy of the Church and military, and declared Roman Catholicism the
new nation’s official religion. In so doing, it was able to accomplish what earlier revolts
like Hidalgo had not - unite Mexicans of vastly different interests behind independence. 69
But, as Anna argues, the real key to the Plan’s success was its affirmation of
regional autonomy. Unlike the United States, Mexico entered independence as a
collection of provinces. Thus, Mexicans’ provincial identity preempted their national
one. Herein lies the explanation for why Mexicans opted for the term empire rather than
nation. Rather than a singular union, the new state was “an aggregation of provinces,
some central and well integrated, some peripheral and scarcely populated,” and all of
which had the right to join and leave the empire of their own volition. In this sense,
Spanish Americans rejected the French idea of nation and instead embraced a
“contractual conception of sovereignty that was fundamentally different form the
emerging European idea of sovereignty based on nationhood.” Mexico’s independence,
therefore, not only represented a far less dramatic break with Spain, but also rendered far
less internal violence and class conflict as the pre-existing institutions, interests and
social order were preserved. Even the “impulse to provincehood” was an affirmation of
Spanish imperial constitutionalism. As Anna puts it, “Iguala and Córdoba, represented a
69
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remarkably tolerant, even magnanimous foundation for a break with the mother country,
serving as they did the interests of Mexicans (although not evenly) while firmly but
almost politely closing the door on the Old Regime.” 70
Mexico’s independence movement must have also felt conservative to many in
the United States, where citizens had opted for a far more dramatic break with their
mother country. Regardless, as news of the events just across the border swept the
frontier, newspapers in places like Arkansas and St. Louis expressed awe and admiration
for Mexico’s ability to achieve independence without considerable conflict or bloodshed.
“Not a man has suffered persecution or privation of property in this revolution,” reported
the Arkansas Gazette, “and the traveler now passes in perfect security thro’ all parts of
the country under the authority of the patriot government.” 71 Welcoming Mexico to the
“great family of the new world” the Gazette termed Mexico’s a “most extraordinary
revolution, affected without bloodshed.” 72 The paper praised its founders for managing
to achieve “equality of rights for all persons, Indians, Mulattos, and Negroes, as well as
whites,” celebrating their remarkable ability to accomplish a revolution that “united all
interests, and promised to all; to the soldiery promotion, to the priests their authority over
souls, to the titles their titled, to the merchants commerce to the planter commerce, and to
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the various classes of laborers, liberty, all were consulted and, named and respected, and
all interests were reconciled.” 73
Regarding the form of government that such conciliation had rendered, the St.
Louis Enquirer lamented that “the condition of the country, and the inhabitants is
probably such, as to have rendered it expedient to adopt a monarchical form of
government.” However, the paper warned its audience of the dangers that too rapid a
transition to a republic could entail, reminding them of what happened when “a more
enlightened people” - the French – “ran in their rapid transition from despotism to a
republic, and the short duration of their licentious freedom.” The paper praised Mexico’s
“gradual regeneration” as evidence of “a cautious and enlightened policy” informed more
by a fear of “aiming at too much to defeat all, than any hostility to a republican form of
government.” The Enquirer concluded by suggesting that Mexico might look to its
northern neighbor as an example to which to aspire in the future: “Let us hope that, a
more unrestrained intercourse with our citizens, a nearer view of the perfections of our
institutions, may lead to such changes in the political condition of these our north
American brethren, as may assimilate more nearly to our own.” Such condescension
informed more than a few reports on Mexico’s decision to opt for monarchy. “I do not
think a milder government would suit this people,” admitted an editor of The Nashville
Whig, “I, alas, cannot conceal from myself that they are not fit for the enjoyment of a free
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and liberal government.” 74 As for Iturbide himself, whom Congress later claimed to have
reluctantly elected president after a series of raucous street protests by enlisted army
men, 75 the new leader garnered mostly effusive praise from frontier newspapers, many of
which were published in places that had once been a part of the Spanish Empire.
Claiming to rely on a source who knew Iturbide personally, the St. Louis Enquirer
declared him to be “of the highest encomium,” possessing “moderation,
disinterestedness, and heroism.” 76
Austin himself remained undeterred by his adopted country’s chosen form of
government. In reference to it he wrote to his cousin that “you must not be frightened at
the name of the Imperial Government, you like myself have lived under a Monarchy,
when Louisiana belonged to Spain and I think we lived as happy then as under the
government of the United States.” This is not to say that Stephen viewed imperial
monarchy as a superior form of government. He simply saw it as the best form of
government for Mexico at that time and one that he himself could live under quite
happily. What he could not live under was the system of government that had recently
emerged in the United States of the North. “A Central Republic is the worst Gov’t in the
world,” Stephen wrote, “for all the power will be in the hands of a few men in Mexico
and instead of a Republic it will in effect be an aristocracy which is worse than a
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monarchy, for in it we shall have 100 Tyrants instead of one.” 77 Here we see perhaps the
strongest evidence of Austin’s hostility to a centralized form of government, which no
doubt informed his preference for Mexico over the United States. For Austin and others
like him, the newly independent Mexico offered an appealing alternative to the United
States of the 1820’s. Although a monarchy, Mexico was a nation founded on the very
principles of decentralized authority with no central banking system and a land grant
system that all but prohibited speculation.
Yet, while Austin may not have minded monarchy and adamantly opposed a
“Central Republic,” his clear preference was for a very particular form of republicanism.
“I do not wish to take an active part in politics,” he wrote, “but if I can do anything in
favor of the confederate system I will do so with pleasure.” 78 Despite his attested support
for the Spanish and later Mexican Empire, the most ideal form of government in Austin’s
eyes was one established on the principles of local autonomy and regional sovereignty.
That said, Austin was fully prepared to accept Mexico as it was and content to stand on
the sidelines while its leaders worked out the kinks of their new nation.
Indeed, Austin did not have to look far to find thousands of willing immigrants
among disillusioned and beleaguered rural Americans, especially those from the south
and west. “There are hundreds on the way and thousands ready to go if one word of
encouragement could now be had from you,” wrote James Hawkins, Austin’s friend and
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former business partner from New Orleans, just months after Mexico had gained its
independence from Spain. Many of the people to whom Hawkins referred had by now
lost almost all interest, let alone hope, in the nation of their birth. In their minds, the
answers to their woes did not lie in Washington D.C. or Philadelphia and they certainly
did not lie in the chambers of Congress or the White House, but rather, in Stephen F.
Austin and his tiny settlement in Texas. “You and your Colony excite more interest than
the assembled sages of the nation,” wrote Hawkins. 79
These people did not speak from ignorance. Many had first-hand knowledge of
life under the Spanish Crown and, given the present state of circumstances, did not mind
returning to a similar system. “It has become a subject of considerable interest in this
section of Missouri,” wrote Daniel Draper of Lincoln, Missouri in December 1821. “All
those who once experienced the gratuity of the Spanish Government (a thing I never have
done) speaks, generally, in favor of it with a few exceptions of social inconveniences.” 80
Indeed, the Austin family had little reason to doubt that their colony would soon be full
of former US citizens, grateful and loyal to a country that had saved them from poverty
and ruin. “I can assure you that a great Number of Families will move from this State,
and from other States,” wrote Austin’s brother-in-law, James Bryan, “I have no doubt
that the Colony will be filled up in twelve months.” 81
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Immigrants who planned to settle permanently expressed a greater interest in the
political climate of the country. “If you have found a good Constitution and the
Government is settled I am clearly of the Opinion that no section of Territory has ever
settled so rapidly as the Texas Colony, or the Austin Colony,” Austin’s cousin wrote in
April 1822. 82 Most American immigrants seem to have shared Austin’s opinion
regarding the Mexican political system. While perhaps not ideal, it was not bad either,
and certainly an improvement over what many perceived as the failed republic of the
North. “[Y]es I am not pleased with the form of government, it is a limited monarchy;
but as Mexico has not bought her independence at the expense of much blood, it is
perhaps better that the change should be gradual.” This is what William Walker of
Mississippi wrote his father in August of 1822. “I think the policy of Mexico at this time,
is practically good.” 83 American-style democracy, after all, was still being tested and did
not look very appealing to those furthest from the center of political and economic power.
Above all, Mexico had promise. “The nation possesses great resources, and its vast and
successful effort for independence combined with the general harmony which at this time
prevails, furnish, I think, sure pledges of future greatness and prosperity,” 84 wrote Austin.
Indeed, news of Mexico’s natural wealth, impressive topography and remarkable
beauty filled western newspapers as much as reports on the recent revolution. In words
seemingly intended to attract farmers, the Arkansas Gazette reported that “The fertility of
82

Ibid.
William Walker 27 August 1822, Samuel E. Asbury Papers, Folder 168, Daughters of the Republic of
Texas Archives, San Antonio.
84
SFA to Hawkins, 1 May 1822, AP, Vol. I, Part I, 505.
83

51
[Mexican] soil is astonishing, and the fields are covered with harvests which exceed in
their produce, by twenty fold, the corn fields of Europe.” The paper claimed that Mexico
produced twice the wheat of the US and “in any actual dearth” could feed the whole
population of Great Britain. 85 Yet it was not just Mexico’s natural wealth that American
newspapers remarked on. “The capital of the Spanish dominions in North America is one
of the finest cities built by Europeans in either hemisphere,” wrote the St. Louis Enquirer
of Mexico City. “There does not exist a city equal to Mexico for the elegance, regularity
and breadth of the streets.” Its market presented “a plane of immense commerce, and the
shops display a profusion of gold, and silver, and jewels.” Travelers to Lima,
Philadelphia, Rome, Paris and Naples, claimed that Mexico’s “majesty” surpassed them
all. Such praise was not unmerited. The three-hundred-year old capital had been built on
top of the Aztec capital of Tenochtitlán, established two hundred years earlier, and was
home to 120,000 inhabitants. It had served as the political, commercial and
administrative center of the Spanish empire and capital of New Spain. It was impressive
not only for its wide, brilliantly illuminated streets and remarkable architecture - perhaps
best exemplified by its imposing presidential palace - but also for its strategic placement
on an isthmus with ready access to both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. All of this
seemed to make it “destined to possess a powerful influence over the events which agitate
the two continents.” 86
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Those who immigrated to Austin’s colony expressed a similar vision. “It seems
as if province designs this world to outshine the balance of the earth, in every respect,”
wrote William Walker of Mississippi, “Her streams, her mountains, her soil, her men, her
politics, all, allure on great scales – nothing small or contracted on her whole
construction.” Indeed, it was not just Mexico’s geography and resources that made it
destined for greatness. What nationalists like Thomas Jefferson and John Quincy Adams
saw in the United States these men saw in Mexico – the promise of a natural and political
utopia that could inspire the rest of the world. “[T]he spire of [Mexico’s] political fabric,”
predicted Walker, “will be seen as a mirror to the civilized world.” Mexico did not just
promise a fresh start for beleaguered US citizens, it offered a fresh start for democracy as
well. “With these and a thousand other advantages I repeat that Mexico cannot fail,
under the influence of a wise and liberal government, to become the greatest nation on
earth.” 87
No matter what political course Mexico took, it offered a special appeal to the
thousands of struggling agrarians in the United States. “The prospects of the farmer and
planter, were nevermore promising in any country, than in this, at the present time,”
Austin wrote. “[W]hatever be the collision arising from difference in opinion as to the
course this government should pursue it is gradually gaining strength, and will, I trust,
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ultimately secure the end of all government, the happiness of the people.” 88 Such
happiness, these immigrants understood, was ultimately no more dependent on their
country’s rejection of monarchy than it was guaranteed by it. And for many, Mexico’s
promise, yet still unrealized, was enough to prompt them to forsake all that they had left
behind in the North. Yet, even as immigrants expressed their admiration for their new
country’s natural and political virtues, things were about to get even better.
***
From its inception there had been little consensus regarding the actual structure
and form of Mexico’s new government. While local elites seized on the opportunity that
independence wrought to establish their own governing entities and advance their
longstanding aspirations to home rule, Iturbide fostered the notion that, as the leader of
the independence movement and recently appointed head of state, his power was
supreme. This brought him into direct conflict with the provinces and their representative
body, which Iturbide attempted to dissolve in late 1822. Believing their new leader to be
in direct violation of the very principles that had sparked their independence movement
in the first place – that of provincial self-determination and supremacy - the provinces
rebelled a few months later. Rebel leaders under the command of a young ambitious
captain named Antonio López de Santa Ana, drafted the Plan de Casa Mata, which
granted greater local authority to provincial deputations and called for the election of a
new congress. Sensing his own defeat, Iturbide eventually abdicated in March of 1823.
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A Constituent Congress formed of appointees of the former emperor and rebel leaders
from the provinces, declared itself in session ten days later. One of its first acts was to
declare the legislature – not the executive – supreme. 89
Other than the primacy of Congress, however, national leaders struggled to agree
on much else. Just as in the United States, a political fissure emerged between those who
wanted to enhance provincial power (federalists) and those who wished the provinces to
operate more like administrative units as they had done during the colonial era
(centralists). 90 Mexico entered a phase of intense political activity as the two factions
debated the virtues of their respective visions. According to Rodríguez, the
“ayuntamientos became the most active political bodies in the nation” as the provinces
themselves began to determine the future course of their young nation. In May the
province of Guadalajara dissolved its “social pact” with the central Mexican government.
The Guadalajara declaration went on to state that it was time for the provinces to declare
“their natural rights” as free, sovereign and independent entities, “without there being
between them, one and another, the slightest inequality.” 91 Before long, seven other
provinces followed Guadalajara’s example including Yucatán, Oaxaca, Coahuila, Nuevo
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León, Nuevo Santander, and Téjas. Some adjoining states expressed the intention of
forming confederations. 92
Yet, it cannot be emphasized enough that they made no attempt to secede. What
they were terminating was a connection with the current government of Mexico, not
Mexico itself. Anna argues that this came from an understanding that the provinces
lacked the infrastructural development and political organization to function as fully
independent nations. Thus

when the states called themselves ‘sovereign’ the meaning was that each state was
independent from each other and from Mexico City in all matters involving
internal government, but also that each of them recognized the national
sovereignty of the republic, that is, that each surrendered to the republic or
endowed the national state with certain powers, primarily to conduct interstate or
foreign affairs.

This was born out by the fact that local bodies kept the secretary of internal affairs
abreast of their actions, even as they moved forward without the central government’s
approval, thereby confirming their commitment to the empire while asserting their right
to govern internal matters. 93 Yet in so doing, the provinces also asserted their own
political supremacy. The government’s legitimacy was entirely dependent on the consent
of the provinces. 94
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Nevertheless, leaders in Mexico City began to express the fear that their country
was on the verge of disintegration. Civil War appeared imminent by late July when the
Supreme Executive Authority dispatched troops to Guadalajara and Zacatecas.
Eventually, the standoff ended and a new congress was finally elected and convened in
November. It was more representative of the provinces, and while the delegates agreed
that Mexico was to be a republic, they could not agree on what kind. Heading the
federalist contingent were Lorenzo de Zavala, Valentín Gómez Farías and Miguel Ramos
Arizpe. The first two were great admirers of the United States, had lived or travelled
there extensively, and wished to see Mexico adopt a similar form of government.
Heading the centralists were Carlos María Bustamante and Father Servando Teresa de
Mier, perhaps the most eloquent member of the convention. 95 Under pressure to draft a
constitution that the provinces would approve before the nation deteriorated, Arizpe, the
representative from Coahuila who had played an active role in creating the Spanish
Constitution of 1812, composed an outline known as the Acta Constitutiva, and proposed
that it be distributed to the provinces for a vote. The first article of the document
declared that “The Mexican nation is composed of the provinces.” In other words, the
provinces were the preeminent governing bodies of the land. Yet, it also confirmed the
sovereignty of the nation and claimed for it the right to adopt whichever form of
government appeared “most conducive to its conservation and greatest prosperity.”
Finally, Articles 5 and 6 declared that Mexico be led by a “representative, popular,
95

Ibid., 319-28; Mecham, 174.

57
federal” government, composed of “free, sovereign, and independent” provinces, each
possessing their own exclusive “administrative and interior government.”

96

Indeed, as it became increasingly clear that federalism was the only form of
government that the majority of Mexicans would accept, centralist delegates launched an
intense interrogation of a system they claimed was not suited for a nation as vast and
diverse as Mexico. The most eloquent voice for this position came from Father Mier,
who insisted that, while federalism might work for the United States, Mexico’s expansive
territory, coupled with its long history of revolution and relative lack of experience as a
unified republic, meant that a federalist system would only enhance division and lead to
the nation’s disintegration. Furthermore, Mier insisted that federalism was foreign to
Mexico, imported from the United States by power-hungry provincial “demagogues.”
But proponents of the article countered by insisting that federalism was, in fact,
the only system suited for a nation like Mexico. Centralism, they warned, would unfairly
subject the remote regions, such as Texas, to the same kind of marginalization and
neglect that they had suffered under the Crown. In this respect, federalism was Mexico’s
salvation, not its doom. Besides, as Gómez Farías pointed out, it was what the majority
of Mexicans had called for. The provinces, he insisted, were already “separate and were
going to unite, and not the contrary, because there is not union without a fundamental
pact.” 97 This was the essence of Mexican federalism: Nationhood was a voluntary social
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compact among the provinces, not one imposed upon them by a central authority - therein
lay its legitimacy. As their political precedent, Mexican federalists pointed to the
Spanish imperial model and the crisis of 1808 in which the king’s absence had
necessitated that the provinces form their own, new social compact. The same was true
now with Iturbide’s abdication, they insisted. The responsibility for forming a new
government once again rested with the provinces and they had chosen federalism. 98
In this regard, the contest between Mexican federalists and centralists in 1823 and
1824 mirrored that which had been unfolding in the United States since that nation’s
founding. Just as Anti-Federalists had in the United States, Federalists in Mexico
believed that greater representative authority ought to be awarded to community leaders.
Meanwhile, Mexican centralists and their counterparts in the US (confusingly referred to
as Federalists, although their views conflicted with Mexican federalists) embraced the
view that representatives ought to be distanced from their locales. 99
The compromise was Article 3 which declared that, with the establishment of a
new central government, only that body had the authority to determine which form of
government Mexico would adopt in the future. In essence, the central government could
abolish federalism if and when it saw fit. “Sovereignty resides radically and essentially
in the nation,” it stated, to which “exclusively belongs the right to adopt and establish by
means of its representatives, the form of government and other fundamental laws.”
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Although it represented a compromise between federalist and centralist impulses,
the Acta, which ultimately passed 70 to 10, nonetheless represented a profound
accomplishment, culminating fourteen years of political change that started with a call for
provincial home rule and ended with an independent republic. 100 Furthermore, scholars
by now agree that the real origins and “spirit” of the Acta lie in the Spanish Constitution
of 1812. 101 This is most clear in the very first article of the Acta: “The Mexican nation is
composed of the provinces.” Herein lies the distinctly Mexican notion of “shared” or
“duel” sovereignty, – the nation was a union of sovereign provinces “reciprocally joined
into a federation of equals.” Each state was independent of the others and Mexico City
when it came to internal affairs such as taxation, and they “endowed” the national state
with power over affairs that transcended states, except of course, for determining the
future form of government. Indeed, the Mexican Constitution exceeded that of the
United States in its privileging of regional sovereignty. In fact, the only other constitution
that would come close to Mexico’s in this regard was that of the Confederate States of
America established nearly four decades later. 102

100

Rodríguez, “Constitution of 1824,” 71-2, 82-6
Historians by now nearly universally agree that the 1824 Constitution, while certainly informed by the
US constitution, arose from the specific historical experiences of Mexico during its first years of
independence. Rodríguez writes that “The framers of the constitution carefully considered the needs of
their country. They granted the states the important role demanded by the regions, and that accommodation
contributed significantly to maintaining national unity,” “Constitution of 1824,” 89. Anna’s whole thesis,
as stated in Chapter 2, is that is came directly from Mexico’s long history of provincialism and plural
identity. And even as he insists that federalism was essentially a concept borrowed directly from the US not
at all consistent with Iturbide’s regime or anything that took place during the colonial period, Mecham
writes that “the nerves, the real spirit of the constitution, find their inspiration in [the 1812 Spanish
Constitution],” 179.
102
Anna 127-8.
101

60
Yet, despite its accomplishment, the Constitution of 1824 did not resolve the
underlying conflict between federalist and centralist impulses that had dominated the
political atmosphere of Mexico’s first few years of independence, just as it had done in
the United States. “In short, the great issues at stake in creating the new nation were not
laid to rest but continued to be the focus of profound conflict throughout the lifetime of
the first federal republic and throughout most of nineteenth-century Mexican history,”
writes Anna. “Indeed, it can be said that the most profound issues a society can face
were only beginning to be formulated.” 103 This was as true for Mexico as it was for its
neighbor to the north.
***
“Was it probable, was it possible,” John Adams later wrote, “that such a plan . . .
of a free government, and a confederation of free governments should be introduced and
established among such a people, over that vast continent, or any part of it?” Such a
possibility appeared to him “as absurd as similar plans would be to establish democracies
among the birds, beasts, and fishes?” 104 Yet, for other norteamericanos, especially those
living on the frontier where newspapers had closely tracked events in Mexico for some
time, the news was far less surprising, although no less pleasing. In June of 1823, the St.
Louis Enquirer reported, in reference to the overthrow of Iturbide, that “Days of
Prosperity, of liberty, and concord” had replaced “usurpation and despotism. Honour and
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praise to the valiant soldiers of the country!” 105 When the nation decided to embrace a
federal form of government the following year, the paper applauded the decision,
reporting that there manifested “the best feeling between the ‘Sovereign Congress’ and
the Congresses of the States,” and referred to “the excellent example” supplied by the
United States. 106 Several months later it reported that “every part of the new political
system was in regular and successful operation in Mexico.” 107 The Arkansas Gazette
referred to Iturbide’s execution at the end of that year as evidence of “how far the spirit
of Republicanism has taken root [in Mexico],” and declared that “Crowned heads may
maintain themselves in Europe by means of bayonets, but here in the New World they are
justly consigned to the worms.” 108
Frontier Americans were particularly excited by the prospect of freer international
commerce and trade with their new “sister republic,” with whom they envisioned sharing
the role of moral and political steward to the rest of the continent. “The use of an
unmolested passage between Mexico and the United States is a necessary in a political as
in a commercial point of view,” declared the Louisiana State Gazette. The US and
Mexico were not only “neighboring powers, inhabitants of the same continent, their
territories contiguous, and their settlements approximating to each other,” they were now
“two chief powers of the new world, and standing at the head of a cordon of Republics,
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which, stretching from pole to pole across the two Americas, are destined to make the last
stand in defense of human liberty.” 109
As for Stephen Austin, he could not have been more thrilled with the direction
of Mexican national politics which, more than anything before it, solidified his and the
other immigrants’ loyalty to their adopted country. In a formal proclamation issued to
the “Fellow Citizens” of his colony on May 1, 1825, Austin declared, “I am convinced
that there is not a breast amongst you that will not palpitate with exultation and delight at
the prospects of Freedom, Happiness, and Prosperity which the Federal Republican
System of Government presents to you.” He went on to express full faith in every
immigrant’s ability to see their dreams realized if they only remained true and patient
citizens of Mexico. “[N]o difficulty or embarrassment can or ever will arise unless
produced by your own impatience or imprudence.” 110
Indeed, in their embrace of extreme federalism, Mexican leaders skillfully
combated precisely the fear that the Austins and so many other disillusioned Americans
like them had expressed – an overly robust central government controlled by political and
economic elites. Now, of course, Mexico had adopted what many of them considered the
ideal form of government – a confederate republic.
Convincing Mexico of their fidelity, however, was no easy task for the thousands
of US immigrants who sought Mexican citizenship during these years, especially in light
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of US leaders’ very public interest in acquiring Texas. But these immigrants both
actively demonstrated their loyalty to their adopted country and asserted their rights
within it in the same way that their fathers and grandfathers had done for the United
States - through armed defense of their nation.
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CHAPTER 2
“Children of the Great Mexican Family”
Citizenship, Identity, and Rebellion on Mexico’s Far Northern Frontier
1824-1827
On May 25th, 1822 Stephen F. Austin penned a letter to the recently appointed
Emperor Augustín de Iturbide of Mexico. “I make a tender of my services, my loyalty,
my fidelity,” Austin wrote, “This solemn act cuts me off from all protection or
dependence on my former government – my property, my prospects, my future hopes of
happiness, for myself and family, and for the families I have brought with me, are
centered here – This is our adopted Nation.” Two years earlier, Austin’s father Moses
had applied for and received an empresario contract from the Spanish government.
Designed to facilitate the development and security of New Spain’s Far North, the
empresaio program granted land to small communities of foreign settlers if they promised
to become Spanish subjects, convert to Catholicism, and develop and defend the region.
By the time he penned his letter to Iturbide, Austin had managed to recruit and settle
several hundred US colonists in a small tract on the Brazos River.

He now sought to

convince the nation’s new leader to honor the contract he had made with his
predecessors, the Spanish. “I therefore supplicate that his imperial majesty will have the
goodness to take the settlement I have formed under his protection, and that we may be
received as children of the great Mexican family.” 111
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Historians have long greeted Austin’s supplications with skepticism. 112 But it is
perhaps more helpful to see them as evidence of the complicated identity that he and
other colonists fostered as Anglo immigrants to Mexico. These men consistently referred
to Mexico as their “adopted nation,” rather than their “mother country” and continued to
identify as American. Yet Austin and others like him consistently declared and enacted
their Mexican loyalty. Not only were the two reconcilable, they were interdependent.
Mexico, as we shall see, was the only place where many believed they could truly be
American.
Meanwhile, Mexican leaders from Iturbide to Bustamante had a good motivation
to believe such appeals and to facilitate Anglo settlement of the Far North. For over a
decade Mexico had been struggling to secure its northern border from Indians who
targeted Mexican settlements and missions. Indeed, by 1820, the Comanche appeared to
be the most dominant imperial force in the Mexican North. But it was also during this
time that Spanish officials and their Mexican successors finally began heeding local
leaders’ appeals to allow settlers, specifically those from the United States, to acquire and
settle land. Thousands responded to the new policy and, by 1827, Texas was home to
nearly 27,000 Anglo immigrants and their slaves.
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Many described their relationship to their adopted country in terms similar to
Austin. As Lynn Hunt has notably written “most Europeans in the eighteenth century
thought of their rulers as fathers and of their nations as families writ large.” 113 What is
surprising is that the language of paternity was employed so late, long after citizens of the
United States and France had abandoned it for and begin to describe their relationship to
the state in more egalitarian terms. Yet, for Austin submission to a patriarchal authority
such as Iturbide was a form of free will.
Yet, for others, loyalty did not come so readily, especially when they sensed that
Mexico failed to live up to their expectations. When a group of disgruntled settlers and
squatters attempted to form their own nation and secede from Mexico, it provided Austin
and other loyalists with the opportunity to prove their loyalty to their adopted nation
rather than merely declare it. While the Fredonian Rebellion ultimately enjoyed only
limited support before being suppressed by the Anglo militia, it revealed a latent tension
between some settlers’ loyalty to their adopted family and loyalty to their nuclear family.
This, in fact, was characteristic of many nations transitioning to republicanism at this
time. As Jennifer Heuer has observed of France, “From the birth of the Revolution in
1789 to the consolidation of a new monarchy, family and citizenship rights were thus
both deeply intertwined and frequently opposed.” 114 Perhaps nowhere was this tension
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more evident than in the Mexican North, where personal and national security sometimes
coincided and other times clashed.
***

For centuries Texas’ immense size and relative lack of navigable waterways hindered
Spanish efforts to settle and develop the region. It was not until the eighteenth century, in
the face of increasing French encroachment in the Lower Mississippi Valley, that the
Spanish began establishing a series of missions and presidios with the aim of winning the
loyalty of local Indians. 115 But unlike the New Mexican Pueblo, the nomadic eastern
plains tribes, in the words of one official, “refused to submit to the merciful yoke of the
Church.” Having established close commercial ties with the French from whom they
obtained muskets and ammunition, southern plains tribes ignored Spanish appeals to halt
trade with the French and, at least according to one report, even “presumed to threaten
with death” anyone who prohibited such activity. “All the Nations are prepared to take
up arms against the Spanish,” wrote one official, “declaring that they will receive in their
territory none other but the French, who supply them their necessaries.” 116
Foreign trade allowed Indian groups like the Lipan Apache, the Karankawa and
others to remain independent of the Spanish. But perhaps no group proved better able to
bend the European presence to their own ends than the Comanche. Arriving in the
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southern plains in the early eighteenth century, the Comanche proved able “to harness the
empowering potential of the new technology more fully than their Native rivals,”
according to Pekka Hamaleinen. Horses, guns and ammunition permitted them not only
to adopt mounted Bison hunting, but to replenish their livestock, ammunition and even
their own population by raiding other Indians and Spanish settlements. It is fair to say
that by the mid-eighteenth century the Comanche, more than any European power,
dominated the Mexican north. 117 Having colonized most of the grassy plains of the
Arkansas Basin, in the late 1760’s the Comanche attempted to expand westward into the
Rockies and southward into Texas, a region previously controlled by the Lipan. Rather
than expanding their territory, the Comanche sought “a vigorous diplomatic and
commercial expansion,” aligning themselves with neighboring tribes such as the Wichita
in order to conduct raids on San Antonio and its surrounding environs. 118
However, by the 1770’s, France transferred its North American territories to the
Spanish, effectively ending the two empires’ American rivalry and inspiring Charles III
to unleash a series of administrative reforms designed to integrate, modernize and secure
Spanish dominance on the continent. This meant a renewed effort to secure Spain’s
northern frontier. In 1771, New Spain’s Minister of the Indies, José de Gálvez, called for
a series of reforms based on his six-year inspection of central and northern New Spain.
Concerned primarily with the British and Russian imperial threats, Gálvez and other
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officials believed they could subdue native groups and harness them to Spanish imperial
aims. In 1776, he ordered the establishment of the Commandancy General of the Interior
Provinces and appointed Teodorode Croix to its head. Unlike his superior, Croix
recognized the primary threat to Spanish imperial sovereignty to be the marauding tribes
of the central and southern plains. Since the Spanish had failed to subdue the southern
plains Indians through conversion, Croix called for adoption of the “French approach” trade and gift-giving would replace the sword and the cross. 119
The need to gain the loyalty of the northern Indians became even more urgent with
the birth of a new and territorially aggressive neighbor to the west. Although Spain had
formally supported United States independence, the new nation’s own imperial ambitions
were not lost on Spanish officials who hoped that through an alliance with the Comanche,
they might secure their eastern border from US encroachment. 120
While the Spanish were able to achieve a lasting peace with the western Comanche,
preserving it in the east proved more difficult. “Unlike in New Mexico,” explains
Hamaleinen, “Spanish officials in Texas had only sporadic interactions with and limited
knowledge of the top-level Comanche leadership.” But before long the recuperation of
the Lipan forced an alliance between Texans, Comanche, and Wichita in which the
Spanish supplied guns, ammunition and uniforms to their Indian allies in exchange for
their loyalty and cooperation. Thus, by the 1790’s, northern New Spain appeared to have
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entered a new era characterized by trade, military cooperation and peace. 121 Yet, the
practice was less successful in Texas where officials had access to fewer resources than
their counterparts in New Mexico and “operated in a more complicated geopolitical
setting,” with more than thirty-three Indian nations soliciting trade from them. 122
Starting in the 1780’s, US traders began venturing into Texas, some of whom had
ties to known filibusters in the North. 123 In an attempt to crack down on such individuals,
Spanish officials in 1795 decreed “that the utmost vigilance shall be exercised over the
persons who introduce themselves in our Provinces from the United States of America,
there being serious grounds to suspect that emissaries are being sent to arouse our people
to rebellion.” The Lieutenant Governor of the Town of Nacogdoches, which rested on
the border with Louisiana and had long been a hotbed of foreign trade and other illicit
activity, was instructed to “have arrested any foreigners existing, or who may hereafter
introduce themselves among our friendly Indian Nations inducing our Chiefs to lend their
assistance for this object.” 124 Thus, the Spaniards’ efforts to hold onto Indian allegiance
was proving increasingly difficult in the face of foreign traders, especially from the
United States. 125 The Comanche, for their part, continued to ignore Spanish orders to
trade with or harbor foreign interlopers as they began to shift their allegiances to the
United States. Governor Antonio Martínez reported that “the traffic between the
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Comanches and the traders from the interior continues without interruption, and that
arms, munitions, and other war supplies are being brought in.” 126
Spanish anxieties were heightened when Louisiana came under the control of the
United States in 1804. Now, the Spanish were confronted with the most territorially
aggressive nation on the continent abutting one of the most vulnerable and least
populated parts of their empire. Meanwhile, French aggression was about to revisit Spain,
this time on the other side of the Atlantic with the Napoleonic invasion and capture of
Fernando VII.
As the sole representative of the Eastern Interior Provinces of the Kingdom of
Mexico to the Spanish Cortes in 1810, Miguel Ramos Arizpe took it upon himself to
enlighten the Cortes to the centuries of imperial neglect and mismanagement that had
been visited upon Coahuila and its surrounding provinces. “At the present,” Arizpe
declared, “[Texas,]after so many years of abandonment, contains in all its vast territory
only three towns, which are most commonly known by the names of presidios, and five
missions of native Indians of the region.” Indeed, the non-Indian population at that point
did not exceed 3,000 inhabitants, according to Arizpe, most of whom struggled under
administrative neglect and the constant threat of Indian raids and foreign filibustering.
Arizpe spoke specifically of the Comanche, whom he termed the most “warlike” of the
local tribes. Despite “Poverty, wars, and epidemics of smallpox,” he claimed they “can
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in a few days assemble many thousands of Gandules, that is, men from eighteen to fifty
years of age, who are very skillful with the arrow, the spear, and the gun, which they all
have of an excellent quality.”
Texas’ resultant lack of development was especially unfortunate considering how
much natural wealth and economic promise it offered. Not a little regional pride factored
into Arizpe’s characterization of the interior provinces: “Their vast extent, their location,
their climate, so varied and healthful in the larger part, and their most abundant and
varied native products make them worthy of constituting by themselves one of the most
extensive and richest empires of the universe.” 127
Indeed, Arizpe’s remarks gestured towards a distinctive norteno identity among the
region’s Hispanic inhabitants, characterized by a rugged agrarianism, martial lifestyle and
close economic and cultural ties to Indians and foreigners, especially those from the
United States. Andrés Reséndez has written that over the course of the early nineteenthcentury “Pueblo Indians, Anglo-American colonists, tejanos, and nuevomexicanos
became linked together through several institutional networks revolving around land,
commerce, politics, and religion, forging impressive multiethnic local and regional
alliances.” Thus, while Spanish officials feared and attempted to prevent Anglo
encroachment on the frontier, the region’s inhabitants welcomed, and often formed close
personal connections with norteamericanos who offered goods, skills and connections
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that they needed to thrive and, as the century progressed, began to look to AngloAmericans as the answer to develop, enrich and protect their struggling province. 128
Meanwhile, tejano relations with the rest of the empire had become increasingly
strained due to generations of administrative neglect and incompetence. For example, in
1787 citizens of the Villa of San Fernando and the neighboring presidio of San Antonio
issued a formal complaint to Governor Rafael Martínez Pacheco regarding the
Commandant-General’s practice of seizing thousands of supposedly wild horses and
cattle. Based on “the royal authority granted to us by our Lord, the king,” the petitioners
requested “a remedy” to the tribunal orders issued from the commandant-general of these
Eastern Interior Provinces of New Spain. They claimed an “undeniable, indisputable,
and legal right” to the horses and cattle based on the belief that they were descended from
stock that had belonged to their fathers and grandfathers, those “honored first settlers” of
the far north. They explained that their forbears had “been obliged to abandon” their
cattle and horses during the previous wars with the Apache, which had “caused the
Indians to steal the greater part of the stock they chanced to find unguarded.” Now,
having finally reestablished themselves, they faced “a still more dangerous enemy” in the
Governor “so that if our situation was most miserable during the whole time of the war, it
was much worse when peace began.” The petition concluded: “[W]e could use our
forefinger’s length of paper and still not tell all the miseries we have endured.” Although
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“the king had ordered that we be protected and encouraged, [the governor] destroyed and
annihilated us. He seized our patrimony, he took our heritage.” 129
Fully conscious of the increased regional alienation of the provinces, especially
Texas, Arizpe called for greater integration, representation and infrastructure to facilitate
“reciprocal trade among their inhabitants” and “draw them into every kind of
relationship,” thereby contributing “to greater uniformity of habits and customs and make
their people well adapted to living together under the same internal centralized
government.” 130
But the one policy that Arizpe seemed to suggest was most necessary to the
development, adhesion and security of the northern provinces – especially Texas - was
increased population:

[T]he eastern internal provinces’ size, their climate, their products, their excellent
seaports, invite millions of men to enrich themselves; but never has the
government put into practice effective measures for leading men there. This idea
has never attained more than the projected stage . . . Perhaps all the advantages of
this or similar measures has not been recognized, nor has an attempt been made to
show the Spaniards that it was aimed at making them quickly and permanently
rich and prosperous.
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To these ends Arizpe recommended a project designed to enhance Texas’ population,
“not withstanding the circumstances in which the nation finds itself,” and insisted that
such a policy constituted “the principle road to national prosperity.” 131
Arizpe’s remarks did not go unheeded. The imperial government soon commenced a
sustained effort to encourage settlers from the North who declared their loyalty to Spain.
Initially, authorities admitted only Spanish vassals from Louisiana wanting to escape the
“harsh” rule of the United States. But before long, many Anglo-Americans were
expressing their interest in immigrating as well. Spanish officials at first refused, but
local leaders argued that they needed the additional population and resources to secure
the region. 132
Indeed, it was in 1809, when exclusion policies reached their zenith in response to
rumored territorial aggression on the part of the United States and Napoleon, that Texan
officials had first argued that increased settlement and a strong militia were required to
establish territorial integrity. “[A]ll indicates a very considerable upturning if this
Province is not attended to, from which it would be difficult to dislodge the American if
he succeeds in occupying it,” wrote Nemesio Salcedo in June of 1812. “[H]ow the cares
and troubles of this Province daily increase,” he bemoaned, predicting “that their
continued succession will alone show the evidence of their reality.” 133 Increased
population, he and others insisted, was the only remedy. “[T]his place seems to me
131
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suitable for Your Lordship to found a new settlement and doubtless it would be most
beneficial to these Provinces,” wrote the Senior Commandant General at Nacogdoches, “I
am certain that settlers of means will settle there for the advantage of finding a good sale
for their produce and grains, provided they find themselves protected properly.” But
settlement was not possible, he insisted, without an aggressive and relentless war against
hostile Indians, “Your Lordship must not believe that [the Indians] become more
peaceable . . . for their happiness they find it in robbing, their valor, in killing the
unfortunate being even when they find them in the greatest misery, hungry and naked.”
Such traits made them “incapable of being attracted to the Christian Religion.” 134 Local
leaders objected to the imperial practice of attempting to curry favour with and eventually
Hispanicize the Indians, and in this way corresponded more to the attitudes of AngloAmericans, especially frontiersmen, than they did with Mexican federal leaders, many of
whom decoupled race from citizenship, tending to see Native Americans as Spanish
subjects who should be “civilized” not exterminated. For the next decade, frontier
leaders would skirt Spanish restrictions by permitting foreigners, many of whom they had
come to know and trust over extended commercial and personal interaction, to establish
themselves illegally along the western frontier, and would continue to carry on a
clandestine trade with Louisiana as well.
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Such was the status quo until the Fall of 1820 when revolution in Spain necessitated
the reestablishment of the Cortes which, among other things, called for local leaders to
issue a report on vacant lands and their ideas about how best to distribute them to needy
and loyal citizens. On September 28, 1820, in response to the demands of local leaders,
the new government overturned the long established prohibition by offering asylum to all
foreigners, whether legally or illegally residing in parish dominions, if they promised to
respect the new constitution and laws. The new government also adopted a more liberal
immigration policy that invited foreigners to settle in small communities along the
northern frontier if they promised to help develop the region and contribute to the
government’s efforts to combat Indian hostilities. This emprasario system is precisely
what allowed the Austins to establish their colony of 300 families along the Brazos.

136

***
Stephen Austin arrived in Natchitoches by steamboat on 26th June 1821. There he
met a group of Spanish officials headed by Erasmo Seguín, the recently elected alcalde
of San Antonio, assigned to deliver the confirmation of Austin’s grant and accompany
him into Texas. Seguín was among that class of men who, according to historian Jesús
de la Teja, “had navigated the treacherous waters of the Mexican War of Independence,
had advocated the development of the province their grandparents and great grandparents
had settled for a century, and [later] welcomed and formed alliances with the recently

136

Ibid., “Chapter 4: Final Preparations for a Successful Colony,” 278-86.

78
arrived Anglo-American settlers.” His forebears, many of them soldiers who had been
stationed at the presidio of San Antonio beginning in the early 1700’s, were among the
town’s founders and some of its most prominent citizens. His paternal grandfather,
Bartolomé Seguín had been a well-respected carpenter and landowner who was also
active in San Antonio politics and society, and had served on several town councils.
Erasmo’s father, Santiago, quickly became one of San Antonio’s most successful cattle
exporters and also served on the ayuntamiento in 1784 and 1787. He was a militant
advocate for local interests and his name is found on the 1787 appeal to Governor
Martínez. 137
The third of Santiago’s seven children, Erasmo himself followed the path of his
father and grandfather into civic politics. He was appointed postmaster in 1807, a
position that he would hold for almost three decades. During Mexico’s war for
independence, Erasmo remained ostensibly a royalist, he was accused of treason after
agreeing to carry a letter on behalf of the revolutionaries during his return from a
business trip to Louisiana. Although he insisted he was coerced into the task, the royalist
governor nonetheless branded him a traitor, had him arrested, and his property
confiscated. Having cleared himself of charges by 1818, the government eventually
returned his ranch and he began rebuilding his fortune. 138
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Accompanying Seguín was another San Antonio merchant, stock raiser, and
councilman, Juan Martín de Verramendi. Verramendi was at least in part selected for his
thorough knowledge of the roads between Nacogdoches and San Antonio. As a wool
trader, he had travelled them extensively. He had also most likely come into repeated
contact with Anglo traders from Louisiana, and had very likely engaged in contraband
trade with them, as he was in fact accused of doing on at least one occasion. In exchange
for wool, cattle and mules, Louisiana traders often supplied items like tobacco and cloth,
both popular in San Antonio and extremely difficult to come by. As prominent stock
raisers, businessmen, and civic leaders, these men saw in Anglo-American colonization
the potential to develop and enrich Texas through increased trade, security, infrastructure,
and economic development. As de la Teja writes, men like Seguín and Verramendi saw
in Austin and the Anglo-American colonists “an unprecedented opportunity for Texas to
rise from the depths of the poverty and backwardness from which the Mexican War of
Independence had left the province.” 139
As the men travelled west toward San Antonio, Austin observed that Texas’ “red
land is very productive and is covered with the most luxuriant growth of Gras I ever
beheld in any country.” He recorded in his journal that the landscape was “gently
rolling” like the “Barrens of Kentucky” and appeared “tolerably well watered” with
“numerous” creeks of “pure and limpid” water. He designated the country along the
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Guadalupe River “the most beautiful I ever saw” with “rolling Prairies” and “soil very
deep and rich.” On July 26th the men learned of a likely Indian attack along the
Comanche trail on which they were travelling. They also received information that an
unspecified group of Indians had recently ridden “into the very town of San Antonio and
killed men and stole horses and mules, and that the people were in a very distressed
situation.” On August 12th they received more cheerful news - Mexico had gained
independence from Spain. Austin reported that his travel companions “hailed this news
with acclamations of ‘viva Independencia’ and every other demonstration of joy,” and
that “Erasmo invited us to breakfast with him on various Spanish dishes sent out by their
wives.” 140
Along the way Austin also encountered the “head chief” of the Tankawas, Gacoso.
As the two men smoked together, Austin wrote in his journal that he “informed [Gacoso]
of my settlement which pleased him” and he said he would “inform his nation who we
were and our objects.” His impressions of the Tankawa differed markedly from those of
Karankawa, whom he met later. This tribe, according to Austin, were “the universal
enemy of man” who “killed of all nations that came in their power, and frequently feast
on the bodies of their victims.”
The men finally arrived in San Antonio on August 26th. Austin observed the town “in
a state of ruin” as a result of the recent revolution and “subsequent Indian depredations.”
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Although the inhabitants appeared to have “but few cattle and horses and raise some
corn,” they nonetheless enjoyed a “very considerable trade” with western Louisiana “and
money is tolerably plenty.” Of San Antonio’s residents, Austin only observed that they
“live poorly, have but little furniture or rather none at all in their houses – no knives, eat
with forks and spoons and their fingers.” 141
In San Antonio, Austin met the man who had been perhaps the most pivotal in
achieving his colonization grant – Philip Hendrik Nering Bogel, also known as the Baron
de Bastrop. The Baron and Austin’s father, Moses, first met in New Orleans nearly
twenty years earlier. Born of a prominent Dutch family in Guiana, Bastrop had been
accused of tax embezzlement in the Netherlands, prompting him to flee to Spanish
Louisiana where he re-invented himself as a Baron and gained a colonization contract to
settle a group of Europeans in the Ouachita Valley. The United States failed to recognize
his contract after the Louisiana Purchase and Bastrop eventually ended up settling in San
Antonio in 1805, where he became a well-respected member of the community. It was
Bastrop who had helped Moses convince Governor Martínez to allow him to settle three
hundred American families on the Colorado River. Previously suspicious, Martínez
eventually concluded that Austin “was a man of honesty and formality, and that the
proposal he is making is, in my opinion, the only which is bound to provide for the
increase and prosperity of this province.” 142
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While Spanish authorities ultimately granted their approval, many remained
suspicious of the immigrants and the issue remained contested well past independence,
often pitting local leaders such as Seguín, Verramendi, and Bastrop against government
officials. As the level of interest among prospective settlers in the US surprised even
Austin, who soon requested another contract, debates ensued over the location of
settlements, how seriously immigrants took their Catholic faith, and whether or not they
were bothering to learn Spanish. For example, Anastacio Bustamante, the Commandant
General of the Internal Provinces suggested that the immigrants should establish
themselves closer to Béxar so as to remain “under the protection and observation of our
government subject of course to our laws, and under terms that we prescribe.” Permitting
them to settle too far from the center of governmental power might compromise the
security of the young empire “facilitating a free pass to the ambitions of the United
States” thereby “paving the way for invasion.” 143
The provincial deputation allayed his fears, assuring Bustamante that, in addition to
being “convenient,” the immigrants would all be Catholics of good character, “giving
their obedience to the Government.” They would cultivate cotton, sugar, and corn and
take up arms in defense of the empire or against “the barbarous Indians.” One local
official compared the Port of Veracruz to Boston in its promise. If allowed to settle
closer to the coast, the immigrants could secure the “auxiliary provinces.” He suggested
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that the government take certain precautions while also sweetening the deal for the
settlers. The government could prohibit immigrants from holding office for a specified
length of time, while also exempting them from paying taxes for ten years and allowing
them to bring their slaves.
Austin quickly filled his initial colonization grant for three hundred families. As
news of his colony swept through Louisiana and Missouri, interest grew, and by May
1822, only about six months after he had established his first colony and less than a year
after he had arrived in Texas, Austin made a formal request for permission to settle eight
hundred more families. He couched his words in effusive praise for the empire and its
leader. “[P]articipating in the sentiments of joy manifested by the nation at the recent
political change, I respectfully approach his Imperial majesty, and offer my
congratulations on the happy consummation of the independence of Mexico, by the
election of the Hero of Iguala, the Liberator of his Country to the Imperial throne,”
Austin began. He went on to assure the Emperor that the his colonists

[L]ook to the Sovereign Congress as the pure fountain from whence those blessings
are to flow which will diffuse peace, industry, improvement, intelligence, and
happiness over this new born Nation. We raise our eyes to him, whose virtues have
elevated him to the station he merited, as the Father, who is to distribute those
blessings to his People, with a firm, impartial, and benevolent hand.

And he expressed the hope that his settlement and the request to bring still more families
would “be deemed a sufficient proof that I come to this Empire in good faith, and with a
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firm determination to be obedient to the established authorities of the Government, and a
wish to be useful to the nation so far as I am able.” 144
Yet, despite Austin’s declaration of loyalty and promises to serve the new empire,
Bustamante remained skeptical and initially suggested that the proposal be suspended. 145
Austin himself acknowledged that a lack of administrative presence was a severe problem
in some parts of Texas, threatening the “social pact that should unite us” among some
settlers. “[T]he laws and regulations that should rule and govern, do not exist here, and
this fault of great consideration has caused disorder and confusion,” he wrote to Iturbide
in a separate letter. “[T]he most industrious and dignified settlers will abandon the
country and retire to Louisiana [without] laws that protect industry and punish crime.” He
warned that “anarchy and disorder” would visit the region, just as it did “for any country
that lacks fundamental policy and laws that are the fundamental basis of the happiness of
the people.” 146
But Austin continued to assure federal leaders of the purity of his and others’
intentions. In a letter to Lucas Alamán, he informed the famous centralist that his father’s
relationship with “the Spanish nation” dated back to 1798 when he became a citizen of
Louisiana “and enjoyed the confidence and protection of that Government until the
cession of that province to the United States.” Even as he complained of the lack of
judicial presence on the frontier, he requested an extension of citizenship to himself and
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his colonists, assuring Alamán that they wished to render “advantages and riches of this
heretofore deserted and uninhabited portion of the great Mexican Nation.” 147
With Austin’s urging, and no doubt to allay some of their own concerns, national
leaders decided they needed to draft an imperial colonization law, which was finally
issued on January 4, 1823. Bustamante played an active part in its drafting. Article 1
stipulated that “The government of the Mexican nation will protect the liberty, property
and civil rights, of all foreigners, who profess the Roman Catholic apostolic religion, the
established religion of the empire.” The document then went on to stipulate clear terms
on which land was to be distributed and maintained. Empresarios (or those who
introduce at least two hundred families) were to inform the executive “what branch of
industry they proposed to follow, the property or resources they intend to introduce” and
any other “particulars they may deem necessary.” Immigrants were expected to
immediately introduce themselves to the ayuntamientos of the towns in which they
intended to settle “in conformity with the instructions of the executive,” so that local
officials “may designate the lands corresponding to them.” The amount of land
distributed was to be highly regulated depending on the stated occupation of each
colonist, usually either farming or stock raising. Settlers should be permitted to select
plots in the order in which they arrived in the country with natives of Mexico getting the
first pick - a stipulation that was no doubt designed to encourage the settlement of
Mexicans. If emresparios failed to “populate and cultivate” the lands contracted to them
147
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within twelve years, then they would lose title and if a colonist failed to cultivate his land
after two years, it would be presumed that he had renounced his right to it, and the
ayuntamiento could grant it to someone else. Such stipulations guarded against
speculation and ensured the primary aim of the colonization program – to populate and
develop the region. Colonists were exempt from all taxation of their products for six
years, and would be subjected to only “half tithes” for the six years following that. 148
The National Colonization Law issued on April 18, 1824 retained most of the
stipulations of its imperial predecessor except that it left to state legislatures the right to
form their own colonization laws so long as they did not conflict with the national law.
Accordingly, the State of Coahuila y Téjas issued its colonization law the following year.
It extended the length of time that foreigners were exempt from taxation to ten years after
their arrival, forbid settlement within twenty leagues of the United States, and awarded
twice the amount of land to foreigners who married Mexicans. 149
By the middle of 1825, Austin had successfully filled 297 land grants from the
Mexican government. Most members of this group of settlers – commonly referred to as
the “Old Three Hundred” - were men like himself who had fallen on hard times and were
disillusioned with the nation of their birth. They came overwhelmingly from the TransAppalachian South – states like Kentucky, Tennessee, Missouri, Arkansas and Louisiana.
They were also highly mobile, often having lived in two or more states before finally
148

“The Imperial Colonization Law,” 4 Januaey 1823 in Ernest Wallace, David B. Vigness and George B.
Ward eds., Documents of Texas History (Austin: Texas State Historical Association, 2002), 47-48.
149
“The National Colonization Law,” 18 August 1824, Ibid., 48.

87
settling in Texas, so that many of those who were not from southern states originally,
lived there at least briefly before settling in Mexico. 150
Later immigrants were somewhat more regionally diverse, but not considerably
so. Of those who arrived after July 1825, approximately seventy percent came from the
South and nearly half came from the border areas of Missouri, Tennessee, Kentucky,
Louisiana and Arkansas Territory. The rest came from other parts of the United States
(chiefly New York and the western regions of Ohio, Indiana and Illinois), from Europe
(mainly Germany), and other parts of Mexico itself. And as with the Old Three Hundred,
these immigrants were overwhelmingly agrarians looking for their own land and a fresh
start. Despite commonly held assumptions that most of the immigrants were fugitives or
vagabonds, it appears the typical Anglo-American immigrant to Texas in the 1820’s was
a married man in his early thirties from a frontier southern state who worked as either a
farmer or stock raiser. 151
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In March of 1825, a year that saw an explosion of immigration, Bastrop, the sole
representative from Texas, convinced the Coahuila state legislature to turn the
empresario system into state law. “Application is made to me daily to receive and settle
more families, as colonists, some of which have already arrived here, others are on the
road and have written to me,” Austin informed Texas Governor Rafael González. 152
The state government was happy to comply. In fact, it granted a total of twenty-five such
152
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contracts that year, although the majority never came to fruition. But a few recipients did
manage to establish a permanent residence with sizeable communities in areas
surrounding Austin’s colony. The most determined and successful empresarios tended to
be other norteamericanos, among them Robert Leftwich, Frost Thorn, Green De Witt and
Haden Edwards. 153
After some congressional debate over whether or not it should be an independent
state, Texas became a department of Coahuila that year. Together the two provinces
composed the State of Coahuila y Téjas, with a political chief – a kind of subgovernor –
who resided at Béxar. Coahuila y Téjas was divided into a series of municipalities ruled
by governing councils or ayuntamientos, each one headed by an alcalde who operated as
a kind of mayor, judge, and sheriff.

Federal and state officials, distracted with the

numerous responsibilities of establishing a new republic, were happy to allow the
colonies a significant degree of self-government and in fact requested that empresarios
take care of whatever problems might arise under their jurisdiction themselves so as not
to burden the authorities. Austin took these words to heart. 154
In addition to the stipulations outlined in the Colonization Law, immigrants were
also expected to form militias. Militia service was expected of all able-bodied men
throughout the republic, but it was deemed particularly crucial in the Eastern Interior
Provinces where Indian raids and foreign incursions remained a reality. One of the
153
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Mexican government’s chief motives for recruiting these settlers, after all, had been to
gain their help in subduing or defeating Indian marauders. Establishing militias to this
end was one of the immigrants’ first lines of business, right after taking an oath of
allegiance. And Stephen Austin wasted no time. On June 24, 1824 he issued his first
formal battalion orders “In conformity with the decree of the Superior Government of the
Mexican Nation.” 155
***
The militia’s significance to Anglo-American political tradition dates at least as far
back as the seventeenth century. During the early republic it acquired particular
significance as a bulwark against political tyranny. Edmund Morgan has written that the
notion of popular sovereignty rested on “the righteousness, independence, and military
might of the yeoman farmer, the man who owned his own land, made his living from it
and stood ready to defend it and his country by force of arms.” Most believed there was
no better defense for a society than the armed strength of its independent, propertyowning male citizens, and no better guarantor of democracy. 156
However, from the US nation’s inception, federalist leaders pointed to the militia’s
inherent inefficiency and unreliability in making the case for a regular army. As one
historian explains, central to the “competing visions of the military was the tension
between those individuals who espoused a parochial republicanism and sought to restore
155
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virtue and unity to American society,” and “an increasing number of individuals who
were willing to embrace a vision of society and politics similar to that of James
Madison.” One of the most vocal proponents of the standing army was Alexander
Hamilton, whose followers were among the first to advance the notion that a national
army, not the militia, was in fact a modern republic’s best form of defense. They argued
that a standing army would be more effective for frontier defense, which required more
or less constant deployment. They also pointed out that it would facilitate the new
nation’s commercial development by allowing citizens to focus on production
uninterrupted by military obligation. Finally, they combated concerns regarding the
threat of political corruption by arguing that there would remain a partial and still
operative militia that could effectively check the attempts of a despotic leader to
monopolize violence. However, between the ratification of the Constitution and the War
of 1812, Federalists’ demand for militarily effective institutions confronted concerns
about the sanctity of the constitutional order.
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Opponents feared that it would aggrandize the executive, and that only the
independent, yeoman soldier could effectively defend the republic. Even as the notion of
the militia as the chief source of military might was losing ground on the federal stage, a
vibrant popular effort to preserve it - principally through military academies and other
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privately funded institutions - emerged. 158 As Amery Ellen Rowe explains, the militia
was understood as “an extension of the community from which it came and had to be
recognized as such by that community.” It required a community “that respected higher
authority, yet demanded the right to control its own affairs, and had the necessary
consensus, manpower and resources to do so.” Whether or not the militia decided to
respond to a government call ultimately depended on “the community’s assessment of the
crisis.” 159 Thus, the militia served as a powerful reminder of a community’s ultimate
right to self-government.
As Kentuckians sprinkled into Missouri after the War of 1812, they modeled their
new militia companies after those of their home state. Many of these militias were so
localized that they were more often used in personal rather than national conflicts. The
Austins themselves were hardly strangers to the tendency of local leaders to employ their
own militia. When Thomas Jefferson appointed Major Seth Hunt commandant of St.
Genevieve District in 1804 as part of the president’s attempt to form “a strong centralized
militia organization that would serve as the arm of federal authority while inculcating
loyalty to the United States and its institutions,” Hunt was immediately drawn into a
bitter territorial dispute between Moses Austin, who in fact maintained his own personal
militia during this time, and his primary mining competitor, John Smith T. On July 4,
1806, the latter launched a full scale assault on Austin’s forces at Mine à Breton in an
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attempt to steal his cannon. When local observers ruled the fight a draw, the men were
compelled to turn to the courts to resolve their dispute, but the fact that the “mineral
wars” took place at all, without any official interference or discipline, illustrate the power
and independence of local militias in the face of federal centralization efforts. 160
Historians have long assumed that only in the Anglo world did the militia carry such
a close association with republican values. “Though the citizen soldier was never a
uniquely American figure,” writes Rowe, “in the British North American colonies he
came to represent a powerful set of ideas, drawn from the British tradition but enhanced
and elaborated in America.” The militia constituted “the supreme expression of civic
values in a traditional, communal and agrarian civil society.” 161
Recently, however, historians of Spanish America have identified militia as a
component of Hispanic republican democracy as significant as suffrage. Hilda Sabato
writes that “The conviction that citizens should be in charge of the defense of the
republic both from internal and external enemies, and that leaving it in the hands of a
professional army opened doors to corruption goes back to classical times.”
Unsurprisingly the militia was one of the cornerstones of the 1812 Constitution, which
deemed it the most effective defense against monarchical absolutism. The new republics
of Spanish America therefore attempted to reestablish the institution in connection with
the new definition of the body politic. In Mexico, founders debated abolishing the army
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all together due to its poor state and the young nation’s general lack of funds. But
proponents of a national army insisted that it was necessary in light of threats of foreign
invasion and the constant wars with northern Indians. Legislators finally decided to
implement an army of 20,000 men in addition to a well-organized militia. As in the
Anglo-American case, militias in Mexico were seen as one of the primary guarantors of
democracy where “the use of force was considered legitimate against a government that
abused power.” And, as Manuel Chust points out, “With the establishment of the federal
republic, the civic militia would be configured as an armed civic battalion of the states
against the centralist or conservative tendencies of the executive branch and some of its
officers.” But because of Mexico’s particularly precarious international position, faced
with threats of invasion from both Spain and the United States, the militia served “a
double role, as a national force against potential invaders, especially Spaniards, and,
within its boundaries, as an armed political force capable of defending liberal
principles.” 162
Perhaps nowhere else in Spanish America was the militia tradition as strong as it was
in the Mexican North. Beginning as early as 1713 and as part of the empire’s efforts to
secure the region, the Viceroy ordered landowners to form their own militias to help
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defend the region against Indian and foreign incursions. 163 In 1772 the commandant
general of the region ordered that they receive formal military training from professional
soldiers stationed at nearby presidios. Despite irregular pay and constant lack of supplies,
the companía volante (volunteer company) enjoyed a special prestige on the frontier, and
many settlers preferred that it, rather than the regular army, defend their municipality. 164
As nearby presidio soldiers integrated into neighboring communities, the militaristic
culture of the region intensified, and a distinct regional identity began to emerge, one that
Arizpe himself spoke of in his remarks to the Cortes in which he described a population
of men who “being obliged to serve not only as militiamen but even as common soldiers”
demonstrated “an extremely commendable character of integrity, honor, and
subordination.” He went on to describe how Texans had, on at least one occasion, been
“forced to subsist on snakes, rats, and even the leather of their saddles” while fighting
foreign intruders along their empire’s border with the United States. Despite such
hardships, there were “no other desertions than that of the cook of the second in
command, who in reality was not a son of those provinces.” 165
Thus both the United States and Mexico experimented with a kind of dual military
force that involved both a standing army and a militia. Yet, while some national leaders
in the US began calling for replacing the militia with a standing army due to the former’s
supposed inefficiency and unreliability, in Mexico, the militia held a far more essential
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role when it came to the preservation of the republic. This was especially the case on the
frontier where, in 1826, the federal government required state and local governments to
recruit local citizens to replace the traditional presidial cavalry companies as they were
being disbanded. Citizen were ordered to form militia companies of their own to operate
under local command and for local service, completely distinct from the regular army. 166
Austin himself received permission to “create a solid base of authority in his
colonies” so long as he agreed to organize his colonists into a national militia force. He
was appointed lieutenant colonel and granted full responsibility for maintaining “the
good order[,] prosperity and defense” of his colonies. 167 In December, 1823, Austin
began formally organizing the militia. 168 His colonists elected Robert Kuykendall as
their captain. The Kuykendalls were like many members of the original three hundred
families who settled in Austin’s colony – frontier southerners, who had not only fought in
some of the most significant battles of the Revolutionary War and War of 1812, but who
lived their lives in an almost constant state of warfare, whether it be with the British or
their Indian allies along the US frontier. 169
While there are few families that could match the Kuykendalls’ militia experience
and prowess, many of the early Anglo-American immigrants to Mexico came from a long
martial tradition that had, at varying times, brought them into conflict with the British,

166

Tijerina, 83.
Baron de Bastrop to Colonists, 4 August 1823, AP, Vol. I, Part I, 677-78.
168
Tijerina, 87.
169
Gifford E. White Papers, “Kuykendall Family,” Folder 242- 243, Daughters of the Republic of Texas
Archives, San Antonio.
167

97
the Indians, and ultimately the US federal government as it sought to relocate displaced
Indian groups such as the Choctaw onto lands claimed by Anglo settlers. 170

Yet militia

service was not merely a way of life for such people, it was how they defined, achieved,
and secured their relationship to the state. It also embodied the principles of extreme
local autonomy that many believed were the cornerstone of republican democracy. This
was no truer than on a hostile frontier where waiting for orders from a superior could be
deadly. The task of defending settlements against Indian incursions fell squarely on the
shoulders of frontier residents, whether Anglo or tejano and frequent appeals for federal
troops were denied. Understandably, many tejanos saw in their Anglo-American
neighbors skilled and experienced allies against the powerful Indian tribes like the
Comanche.
Yet, while Austin and his militia captains were ready and eager to organize local
companies, they were slower to place them under national authority. As one historian of
early Texas points out, Anglo settlers only “haltingly achieved their mandatory quotas of
militia squadrons” after “repeated threats” by Governor José María Viesca. Even then
“the new militia organization existed only “on paper,” and “the governor had to remind
them of their duty to comply with the law.” 171 While this might suggest a tenuous sense
of loyalty to Mexico and Mexican authorities, Austin’s behavior was in fact not so
different from what occurred in Missouri twenty years prior when the Jefferson
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administration attempted to consolidate its power over frontier militias. These men were
more than willing to form local militias to defend and protect their country, they were
reluctant to relinquish control over them to the federal government – whether it be
Mexico or the United States.
The tension between these men’s individual interests and those of their nation,
between local authority and federal, was ever present in Mexico just as it had been in the
North. In both instances, the decision to form a militia in defense of the country rested
on the consensus of the community and was issued on a case by case basis. Austin was
ever mindful of this in his early writings to government officials who consistently urged
him to form militias promptly and declare war on local Indians immediately. As much as
Austin wanted to serve his adopted nation, he also knew he must honor the localistic
spirit of the militia tradition. More importantly, however, he did not wish to threaten
colonists’ delicate position by inciting Indian recrimination. Observers noted that the
Indians did not seem to target Anglos the way that they did Mexicans. It’s possible that
Anglo settlers, even as they declared loyalty to Mexico, wished to perpetuate the notion
that they were a separate people, unaligned with Mexico so as not to invite the
aggressions of the Karankawa or the Comanche. In his “Referendum on Indian
Relations,” Austin promised, if again ordered to declare war on the Indians, to “lay the
subject before the inhabitants of each militia district for their consideration, opinion and
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advice, the course determined on by the majority shall be adopted.” 172 Thus Austin was
faced with the dual task of serving and appeasing his adopted country as well as honoring
the tradition of community consent and decision-making in militia activities. While some
might see this as nothing more than Austin speaking out of both sides of his mouth or
attempting to compensate for a lack of commitment from his settlers, he was in fact
honoring the very republican principles that had attracted him and other norteamericanos
to Mexico in the first place.
***

While it certainly had its benefits, the empresario program aggravated a set of
long-standing administrative challenges for the new republican government. Obviously,
if Mexico was going to expect these men to pledge allegiance and risk their lives for their
adopted country, it had to deliver on its end of the bargain. Yet, as more and more
immigrants flooded across the Sabine, keeping track of them and making sure they both
adhered to the duties and received the benefits of Mexican citizenship, proved
increasingly difficult in a region that had always suffered from limited administrative
presence.
Land grant disputes between older more established settlers and new arrivals were
common. In April 1825, Green DeWitt, another immigrant from Missouri, received a
land grant for 400 families to settle just south of Austin’s colony. But when they were
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forced to move further down the coast after an Indian attack in the middle of 1826, it
brought them into conflict with Martín de León, who had mistakenly been granted land
that overlapped with Dewitt’s. As a native Mexican, De León received preferential
treatment and the Dewitt colony was forced to return to its original site just west of the
Colorado. 173
In February of 1824, another such dispute arose involving Edmund Quirk, himself
a United States immigrant who had gained admittance about a decade prior when the
Spanish Empire briefly relaxed its immigration policy. Quirk accused a group of more
recent immigrants of encroaching on his land along the Trinity. They responded by
lodging a formal complaint against him and requested that the state government reclaim
his land and grant it to them. Quirk was an absentee landowner, they insisted, of the very
kind that the Spanish and subsequent Mexican government had hoped to guard against.
While holding land, he had done little to improve it, and was now attempting to evict
those who had. “[C]ountries where a few persons are allowed to monopolize large
quantities of lands are more liable to feel those evils,” they argued, referring to their very
motivation for coming to Mexico.

“An exclusive right to the possession of the soil and

its productions is the only agent that aids universally and constantly upon men and
prompts human industry.” A system that awarded land ownership to he who developed
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and improved it – “so that one may work for himself and not for another” - was, they
claimed, the chief aim of any democratic republic. 174
The lack of governmental presence in the Far North, therefore, was as much a
problem for recent immigrants as it was for the Mexican government itself. The petition
went on to insist that immigrants wanted from “lack of any government” and that, as a
result, “almost all this time they have been very unhappy not knowing their obligations as
citizens of this government, and conversely those of the government towards its
subjects.” Far from wishing to evade the Mexican state, as some officials suspected,
they pressed their eagerness “to conform in everything with the constitution of this
government” including forming a militia “for the defense of the Province in case of any
invasion.” They concluded by insisting that “We, as subjects, take a particular, personal
interest in the prosperity of the Mexican Government and “respectfully request Your
Excellency to please command that the mail (if it is possible) pass as far as this District
by which means we should be entirely able to cooperate with your wise vigilance.” 175
The government’s immediate response to virtually all of these complaints was to
advise colonists to be patient and obedient, assuring them that it would “watch over your
interests and protect your rights” and that “If the government of the nation is not yet fully
and finally organized, the causes which have produced the delay are well known.” José
Antonio Saucedo advised the petitioners in the meantime to listen with full “attention and
174
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confidence” to Colonel Austin “whose authority is from the supreme powers of the nation
to which you now voluntarily belong.” 176
Not all the colonies expressed their frustrations as civilly as those on the Trinity,
however. The region in and around Nacogdoches had long menaced Spanish authorities,
and it would do the same to their Mexican successors. Situated on the border with
Louisiana, it had been the site of illicit trade and settlement for decades by men who
appeared more interested in evading US authorities than declaring loyalty to Mexico.
Residing there were a diverse group of settlers – some legal, some illegal – that included
Anglo-Americans, French, Spanish, and a large number of Native Americans, namely a
group of Cherokee recently displaced from the North. In 1825, Haden Edwards received
a contract to settle 800 families in the region. When he arrived there in September, he
demanded that the pre-established settlers produce titles to their land or face eviction in
order to make way for his own colonists. In reference to the Edwards colony, however,
Saucedo insisted that they had “arbitrarily established themselves . . . with the damage to
the owners and old residents.” He further warned that “if they wish to appropriate them
by force they defame themselves entirely and lose the concept of being able to be
admitted by the Mexican Government.” 177
On November 13, 1826 the commanding officer of the Nacogdoches militia, José
Antonio Sepulveda, wrote to the political chief of Texas informing him of the Edwards
176
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rebellion. He warned that “the Province of Texas would be lost to the country if the
Almighty did not open the eyes of the Superior Government, and induce them to send
troops for its protection.” He claimed that the “rebellious American rogues,” aimed to
ally themselves with local Indians “to ensure their assistance in overthrowing the
authorities of our government.” 178
Such news renewed Mexican leaders’ long-established doubts regarding the intent
of many Anglo-American immigrants, especially those who settled closest to the border.
J.E.B. Austin, Stephen’s cousin then residing in Béxar, reported that regional leaders
“treated [the petition] with much contempt.” 179 Many accused them of having settled
arbitrarily, and insisted that it would serve Mexican interests better if they moved closer
to the interior. Bastrop confirmed these sentiments and warned Austin of the impression
that his fellow empresarios were forming in the minds of Mexican leaders, specifically
the fear that they might “one day attempt to separate and unite with their native land.”
Such apprehensions, according to the Baron, had “made quite a sensation in Mexico.” 180
But letters from some of the settlers of that region reveal a highly factionalized group
whose grievances primarily rested with local leaders charged with administering the
government’s laws and regulations.
Austin began receiving letters from Anglo-American settlers complaining chiefly
of an alcalde named James Gaines who, they claimed, was responsible for preventing the
178
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formalization of their land grants, excessive taxation, and other offenses. Gaines, they
insisted, “if suffered to pursue with impunity, the course which he has adopted,” would
ultimately “render the Americans in this section of country odious to the Mexican
nation.” In other words, it was not Mexico they had a problem with. “The people are
willing and ancious to obey the law properly administered,” assured one settler by the
name of John A Williams, “But it is mortifying to the feeling of an American to stoop to
arbetrary sway.” Williams insisted that “I attribute none of our present difficulties to any
person but James Gaines and his understrapers.” Tellingly, he asked Austin to appeal on
his and other settlers’ behalf to the Mexican authorities in order to rectify the situation. “I
hope sir that you will have the goodness to inquire into our condition minutely; and make
such statements to the proper authority” as to “afford us the protection of person,
property, and civil rights, which the Mexican Nation has promised.” 181
The government’s response, however, was not what they hoped for. Article 7 of
the national Colonization law declared unlawful any settlement of foreigners less than
twenty leagues from the US border. By then, however, hundreds of immigrants were
firmly established as was the cotton economy they had introduced to the region, drawing
them ever closer to the United States. They were joined by the Cherokee who had
opposed Article 1 of the 1825 state colonization law stipulating that all immigrants
convert to Catholicism. 182
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Tensions reached a climax during the elections for alcalde, when battle lines were
drawn between the older settlers who supported Samuel Norris, and the disgruntled group
of Anglo-Americans who supported Edwards’ son-in-law Chinchester Chaplin. When
Norris’ supporters declared Chaplin’s election fraudulent on grounds that most of his
votes came from non-citizens, he ignored their protests, seizing the archives and
assuming his duties as alcalde. When Saucedo declared the election in favor of Norris
and ordered Chaplin to step down, Chaplin declared that he only took orders from the
state capital in Saltillo, dismissing Saucedo’s authority as a local leader without access to
regular troops. He then threatened that “oceans of blood will be spilled” if he failed to
send in the regular army. Edwards’ taunt not only revealed his disregard for the jefe’s
authority as a regional official, but also his ironic disregard for the power of the militia
who would eventually be his downfall.
In July, Benjamin Edwards, Haden’s brother, wrote that he “found everything in
disorder and confusion in this section of the Province.” Each day seemed to produce
“new excitements against the civil authority here, in consequence of proceedings and
decisions, believed to be incompatible with a republican government, and contrary to the
fundamental principles of the constitution of the country.” Edwards seemed to suggest
that his brother was the victim of arbitrary censure “without any inquiry into the truth or
falsehood of the accusations” against him. “It cannot be,” continued Edwards, “that the
fundamental principles of a free constitution, cemented by the blood of thousands is thus
early trampled under foot, and its most sacred principles violated in the persons of
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Americans.” 183 Gaines himself did not elaborate on the sources of confusion in his own
letter to Austin, but he did report the degree of discontent and what it might mean: “I am
led to believe something like a revolution has been aimed at and probably yet on foot.”
Refusing to surrender, on November 22 the Edwards brothers and their allies
seized Norris and Texas Militia Captain José Antonio Sepulveda and tried them for
oppression and corruption in office. They accused the men of “Misrepresenting to the
Governor of this State the conduct and character of the American Emigrants,” and
“painting them in colors most calculated to rouse the jealousy and resentment of the
Spanish Government.” They stated that they had been “induced by the promises of the
Mexican government, as well as by the beauty and fertility of the soil, to emigrate from
their native land, the birthplace of freedom,” and that all they were guilty of was
practicing “the republican ideas which have been instilled into them by their fathers in
their own native country.” 184
But Norris offered a very different account in his letter to the Political Chief. He
claimed that he and Captain Sepulveda had been arrested and imprisoned by a group of
“American ruffians,” some of whom were not even Mexican, but resided “on the other
side of the Sabine.” However, they were released once the rebels heard that “Lieutenant
Manuel Santos had assembled twenty four citizens and a few Indians.” They nonetheless
informed the men that they “should no longer hold any office here,” seized the local
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archives, and appointed one of their own, Joseph Doste, as alcalde. Norris declared that
the event amounted to “a total contempt for the legal authorities” and feared that “a large
portion of our country is lost to us if some assistance does not arrive shortly.” 185
Indeed, Texas officials arrived shortly thereafter. They sided unequivocally with
Norris and the Military Commander of Texas called him a “downright imposture” for
claiming to have been appointed military commandant by state authorities so that he
might “commit various excesses which have been reported to the Political Chief of this
Department by the Alcalde of Nacogdoches.” Edwards’ actions and the reports they
received from local leaders like Norris confirmed Mexican leaders’ worst fears about
Anglo settlers. “This class of men who know no law but their rifle,” declared the
commander, rule that interior wilderness, still sparsely populated. They are now
beginning to insult our public officers with impunity; and I much fear that they will
endeavor to render themselves independent of Mexico.” 186
He was right. Later that year, the allied group of Anglo settlers, Cherokees and
other indigenous groups signed a formal declaration of independence. They agreed to
form the Fredonian Republic which would consist of two distinct halves, the northern
part of Texas for the “Red people” and the southern part for the “White people.” 187 At
this point, they transferred their grievances from their local leaders to the Mexican
Republic, insisting that “the government of the Mexican United States,” had “by repeated
185
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insults, outrages and oppressions reduced the white and red immigrants of the United
States of the North now settled in the Province of Texas.” They accused it of having
lured them there “by promises most solemnly declared, and most vilely inforged,” and
that they now faced “the disagreeable alternative of either submitting their free persons to
the yoke of the embecile, faithless, and despotic government, (erroneously called a
republic) or to take up arms for the defence of their inalienable rights.” 188 Reports began
to flood in of the rebellion as those unsympathetic to it arrived in Austin’s colony. One
citizen of Nacogdoches declared in a sworn affidavit to seeing “an assemblage of armed
men . . . for the purpose of going to war with Mexico” and “a flying flag in said town of
Nacogdoches the colors of which were white and red.” The next piece of information
must have been particularly unnerving for Mexican authorities: “[H]e also stated that the
rebels were in Expectation of aid and assistance of several hundred men from the U.
States of the north whose arrival were looked for shortly.” 189 A correspondence from the
rebels themselves confirmed the severity of these reports. Benjamin Edwards wrote that
“We have concluded a treaty with the chiefs and representatives of twenty-seven tribes of
Indians; and if I am not deceived, we will, in six months make this perfidious government
shake to its centre.” 190
In their attempt to gain support from other Anglo immigrants, the Edwards
brothers appealed to a common Anglo-American identity. Rather than speaking of their
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“adopted nation” as Austin had, Benjamin Edwards reminded the inhabitants of Pecan
Point outside of Nacogdoches that they were all “children of the same mother country.”
Characterizing the immigrants as “Americans in a foreign land, groaning under the
galling yoke of injustice and oppression,” he reminded them that “Our fathers in their
struggle for liberty contended against the giant of the world. We have to contend against
a corrupt and imbecile Government.” 191 Benjamin used a similar appeal in his letter to
Col. James Ross of Austin’s Colony: “You and I sir, are strangers; but you are an
American, and so am I. [T]he time has arrived when that proud title, I trust, will be a
sufficient passport to the bosom of every man, who claims freedom as his birthright.” 192
Their appeals met with opposition from Austin himself, who suggested that the
rebels had betrayed both their Mexican and Anglo-American identity. “I am compelled
to say with all the frankness of an old friend that you are wrong,” Austin wrote to one
Buttil Thompson. “I cannot believe that you have so far lost your senses as to think of
open opposition to the [Mexican] Government.” Yet it was not just Mexico these men
had turned their backs on. “[N]either will I believe that you have so far forgotten the land
of your birth and the proud name of American as to disgrace that name by associating
yourself with persons, and advocating a cause unworthy of it.” For Austin, honoring
one’s American identity meant remaining obedient to a nation that had demonstrated its
commitment to the preservation of America’s original promise. It also meant avoiding
191
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an unholy alliance with Native American groups, even one as “civilized” as the
Cherokee. “Great God, can it be possible that Americans, will so far forget the country of
their birth, so far forget themselves, as to league with barbarians and join a band of
savages in a war of murder, massacre and desolation,” he declared. Austin concluded his
letter by encouraging the rebels to disband their militia and formally express their “entire
submission and obedience to the [Mexican] Government.” 193
In another New Years’ letter to a different Nacogdoches leader, Austin reiterated
the same sentiment: “As an American I feel a lively and warm interest in everything that
concerns Americans, and as a Mexican I am bound by my duty, honor and every
obligation that a man ought to hold sacred, to be faithful to this Government and to the
true interests of this nation.” 194 For Austin, there was no contradiction between his
American heritage and his Mexican citizenship. While the rebels saw themselves as
Americans in a foreign land, Austin saw himself as an American at home in a land more
committed to fulfilling American values and ideals than the United States was. While
granting that the rebels probably did have cause for grievance, he insisted that they had
“taken the wrong method of seeking redress.” Furthermore, they were wrong to think
that they would find any support among the other settlers. “The people of this colony are
unanimous,” insisted Austin, “I have not heard of one man who is not opposed to your
violent measures and there is not one amongst us who will not freely take up arms to
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oppose you and sustain the Govt.” 195 Indeed, in an effort to distance themselves from the
insurgents, other colonies publicly renounced the rebellion and confirmed their loyalty to
Mexico. In a correspondence to Saucedo, Austin expressed sympathy towards the
insurgents’ original grievances, but renounced their ultimate actions. “From what I could
learn of that occurrence, it would seem, that the principal cause was the hatred of those
people toward [G]aines and Norris, and not any ill feelings against the Government.”
With a more impartial administrator, he assured Saucedo, “no difficulty need be
apprehended on the part of the inhabitants." 196 Accompanying the letter was a formal
“Resolution of Loyalty” from the inhabitants of his colony who had “no hesitation in
declaring that they view the attempt of the Nacogdoches party to declare the
independence of and call in the Aid of Indians to wage war against a peaceful inhabitants
of Texas with the most decided disapropriation.” They further declared themselves
“ready to rally around the standard of the Mexican nation and sustain its Govt and
Authority by force of arms whenever called upon.” They asserted that “they are satisfied
with the Govt of their adoption and that they are gratified for the favours they have
received from it and have full reliance on its justice and Magnanimity.” As a testament
to the sincerity of their claims, they promised to “take up arms in its defense whenever
necessary to do so.” They concluded by further assuring the Superior Government “of
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our firmness and patriotism in defense of the liberty honor and Rights of the Mexican
Nation to which we have the honor to belong.” 197
Similar resolutions came from the District of Bravo which declared that “We are
Mexicans by adoption and as such are willing to Turn out when called on to quell the
Enemys of the Government” and offered their “services in support of said Government
on this or any similar occasion if required.” 198 Dewitt’s Colony similarly resolved that
“[A]s adopted children they have full confidence and faith in the equity, justice and
liberality in the Federal and State Governments of their new parent” and they hoped that
Mexico would distinguish “between the honest, industrious and peaceable American
emigrants, and those of bad character, whom we consider as refugees and fugitives from
justice.” Like Austin, they renounced the insurgents’ behavior as un-American and
looked upon them “with contempt and disgust,” insisting that “they are unworthy the
character of Americans.” The inhabitants of Dewitt’s colony concluded by pledging their
“lives, and our fortunes” to Mexico, “our much beloved and adopted Country.” 199
While Austin may have had a flexible identity, the nation to which he claimed
loyalty was consistent and absolute. At the end of the day, he was a Mexican, and it
appears that other Anglo colonists felt the same. “I will befriend you all as far as I can
consistent with my duty to the Government,” he wrote to the rebels, counseling them to
surrender and humble themselves to the Mexican government, “but I am a Mexican
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Citizen and officer and I will sacrifice my life before I will violate my duty and oath of
office.” 200
On December 28th, José Antonio Navarro announced to the citizens of
Nacogdoches that, in response to their calls, the government would sen troops to maintain
order. Mindful of the reaction that this might cause, he assured them that it was not an
invasion and to dismiss reports to the contrary. 201 In fact, colonists appeared to welcome
Mexican troops and quickly formed a nearly two hundred man volunteer militia to assist
them in suppressing the rebellion. Even a good number of the restive population proved
less than fully committed to the cause. As Peter Ellis Bean reported, “the People is very
much divided[,] there is not more than 30 [A]mericans of the Rebel Party.” 202 One
resident of Nacogdoches explained in his appeal for amnesty following the rebellion that
Nacogdoches had “Been Left Intirely to the management of a few Ignorant and
Designing men . . . who wished to show their power and acted with more Tyranny Then
Ever was, Exercised under the king of spain.” 203
While Austin’s appeals held sway with most of the Anglo colonists, he failed to
convince a few of the rebels. Having attempted conciliation, the Mexican government
turned to force, dispatching two hundred of its troops to suppress the rebellion. It also
called upon the Anglo militia for assistance. They were more than ready to comply. Just
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as he had done in his appeals to colonists to fight the Indians in the name of Mexico,
Austin addressed the interdependent relationship between immigrants’ individual selfinterest and that of their adopted country when he appealed to them to help suppress the
Fredonian Rebellion:

I have made no official call but merely appeal to you as men of honor, as
Mexicans, and as Americans to do your duty – our interests sometimes conflict
with our duty, but I am happy to say that in this instance they are the same - it is
our duty as Mexicans, to support and defend the government of our adoption, by
whome we have been received with the kindness and liberality of an indulgent
parent,- it is our duty as men , to suppress vice anarchy and Indian massacre – and
it is our duty as Americans to defend that proud name from the infamy which
[the] Nacogdoches gang must cast upon it if they are suffered to progress

Here, Austin appealed not simply to colonists’ dual identity as both norteamericano and
Mexican, but also to their manhood in his efforts to link their interests as independent
propertied men to their duty as Mexican citizens. In so doing, he attempted to remind
settlers that in Mexico, unlike in the United States, their individual interests and state
interests were one in the same, “for without regular Government, without law, what
security have we for our persons, our property, our characters and all that we hold dear
and sacred?” The answer was clear. Devotion to the state was essential to
republicanism. The rights and privileges of a republican government could not be
guaranteed if the integrity of the nation was violated. If it was, then “we at once embark
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on the stormy ocean of anarchy, subject to be stripped by every faction that rolls along,
and must finally sink into the gulf of ruin and infamy.” 204
Tellingly, the commander of the loyalist militia was none other than John A.
Williams who had earlier petitioned the Mexican government to honor his and other’s
claims to land settled along the Trinity. Indeed, the most convincing evidence of settlers’
unflagging loyalty to Mexico and lack of support for the rebellion, was their swift and
organized, although ultimately anticlimactic, suppression of it. Williams himself wrote
that “As soon as the inhabitants were generally informed of the measure which had been
taken to put down the rebellious party, they flocked to us from all quarters in defense of
their country.” Their patriotism “far surpassed my most sanguine expectation.” Upon
learning of the militia’s approach, Edwards evidently fled across the border to the United
States, at which point, “a party was dispatched in pursuit of them,” but they only caught
two. “The result of these just measures and fortunate reinforcements from different
quarters, has, in my opinion, settled the fate of the rebellious party.” The next day they
were joined by a detachment under Col Bean and another from Austin’s Colony. “At this
time there is every prospect of immediate tranquility in the neighborhood,” Williams
reported. One hundred eighty-seven men enrolled as ready for duty and “manifested
every disposition to serve their country.” 205
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Fields and one other insurgent leader were killed in the conflict, the rest of the
accomplices were taken prisoner and eventually expelled from the country. By the time
the dust had settled over Nacogdoches, J.E.B. Austin reported that the insurgents were
“treated with a degree of lenity by the Mexicans they had no right to expect from the
nature of their crimes” and which “would not have been shewn them in their native
country.” 206 Rather than compromising Anglo immigrants’ relationship with Mexico, the
event cemented it by both allowing settlers to demonstrate the degree of their loyalty to
their adopted country and permitting Mexico to prove itself an effective though
magnanimous parent. As Stephen Austin himself put it in a letter to his friend Samuel
May Williams, “the Mexican character stands higher here now than it ever did before.” 207
On February 9th, Samuel Kinney wrote to the Military Commander describing the
state of affairs in Nacodgoches following the rebellion. He relayed the request of the
militia commander that an armed force continue to be kept in that quarter. “It also seems
to be a general wish of the inhabitants here, that a portion at least, of the [Mexican]
Troops should be quartered somewhere in that neighborhood. He also “delivered” nine
individuals “charged with having belonged to the late faction” by the militia captain,
albeit without proof that they “acted as principles in the late affair.” Regarding the recent
rebellion, Kinney concluded by stating that he believed it to be “completely suppressed,”
but warned that “nevertheless as much confusion still exists” and recommended
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stationing Troops “nearer the frontier than Nacogdoches” to “prevent any irruption from
designing persons from the U.S. of the North.” He concluded his letter with the
appropriate “Union and Mexico.” 208
By April 1827, Bustamante reported that he was glad to hear that “complete
tranquility” had been restored to the region and that “the honor of our Government and
the Mexican flag is still unsullied.” He implied that the rebels had “enticed” the Cherokee
into rebellion and suggested rewarding the loyal Indian tribes by inviting them to settle
“wherever they may live happy” and directed Saucedo to solicit their future help in “the
pacification of the Comanche.” 209
***
Despite the ready participation of nearly two hundred men armed and prepared to
suppress the Fredonian rebellion, the historic tension between the obligation to protect
one’s country and the obligation to protect oneself did emerge, particularly among
settlers who were living within close proximity to certain Indian groups. As Thomas M.
Duke, captain of the Bay Prairie militia wrote:

I was truly distressed at the contents of your letter [informing of the rebellion]. I
feel as I believe every man in the Prairie does a sincere wish to be of every
service in our power for the support of the government but situated as we are in
the Prairie it is not in our power to give much aid to the government at this time.
[T]he smoke from the Karankawas is seen from my house every day. 210
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When men had to choose between protecting their nation and protecting their property
and families they almost always chose the latter, a testament to the strength of the very
impulse that had attracted them to Mexico in the first place – individual and local
autonomy.
While Austin understood perfectly the interdependent relationship between
individual interests and national interests, not all frontiersmen did, a fact about which
Austin often complained bitterly. “[A]mong the ignorant part of the Americans
independence means resistance and obstinacy right or wrong - this is particularly the case
with frontiersmen,” he wrote, in whom “a violent course with such dispositions might
have kindled a flame that would have destroyed them and the settlement entirely.” 211
While resistance and obstinacy did not necessarily characterize most immigrants’
attitudes towards their adopted nation, isolation and a privileging of one’s self-interest
above all else often did. This kindled flame would burn consistently for another decade,
flaring up every time immigrants felt that the federal government threatened local
autonomy or stood in the way of its citizens’ pursuit of their own interests. But for now,
Mexico rested safely under the protection of its armed male citizens.
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CHAPTER 3
“Each Citizen a King Like unto Adam”
Religion and Slavery in Mexican Texas
1824-1832

In the summer of 1831 a peculiar scene took place at Abner Kuykendall’s ranch
about twenty miles north of San Felipe de Austin. At least one hundred members of
Stephen Austin’s colony were baptized and re-married as members of the Roman
Catholic Church in accordance with their new nation’s constitutional stipulation that
anyone seeking Mexican citizenship formally adopt the Catholic faith. A colonist who
helped facilitate the event later described the chaos and comedy of several hundred
immigrants getting re-baptized and re-married as Catholics:

I immediately issued orders for a general parade. During this time, however, the
brides and grooms, being used to married life did not feel that intense interest that
is common for young expectants, and they had become scattered and separated, so
that it was with much difficulty they could be paired, and a complete hurly-burly
commenced. “ ‘Have you seen anything of my wife?’ ‘Have you seen anything of
Jim?’ ‘I can’t find him.’ ‘Have you seen anything of Polly?” All was hurryscurry, and one hour at least was spent before they were ready to fall into line;
and even then one poor woman had to march without her husband for find him
she could not. 212

He claimed he comforted the woman by telling her that if her husband “did not come in
time, she could certainly have another.” The Mexican federal government assigned
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Father Michael Muldoon, an Irish priest, to travel to the Anglo colonies and perform the
necessary sacraments. The colonists themselves, for the sake of expediency, opted for a
mass ceremony of sorts. The site of a Roman Catholic priest, much more the experience
of being baptized and married by one, must have felt unfamiliar to say the least for these
lately Protestant Anglo-Americans, born and raised in a society decidedly hostile to
Catholicism. Reports concur, however, that Muldoon’s “sage appearance and seemingly
good manners caused him to be kindly received by the colonists,” as a “necessary evil
which they could not well avoid.” With everything arranged, the padre proceeded to
baptize and then marry the colonists en masse, much the way his Spanish predecessors
had done to the Indians centuries prior. The converts then followed the ceremony with a
“splendid barbeque” and “all the necessary exhilarating libations abundantly provided so
as to make it a day of felicity.” 213 If the new converts were at all resentful of the
obligation, it was not evident.
Both traditionalist and revisionist historians have tended to see early nineteenthcentury Anglo and Mexican culture as incompatible and even antagonistic due to
differences in religion, slavery and racial ideology. “[I]n the broadest sense the [Texas
Revolution] resulted from a clash of cultural traditions,” writes Randolph Campbell in his
pivotal work on early Texas, “Anglo-Americans were simply too different from
Hispanic-Americans.” Historians of Mexican Texas such as Arnoldo de León largely
concur. De León writes that Anglo settlers’ attitudes towards the Mexicans they
213
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encountered “ranged from xenophobia against Catholics and Spaniards to racial prejudice
against Indians and blacks.” Mexicans were thus “doubly suspect as heirs to Catholicism
and as descendants of Spaniards, Indians, and Africans.” The southern character of most
Americans who immigrated to Mexico, according to de León, was the primary reason for
their hostility. “From the Southern and frontier-oriented culture [these settlers] had
acquired a certain repulsion for dark-skinned people” that they simply transferred to
Mexicans, whom they believed “had descended from a tradition of paganism, depravity,
and primitivism.” 214 Historians have consequently tended to see Mexicans, not Anglos,
as the primary assimilators. 215
But Anglo immigrants, in fact, demonstrated a remarkable willingness to adapt to
Mexican strictures. Furthermore, far from being the primary factor contributing to their
antagonism, it was precisely these early immigrants’ “southerness” that attracted them to
Mexico and facilitated cooperative and close relationships with the local Mexican
population.

As it turns out, American southerners and Mexican northerners shared more

in common with one another than they did with many of their respective compatriots in
the American northeast and Mexican center. Both groups came from intensely
patriarchal agrarian traditions that embraced some type of racialized forced labor. This, of
course, came at a time when Americans in the northeast were beginning to reject slavery
214
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and many Mexican national leaders already had.

216

Similarly, as women in the northern

United States were beginning to claim their own sphere of domesticity and religion, many
southerners would have more readily identified with the traditional social order of rural
Spanish America than that of the American northeast.
The extent to which Anglo-American immigrants were willing to adapt to
Mexican laws regarding religion and slavery not only demonstrates their commitment to
becoming Mexican and appeasing their adopted country, but suggests that AngloAmericans and Hispanic-Mexicans were not as rigidly antagonistic as historians have
assumed. In fact, they were surprisingly cooperationist. Finally, it was AngloAmericans, not Mexicans, who did most of the cultural adjusting in the years leading up
to the Texas Revolution, not the other way around. This changed, however, as Austin
and his allies began actively recruiting slaveholders in an effort to develop and enrich the
region. Such individuals, most of whom arrived in Texas between 1825 and 1834 on the
guarantee that their human property would remain secure, complicated Texas’
relationship with the rest of Mexico and forced Austin and his allies to more seriously
quarry exactly what type of society they envisioned Texas becoming.
***
Of all aspects of Mexican culture and constitutionalism, there was none so
seemingly at odds with Anglo-American tradition and sensibility than established
216
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religion. America, of course, was founded on the principles of religious freedom,
Mexico was not. 217 Indeed, the Mexican Federalist Constitution, despite being one of the
most liberal republican constitutions of its time, stipulated that all citizens declare loyalty
to the Roman Catholic Church. Not surprisingly, many prospective immigrants from the
North met such policies with derision. “No feature in any government could be more
abhorrent to men born in the land of liberty, and matured in the arms of universal
toleration, than religious restraint,” wrote one prospective immigrant. 218 Given the
intense American aversion to established religion, especially Catholicism, such
reservations are not surprising. What is surprising is that they were not expressed more
often and that Austin himself did so little to allay them, much less bring them to the
attention of Mexican authorities. Despite Mexico’s strictures on religious expression,
immigrants continued to come in droves. Furthermore, hundreds of Anglo-American
immigrants made the decision to convert to Catholicism as a prerequisite to becoming
Mexican citizens, in contradiction to their norteamericano heritage. Howard Miller, one
of the only scholars who has written on this topic, explains that, unlike their forefathers
who had “fled religious persecution for a land in which they hoped to find religious
freedom,” Anglo-American immigrants to Texas left “the ‘land of liberty’ for one
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dominated by the church most closely associated in the nineteenth-century American
mind with religious intolerance.” 219
This truth was not lost on many prospective immigrants. Austin fielded numerous
letters from Americans eager to come to Mexico but concerned about its religious
restrictions. “The most interesting subjects to the people here appear to be that of Slavery
and Religion” stated one immigrant from Alabama. 220 Another from Kentucky inquired
similarly, “[W]ill the settlers be allowed to worship their god agreeable to the dictates of
their minds, etc, or will they be compelled to acknowledge the Catholic religion as the
supreme religion of the land.” 221
Mexico was a Catholic country, but by the 1820’s the Church itself had seen
better days. As J. Lloyd Mecham explains, the state of the Catholic Church in Mexico
during the apex of Mexican federalism – was “politically weak, economically poor and
dependent on the state.” Yet the clergy were a formidable constituency within the
independence movement and one that had to be appeased if the new nation was going to
enjoy any degree of legitimacy or success. The Plan de Iguala, which had been drafted
by both royalist and liberal forces, specifically stated that only the Roman Catholic faith
would be tolerated, and that all the rights and privileges of the clergy would be protected.
The Church enjoyed considerable authority and influence under the conservative Iturbide
regime and, at the time of his abdication, possessed one-quarter of the nation’s wealth.
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This was largely due to the decline in the number of clergy after independence.
According to Mecham, “Independence during creole leadership only served to aggrandize
the Church in wealth and prestige.” Over the next three decades, its wealth would
increase until it became the most powerful institution in the country. 222
But the Church’s impact was not the same everywhere. It was considerably less
palpable on the frontier where there was a notable lack of clerical presence, sometimes
contributing to a degree of secularity that scandalized more pious observers. Indeed,
when Father Mariano Sosa visited Béxar in 1810, he complained of “numberless evils
against religion, society, and good order,” reporting that “the generality of [bexarenos]
are dissolute, without morals nor Christianity,” and a few seemed “to doubt or misbelieve
the priests and rather follow the fatal precepts of bad men.” He reported that “much is
the disregard for the 6th command of God, that fathers and daughters, brothers and sisters
are living in the most damning intercourse.” Not surprisingly, the padre cited the
bexarenos’ poverty as the primary reason for their apparent lack of religiosity. It
contributed to their inability to construct “proper partitions” between the rooms of
“parents and children,” he claimed, and to the tendency of married women to “sell their
bodies.” 223
Yet, despite this evident lack of religiosity in certain aspects of their daily lives,
historians insist that tejanos did demonstrate a firm commitment to their nation’s
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established faith, overwhelmingly supporting and accepting the Church’s privileged place
in Mexican society. In 1821, Béxar residents joined their compatriots in swearing
allegiance to their new nation and its Catholic faith in an elaborate ceremony in the town
plaza. For tejanos, as was the case with other Mexicans, being Mexican meant being
Catholic. But this apparent religiosity was also informed by a regional specificity that
often meant avoiding certain obligations such as mass and payment of tithes. However
frontier Mexicans chose to practice their faith, they had no problem accepting it as their
country’s established religion. When in 1825 Mexico decided to permit states to write
their own colonization laws, rather than eliminating religious intolerance so as to attract
more North Americans, Coahuila y Téjas specifically stated that the rights and property
of foreigners would only be honored if they became Catholics. By 1832, state legislators
were demanding proof of every male immigrant’s formal adoption of Roman
Catholicism. 224
This, of course, was easier said than done in a region where there was almost no
clerical presence. One immigrant from Texas stated that he saw a Mexican priest only
once during his time in Mexico – he was observing a cockfight. 225 The striking lack of
clergy created quite a predicament for Austin’s colonists who wished to finalize their
citizenship by converting to Catholicism. As one immigrant wrote, “The only legal
marriage in the colonies was that performed by a priest of the Catholic Church – and
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there were no priests!” 226 One way that colonists dealt with this issue was to engage in
marriage by bond, in which they registered with the alcalde and then waited to have their
marriages formalized when a priest came to town which, in some cases, took years. But at
least some colonists viewed priests in a spiritual as well as administrative capacity.
Indeed, among the complaints that the Fredonian Rebels lodged against their alcaldes was
“Endeavoring to suppress the public celebration of religion by refusing to admit a Roman
Catholic priest to perform public worship.” 227 Father Muldoon’s relationship with the
colonists is difficult to assess, but it appears that he enjoyed a fairly cordial one to say the
least among the older settlers such as the Kuykendalls and the Austins. This group often
referred to themselves as “Muldoon Catholics” expressing a conditional affiliation with
the Church dependent mostly on their personal relationship with Muldoon.228
Regardless, the significance of the Church to their adopted country, namely its
relationship to the state, and the profound way in which this differed from the churchstate relationship in the US, was not lost on many immigrants, some of whom, unable to
make the venture to Kuykendall’s farm, were nonetheless eager to be converted. “I have
understood that yourself and Padre Muldoon will shortly pay a visit to the Fort Settlement
where the neighborhood will assemble for the purpose of marriages and christening,”
wrote one such gentleman. He explained, however, that he would not be able to attend,
“Owing to the extreme indisposition of myself and the helpless situation of my family.”
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He therefore requested that Father Muldoon “call at my home on the way down.” 229 To
say the least, colonists understood and accepted their adopted country’s terms of
citizenship, as unfamiliar as it must have felt to them, and took an active role in seeing
that they conformed to it. This, of course, is not to say that they were enthusiastic or
even dutiful Catholics, but, then again, nor were many of their tejano neighbors.
While plenty of prospective immigrants expressed apprehensions at the
establishment clause, there is virtually no evidence of opposition once they arrived. “I
wish to know what the feelings of the Government are at this time upon the subject of
religion,” wrote one such individual, “Will it wink at liberty of conscience and permit
good and worthy inhabitants to peaceably assemble and worship their God in the way
most agreeable to their feelings.” Yet, immigrants rarely expressed such concerns once
they arrived. Perhaps those who had the strongest reservations decided not to emigrate,
or perhaps most were content to enjoy a kind of de facto freedom of religion in which
they were willing to conform publicly to Catholicism so long as they could practice their
own faith in private. For other immigrants, the concern was as much economic as it was
spiritual. “Will Religious toleration be allowed the Emigrants from the United States, so
far as to be exempted from the payment of tithes to the established Church,” wrote one
individual, “And to think and act for themselves in matters of conscience? Provided they
do not interfere with the Catholic Religion, and with fidelity support the laws of the land,
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as citizens ought to?”230 They expressed a characteristic desire for autonomy when it
came to matters of religion, just as they did for almost everything else. Their desire to be
left alone to worship as they wished in the privacy of their own homes was part of their
consistent desire for personal and political autonomy generally. And just as common as
enquiries about Mexico’s established religion, were those about its climate, geography,
politics and economy. All in all, immigrants demonstrated a surprising willingness to
compromise with their adopted country on this most fundamental of Anglo-American
principles, agreeing overwhelming to become at least nominally Catholic. They must
have figured that the cost was worth it, or perhaps the government guarantee of religious
freedom was not as fundamental to antebellum Americans as many have assumed.
Miller argues that, while demonstrating a surprising cultural flexibility, their
decision was ultimately a pragmatic one. Preferring religious tolerance, Austin
strategically avoided the religion issue, for fear that it would compromise his colony’s
relationship with Mexico, while making sure that his colonists satisfied the state’s
stipulation that they formally proclaim the Catholic faith. 231 Indeed, to the extent that
Austin himself may have had reservations regarding Mexico’s established Church, he
almost never expressed them and he was unequivocal about making sure that prospective
immigrants understood that Mexican citizenship meant at least formal adoption of
Catholicism. “I wish the settlers to remember that the Roman catholic is the religion of
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this nation,” he wrote, “we must all be particular on this subject and respect the Catholic
religion with all that attention due to its sacredness and to the laws of the land.” 232
But at least some immigrants did not just tepidly accept Mexico’s religious
strictures. It appears that at least some actually preferred them, rejecting the notion that
religious freedom was necessarily preferable. It was, in fact, their experience of the
antebellum religious environment that led them to these conclusions. If there was one
benefit to established religion, it was that it stifled the religious fanaticism and
competition that plagued the North, and that Austin himself abhorred. Austin had been
educated at Lexington’s Transylvania University, one of the nation’s most liberal
institutions. Indeed, it had been his father’s wish that he receive such an education “lest
he become a bigot.” 233 In a letter to his sister, Austin expressed his strong distaste for
religious fanaticism and his own desire to make Texas a haven from it. He wished to

form a little world of our own where neither the religious, political or moneymaking fanaticism, which are throwing the good people of our native country into
all sorts of convulsions shall ever obtain admission? Some philosopher, or
dreamer, has called man a bundle of habits. I think he would call the North
American of the present day a bundle of extremes. 234

Austin’s intolerance for religious “extremes” is particularly evident in his
descriptions of the few beligerent Methodist colonists who made their way to Texas,
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continuing to practice their faith despite the religious strictures, and whom he accused of
poisoning the other immigrants’ relationship with Mexico.

[I[f [the Methodists] are kept out, or would remain quiet if here for a short time
we shall succeed in getting a free toleration for all Religions, but a few fanatic and
imprudent preachers at this time would ruin us – we must show the Gov’t that we
are ready to submit to their laws and willing to do so, after that we can with more
certainty of success hope to have our privileges extended. 235

Indeed, Austin did hope to one day see Mexico adopt the same commitment to religious
freedom that the United States had. But he also sought to spare his adopted country from
the kind of religious antagonism that plagued the North, something which, according to
him and some of his fellow immigrants, was potentially even more stifling to liberty than
an established church.
But no one forged a more convincing defense of Mexico’s establishment clause
than Ira Ingram, another early immigrant and close friend to Austin. “The Roman
Catholic is the religion, and the established religion of this government,” wrote Ingram to
his uncle, a Protestant minister back in the US, “-and every settler in the colonies is
obliged to take an oath to support the constitution of the Government which protects his
life, liberty, and property and guarantees to him the right of the pursuit of happiness.”
For Ingram, established religion, ironically, offered ex-patriated Americans a freedom
that they could not enjoy in the land of their birth. “[I]t exempts us entirely from the
shameless strife and animosities, too often the offspring of a well meant zeal for the cause
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of true religion, and invariably the handmaid of intolerant fanaticism,” wrote Ingram in
May of 1830, after Austin’s colony had been established for about seven years. “We hear
no ravings and see no rompings of indecorious and indecent exhibitions under the cloak
of religious assemblage, either by night or by day; no santuarys or pathetic by unholy
intention and desires for we have no sanctuaries but private ones, and here all are
perfectly free to worship as they please.” Far from limiting religious expression, Ingram
argued that Mexican policy enhanced it by stifling the religious competition and
animosity of which Austin complained. “Why, then, it will be natural for you to enquire,
have an established religion?” Ingram continued, attempting to explain the logic of
Mexico’s founders. “The reply to this enquiry, and it is the best of all good reasons,
because the Mexican Nation, at the adaption of the Constitution of the general
Governants, knew no religion but the one they adopted.” Ingram correctly argued that
there were vocal advocates for freedom of religion in Mexico such as existed in the US,
“a few really intelligent and liberal minded patriots,” who were “obliged to concede
something to the physical mass of the nation to secure their political independence.”
Religion was their compromise - “A nation freed from the bondage of centuries, on the
cheap condition of being permitted to retain a Name! Where is the patriotic citizen and
philanthropist, who does not exclaim, on hearing this, Victory!” 236 In a nation where the
majority of its citizens were Catholic, extending religious freedom did not feel like
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liberty. If anything, it might be interpreted as oppression, especially if it opened the door
to extremist expression as was occurring in the North. Thus, in Ingram’s mind, the
decision to make Catholicism the state religion was not so much an expression of
disinterest in or opposition to religious freedom by the founders, but motivated by their
desire to achieve independence and democracy for their country, given the specifics of its
society and culture.
Furthermore, an establishment clause could, and did, serve to unite an otherwise
extremely ethnically and geographically diverse nation, thereby avoiding something far
more cataclysmic than the lack of religious freedom. Given that Catholicism was one of
the few things uniting Mexico’s population at this time, Ingram insisted that, in order to
avoid civil war, the legislator must consult at least some of “the prejudices of the people.
He must moderate, modify, remove, or subdue them.” These prejudices “were so many
Gordian knots, which must be untied – they cannot be cut.” While Ingram acknowledged
a preference for religious freedom from an ideological standpoint, Mexico’s challenge
was achieving a coherent, unified and peaceful nation. Otherwise, an attempt “to
overleap” might end up leading the people “captive to the temple of reform” and bring on
“the whole apparatus of war.”
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decision. “Yes, - with all my prejudice in favor of religious freedom about me, and with
all its imperfections clinging to it, I should have voted for the present constitution,
persuaded that it was the best, all interests reconciled and all predilections surrendered
that the circumstances of the world permit.” The Mexican founders’ decision was right
for their country, and Ingram’s declaration that he would have done the same
demonstrates not only a strong defense of their decision but a strong personal
identification with Mexico. Adopting Catholicism was a small price to pay for the
privilege of being Mexican. “[W]e have and daily enjoy more to create our deepest
gratitude toward the Government of our adopted county, than any other people on earth,”
he concluded. 238
Yet, Ingram remained fully optimistic that Mexico would, sooner rather than later,
abolish its establishment clause and embrace religious openness. “From all that I can
learn, I have but little doubt that “Free Toleration, on the subject of religion, if it has not
already been adopted by this Government, very soon will be.” But he cautioned against
embracing the change too quickly, before “the mass of the nation is prepared for its
adoption,” warning that
there is some reason to apprehend danger from doing, or attempting to do too
much. Perhaps there is more danger of this than that too little will be done. If the
majority of the nation are unprepared for so great a change, it may produce a
violent reaction. This might be followed by the loss of everything. But if the

238

Ira Ingram to Roswell Ingram, 29 May 1830, Asbury Papers.

135
mass of the nation is in reality favorable to the change, no great, or general,
inconvenience can arise. 239

If Mexico was going to achieve its democratic promise it had to reflect the wishes of its
people, rather than imposing change on them. Perhaps above all, Ingram’s words
demonstrate a profound cultural and political relativism, crediting Mexico’s leaders for
their wisdom and prudence: “The wise statesman whilst he is diffusing light, will
conform his measures to the prejudices, the customs, and even to the whims of the nation,
whose happiness is committed to his keeping.” Good leaders, according to Ingram,
“must prepare innovation at a distance that it may not appear innovation.” Indeed, such
accommodation did not negate the possibility of future change, quite the opposite. “If
this has been done in Mexico then toleration will succeed,” Ingram assured, “because it
will receive the popular sanction. But if it has not, blood will again flow, to atone for the
rash and premature reform.” 240 Ingram remained ever conscious of the challenges that
Mexican lawmakers faced in uniting such a diverse nation, and insisted that Mexico’s
unique character should dictate its political course. His logic is not only surprising for
an American of his time in its virulent defense of one established faith, but it also
demonstrates a profound sensitivity to Mexico’s unique historical context, and a nuanced
understanding of what democracy meant or could mean to different nations and peoples.
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This was an attitude profoundly different from the unrelenting commitment to Anglo
notions of freedom and democracy that some of his contemporaries expressed.
Ingram’s sentiments are nothing short of remarkable, especially considering that
they came at the very moment when the separation between church and state was
becoming solidified in the United States of the North. Indeed, it had been fears of
Catholic authority and intrusion that prompted many Protestant Americans to embrace
separation as a respectable American principle and uniquely American right. This no less
was a time when Protestant leaders especially began to combine their long-standing
prejudice toward Catholics with modern fears of ecclesiastical authority and its
imposition on personal and individual freedom. Catholicism became linked in the
nineteenth-century Protestant American mind with all that was un-American. Most
specifically, it was the Church’s ability to stifle religious dissent that Americans most
loathed - something which, by the 1830’s, it did with only a fraction of its former
vigor. 241 But Ingram’s and Austin’s words present a surprising exception to this hostility,
and what’s more, an acceptance of a system that they had been trained to abhor. Indeed,
what their words seem to suggest is that the existence of an established Catholic Church
in Mexico was precisely what ensured liberty – whether religious or otherwise.
Of course, as Ingram observed, Mexican leaders were by no means uniformly
opposed to disestablishmentarianism, and in fact many preferred religious tolerance.
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One such individual was Lorenzo de Zavala, the Yucatán native who served as Vice
President of Mexico under the liberal Vicente Guerrero regime, which replaced Iturbide
in 1824. One of the clergy’s most hostile critics, Zavala’s attacks had less to do with any
commitment to religious or spiritual freedom than with discontent over the clergy’s
economic domination. Educated in Europe, Zavala travelled extensively throughout the
United States of the North. He proved to be a great admirer of that country’s political
system, particularly republicanism, and not least of all its commitment to religious
liberty. Speaking of American Protestant ceremonies, he wrote, “Compare this religious
festival to those that we have in the [Mexican] republic, which are more or less like those
of Spain and all of Italy, an hour or two in the temple, where the people take very little
part in the religious feelings that should occupy them in those circumstances.” Catholic
worship, with its formalized Latin mass, recited “without coherence, without conscience,
and without divine comfort” lost “all its effect because of the absolute lack of
communication between the priesthood and the people.” Zavala particularly disapproved
of the way the Church both emulated Europe and seemed to perpetuate its elitism. But he
saved his most vitriolic criticism for the Church’s evident economic exploitation of the
Mexican people,

Ah! The pen falls from the hand in order not to expose the civilized world a hoard
of idolaters who come to deliver into the hands of lazy friars the fruits of their
year’s work to enrich them, while they, their women and children have no
clothing, not even a bed. And the Spaniards, our fathers, have dared call this
religion!!!
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Zavala’s criticisms were characteristic of his federalist allies, whose attraction to
American religious freedom was primarily based on its insurance of political freedom and
economic liberty. “The American people are most religious, even to the extent of being
fanatic in some places and congregations,” he agreed with Austin, “but worship is
entirely in the hands of the people. Neither the general government nor that of the states
intervenes in any manner.” But it was the democratic spirit of religion that he seemed to
admire most, “They name their ministers, support them, and exercise over them the
authority that a company would have that pays their workers.” In the Catholic system,
however, “bishops are appointed by the Pope, and the people receive these or not as they
please. The Episcopaleans, when they have a vacancy, meet to name their prelates. For
Zavala, the way the Church hierarchy functioned and its relationship to the Mexican
people seemed to contradict the very democracy that he wanted for Mexico. Thus, he,
like most Mexican liberals, was less concerned with the limits that an established church
placed on spiritual freedom - he acknowledged the fanaticism that plagued the United
States – than he was with the effect it had on the economic and democratic welfare of the
country.
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In this regard, Zavala shared much in common with men like Austin and Ingram
with whom he would eventually become quite close - a desire to see the Catholic Church
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enjoy a circumscribed privilege. They did not object to it being the only legitimate faith
in Mexico, so long as it did not interfere with their economic, political and spiritual
liberties. It was less the existence of an established religion that these men objected to, as
it was its impact on the freedoms of Mexico’s people and the ways in which the church’s
relationship with the state lent itself to the very kind of state privilege that Austin
criticized among economic elites in the North. They found their utopia in Texas where
Catholicism existed as the only publicly recognized faith, but the church’s power itself
remained severely limited and often completely absent. This removed existence
guaranteed the spiritual freedom these men craved while avoiding the political and
economic injustice they despised.
As much as Americans like Austin and Ingram accepted and even admired
Mexico’s religious laws, they remained ultimate defenders of the principle of religious
freedom. Austin himself was quick to note the deleterious impact of established religion
when he travelled to Mexico City, where he suspected the confederate system would be
opposed “by those miserable drones [who] are the enemies of liberty, of human happiness
and of the human race.” Of the Mexicans, he had to admit, “there never was a people so
dreadfully priest ridden and enslaved by superstition and fanaticism as the great part of
this nation.” Yet, like Zavala, his criticism was of the clergy’s corruption more than
anything - “[They] literally suck the blood of the unfortunate people.” But, like his friend
Ingram, he remained optimistic, “will the great god of justice and of truth, will the lights
of the age, permit such horrible abuses to exist much longer? No – Mexico has recovered
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her civil liberty - she will soon assume her rights in full, and bursting the chains of
superstition declare that man has a right to think for himself.” 243
As much as he resented the Catholic and centralist impulses most evident in
Mexico City, Austin was certain that Mexicans would one day see the light - that the
inherent superiority of a confederate, secular system of government would triumph and,
when it did, Texas would be its inspiration. “The Government is yet unsettled though
there is now no doubt of its being a federal republic” he wrote, and “the Roman Catholic
is the established religion to the absolute exclusion of all others and will so continue for a
few years, but the natural operation of a Republic will soon change that system.” But
until Mexico did embrace religious toleration, Austin felt it his responsibility to see that
the immigrants under his authority accepted the religious dictates of their adopted
country. “[P]rivate worship will never be enquired into, but no public preaching or
exhorting will on any account be permitted, and I should feel myself compelled to silence
any preacher or exhorter who would attempt it within my jurisdiction.” 244
***
Historians have disagreed widely over slavery’s place in early Texan society,
economy and politics. While Eugene Barker and Lester G. Bugbee have argued that
slavery was peripheral to the establishment of Texas and that men like Austin only
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tenuously supported it, 245 more recent studies insist that it was as entrenched in Texas as
it was in any other part of the antebellum South. Pointing out that on the eve of the Civil
War the proportion of slaves in Texas was the same as that in Virginia, Randolph P.
Campbell argues that slavery was as strongly established in “the newest slave state, as it
was in the oldest slave state in the Union.” 246 Others have gone even further to argue that
slavery was the main impetus for Anglo-American immigration to Texas and its eventual
secession from Mexico. One such scholar writes that slave-based agriculture “served as
the foundation for the exodus of Americans into Mexican territory during the 1820s and
1830s.” 247 But such an observation overlooks the complex and winding course that
slavery took in Texas, especially during the Mexican period.
Striving for a more nuanced understanding of slavery’s place in Texas history,
Sean Kelley argues that Texas constituted a “borderland plantations society” in which
slavery existed in a “statutorily grey area” whereby it was “perpetually contested” and
“punctuated by clashes, negotiations, and tactical advances and retreats on each side.”
Kelley points out that, while freedom was technically more attainable for Texas slaves
than it was for those in the North, the harsh, unfamiliar and even violent environment that
they encountered rendered, what he calls, a “borderlands paternalism,” whereby slaves
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and masters developed a codependent relationship and slaves opted to stay with their
masters rather than escape into the harsh unknown. 248
While environmental and political stresses no doubt complicated the traditional
master-slave relationship, I would argue that it also served more as a nexus of
compatibility, rather than antagonism, between Anglo southern immigrants and their
adopted country. The nature and function of chattel slavery certainly changed, but it was
also confirmed by Mexicans themselves. It is true that the republic formally outlawed
slavery upon its founding in accordance with a long antislavery tradition dating at least as
far back as Bartolomé de las Casas. Yet, it is equally important to note that many
Mexicans, especially those on the frontier, not only came from slaveholding families
themselves, but supported and lobbied on behalf of Texas slaveholders, believing as they
did, that slavery offered the best opportunity for Texas to thrive economically.
Meanwhile, many Anglo-American immigrants, especially Austin and his earlier cohort,
demonstrated a profound willingness to work within the Mexican legal system, whether
to gain slavery’s admission or to abandon it in favor of Mexican forms of compulsive
labor, namely debt peonage. Indeed, even when it came to this most southern of
institutions, many Anglo-American immigrants were willing to adapt to Mexican law and
tradition. This meant that, ultimately, it was slaves themselves who would reveal the
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limits of this compromise and the limits of Anglo immigrants’ willingness to conform to
the strictures of their adopted nation.

Slavery, in fact, had deep roots on the frontier where New Spain permitted and
protected the enslavement of people of Indian and African descent beginning in the early
sixteenth century. On the farthest margins of the empire, Indian and African slavery
existed as a form of compensation for those who agreed to settle there and in a form quite
similar to the kind of chattel slavery found in the American South. As Ramón Gutiérrez
explains, the ownership of Indian slaves determined a man’s honor-status and, by the
nineteenth-century, race became the dominant way of defining social status in the north,
creating a structure similar to that of the antebellum South: “[M]uch of what it meant to
be honorable [in nineteenth-century northern New Spain] was a projection of what it
meant to be a free, landholding citizen of white legitimate ancestry, and by contrast what
it meant not be a slave, an outcast, or an Indian.” 249 Slavery in New Spain, as in the
American South, was understood and justified in terms of a man’s exclusive right to
control his dependents. Eighteenth century laws placed children and servants alike under
the complete control of their fathers or masters as demonstrated by a 1783 Nacogdoches
law that prohibited children from renouncing or blaspheming their parents, and placed
servants “under the economic and civil authority of their masters whom they must respect
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as they would their parents,” prohibiting them from “leaving or seeking employ from
another” until their terms of service were up. 250

Thus Mexicans were used to a system

that placed servants under the same kind of absolute submission that children were
expected to demonstrate toward their parents. While this was no southern-style chattel
slavery, to say that northern Mexicans were unfamiliar with compulsive labor would be
incorrect.
The patriarchal household gained pre-eminence in 1776 with the Caroline
Pragmatic, which deprived the Church of its formerly exclusive rights over marriage,
effectively expanding parental control so that “the patriarchal household became the
natural and analogical symbol of good government. As a father exercised his authority
and domination within the household over wife, children, servants, and retainers, so the
king viewed the state as his private domain.” The Church and state helped maintain
patriarchy by supporting this. 251 As one historian explains, religious authority within the
family was a cornerstone of patriarchal control. Men were often compared to monarchs
and rulers, and women to subjects. Furthermore, the latters’ perceived sexual
vulnerability, something which reflected on men’s honor, dictated that women be
cloistered within the home. 252 The Mexican patriarch was one who “completely
controlled his wife’s legal acts, property and person, being able to claim her domestic
services, obedience and sexual fidelity (although the double standard granted him sexual
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freedom); he made all important decisions to enforce his will upon its members using
whatever means he deemed necessary.”
Given the preeminence of patriarchy in northern Mexico, it made sense that filial
and kinship terms used to refer to slaves derived from “authority relationships within the
household, particularly a father’s right to rule over wife, family, and thralls.” Indeed,
Mexican slaveholders, just like their southern counterparts, “often characterized relations
with slaves as governed by the same rules that governed family” and “A patriarch’s
natural law authority over his family gave him the right to correct and punish an erring
wife, child or slave.” 253
While the urban North was beginning to embrace the notion of separate spheres
for men and women, the mainly agrarian societies of the American South and Mexico
continued to see the male-headed household as the central organizing component of
society. Women as well as children, slaves and servants where they existed, remained
firmly under the control of the male household head. This system acted as an equalizing
force in the Old South by allowing all white property-owning men the same legal
protection and privilege. “Unlike the newly privatized middle-class homes of the urban
northeast, from which so-called ‘productive’ labor had been largely expelled by the
1850’s,” writes Stephanie McCurry, “yeoman households were the locus of production as
well as of reproduction and consumption.” Anglo Southern settlers encountered and
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perpetuated this social order in their new home. 254 As Lorenzo de Zavala described it,
Texas was a place where “Each citizen is a king like unto Adam.” 255
It should not be surprising, therefore, that Anglo colonists, just like their tejano
neighbors, used the language of filial relationship to justify their ownership of other
human beings. “Those inhabitants respectfully represent to your sovereignty that the
Slaves introduced into this establishment were not brought here for the purpose of Trade
or speculation,” Austin wrote in his 1824 Petition Concerning Slavery, “neither are they
Africans but are the family servants of the emigrants and raised by them as such from
their infancy.” 256 Austin and the other colonists hoped that, like its imperial predecessor,
the Republic of Mexico would allow Anglo settlers to immigrate with their slaves despite
the fact that its founders opposed the institution in principle.
Mexican independence raised questions for slavery primarily because so many
revolutionaries voiced strong philosophical oppositions to it. Regardless, a small number
of modest slaveholders were among the early immigrants to Texas. Josiah H. Bell
brought three slaves in addition to his wife and two sons, and Jared E. Groce brought
ninety bondsmen, allowing him to establish a cotton plantation on the Brazos River, the
produce of which he sold to customers in the Mexican interior. On May 13, 1822, Austin
issued the first of a number of memorials to the Mexican Constituent Congress in which
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he expressed his and other colonists’ desire to bring their slaves with them and receive
land for them. Mexican lawmakers responded by attempting to strike a compromise
between their desire to develop their northern frontier and their own philosophical
opposition to slavery. The result of their efforts was Article 30 of the Imperial
Colonization law which allowed emigrants to bring their human property with them, but
strictly forbade the purchase or sale of slaves within the empire and stipulated that any
children of slaves born in Mexico had to be freed when they turned fourteen years old. 257
Austin was pleased with the limited way in which slavery was permitted in Texas and
was able to use such allowances to reassure prospective colonists – especially those
moderately wealthy southern agrarians that he most hoped to attract, even if he had to
censure some of the information he gave them. “I found it necessary to be extremely
cautious in writing about your grant or the guarantees you could give settlers as to slavery
laws, etc. –,” wrote Joseph Hawkins, “My prudence was well timed – If things are as you
desire, we can now secure a population of a different cast[,] one which would prosper in
any Country.” 258

But Austin knew that such legislation was only a temporary comfort

and that few slaveholders, no matter how appealing Mexico was, would feel confident
leaving a country where their right to human property was specifically protected for one
where it was so precarious. Austin set to work trying to negotiate for more favorable
legislation. “The principle difficulty is slavery,” he wrote to one prospective immigrant,
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“this they will not admit.” But Austin hoped to convince the legislature to amend it “so
as to make them slaves for life and their children free at 21 year.” 259
Things got more complicated with the establishment of the Mexican Republic and
Federal Executive’s immediate decision to emancipate all slaves. Austin and his
colonists reacted by issuing a swift petition reminding the Executive that the slaves
introduced “were intended to aid in clearing the land and establishing their farms which
these Colonists could not have affected without them,” given the shortage of labor on the
frontier. They insisted that slaves had been brought there “As a necessary part of the
Capital required by the desert state of the Country to establish their farms and Ranches.”
Furthermore, they reminded Mexican leaders that many of their “friends and Relations”
who had visited the country earlier to select land and build their homes were “now on the
road bringing their slaves with them relying on the Colonization law under which
Austin’s establishment is formed. They would “be totally and forever ruined if on their
arrival here after so much fatigue labor and expense in removing they are to lose their
slaves.” They concluded their petition by pleading “that your sovereignty may take their
Case into Consideration and declare that the slaves and their descendants of the 300
families who emigrate to the Establishment formed by the Empresario Stephen F Austin
in this province shall be slaves for Life.” 260
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In their efforts to gain exemption from the federal decree, Austin and other Anglo
colonists solicited the aid of their tejano neighbors. Indeed, not a few tejanos owned
slaves themselves and aggressively supported and assisted Anglo efforts to formally
legalize the institution in Texas. Erasmo and Juan Seguín, two of the most noted and
powerful bexarenos, did not only own slaves, but saw in slaveholding colonists an
unprecedented opportunity for Texas to escape the poverty and destitution that had
plagued it since the Mexican War of Independence. At one point, Seguín even traveled
to New Orleans to learn about the cotton trade so that he might establish his own in
Texas. He, like Austin, was a firm believer in the capacity for a southern style economy,
replete with chattel slavery, to bring prosperity to Texas. If permitted in Texas, Seguín
believed, slavery would attract men of means who could make the region prosper as it
never had before. 261
There is evidence, specifically from James Austin’s correspondences during his stay
in San Antonio, that Seguín was not alone among bexarenos in his support of slavery. “I
have had much conversation with Saucedo and others on this subject,” wrote James to his
older brother in reference to the slavery question, “I see no reason why you should
apprehend the abolition of the Slaves of the 300 families; the thing is decided with regard
to that point – those slaves are guaranteed to the settlers by the Law of Colonization and
they cannot be deprived of them – this is the opinion that prevails in this place.” The
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Baron de Bastrop, who had helped Austin convince Mexican authorities to grant him a
colonization contract and Texas’ sole representative in the state legislature, was one of
the immigrants’ most strident supporters when it came to slavery. “If a favorable slave
law is passed it will be attributed in a great measure to the unremitted exertions of the
Baron” wrote James. 262 In another letter he instructed his brother to “Try and keep the
slaveholders from going until they hear the result of the slave question, - Tell them they
are safe yet,” he assured him, “- and there is but little doubt but part of the laws will be
favorable” for “The Ayuntamiento of this place have made as Warm a Representation in
favor of it as you have.” 263 Ultimately, however, everyone knew that the question
depended on the decision of the Mexican federal government which stood firmly
committed to abolitionism. 264
What the Constituent Congress ultimately decreed was not general emancipation
of all slaves, but rather a prohibition of all “Commerce and traffic in slaves proceeding
from any country and under any flag whatsoever.” American slaveholders chose to
interpret this language to mean that they could introduce slaves to Mexico, they just
could not sell or purchase them as merchandise. For the time being, slavery was safe in
Texas, or so it seemed. 265
But Mexico’s generally anti-slavery stance made it difficult for Austin to recruit
the very class of people that he most wanted. “Nothing appears at present, to prevent a
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portion of our wealthy planters from emigrating immediately to the province of Texas but
the uncertainty now prevailing with regard to the subject of slavery,” wrote James H.
Phelps on January 16th 1825. He specifically referred to rumors that Mexico forbade the
introduction of “negro property” and that it subjected “the persons so offending to the
severest penalties, and also an immediate emancipation of thos[e] slaves now belonging
to the citizens of the province of Texas.” Phelps asserted that “If this be a fact, it will
check the tide of emigrating spirits at once: and indeed it has had its influence already.”
Phelps concluded by emphasizing the need to check the circulation of such
misinformation as “That portion of the Mexican Republick is becoming every day more
and more an object of interest with this portion of the United States,” 266 meaning the
slave South. Austin and others had to effectively dissuade prospective immigrants of
Mexico’s commitment to anti-slavery. Regardless of their unflagging interest in Mexico,
many could not convince themselves to immigrate to a country that did not permit them
to keep their human property.
On March 31, 1828, Austin came up with a way to get around Mexico’s antislavery laws by requesting that slaves be admitted under the country’s current system of
debt peonage. It was approved two months later. Under this new system, slaveowners
had to take their slaves before a notary public in the United States and draw up a contract
stipulating that each bondsman wished to accompany his master to Texas. Although
technically not enslaved once he entered Mexico, he owed his master for his value plus
266
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the cost of travel which he would theoretically pay for with his own labor. Within a few
years, slaveowners began employing indenture contracts to bring in bondsmen.
Campbell argues that such contracts allowed slaveowners to keep their slaves “as firmly
in servitude as if they had never left the United States.” For several years debt peonage
served as the answer to slaveholders’ concerns. 267
Indeed, indentured servitude offered an appealing way to avoid the slavery issue
altogether and comforted many potential immigrants. “The intelligence I immediately
made public, and am induced to believe it will be of great service to this Country,” wrote
a fellow colonist and close associate of Austin’s in reference to the generous state law, “It
has made a material change in the feelings of many valuable Emigrants.” 268
But in truth, indentured servitude was not as secure as chattel slavery since it
technically permitted slaves to exercise their legal power. “The intent to have slaves is
even more disguised under the manner in which the [Mexican] government guarantees
the contracts the colonists might have in North America with salaried workers,” observed
General Manuel Mier y Téran in his 1828 tour of Texas. A close reading of such
contracts reveals that they were in fact designed to replicate slavery, typically binding
servants for ninety-nine years of service such as the contract between D. Sancifer and
“Clarisa a Girl of Color.” It declared the two “bound to each other” for ninety-nine years
“if she shall so long live, during said time she obliges herself to serve his successors or
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assigns as a good, honorable, diligent, and faithful servant . . . hereby denouncing and
disclaiming all her rights.” Clarisa’s owner was bound to provide her “with good and
sufficient meals, board, and lodging and medicine and attention in case of sickness,” and
if she became disabled, “to support her in a “decent and comfortable manner.” While
some contracts stipulated a mutual obligation between owner and servants, others
portended an instructional purpose. One such contract bound nine young men of color,
all of them under twenty years old, to James Morgan “to learn the art and mystery of
farming and planting,” and seven women “to learn the art and mystery of housekeeping
and a seamstress.” 269
Whatever their specific terms, servitude contracts, by their very nature were
riddled with loopholes. Terán reported that some servants, realizing “that their labor was
worth more,” sought to have their contracts dissolved upon arrival in Texas. According
to him, Mexican courts often sided with the petitioners in such cases, to the alarm and no
doubt grave disappointment of their masters. 270 There are actually only a few cases of
Mexican courts overturning such contracts, but that was enough to prompt Anglo
slaveholders to question how safe their property rights were in their adopted country. 271
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In addition, Mexico’s increasingly aggressive anti-slavery federal legislation continued to
deter prospective immigrants who realized that in the right hands, it could have
detrimental effects on their right to human property.
Problems reached a head in the Fall of 1829 when federalist president Vicente
Guerrero issued a blanket emancipation decree. Ramón Músquiz, the political chief of
San Antonio and a pro-slavery advocate, withheld publication of the decree and instead
wrote a letter to Governor Viesca asking that he appeal for Texas’ exemption. Músquiz
pointed out that such a law was unconstitutional because it violated Texan slaveholders’
property rights. Besides, they could not help develop the region “without the aid of the
robust and indefatigable arms of that race of the human species which is called negroes,
and who, to their misfortune, suffer slavery.” Finally, Músquiz argued that to suddenly
liberate those now in bondage would present a serious threat to public order. Governor
Viesca agreed and issued a formal request to President Guerrero for Texas’ exemption,
something he argued he would have done even without Músquiz’s request because of
Texas’ special need for slaves. In addition to this concern, Viesca worried about the
implication of such a decree on the behavior of slaveowning Texans, since strong feelings
result when men are “in danger of being ruined, as would happen to many of them whose
fortune consists entirely of slaves.” 272
Viesca’s fear was warranted. Before he could obtain the exemption, the decree
somehow made its way into the hands of the alcalde of Nacogdoches and caused near
272

Ramón Músquiz to Governor of Coahuila and Texas, 25 October 1829, AP, Vol. II, 273-75.

155
panic. But Austin once again counseled calm and insisted that if Músquiz and Viesca
failed in their efforts, the people should employ the channels of the Mexican political
system, appealing to their constitutional rights. “The constitution must be both our
shield, and our arms, under it, and with it we must constitutionally defend ourselves and
our property,” he wrote. 273 Indeed, Austin consistently expressed full confidence in the
ability of the Mexican legal system to protect the seemingly unique interests of American
colonists.
In the meantime, however, Anglo slaveholders and their tejano allies scrambled to
prevent news of the decree from circulating, lest it create confusion and concern. Hence,
Músquiz’s immediate advice was to suppress publication of the decree “because it may
alter the tranquility of this population” if they knew that “the President of the Republic
has just abolished slavery in the whole Nation.” 274 Particularly in light of events such as
the Fredonian Rebellion, it is understandable why Texan leaders would want to prevent
news of this from spreading to the Anglo slaveholder population.
As colonists attempted to censure the news and keep calm in the colony, tejano
leaders set to work trying to convince federal leaders of the destructive potential of their
recent declaration and attempted to gain exemption from it. Músquiz agreed with Austin
regarding the unconstitutionality of the decree and that “it is beyond the extraordinary
faculties laid out in the Law of the 25th of August, and is most offensive to the
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sovereignty of the states.” 275 Other tejanos agreed. “From the moment that the Géfe
político of this place told me about the decree abolishing slavery,” Jose Antonio Padilla
wrote, “I gave my opinion with the strength and good faith that it merited; that there
should be no obedience nor compliance, because it is unconstitutional; and directly
attacks the right of property.” Padilla gave his word that he would “oppose with all my
strength the publication and compliance of a law so tyrannical, cruel, illegal and
monstrous.” 276
Meanwhile, Gov. Viesca addressed a lengthy and formal letter to the Minister of
Relations reminding him of Texas’ exceptional circumstances and warning him in no
uncertain terms that such a decree, if put into effect, would surely ruin the state of
Coahuila y Téjas. While expressing admiration for the desire to liberate all men from a
state of bondage, he asked “what is the philanthropy of liberating men whose condition
will be reduced to one even more obscure and barbaric.” Even “the most civilized
nations on the planet have not been able to destroy the institution of slavery.” 277
The news they anticipated arrived not a day too soon. Terán replied in late
December, clarifying that Téjas y Coahuila was in fact exempt from said decree “so long
as there is no more introduction of slaves.” 278 Almost as quickly as panic had set in, it
was allayed. Austin received a warm congratulations from Músquiz “for this success of
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such importance for this department particularly and for your colony that was in eminent
danger of being ruined.” 279
Relieved at the news himself, Austin made haste to express his gratitude to the
one man whose efforts he did not doubt had caused Texas’ exemption. “I do not have
words to express my recognition and gratitude to you for this act to such great importance
to Texas and for your efforts in making it known,” he wrote to Terán, assuring him that
its enforcement would have resulted “in the ruination of many people, the loss of
confidence in the government and the abandonment of this particular part of the republic
to the barbarians.” Austin concluded his letter with a characteristic guarantee of Texans’
faith in their adopted country. He assured him that “never was there the least threat to
good order in this colony concerning the September 15 decree because these inhabitants
rested with the justice and good faith of the government that they have adopted.” He
insisted that “it never crossed their minds that it was the idea of the government to
deprive them of any part of their property.” 280
The damage had been done, however, when it came to prospective immigrants.
Mexico’s inconsistent policies and colonial leaders’ inability to prevent such news from
reaching Anglo colonists or potential colonists in the North was already having
deleterious effects on the inflow of slaveholding immigrants. “[W]e have been led into
an error by a proclamation of the Mexican president as to the liberation of slaves,” wrote
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Richard Ellis, a close associate of Austin’s tasked with recruiting colonists. “Perhaps he
only meant bound servants such as has been by the civil law for 200 years, but you know
such is the sensitive feelings of the slaveholders on that subject, that the least agitation
will deter them from emigration, and I really begin to believe with you that it is shortly to
be a great evil among us.” 281
The damage had been done when it came to slaves as well. The federal decree
not only emboldened slaves by signaling that Mexican authorities supported abolition, it
provided them with a critical loophole with which to achieve their freedom. Records
indicate that by 1830, slaves knew that entering Mexico changed their legal status and at
least a few of them attempted to take advantage of Mexico’s complicated and ever
changing legislation to secure their freedom. Tomás Maque, for example, petitioned on
behalf of himself and several other slaves, requesting that they be set free because they
surpassed the maximum age (fifty years) that Mexican law permitted one to be enslaved.
Evidently having failed, Maque appealed to Mexican courts again two years later in an
attempt to obtain his freedom. He claimed that his former owner was deceased and, being
that he was on Mexican soil, this made him a free man. The courts agreed on the grounds
that “his master Elias Loyd is dead and died in the prison in Rapid, Louisiana one of the
Northern states.” The alcalde of Béxar thus declared Macque “totally free,” that “he
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may circulate freely outside of the slavery in which he was held” and “enjoy the rights of
freedom that the State Constitution provides for all Mexicans.” 282
A similar case occurred in April of that same year when Peter, a former slave
from Austin’s colony escaped to San Antonio with his son in search of freedom. Peter
and his son Tom appealed to the alcalde of San Antonio, demanding their “protection”
and “claiming the laws that favor them.” According to the alcalde, Peter “demanded that
he and his son be declared free and that the declaration of freedom be extended to include
the rest of his family that was still held by his owner.” The fact that slaves were aware of
Mexico’s tenuous support of slavery and figured that they could appeal to Mexican
federal law to obtain their freedom, no matter what the circumstances, must have been
extremely disconcerting to Texan slaveholders. 283
But what was at least as disconcerting to Mexican authorities was the way in
which Peter’s master reacted by entering San Antonio and kidnapping the men before the
courts could determine their status. The offense evidently enraged Músquiz who, despite
his own support for slavery and personal experience growing up in a household with
slaves, was incensed at the settlers’ disregard for Mexican authority. “[S]candalized by
the audacity with which [B]rown and his criminal companions have violated the law,
have scoffed at the enforcing authorities, and have grossly sneered at public punishment,”
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he ordered the immediate pursuit and arrest of the kidnappers. 284 Furthermore, Músquiz
argued that

The crime committed by [Henry] Brown and his accomplice is of such a nature
and scope that it tramples over the laws of a hospitable country that has received
them in her bosom regarding them as adoptive sons, and they return the favour by
making a mockery out of the authorities charged with preserving the security of
this town and of the entire department. 285

Although instances like these were extremely rare, they did illuminate the tension that
emerged between some immigrants’ status as slaveholders and their Mexican citizenship.
Perhaps due to this very tension, Austin himself expressed reservations about
slavery even as he worked tirelessly to guarantee its safe presence in Texas. His primary
concern, however, had to do with what slavery might mean for the racial future of the
region. “The idea of seeing such a country as this overrun by a slave population almost
makes me weep –,” he wrote to Richard Ellis, expressing an opposition that had more to
do with slavery’s deleterious effects on whites. “It is in vain to tell a North American
that the white population will be destroyed some fifty or eighty years hence by the
negroes, and that his daughters will be violated and butchered by them.” In this regard,
Austin’s opposition to the institution was far more Jeffersonian than abolitionist. He
acknowledged the pragmatic necessity of slavery to establishing the colony. “[I]n the
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beginning of this settlement I was compelled to hold out the idea that slavery would be
tolerated, and I succeeded in getting it tolerated for a while by the Gov’t.” Yet, he
clarified that he had done so “to get started for otherwise it would have been next to
impossible to have started at all.” 286 But Austin ultimately feared the consequences that
it would render, especially as Mexico and its laws emboldened Texan slaves.
Austin, however, primarily embraced Mexico’s anti-slavery policy because of
what it meant for the political future of Texas, which he hoped to maintain as untouched
by federal authority as possible – especially that of the United States of the North.
“Slavery is now most positively prohibited by our Constitution and by a number of laws,
and I do hope it may always be so.” If slavery is admitted, he argued, “Texas will
become what all slave countries are and of necessity must be[,] destitute of physical force
and dependent on some other power even for the preservation of its internal tranquility.”
Ultimately, Austin knew that admitting slavery would drag it ever closer to the United
States of the North, where it was, for the time being, constitutionally protected. Slavery,
as Austin well knew, could not survive under state exemption alone, it had to have a large
and strong federal structure to support it, which simply did not exist in Mexico and most
likely never would. While slavery would no doubt make Texas economically productive
and independent within Mexico, he feared that it would draw it ever closer to the political
and cultural embrace of the North.
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Things worsened for the prospects of both slavery and immigration in the spring
of 1830, when the liberal Guerrero regime was overthrown by conservative centrist
Anastacio Bustamante. Concerned that the growth of slavery in the north was drawing
the region closer to the United States, one of Bustamante’s first acts was issuing a decree
which prohibited further immigration from the United States all together. Conceding that
emancipation would not help national security, the decree allowed settlers to keep their
slaves in bondage but insisted on strict enforcement of rules forbidding their importation.
Meanwhile, immigrants continued to sprinkle in, some of them bringing slaves with
them, thereby violating the law twice. 287
Yet Austin continued to see Texas’ promise resting with Mexico, not the US. He
thus continued to insist that all slaves were technically free once they entered Mexico. In
a separate letter to Ellis, he wrote, “I am of the opinion that Texas will never become a
Slave state or country. I will be candid with you on this point, and say that I hope it
never may.” While Austin admitted his initial advocacy of slavery, he made clear that he
looked forward to the day when it was no longer necessary in Texas. “In the
commencement of this settlement I was in favour of the limited admission of slaves,” he
wrote, “My reasons were, the difficulty of procuring hands in the beginning for the
necessary purposes of farming, and the necessary of holding out inducements that slaves
might be brought, in order to give the settlement a start, and to draw emigration.”
However, he insisted that “The reasons for a partial toleration of this evil, have now
287
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ceased, and the true prosperity and happiness of Texas require; that an everlasting bar
should now be interposed [on] the further introduction of slaves.” 288 Indeed, as late as
June of 1830, Austin was still insisting that Texas resist becoming a slave state,
remaining in accordance with Mexican federal policy. “Article 13 of the constitution has
determined the question regarding slaves and there is no doubt that we neither can nor
should introduce a slave class,” he wrote, although they were permitted to bring in
“domestic servants and some field workers.” Those that they introduced, would
eventually gain emancipation in conformance with the article, he explained. “Now that I
better understand the law, it does not appear a bad one,” Austin concluded, “The prospect
of politics offer hope for peace and union throughout the nation. 289
He expressed satisfaction that Mexico’s debt peonage laws were sufficient to
meet Texas’ labor needs and, significantly, an element of optimism about what the state’s
acceptance of such would mean for the overall cohesion of the republic. After having
worked to gain Texas an exemption from Mexican federal law so as to continue to attract
the demographic of settlers that he wanted for the country, Austin would never abandon
his fundamental aim of seeing Texas remain a country free of slaves. Slavery had been a
“necessary” and temporary evil that he now hoped would be replaced by a system of
indentured servitude that was not only less severe but more in line with the Mexican
federal constitution. Yet even as he called for an end to slavery, Austin made it clear that
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Texas was to be a white man’s republic. He was happy to report that “Measures have
been taken to exclude free negroes and mulattoes” whom he called a “worse nuisance
than slaves.” If Texas was prudently managed, he argued, it would “be saved from the
overwhelming ruin which mathematical demonstration declares must overtake the slave
state.” He even predicted that Mexico might serve as a kind of refuge for the white
population of the North from the demographic effects of slavery, so that white Americans
might not be “driven to the frozen regions of the north.” 290 If anything, Austin
envisioned Texas as a haven from slavery, not an extension of it. Fear of the racial
consequences of slavery loomed large in Austin’s mind as it did for many American
southerners, especially in light of the Haitian Revolution. “I sometimes shudder at the
consequences and think that a large part [of] America will be Santo Domingized in 100,
or 200 years,” he wrote in a separate letter, “The wishes of my colonists have hurried me
into this thing – but I am now in for the question and there is no retreat, for my rule is to
go ahead after once coming to a decisive resolution on a matter of such consequence as
this.” 291
However, prospective immigrants, particularly of the type that Austin wished to
recruit, could not be so easily convinced to abandon the only system of forced labor they
had ever known and the only one that allowed them the power and control that they felt
they needed to secure their workforce. Samuel Rhodes Fisher, who immigrated to Texas
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in 1830 and eventually settling in Matagorda, stated that he, like Austin, “detest[ed]
Slavery,” but was nonetheless “firmly persuaded that the free admission of slaves into the
State of Texas, authorized by act of our legislature, would tend more to the rapid
introduction of respectable emigrants than any other course which could be pursued.”
Fisher also seemed less convinced that the kind of southern style agriculture that they
hoped to introduce to Texas could be as readily accomplished with any other kind of
compulsive labor. “Our rice and sugar lands require that kind of labour [slavery]” he
wrote. Yet even Fisher called for nothing more than “a temporary introduction of
slaves,” and limiting “the period of admission to 5 years, or to any other number that you
deem expedient.” 292 Indeed it appears that most colonists were slightly less eager to let
go of slavery than Austin himself was, even if they agreed on its ultimate undesirability.
“[Th]at you are in favor of a free population is no surprise to me, believing that every
reflecting man of equal intelligence must be so,” he wrote, “but I was not prepared to
know that your determination was so decided as you have expressed it at the present
juncture.” Fisher, who was from Pennsylvania, reminded Austin that “[M]ost of your
colonists are from Slave-holding States – they have enrolled themselves in your register
under the firm conviction that slavery would be tolerated, and that they would be secure
in the ownership of those brought by them.” Texas was rapidly becoming
“southernized,” but it would be hard to achieve a southern economy without southern
style labor. “From your approximity to the southern states, and from the favorable
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feeling already pervading her citizens, Texas may fairly anticipate a population from that
quarter, more speedy and more numerous than from the northern and Eastern,” Fisher
wrote, “[D]o you believe that cane and cotton can be grown to advantage by a spare
white population?” he asked Austin pointedly. But as far as he knew, “there is no
country in the world where these articles are grown unless by the assistance of Slaves.” 293
Texas therefore had two options - “we must either abandon the finest portion of
Texas to its original uselessness or submit to the acknowledged, but lesser evil of
Slavery.” Fisher proposed allowing admission of slaves for five years after which point
“the law of permission be then repealed and one substituted, making their introduction
under any pretense highly penal.” 294 As much as Fisher did not like slavery, he insisted it
was a temporary evil that Texas had to adopt for at least its first few years. Indeed, in his
correspondence with Mexican officials, just as he had in letters to his fellow colonists,
Austin insisted that Texas ultimately did not need slavery to thrive. In a December 1830
letter to Piedras, Austin wrote that “there should be no change in the law nor article 13 of
the state constitution and slaves should be converted to free persons from the moment
that they enter the territory . . . it appears to me that all negroes are servants and cannot be
anything else, and they should be admitted as such.” 295
As Austin continued to declare his commitment to a “free” Texas, Mexican
officials remained more concerned with the unity and cohesion of their young republic
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than ensuring slavery remain outlawed. “[R]egarding the introduction of slaves,” wrote
Terán, “my opinion is that if they are allowed in Texas they need to be permitted in all
the states that have coasts and require much labor to cultivate, otherwise it is a privilege.”
Dismissing the claims that Texans faced inordinate obstacles in the establishment of their
economy, Terán cautioned patience. “[T]he admission of slavery would undoubtedly
rapidly augment the production of Mexican coasts,” he admitted. But it would also
“bring with it a means of promoting that which no country wants to use the government
to prevent,” Terán wrote, most likely referring to slave insurrection and the likely need
for a large central military to suppress it. 296 While Terán acknowledged slavery’s
undeniable benefits to developing the region, he, like Austin, feared its consequences.
Yet his primary concern remained national cohesion. “[S]lavery should be permitted in
all the states along the coast of the Gulf of Mexico; if one is allowed then they all should;
and vice-versa,” he wrote in 1831, as Mexico was facing serious social and political
turmoil surrounding the competition between federalists and centralists. “I am persuaded
that sooner or later slaves will be admitted, for this I am convinced that the coasts of
Mexico will not prosper without them.” However, in this time of “political convulsions,”
Terán believed that “there should be no question of this topic.” 297
Thus, the desires of the early colonists and some national officials in Mexico City
were by 1831 not so far apart. Both acknowledged the benefits and risks of slavery, and
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both parties wanted to, above all, secure and preserve Mexican peace and unity. While
pretty much everyone agreed that Mexico needed some form of compulsive labor, they
could not readily agree on which one, and by the middle of 1831 the question was still
unresolved. “Negreos can be brought here under indentures, as servants, but not as
slaves,” wrote Austin, “This question of slavery is a difficult one to get on with. It will
ultimately be admitted, or the free negroes will be formed by law into a separate and
distinct class – the laboring class.” Whatever their technical status, he argued, “The law
must assign their station, fix their rights and their disabilities and obligations – something
between slavery and freedom, but neither the one nor the other. . . Which is best? Quién
Sabe? It is a difficult and dark question.” 298
Uncertainty regarding the future of slavery, however, inspired anxiety among
many prospective immigrants, especially when the state of Coahuila y Téjas issued a
decree in April 1832 stating that all “servants and day laborers” thereafter introduced by
foreigners would remain slaves for no more than ten years after their entry. More than
established religion, time and again prospective immigrants expressed concern about
Mexico’s commitment to abolition and what it would mean for prosperity and success in
their adopted country. Even as they praised Mexico for its abundance of natural
resources, economic opportunities, and superior political system, they seemed to believe
that only slavery could render the fruits of such opportunity. Richard Ellis of Tecumsia,
Alabama, for example, did not mince words when it came to admiration for Mexico and
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what it had to offer, from its natural resources to its government. “[I]ndeed frankness and
candor impels me not to withhold from you the expressions of the opinions and thoughts
that have so repeatedly obtruded themselves on my mind,” he wrote, “(that is) that every
family ought to bless his happy star that conduced him to a country blessed with the
finest soil in North America, with plenty, health, peace and happiness.” Ellis expressed
his certainly that “if they act wisely (as I hope and trust they will) they will foster and
cherish the Government they live in, which will be the certain means of preserving their
estimable rights” and “sure protection of their property.” Ellis confirmed that conditions
were every bit as bleak in his part of the United States as they had been when the Austins
first established themselves in Mexico, “there are hundreds of thousands of families who
do not own a foot of land nor do they have any hope of ever doing so.” Yet he believed
that the success and happiness of these families in Mexico ultimately depended on their
ability to protect the property they had – especially their property in slaves.

[I]n short time since my arrival at home I have ascertained beyond question that
40 or 50 families would emigrate with me next fall to your country if they could
introduce their slaves, many of them are large holders of that description of
property; and I consider it a duty I owe myself as well as you to assure you that I
should move to your country next fall if I can with safety bring mine. 299

Ellis concluded by assuring Austin that “I feel a deep interest in the prosperity of your
country.” For many slaveholders, their decision to immigrate to Mexico was ultimately
dependent on their ability to bring and keep their human property. “Our most valuable
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inhabitants here are our own negroes,” wrote another prospective immigrant from
Alabama, “They are an important species of property here and our planters are not
willing to remove without they can first be assured of being secured to them by the laws
of our Government.” 300 Even as they showed some flexibility when it came to religion,
this was less the case with slavery. “The most interesting subjects to the people here
[appear] to be that of Slavery and Religion,” wrote another gentleman, “the latter being a
constitutional matter I have no expectation of as early a change[.] But would like to
know what is the present state or prospect relative to the admission of slavery.” 301
Another one of Austin’s associates then in the North wrote, “Nothing appears at present,
to prevent apportion of our wealthy planters from emigrating immediately to the province
of Texas but the uncertainty now prevailing with regard to the subject of slavery.” 302
Yet, despite their uncertainty, settlers continued to come to Texas. By 1834, on
the eve of the Texas Revolution, slaves would constitute about 10% of the overall
population - approximately 2,000 individuals - over four times their number in 1825.
Almost all of the slaves in Texas were in the Anglo municipalities, although some tejanos
owned them as well. 303 However, throughout the early part of the 1830’s, the fate of
slavery, and consequently the future of Anglo immigration to Texas, hung in the cross
hairs. But slavery was just one issue that Mexican leaders had to grapple with as they
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struggled to integrate and modernize their sprawling young republic, especially their
sparsely populated and still underdeveloped northern frontier, which it seemed everyday
was drifting more and more out of its grasp.
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CHAPTER 4
“The Strongest Arm of the Mexican Republic”
Commerce, Culture and the Challenge of National Consolidation
1828-1833

In April 1828 Mexican General Manuel Mier y Terán arrived in San Antonio de
Béxar as head of a Boundary Commission appointed by the new administration of
Vicente Guerrero to assess and document conditions in Mexico’s Far North. Of
particular concern among Mexico’s leaders was their nation’s security along its border
with the United States, particularly in light of the growing number of Anglo-American
settlers and recent efforts by the US to purchase the region. Among the questions Terán
was hoping to address: How effective was the empresario program at populating the
region with loyal and productive Mexican citizens from the North? How many were
actually there legally and how many were simply squatting? Most important, to what
extent did their presence threaten Mexico’s territorial integrity? Leaders in Mexico City
were growing increasingly wary of US territorial encroachment and many believed
Anglo-American settlers were part of that country’s plan to dominate and eventually
acquire a significant portion of Mexican territory.
Their suspicions were understandable. The United States had just elected a
president with a demonstrated desire to acquire, as he put it, “all of Spanish North
America.” The first sign of this intent had occurred in 1818 when Jackson drove US
forces into Florida as part of a plan to jumpstart stalled negotiations between that country
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and Spain over the western boundary of Louisiana. Emboldened by Jackson, Secretary of
State John Quincy Adams had briefly attempted to convince the Spanish to surrender the
entire northwest corner of their empire, thereby permitting the United States to extend its
reach all the way to the Pacific. Jackson would ultimately surrender his ambitions for the
guarantee of Florida, which he believed was essential to the protection of his country’s
new southern boundary, and whose transference might be jeopardized by a push for too
much. But he would never forget Texas, and almost as soon as he entered the White
House, Old Hickory began scheming of ways to regain the territory. Meanwhile, the
Spanish and their Mexican successors would never forget General “Andrés” Jackson
whose recent election had them gravely concerned. Caught in the middle of the growing
tension between Mexican and US authorities were Anglo-Texans themselves, whose
growing presence in Téjas began to look more and more suspicious to men like Terán. 304
Meanwhile, Mexico was entering a fragile political phase as its experiment in
radical federalism began to falter.

Years after achieving independence, the young

republic remained bankrupt, and still struggled to restore basic communication and
transportation. Travel was slow and cumbersome - roads plagued by bandits and thieves,
bridges impassible. Wartime damage throughout the country remained unaddressed. At
the heart of Mexico’s turmoil was an intense political struggle between those committed
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to the realization of its federalist promise and those who insisted that a more centralized
form of government was necessary to achieve a functional and modern nation state.

305

The struggle between the centralists and federalists played out in a series of coups
between 1829 and 1835. The first of these occurred in January 1829 when Congress
annulled the election of Gómez Pedrasa and recognized Vicente Guerrero, a federalist. It
was Guerrero’s regime that sent Terán north to draw and develop a plan for fortifying the
boundary line first agreed to under the Adams-Onís Treaty. Specifically, he was to
document conditions on the frontier and develop a prescription for bringing the region
into the national fold. Until this point, leaders in Mexico City had only vague notions of
the Far North. Few had ever been there. In fact, this was Terán’s first time travelling so
far from his nation’s capital, for the one exception of Europe. 306
What the General encountered in the north was both unfamiliar and unnerving.
As the Mexican economy worsened after independence, the United States economy had
flourished, drawing Texans, both Mexican and tejano, into the orbit of its burgeoning
market revolution, so that by 1826 Texas was importing most of its necessities from the
United States. Anglo settlers, and only a handful of tejanos, dominated a trade network
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that threatened to pull the Mexican frontier ever closer to the US. Texans, whether
Mexican or Anglo, relied on the North for nearly everything from food to arms. 307
But this was not the only thing that threatened Mexico’s grasp on the northern
frontier. Mexican villages experienced an intensification of Indian raids during this time
as various nomadic groups began to cash in on the inflow of goods, namely lifestock and
arms. Indeed, while Mexican leaders blamed much of this violence on increased trade
with the US and attempted to regulate and limit it, they came into conflict with local
leaders who insisted that the inflow of such goods was necessary to both their survival
and self-defense, thereby fueling the disagreement between the northern states and
Mexico City over how best to police and protect the border.

308

Indeed, by 1828 the Mexican North appeared an almost separate nation to an elite
creole from the nation’s capital. Yet, despite historians’ tendency to echo the views of
Mexican national leaders in seeing the Anglo presence, and specifically their trade with
the north, as critically compromising northern Mexico’s relationship with the rest of the
country, it is important to acknowledge that many Anglos and tejanos themselves
understood it very differently. They understood their trade with the north as a critical

307

Andrés Resendéz, Changing National Identities at the Frontier, Texas and New Mexico, 1800-1850,
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), Chapter 3, quote p. 96; D.W. Meinig, Imperial Texas: An
Interpretive Essay in Cultural Geography (University of Texas Press: Austin, 1969), 23-37. For their
reliance on the US for arms see Brian DeLay, War of a Thousands Deserts: Indian Raids and the USMexican War, (Yale University Press, 2008), Chapter 3.
308
Ibid. DeLay argues that this trade had been going since the eighteenth century, but became intensified in
the 1830’s with the increased arrival of settler from the United States. Like Reséndez, he argues that it
compromised Anglo-American settlers’ relationship with Mexico.

176
part of the Mexican nation-building project. Far from compromising their young
republic, they believed it would enrich Mexico, fueling its infrastructure and
strengthening its domestic economy. Just as historians of the US empire have long
identified agrarians as the driving force behind antebellum imperialism and
industrialization, those who immigrated to Texas were often the most vocal advocates for
Mexican imperialism and development. 309

While they may have continued an almost

exclusive trade with the United States, they attempted to strengthen their ties with the
Mexican interior and saw their efforts as complementing Mexican nationalist aims, not
impeding them. Far from drawing Texas closer to the US, they aimed to make it a
continental crossroads, linking the American South with northern Mexico, in a way that
would make it “the strongest arm of the Mexican republic.” 310
Their actions, however, often had precisely the opposite effect. As historians
have observed, the more Texans pushed the commercial confines of their adoptive nation,
the harder it became to keep them within the nationalist fold, especially at a time when
Mexico’s central government remained so weak. And the more the federal government
attempted to remedy this through importation tariffs and immigration regulation, the
more they threatened to alienate those colonists even more. Even as Austin and his allies
aimed to help federal officials in their efforts to consolidate and control the sprawling
new republic, they decried the federal government’s efforts to regulate trade and police
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the frontier as a violation of the very federalist promise that had attracted them in the first
place. They wanted Mexico to become stronger, wealthier and more consolidated, but on
their terms.
Meanwhile, as more and more US immigrants began flooding into Texas, a
generational rift emerged among the settlers there. Whereas earlier settlers such as
Austin, Kuykendall, Williams and Ingram were primarily drawn to Mexico for its
political promise, a later generation, most arriving after 1830, entered the nation at a time
of profound political instability and chaos. This newer cohort did not know Mexico as
the federalist Promised Land that their forbears had, nor did they have the same
opportunity to familiarize themselves with the country, its people and culture. Therefore,
they demonstrated far less faith in the Mexican political process, and their political
purview was far more local and less national.
Further north, an increasingly territorially aggressive pro-slavery southern
contingency began to cast their eyes on Texas, seeing its absorption as an appropriate
extension of their own power. Thus, by 1832, Texas rested strategically, though
precariously, at the center of a much larger and more or less coherent geo-political unit
committed to regional sovereignty, small central government, free trade and forced labor
that struggled, and threatened, to become the most prosperous region in the northwestern
hemisphere.
***
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There were few men in Mexico more qualified to undertake an administrative tour
of the Mexican frontier than General Manuel Mier y Terán. The thirty-six year old was a
graduate of the National College of Mines, an accomplished mathematician and engineer
with a strong interest in the natural sciences. He was a veteran of the war for
independence and former member of the nation’s first congress before serving as
Mexico’s Minister of War. When he was not compiling extensive reports on Texas’
natural resources and geography, Terán kept a diary where he documented not only those
physical aspects of Texas that impressed him, but the culture and habits of the Texans
themselves. 311
Regarding the tejanos, the General described a group of people whose geographic
and cultural isolation from the nation’s core kept them in a state of stunted civic
development, while their exposure to Anglo immigrants rendered them particularly
vulnerable to the cultural and commercial influence of the North. “Ciudad de Béxar
resembles a large village more than the municipal seat of a department,” he wrote, “There
is no paved street and no public building.” Meanwhile, trade with the norteamericanos,
“and the blending in to some degree of their customs” made tejanos “a little different
from the Mexicans of the interior whom those in Texas call foreigners and whom they
scarcely like because of the superiority which they recognize in them.” Tejanos exhibited
a kind of hybrid culture which extended to food, dress and even behavior. Terán
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observed, for example, that “In their gatherings, the women prefer to dress in the style of
Louisiana, and by so doing they participate both in the customs of their neighboring
nation and of their own.” Indeed, the prolonged presence of Anglo immigrants in the
North drew tejanos closer to American culture and customs while placing a strain on
relations with their compatriots in central Mexico, who often perceived them as poor,
lazy, and unsophisticated. The further Terán traveled from the nation’s interior, the less
Mexican the Mexicans seemed and, at least in his view, the worse for it. Terán saved his
most ardent criticisms for those Mexicans near Nacogdoches who, by this time,
composed an extreme minority – one in ten – and where Mexican influence was “almost
non-existent.” He bemoaned that
the Mexicans of this town consist of what people everywhere call the abject class,
the poorest and most ignorant. The North Americans residing in the town run the
English school and send their children North for their education, the poor
Mexicans neither have the resources to create schools, nor is there anyone to think
improving their institutions and their abject conditions.

Particularly discouraging was their lack of work ethic. While he may have saved his most
extreme criticism for the Nacogdoches Mexicans, Terán observed tejanos generally to be
“carefree” and “very fond of luxury, and the worst punishment that can be inflicted upon
them is work.” He criticized the Mexican women of Texas for their indelicacy, noting
that “Their very language seems almost to forbid the cultivation of this most beautiful of
the Graces,” and the men for being “not well formed in feature or person” and “extremely
ignorant in all the advanced arts of civilization, the majority not being able to read.” As a
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result, they were “completely the slaves of Popish superstition and despotism [being]
distinguished for the knavery and breach of faith.” 312
On its surface, Terán’s reaction may appear merely the snobbish impressions of a
metropole, but the General had practical concerns about what tejanos’ indolence,
backwardness and lack of integration meant for the wellbeing and integrity of his
country, especially considering how advanced the Anglo population seemed in
comparison. The tejano “agricultural industry,” he wrote, “is so wretched that a
monopoly over them by the American colonies founded in this department is to be
feared.” Tejanos, according to Terán, could not “vie in any respect with those industrious
colonists, much more hard working than they.” Upon seeing their agricultural tools, one
would have believed “oneself to have gone ten centuries backwards in the elementary and
necessary arts.” 313
Specifically, Terán feared that their inadequacy might be just as evident to Anglo
settlers, thereby contributing to their lack of respect for the nation as a whole. “Senor
President, I must disturb you in the same way I was disturbed to see the foreign colonists’
attitude towards our nation,” Terán wrote to President Guerrero, “Most of them, with the
exception of a few who have travelled to our capital, knowing no Mexicans other than
those who live here . . . think that Mexico consists of nothing more than blacks and
Indians, all of them ignorant.” An educated, cosmopolitan like Terán hardly seemed
312
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Mexican at all compared to his northern brethren. “In some homes, where they have
done me the favor of considering me an educated man, they have told me to my face that
it could not be so unless I were French or Spanish.” 314
Such experiences must have been both humiliating and disconcerting for a proud
Mexican nationalist like Terán. Not insignificantly, however, he noted one exception:
“This should not be understood as applying to the colony of Don Estében Austin, the only
one where they try to understand and obey the laws of the country, and where, as a result
of the enlightenment and integrity of its empresario, they have a notion of our republic
and its government.” 315 It was in Austin’s colony that Terán was greeted by a woman
and her daughter who “spoke Spanish well enough to be understood in conversation.” 316
They lived on a farm owned and operated by the woman’s husband, then in the United
States on business. Unfortunately for Teràn and others who wished to tighten the federal
government’s grasp on the frontier and make a more cohesive nation, colonists like these
were becoming less the norm, overwhelmed by more recent arrivals from the North who
settled closer to the Sabine, remained unaffiliated with any empresario, and therefore had
limited formal connection to Mexico. “This country is the asylum for fugitives from the
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neighboring republic,” complained Terán, “Foreign agriculturalists settle where it suits
them, and they take over whatever land they desire.” 317
As part of their effort to strengthen their hold on the frontier, Mexican leaders
hoped to develop the region’s agricultural economy, something that, by Terán’s own
admission, seemed to require an Anglo presence. Most Mexicans, at least as far as he
could tell, seemed loath to become farmers. “More than a century after it was colonized
the region remains static, and it will never be covered with fields except in more active
and hard-working hands. What surer wealth than the products of a flourishing
agriculture?” 318 Terán rarely acknowledged the role that decades of Indian depredations
surely played in impairing agricultural development, or the fact that even Anglo settlers
believed it all but impossible to cultivate the land without the aid of slave labor.
But what Terán did acknowledge was that his country seemed to face a quandary.
He and other national leaders wanted to see Mexico’s frontier settled and developed in a
way that only foreigners seemed capable of. Yet, no matter how much credit Terán
seemed willing to give Anglo settlers for their contribution to Mexico’s agro-economy,
he simply could not take their allegiance to Mexico seriously, especially in light of the
Fredonian Rebellion. “If it is bad for a nation to have vacant lands and wilderness, it is
worse without a doubt to have settlers who cannot abide by some of its laws and by the
restrictions that [the nation] must place on commerce. They soon become discontented
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and thus prone to rebellion,” he wrote, seemingly unconvinced that many of these settlers
had in fact renounced their loyalty to the United States and declared it enthusiastically to
Mexico. “[E]verything becomes graver still if those people have strong and indissoluble
connections with a neighboring government.” 319 No matter where they lived or who they
declared their allegiances to, as far as Terán was concerned, these were norteamericanos
through and through. National identity was far more enduring and permanent to Terán
than to someone like Austin. In some ways, Terán’s words should be expected from a
member of the Mexican elite, educated in Europe, who had never ventured so far from
his country’s interior. Yet, he believed enough in the imperial capacity of his young
country to look forward to a day “not far off when the progress of a population such as
Mexico’s will spread over its empty lands.” Furthermore, despite all his criticism of
tejanos and blame he placed on them for their condition, Terán acknowledged that much
of it had to do with the political incompetence of a past imperial regime, and took
personal responsibility for improving his new nation in the future: “By now the Mexican
settlers of Téjas would have settled a quarter of the wilderness, but their history since the
time of their first settlements shows that they have suffered numerous misfortunes[,] most
of which emanated from government mistakes.” 320 It was these past mistakes that Terán
and his allies in Mexico City hoped to remedy, but the task was not an easy one given the
shifting and often chaotic political climate of the early Mexican Republic.
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***
While the Mexican government was attempting to fortify the Sabine boundary, a
couple thousand miles to the northeast Andrew Jackson, the newly elected US president,
and his cabinet were plotting a way to push that boundary further south. Indeed, Terán’s
commission was in large part a reaction to the Jackson administration’s recent attempt to
purchase Texas, an attempt that only succeeded in raising Mexican suspicion and enmity.
In many ways, Jackson’s election was a response to precisely those impulses that had
spawned US emigration to Mexico in the first place. He ran on a platform of “reform
retrenchment and economy” in which he promised to end corruption and return the
country to the ideals of the Founding Fathers. Jackson was also an ardent expansionist.
Old Hickory had always regarded Texas as part of the Louisiana Purchase and acquiring
it from Mexico was an early aim of his administration. 321
Jackson rejected the notion of open and fluid borders on which the Texan
colonists now depended, insisting instead that it was dangerous “to leave a foreign power
in possession of heads of our leading branches of the great Mississippi.” Like Henry
Clay and many frontier leaders before him, Jackson firmly believed that Texas should be
part of the United States, as such an acquisition was “necessary for the security of the
great emporium of the west, neworleans.” Furthermore, “the god of the universe has
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intended this great valley to belong to one nation,” by which, of course, he meant the
US. 322
Indeed, for someone like Austin, a man of the West who had long railed against
eastern elitism and corruption, Jackson’s election was thrilling. “This day belongs most
emphatically to the history of North America,” he wrote in a letter to his friend, one of
the only times he ever mentioned US politics since settling in Mexico. “I am of opinion
that his administration will in general be very popular and very advantageous to the
nation,” he wrote in reference to Jackson’s 1828 tariff that favored western farmers by
placing heavy duties on imported raw materials. 323 The dispute over export tariffs on
cotton, one that would alienate Jackson’s southern base and lead to the nullification
crisis, had not yet occurred. While Austin may have admired Jackson, his words
represented a rare expression of interest in the political system of his native country. “I
have taken no great interest in the election, tho I have no objection to see Jackson
president – Your government is founded on the popular will,” his use of the pronoun
revealing that he no longer considered himself a citizen of the North. 324
Some expatriates had a far more critical view of the new administration. David
G. Burnett, a close associate of Austin’s and himself an early settler, called the new
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president “deplorably incompetent” and said that his cabinet was “the weakest and most
inefficient that this government has ever seen.” He predicted that Van Buren and
Calhoun, “will be like two dogs at the bone, pulling different ways and ever growling at
each other,” and referred to the president’s “deplorable incompetency.” Of the others, he
wrote “Ingham is a second rate man in all things but party zeal, and many believe he has
an ‘itching palm’ - [B]ranch the North Carolinian is perhaps worthy of his state, famed
for pitch and sweet potatoes – Eaton is probably the most obnoxious of the whole tribe.”
However, like Austin, Burnet’s interest in the political state of his native country was
minimal. He had renounced it long ago. “These political notions are not readily my own
for you will readily imagine that I take little active interest in the strifes of the Country –
being a Coahuilatexanian.” 325
Furthermore, while Texans may have admired Jackson for his commitment to
restoring the yeoman’s republic, many were yet unaware of his expansionist designs.
When they finally did catch wind of them, they expressed anger and frustration. “They
speak here of this matter [transference to the US] as one which in no wise concerns the
present population of that country [Texas],” wrote Ira Ingram to another early immigrant
during a trip to New Orleans, “– and in fact, as though those now in peaceful occupation
of the country, have neither rights nor impartialities to be invaded or consulted, and like
sheep and oxen, perfectly passive.” Ingram’s words make it clear that those who
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advocated for US acquisition of Texas were not only profoundly out of step with the
desires of Texans themselves, but demonstrated the same elitist disregard for popular
opinion that had compelled so many to leave their country in the first place “I have
frequently ralied them on the subject of their national vanity,” Ingram continued, “and
plainly told them in many instances that, altho’ it might suit them very well to regard the
population of Texas in no other light than a degraded species of property, nevertheless,
there are many among us who viewed the subject in a very different light.” Ingram’s
words put the lie to this “national vanity” – the assumption that just about all people, but
certainly former US citizens, would want to live under US dominion. 326
As much as Austin initially relished in Jackson’s victory, he ardently opposed his
foreign policy and remained as jaded as ever when it came to the ability of that
government to serve his or other immigrants’ best interests. He termed transference to
the US, the “greatest misfortune that could befall Texas” because it would throw
immigrants “upon the liberality of the Congress of the united states of the north,” making
theirs “a most forlorn hope.” Tragically, perhaps, Austin remained woefully unaware
that the United States was in fact planning such an extension of its territory, having, as he
put it, “too much confidence in the magnanimity of my native country to suppose that the
government would resort to that mode of extending its already unwieldy frame over the
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territory of its friend and sister republic.” 327 The notion that the United States would
have little interest in extending its reach all the way to the Rio Grande for fear of making
the republic too expansive to sustain was commonly held, especially in the northeast.
The sectional split over this question was one that even Terán observed. “[T]he opinions
of the north and the west of that nation are opposed,” he wrote, “That is, the commercial
states want the population to be concentrated, limited to the nation’s land and vast
resources. The states of the west, that is, the agricultural states, look to expansion into
new and fertile country as the principal means of [promoting] their influence within the
entire federation.” 328
Indeed, in August 1829, only months after the Jackson administration had failed
to convince the Mexicans to make the Rio Grande their northern boundary, foreign
minister Joel Poinsett received instruction to propose a purchase of the far northern
region known as Téjas. The President, with the help of Vice President Martin Van
Buren, Henry Clay, and a free-wheeling South Carolina land speculator and former
Mississippi legislator named Colonel Anthony Butler, hoped to convince them of the
mutual benefit of a “natural border” between the two countries. Implicit within this
proposal were a host of assumptions that ran directly counter to the sentiments that
immigrants had articulated up to that point. The men argued that the US acquisition of
Texas would eliminate “collisions” between two peoples of “conflicting laws, habits, and
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interests.” Assuming that the Texans would favour the transfer, they argued that the
failure of such a sale would encourage Texans to establish independence on their own,
something that would weaken “the bonds of amity and good understanding” between the
United States and Mexico.” 329 But when Poinsett presented the offer to Mexican officials
they angrily dismissed him and called for his recall.
Jackson appointed Anthony Butler in his place, whom he instructed to proceed
with negotiations for Texas. “The acquisition of that territory is becoming everyday an
object of more importance to us,” Jackson wrote, “and if any reliance can be placed on
the illiberal speculations which they already ascribe to us, in connection with it, a still
stronger argument, for the cession can be based upon them.” In reference to the
perceived Mexican suspicion that the United States already had troops stationed on the
other side of the Sabine, “watching an opportunity for the conquest of that territory,” he
wrote, “A conjecture so idle can only emanate from a consciousness of their weakness,
and inability to assert their power in that province.” Jackson roundly misinterpreted both
the Mexican leadership and the colonists themselves. He greeted Mexican accusations as
an effort to “create a negotiation by which they hope to affect a transfer of the country,
before the power of disposing of it, is lost by the course of a revolution.” In fact, the
Mexican government neither wished to sell Texas, nor did Texans wish to see it sold.
Nonetheless, Jackson believed he had devised the perfect plan to seduce Mexican leaders
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into surrendering the territory. “I scarsely ever knew a Spaniard who was not the slave of
avarice,” he told Butler, “and it is not improbable that this weakness may be worth a
great deal to us, in this case.” 330
Not surprisingly, the renewed efforts were an abysmal failure. In addition to
souring relations between Mexico and the United States, they threatened to sour relations
between US immigrants and their adopted government. Despite Austin and other
colonists renouncing US imperial aims towards Texas, it felt increasingly obvious to
Mexican leaders that something had to be done to protect their fledgling nation from its
increasingly aggressive northern neighbor. This fear was palpable in Terán’s summary
letters to national leaders following his tour. “Forgive the amount of reading I have sent
you,” he wrote to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs in July 1828, “but I wish to inform
you right away about this country and not wait until the day I present my complete
observations to the government, because [by then] the time to take corrective action will
have passed.” Warning that “if timely measures are not taken, Téjas will pull down the
entire federation,” Terán elaborated on this theory in his letter to the War Department.
Yet, the primary evidence for his suspicions were not so much based on his observations
of Texans themselves, as they were of Téjas’ geographic proximity to a nation with its
own specific history of territorial aggression. “The department of Texas is contiguous to
the most avid nation in the world,” he wrote, “The North Americans have conquered
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whatever territory adjoins them. In less than half a century they have become masters of
extensive colonies which formerly belonged to Spain and France and of even more
spacious territories from which have disappeared the former owners, the Indian tribes.” 331
Yet their ability to do so, according to him, rested precisely in what he termed
their “silent means,” - their practice of settling sparsely populated regions belonging to
other powers, effectively paving the way for eventual acquisition by their own state.
“Instead of armies, battles, or invasions – which make a great noise and for the most part
are unsuccessful – these men lay hand on means that, if considered one by one would be
rejected as slow, ineffective, and at times, palpably absurd.” Yet, there were “without a
doubt, some of the most effective means of imperialism. Beginning with “adventurers
and empresarios” who “take up their residence in the country, pretending that their
location has no bearing upon the question of the government’s claim,” they then
develop an interest which complicates the political administration of the coveted
territory; complaints, even threats, begin to be heard, working on the loyalty of
the legitimate settlers, discrediting the efficiency of the existing authority and
administration; and the matter having arrived at this stage – which is precisely
that of Texas at this moment – diplomatic maneuvers begin 332

Despite all their testaments of loyalty to Mexico, Terán saw the actions of US immigrants
going hand-in-glove with the efforts of US imperialists.

331
332

Terán, Diary, 178
Ibid.

192
Terán wasted no time in addressing the threat of foreign incursion - misplaced as
it may have been. First, he advised greater government authority on the frontier,
including relocating Col. Bustamante to Téjas “because we need a person whom the
foreigners respect.” Most controversial, however, was his recommendation that the
government prohibit any more US immigrants from settling in the region. He made sure
to specify, however, that established colonies like Austin’s, “should remain and be
granted as much freedom as possible in the cultivation of the land, the sale of their
products, and the importation of those [products] of prime necessity to them, according to
their uses.” This should also entail enforcing a consistent and universal policy towards
slavery. “If [the North Americans] are allowed to introduce slaves, the Mexicans of Téjas
are also permitted to do so,” he wrote. Finally, Terán proposed reserving the eastern part
of the state for settlement by ethnic Mexicans: “The transfer of five thousands
Yucatecans, or a thousand families, to the banks of the Trinity River in the course of two
years is the greatest and most beneficial enterprise for the [Mexican] federation. 333
Something else that the yucatecanos had in common with the Texans was a strained
relationship with Mexico City. Indeed, just a decade later, Yucatán would present the
same threat to Mexico that Téjas did. Such a recommendation reveals not only how out
of touch Terán was from those Mexicans beyond his country’s core, but also the extent of
anti-centralism throughout Mexico in the early nineteenth century and the challenge that
Mexican national leaders faced in trying to hold their country together.
333
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Terán concluded his letter by remarking on the population of Texas, one that had
consistently impressed him as both distinct and peculiar – “a mixture of such strange and
incoherent elements that no other like it exists in our entire federation,” among whom
were “tribes of savages” and colonists who came from “another, more advanced society,
better educated but also more malicious and mistrustful.” The foreigners were composed
of “all kinds: fugitive criminals, honorable farmers, vagabonds, and ne’er do wells,
laborers, etc.” who “all go about with their constitution in their pocket, demanding their
rights, and the authorities and functionaries that it provides.” 334
Terán could not help but reflect fondly on the pleasant escapism that Téjas
afforded. As he set off on the next leg of his journey, he admitted he felt
an aversion that must be caused by the dismal situation at the center of my nation.
It seems that I am seeing for the last time the tranquility hidden in this immense
wilderness, and that I am denying myself this lone refuge in order to plunge into
that abyss of passions that causes my country to groan. 335

But such tranquility and serenity, of course, was the result of Texas’ profound isolation
from the country’s chaotic center, an isolation that Terán knew challenged the very
existence of his beloved country.
***
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While Terán was attempting to fortify Mexico’s political and territorial integrity,
many northern Mexicans – both tejano and Anglo – were forging a vibrant transnational
economy that depended on loose and fluid borders and aimed to link the deserts of the
Mexican north with southern plantations and Caribbean ports. Terán himself observed
that inhabitants of Austin’s colony devoted “themselves to raising mules, with the idea of
shipping them to the French and English Antilles. They say that Jamaica buys 5,000
mules a year.” But this was just the tip of the iceberg. Perhaps no one better articulated
what Texas promised to contribute to Mexico’s enrichment and development than J.
Child who had helped Austin establish his colony and before that had participated in
Mexico’s war for independence. In 1830, claiming that Texas was “destined to become
the strongest arm of the Mexican Republic,” Child called for greater government
infrastructure to make his prediction possible. He envisioned “A military lookout post at
Fort Bolívar” and “a trading establishment at the head of the navigation on the Buffalo
Bayou connecting these establishments with [Austin’s] town on this side[,] and securing
the trade and attachment of the Indians and whites on the waters of the Trinity.” Child
craved greater federal presence, not less. “With this view,” he continued, “let the
Mexican government open a land office of San Felipe de Austin with full powers to make
indefeasible complete grants of land to actual settlers for a price certain for any quantity
not exceeding 640, or 1,000 acres.” Child encouraged greater settlement of both ethnic
Mexicans and immigrants from the North, encouraging the government to “invite the
Mexican in the interior to come down and settle in texas” and allow more “foreign
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immigrants of good character and small capital with industrious habits to settle
permanently among them.” If the Mexican government did all this, “my word for in
three or four years, we will give a spur to commerce and agriculture, greatly enhancing
the price of lands and creating the present drone like apathy that broods over those
delightful regions into the busy drum of the beehive come May.” 336
Settlers like Child in no way saw the steady stream of immigrants from the north
and a growing trade with the United States as compromising their relationship with
Mexico – quite the opposite. While historians have correctly observed that Texans
engaged in a trade network that ultimately had little to do with the Mexican interior, they
dreamt of one that would stretch from St. Louis to Chihuahua and from Santa Fe to
Havana, making Texas the nexus of a hemispheric network, and contributing in no small
part to the Mexican nation-building project. While Jackson envisioned Texas as a kind of
frontier buffer for the United States, and Mexican leaders feared the same, Austin and
other colonists saw it as a potentially integral and productive part of Mexico. 337
The reality on the ground, however, was something very different. Throughout
the late 1820’s, Texans, both Anglos and tejanos relied almost exclusively on trade with
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the north. Anglo traders like Samuel May Williams served to benefit, as many tejanos
came to rely on them for necessities. Williams had been among one of the first US
immigrants to arrive in Texas in 1822 and by 1831 he owned over 4,800 acres of land.
He had acquired fluency in Spanish and familiarity with Spanish American politics and
culture from spending most of the 1810’s in Buenos Aires, working for the city’s
merchant class. Williams rose to prominence by acting as one of Texas’ chief traders
with the North, supplying Texans with goods like food, seed and clothing. In January
1830, J.M. Ibarra wrote a letter to Williams requesting seed for his garden for which he
aimed to acquire “from many places, the best plants and flowers that I could get” and
hoped that, “through your helpful cooperation, I might be able to get plants and flower
seeds from Baltimore.” In concluding his letter, Ibarra requested that Williams “Give my
regards and appreciation for his personality, to my friend Austin” before making one last
request for “one pair of half boots of the best quality.” 338
Ethnic Mexicans were not merely the recipients of trade with the north. In San
Antonio a group of tejano merchants emerged as well. Chief among them was José
Casiano. Born in Genoa in 1791, Casiano established himself as a successful merchant in
New Orleans before settling in Texas in 1820. The Casiano Family appear to have
owned at least a handful of slaves and some members would later serve in the Army of
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the Confederate States. José acted as an interpreter and even helped initiate other tejanos
into the Texas-US trade network. 339
Some less savory characters emerged too. Col. Monroe Edwards, for example, a
native of Kentucky, arrived in Texas in 1823. He soon became involved in a scheme to
purchase slaves in Brazil, take them to Texas and then funnel them to the United States,
thereby taking advantage of the increase in demands for slave labor caused by the North’s
recent ban on the Atlantic slave trade. It was individuals like this that had Mexican – and
US – leaders concerned, as the two countries quickly began jostling for control of the
region. 340
Mexican leaders, however, feared that Texans’ increasing commercial ties to the
north threatened to draw the region ever closer to the United States’ grasp. In an effort
to limit and control this trade, the Mexican government placed an import tariff on most
goods coming from the north, thus placing a considerable strain on Anglos and tejanos
alike. Terán noted bexarenos’ frustration with the tariff on northern flour “because in
Béxar they eat bread from no other.” Texans were also prevented from growing tobacco
for sale to the US. 341 Texan leaders reacted by launching a series of appeals to state and
federal leaders asking for exemption from the tariff on grounds that it was detrimental to
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Texan inhabitants who relied on basic items from the north. Austin insisted that for
Texas to be “useful and rich by way of agriculture, it needs foreign exportation and
commerce,” the former being “essential to the stimulation of agriculture.” 342
He was careful, however, to make it clear that trade with the United States in no
way compromised Texan ties to the rest of Mexico. Indeed, for Austin and other Texans,
trade with the North coexisted with and in fact facilitated Texas’ integration with the rest
of Mexico. In a petition to Terán, written June 30, 1828, Austin requested a formal
exemption from the import tariff until 1835, permission to raise tobacco for export, and
regulation of the coasting trade to permit Texas products in Mexican ports. 343
While Mexican officials did grant permission for intra-state commerce, they did
not have the resources to effectively establish and regulate ports like Galveston which
remained closed for years after its establishment. 344 This prompted Austin on July 28,
1828 to issue yet another petition, this one for relief from the National Government’s
prohibition against trade with unauthorized ports. Arguing that lifting restrictions on
international trade “was to the greater agricultural good of the entire country,” Austin
insisted that if his request was granted, Texas would surely become “a rich and important
state for the great Mexican federation.” In one such letter to Anastacio Bustamante,
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Austin addressed the concerns of Mexican officials by expressing confidence that his
colonists themselves would be able to guard the Texas coast against invasion. 345
On September 8, 1828 Austin wrote directly to the president of Mexico himself
for permission to introduce free of duty all articles for the consumption of his colony. He
insisted that his suggestions “emanate from an ardent desire to see my country flourish,”
and proceeded to explain how Texas’ cotton economy would serve Mexican leaders’
aims of developing and enriching their new republic, most specifically through the
development of national infrastructure. “[T]he improvement of roadways and canals and
the navigability of the rivers will improve in proportion to the wealth and prosperity of
the people and the liberty of the Government of the United states [of Mexico],” he wrote
in a letter to the Governor of Coahuila y Téjas. Austin dreamed of Coahuila y Téjas,
Nueva León, Tamaulipas and other northern states growing rich on cotton and tobacco
production facilitated by “a roadway so first class from Saltillo to Béxar” and
“steamboats” along the Rio Grande “carrying cotton and other products to the port of
Matamoros.” Yet it was not just Mexico’s infrastructure that would improve. “[T]o
promote cotton planting is to give encouragement to all branches of industry, and creates
an article of exportation that is necessary to all foreign countries without expense.” 346
He suggested that Mexico capitalize on the political troubles in the North, and the
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growing resentment between Britain and the United States over the 1828 tariff, by
commencing a trade in cotton with the British. “In my opinion, cotton should be the
principal product of exportation from Texas.” 347 Texas’ prosperity was intimately linked
with that of the rest of Mexico. Cotton was a way to improve not just Texas, but the
whole country.
Noting the detrimental effect that the federal trade prohibitions had on Texas,
Terán wrote that “For all these reasons, the colonies here are considered to be in a state of
discontent, and the empresarios in one of bankruptcy.” 348 Yet, immigrants continued to
arrive even after the turning of the political tide in 1828. Furthermore, many of these
immigrants, just like Austin, sought integration with the larger Mexican economy and
society and, in at least a few cases, even employment by the Mexican government itself.
In a letter to Austin written in August of 1828, Samuel Parkman inquired into all aspects
of Texas geography and accessibility to the interior: “How far is your colony from the
Gulf Coast? Is the country mountainous or level? How large are the rivers Colorado and
Brazos? Do they in any considerable degree afford facilities for navigation?” and “What
time is required to sail from your colony to the port nearest to the city of Mexico?” were
only a few of his questions. After asking about the extent of Austin’s grant, Parkman
then asked if the colony “and the country in general” was explored and surveyed. He
volunteered himself as an assist in making a map of the country, stating that he was “a
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surveyor and in that business would wish to be employed either in Texas or elsewhere in
the Mexican provinces.” Just as much as religion or slavery, prospective settlers
expressed interest in Texas’ geography, navigability and accessibility to the rest of
Mexico. “I am aware that the number of my inquiries may intrude upon your leisure,”
wrote Parkmen, “but you may rest assured that in giving me the desired information you
will confer a very particular favor and not only on myself but a very considerable number
of my acquaintances who have the idea of emigrating.” 349
Despite the seemingly constant political chaos emanating from Mexico City,
something that Terán often agonized over in his writings, it was the political instability
and oppression that they experienced in the United States to which prospective US
immigrants constantly referred. “You are already apprised on the unhappy state into
which political schism has thrown our republic,” wrote Parkman, “in south Carolina open
opposition is threatened to the tariff, yet “how far their threat will be carried into effect
we have no idea.” As bleak as Mexico’s political prospects looked, to many the United
States looked far worse. “I cannot but hope there is a redeeming spirit in the land which
will counteract the effects of military deeds upon the deluded multitude,” Parkman
wrote. 350
Meanwhile, Austin used the opportunity to promote Texas to southern cotton
producers. He may have complained bitterly about the import tariff to Mexican leaders,
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but when he wrote to planters in the North who might consider relocating to Texas in
order to escape the anti-southern tariffs in that country, he presented Mexican policies in
a very different light. In July 1829, Austin wrote that the tax on imports “causes
domestics to sell high and as the restrictive system appears to have become a part of the
national policy, fair prospects may be calculated on for the manufacture of many years to
come.” 351
Austin also emphasized the superior climate that Texas offered - one that
particularly lent itself to the production of southern crops. “It is true that our climate will
not admit of coffee and cacao and other tropical productions,” he wrote, “[but] we can
boast of the quality and abundance of our cotton crops and sugar and the other
productions of Louisiana and Mississippi succeed very well.” Agriculture was not the
only industry that Texas offered: “The pasturage or ‘range’ as we term it is certainly
superior to anything I have ever seen in any country, and the facilities for raising cattle,
mules, sheep and hogs etc. almost exceeds credibility.” Just as importantly, Texas’
location and terrain meant that growers and ranchers had ready access to Ports in the
Caribbean, Europe and throughout Latin America, forgetting that many of these ports,
principally Galveston, remained closed. “The facilities of interior navigation are
considerable and susceptible of extensive improvements,” he admitted, but “no country is
better adapted for the cheap construction of country roads.” It was true that “our harbors
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will not admit vessels of the largest class,” but they were “sufficiently cheap for brigs and
the smaller class of merchant ships.” Additionally, Texas appeared to be more healthful
than dank overpopulated port cities like New Orleans. “The climate of Texas I deem to
be decidedly superior in point of health and salubrity to the portion of north America at
the same parallel,” he wrote, “I think that the practical experience of seven years justifies
me in saying that the rivers of Texas are less liable to diseases than any river of the US
below latitude 36” 352
With their superior climate, strategic location and advantageous terrain, Texans
made no secret of their hopes to replace the South as the leader in cotton trade and
production in the Western Hemisphere. And the current political climate in the North
suggested they might see their dream come true. “We shall next year be able to export a
considerable amount of cotton and it is considered by many that if the “Tariff system” is
continued by the Gov’t of the US a discrimination will be made by Great Britain in the
article of cotton which will give to that of other countries a decided advantage over the
United States.” Furthermore, with Mexico’s liberal land policy and immigrants’
exemption from taxation for the first seven years after their immigration, “the means of
subsistence here can be raised cheaper and no capital of consequence can be required at
least for several years to procure land.” Finally, “labor here will produce more than any
part of the US within my knowledge.” Indeed, Texans relished at the first hint of
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sectionalism that would eventually rip the United States apart. As southern planters
writhed under the tariff, Texan planters basked in the rays of the comparatively liberal
trade policies of their adopted government. When Austin did mention the state of
Mexican politics, he remained cautiously optimistic. “Our government gets on very well,
all things considered,” he wrote, “The federal system was an experiment and a very
dangerous one for Mexico because their former habits and ideas as to political subjects.”
Austin admitted that “there must be some collisions for a while, but good will grow out
of them.” 353
But the right climate and government were not all that Texas had going for it. Its
strategic location, nestled in the northwestern corner of the Gulf of Mexico, accessible
from both the interior of the US and Mexico, as well as the Caribbean, meant that Texas
was poised to become the hub of a commercial empire that encompassed the entire
hemisphere. This was in fact precisely Austin’s plan. “I have it in contemplation to open
a road direct from here to Paso del Norte, and Santa Fe, with a view to turn the trade
which is now carried on to those places from Missouri, to the Port of Galveston,” he
wrote to his cousin Henry in August 1829. “Should you fit out any exploring or other
parties to that region I wish you would insert into their instructions to examine whether
there is a practicle route through the mountains, east of El Paso, to the open prairies at the
head of the Colorado or Brazos.” Austin rightly observed Texas’ central location to any
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trade network that linked the Mexican interior with the US. “[T]he whole trade of the
Chihuahua and Sonora and New Mexico regions must ultimately enter on one of the Ports
of Texas.” In fact, Austin was downright arrogant when it came to his plans to make
Texas the dominant commercial center of that corner of the globe:
I am bold to say that, as a country, taken in the general average it is unequaled by
any portion of North America. You will recollect that I have had some
opportunity of forming an opinion of this matter for I have seen this continent
from Connecticut to the City of Mexico, and have generally been a close observer
of localities, soil, climate, and etc., part from the peculiar values of the
Mississippi River and the harbors I deem Texas to be of more intrinsic value as a
country than all the states of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, and the
territories of Florida and Arkansas. 354

Yet Texans never saw this dream of a transnational economy threatening their
relationship with the country that had made it all possible. In fact, Austin took it upon
himself to make the first official map of Texas, which he promptly sent to the
Ayuntamiento of Béxar and the President of the Republic. He did this service, he
claimed, “for my adopted country in allegiance as a citizen” in order “to contribute to the
geographical knowledge of Mexican territory, and to present our beloved Texas to the
Mexicans and the rest of the world.” 355
Austin then included a lengthy set of explanatory notes to the map which, it soon
became evident, he hoped would illustrate the very concerns he had expressed to
354
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Mexican officials: “We need two customs houses in Texas, one in Galveston and the
other in Matagorda[,] and a maritime receivership or customshouse on the River Brazos.”
The lack of such was a considerable problem since the colonies conducted all of their
“jurisdictional commerce” through that river, their “infant state” requiring trade with
[New] Orleans.” Austin insisted that “to prohibit or impair this commerce now would be
most tragic to this region.”
Yet, he was cautious to make clear that he had no plans whatsoever to see Texas
separated from Mexico, no matter who came to inhabit it. “Texas rightly belongs to
Mexico, and for the naturalness of its geographic location, of its commercial interests,
and its products,” he wrote. Furthermore, he insisted that ultimately, though not yet, even
Texas’ trade with the United States of the North would cease and be replaced by
exclusive domestic trade with other Mexican states.
The commerce of Texas will not be nor should it be, with the United States of the
North but with the neighboring and maritime states of Mexico, and with the
islands, and Europe, and consequently it is and will be the interest of Texas to
unite with Mexico whatever might be the origin of its population, as long as they
are civilized people, illustrious and entrepreneurial.

Significantly, and perhaps surprisingly, Austin saw Texas’ seeming dependence on
northern trade as temporary, lasting only as long as it would take for Texas and the rest of
Mexico to develop their own internal economies. Austin saw Texas’ commercial
relationship with Mexico as ultimately far more important than its commercial

207
relationship with the US. Conversely, Texas separation from Mexico would result in a
loss of “the most productive and secure source of their commerce,” as well as their rights
and privileges, “assuming that the Mexican government establishes itself permanently
and quietly.” 356
While Austin looked forward to a time when Texas’s principal trade would be
with Mexico and not the North, he knew that first Texas had to establish itself. He
therefore requested a few more years of unimpaired trade with the United States, “so as
not to impede its progress and speed its development.” Yet, he envisioned a time when
all of the northern trade routes would lead to Matagorda or Béxar. “[I]n a few years the
commerce of New Mexico, Chihuahua and Sonora that now goes to Missouri should all
be concentrated in Matagorda or Béxar,” he wrote. Indeed, Austin aimed to replace
American ports like St. Louis with Mexican ones.
One look at the map of Texas shows that the designated port, given the
geographical arrangement of those regions for their commerce, is Matagorda. The
distance of this port to Santa Fe in New Mexico is less than to Saint Louis . . . and
you can buy goods in Matagroda at less cost than in Missouri because there is only
one port to the ocean and the other is hundreds of leagues to the interior.

Such a reorientation of the current trade network would, of course, benefit Mexico by
reducing the cost of transportation since it would be “entirely contained within the
territory of Mexico and by Mexican citizens.” In so doing, Austin hoped to rectify
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Mexico’s current extractive relationship with the United States, “Today the inhabitants of
Missouri receive all of the benefit, when the origin of the commerce belongs to the
Mexicans.” 357 Texans consistently saw themselves and their commercial enterprise as
forming a critical part of the Mexican national project. Not only were they cautious to
work within the legal confines of their adopted country, but they aimed to make
themselves an imperative part of it.
***
Yet, the challenge of integration extended well beyond trade and commerce. As
migrants flooded into Texas in the late 1820’s, Mexican administrators struggled to keep
track of them, and even to assure that they intended to become loyal Mexican citizens.
Many ended up settling along the northern and western border without contracts or
formal permission from the government. Regardless, many of them indeed wanted to
become Mexican citizens and petitioned the government for recognition and integration.
But while earlier settlers identified Mexico’s political system as their primary motive for
immigrating, later settlers pointed to more pragmatic factors, such as land and protection
from Indian raids.
When Spain invaded Mexico in 1829, a group of Anglo-American squatters along
the Sabine did not hesitate to defend Mexico, much as their predecessors had done during
the Fredonian Rebellion. But their stated reasons for wanting to be a part of that country
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were somewhat different. They lauded Mexico’s political system more for its distinction
from Spain’s, not the United States.’ “The fair Godess of Liberty prescribed and hunted
down in the old world, has chosen the continent of America as her favorite residence,”
they wrote, “and when in their turn she penetrated and pervaded the hearts of the
Mexicans . . . we felt the most lively enthusiasm and deepest interest for the successful
termination of so glorious a conflict.” Since then “we have with pride and joy seen the
Mexican politicians and sages forming political institutions, the most enlightened and
liberal, particularly as regards foreigners.” After praising Mexico for yielding to “that
singleness and purity of motive, that devotedness of thought and talent,” they pointed to
the one thing that they would like in exchange for their service. 358 Buried near the end of
their document they explained that
We have, sir, most of us, with much expense and trouble, come a great distance
with our families, and to settle in the country, to obtain lands for our children and
ourselves, to lay our bones in a soil consecrated by its heroes, and eternalized by
the wisdom of its statesmen. We have full confidence that the Commissioner
mentioned by your excellency and Promised by the Most Excellent President of
the Republic, will come amongst us, and put us into possession of the lands we
occupy, agreeable to the laws; we shall rejoice on the day of his arrival.

Does the fact that their demonstrations of loyalty were accompanied by self-interest
compromise their integrity? Earlier immigrants had economic motives too, but their
identity was more specifically Mexican. This later group seemed to draw on a shared
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republicanism that cast the Old World monarchies, not the United States, as the opponent.
Suffice is to say that, unlike the Fredonian rebels or squatter communities more
generally, these men aspired to national belonging, with all of its attendant benefits and
obligations. They wanted the Mexican government to acknowledge and absorb them, and
in exchange they “organized with arms in our hands, and both now and at all times
hereafter, tender to Your Excellency,” rendered “our best services in support of the state
and general government against all enemies whether external or internal.” 359
Land title was not the only thing fueling immigration during this period. As
Indian raids picked up in the late 1820’s and into the 1830’s, it gave many borderland
residents a new reason to claim Mexican citizenship. Disappointed by the United States’
failure to protect them from hostile Indian tribes - and in many cases propelled into
conflict with these groups due to the United States’ own Indian removal policies - many
turned to Mexico.

In 1828 William Rabb petitioned the Governor of Texas for

increased protection from Indian marauders and US authorities on the western side of the
Red River. “The opinion of the most intelligent men in the country is that we are within
the limits of the province of texas, and a melancholy experience convinces us that we do
not enjoy the protection of the United States,” he wrote. Identifying themselves as
“worthy and industrious inhabitants who have now the misfortune to live under the most
oppressive and disgraceful circumstances,” Rabb explained that “The opposite bank of
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the Red River had, heretofore been under the civil Jurisdiction of the United states which
government has, lately, ceded the territory to the Choctaw Indians.” Yet the settlers and
late civil officers still continue to live in said territory, and exercise by force their
jurisdiction.” As a result, Rabb explained, “We are compelled to pay the most exorbitant
taxes” and “we have daily to submit to the most insulting and oppressive abuses.” He
complained that the inhabitants of the north bank, “carry on a regular commerce with the
Comanches, supplying them with arms and ammunition.” Rabb stated that the
inhabitants of this “oppressed territory” would “be happy under your protection, and feel
sorely the absence of laws or regulations by which they may be governed.” 360
In addition to raiding and lack of title, a general sense of lawlessness seemed to
pervade especially eastern Texas. In 1829 a group of citizens in Nacogdoches, the region
that just two years prior was home to the notorious Fredonian Rebellion, issued a formal
request of the Mexican president. They informed him that they had “resided in this
province for several years during which time we have been without Government and
without a knowledge of what is required of us as citizens of this Republic.” Feeling
“sensibly the allegiance due from a citizen of this Government, and the obligation on the
part of the Government to protect its citizens from Laws” they requested “a publication
and diffusion of the Laws of the country in the English language.” The fact that they
could not read Spanish, of course, illustrated the accuracy of Terán’s claim that Anglos
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were rapidly outnumbering Mexicans by this time and no longer felt the same
assimilationist impulses – including language acquisition - an earlier generation of
settlers had. But they nonetheless sought greater integration into the Mexican
administrative fold.

They requested that a court be established “according to the custom

now prevailing in that section of the country.” They pointed out “the propriety of
organizing the Militia for the defense of the Province, in the event of an invasion of this
country by Old Spain.” Additionally, they expressed the need for the adjustment of their
land claim, which would “attach the people more firmly to your Government.” Lest one
suspect that they were only interested in obtaining the benefits of citizenship, they also
requested greater communication with and access to the seat of national power “so that
we can have it in our power to act in conformity with the wishes of the Government.” 361
Here we see a set of sentiments very different from what the rumors suggested and
indeed what most interpretations of early Texas settlers would have us believe. It was the
lack of government authority not its excess of which they complained. These people did
not seek to avoid the state, as national leaders feared, they craved its embrace. 362
Yet, not all policies designed with the aim of extending Mexico’s administrative
reach were greeted approvingly. Austin and some more established settlers often found
themselves defending local government taxation initiatives from immigrants who insisted
that the colonization law protected them from such encroachments. Terming its critics
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“either ignorant of the law” or “willfully malicious and wish[ing] to create confusion,”
Austin reminded colonists that they were in fact exempt from most taxes, but not those
“that are laid generally to repel a foreign invasion,” or taxes “levied by the ayuntamiento
for municipal purposes.” 363
When colonists complained about being required to register births and deaths,
Austin again jumped to the defense of the government, stating that “The law most
positively requires the ayuntamiento to keep a register of births and deaths in the
jurisdiction, and to make a return every three months to the chief of the department.” He
dismissed the colonists’ complaints. “Strange and incredible as it would appear to any
man who possessed common sense that this measure should create discontent and
misrepresentation,” Austin insisted that it was in the best interest of every citizen, but
especially children, for it secured to them “beyond the possibility of a doubt important
privileges as native born Mexicans that someday or the other may be of the greatest
advantage to them.” Austin reminded colonists that the benefits of Mexican citizenship
came with responsibilities too. He went on to explain that citizens’ failure to comply
with the law would only create more expense by requiring a sheriff to go house to house
to collect the information. Of the state vagrancy law he wrote that “All civilized countries
that I know anything about have a vagrant law – this state has one and it is a very good
and just and necessary one.” The “clamour” of discontent compelled the ayuntamiento
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not to enforce the law, something that enraged Austin who blamed “disorderly and bad
men” for instigating discontent. “I regret this state of things exceedingly,” he wrote, “It
has caused me to doubt that there is either a want of judgment in the mass of the people
to discriminate between a rigid and just execution of the laws and an abuse of them[,] or
that there is a great mass of moral depravity which results from restrain or legal
control.” 364
Yet, it was becoming increasingly clear, both to Austin and Mexican authorities,
that integration would not be easy. “The civil authority must be sustained by public
confidence,” wrote Austin “and if the people are mere puppets in the hands of artful
demagogues and clamorous factionists whose interest it is to discredit the civil authorities
and throw them into ridicule, where is the security of honest men?” In part, he saw this as
a result of Americans’ lack of familiarity with Mexican law - something that he sought to
remedy immediately. But for Austin the problem went even deeper - it was in fact an
unfortunate cultural characteristic. The people of his colony “lack judgment to
discriminate between what is the duty of a public officer, and an abuse of his authority,”
and suffered from “a disposition to be suspicious and jealous of ‘men in power.’” Rather
than any sign of incompatibility with Mexico, Austin insisted that “the American people
of a natural propensity to suspect and to abuse all men who are in office.” 365
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Indeed, for Austin, the problem had to do with the particularities of the American
character. In another letter to Thomas White written the same month, he blamed such
lack of national obligation towards and cooperation with the Mexican government on the
“unbounded republican liberty which is enjoyed by all classes in the United States.” In
other words, a “jealousy of those in office, jealousy of undue encroachments of personal
rights and a general repugnance to everything that bore even the semblance of a stretch of
power.” Conceding that such feelings were “correct when properly guided by an
enlightened judgment, capable of discriminating between a necessary and rigorous
discharge of an official duty and an abuse of it,” Austin insisted that the American people
were “somewhat defective” when it came to this ability – “though not more so than the
mass of the people – most of whom were in the United States. Thus, there was still hope
for the colonists who, Austin insisted, owed their loyalty to a Mexican government,
whose policies were so “liberal and indulgent” that they “caused some to doubt their
reality.” Austin concluded his letter by delineating between the political situation in
Texas versus that unfolding at the country’s center. “The disturbances in Mexico do not
affect us here – we have nothing to do with them – all that is necessary here is to keep
harmony amongst ourselves – and to work hard.” 366 Norteamericanos, simply put, were
difficult people for anyone to govern.
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Yet, as frontier southerners, it is perhaps just as likely that their behavior was the
result of their hereunto limited experience with federal authority – an entity that they
perhaps only understood in the abstract. This later generation of settlers did not
demonstrate the same political sophistication that those of Austin’s generation did. There
were many reasons for this, one being that the Austins were simply more educated and
worldly than many of the later settlers. As part of the founding generation of American
immigrants to Mexico, circumstances had also required a certain level of familiarity with
and trust of the central government. More to the point, however, ideas about citizenship,
government, and authority were still nascent in early nineteenth-century Mexico and the
United States, especially on the frontier where federal authority often remained
inconspicuous. While many frontiers people understood that there was a federal
government somewhere that could grant them rights and privileges in exchange for
service and loyalty, the precise nature and mechanics of this relationship were still
unclear, and, they believed, malleable. This was as true in Mexico as it was in the US
and was not necessarily a sign of disloyalty. It was, rather, a sign of the still nebulous
and changing relationship between citizen and state in these young republics.
One remedy might be to better acquaint immigrants with the laws of their adopted
country. In October of 1829, Austin decided to translate all legislative decisions and
have them printed in local newspapers. “The work is very essential,” he insisted, “and
there is nothing more necessary and important for the welfare of Texas for reason that
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more of the inhabitants do not understand a word of Spanish and it is entirely impossible
to govern a people with laws whose existence the masses ignore absolutely.” In many
ways, these problems were the result of the success of his own recruitment efforts. As
more and more immigrants from the North flooded into the region, they felt less
compelled to assimilate or even cooperate with Mexican officials. Many of Austin’s
complaints were beginning to mirror those of Terán and other national leaders who called
for greater governmental presence and authority on the frontier: “All the difficulties in
Nacogdoches has come entirely from the lack of troops and persons of law and chiefs in
order to administrate them.” But perhaps most worrisome was that so many people were
ignorant of the very laws and constitution that had attracted the first wave of immigrants.
“I have not a person of judgment that is well informed about the national and state
constitution,” Austin wrote. Yet he claimed to not know of a single person who knew
them who did not express himself “entirely satisfactory with them and this is enough in
order to prove the importance of the translation.” 367 In addition to greater knowledge of
the laws and constitution of Mexico, Austin had to make sure that colonists were taking
oaths of allegiance. 368 Only then could they receive formal title to their land. In this
way, Austin worked tirelessly to guarantee both Mexico’s national security and the rights
of its colonists.
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Yet, the precise nature of the colonists’ grievances and to whom, exactly, they
were directed, remained unclear. A September 1829 letter from Thomas McKinney
suggested that colonists’ dissatisfaction was limited to local authorities. “I am somewhat
astonished at the idea of there being in circulation a report that there was brewing in this
section of country any project against the Government[,] for I do assure you that so far as
has come under my observation or intelligence there is not such a thing thought of.”
McKinney clarified that said discontent had more to do with the seemingly arbitrary
behavior of particular appointees, not the state or federal government. “As to Col.
Piedras,” McKinney wrote, “there is the strongest opposition among the people both
Americans and Mexicans,” who accused him of “being friendly to the Spanish invasion.”
McKinney insisted that Piedras was “aware of his standing and ready to say as frequently
as he has done that it is an unfriendly feeling towards the government when in reality it is
nothing more than a just contempt for his baseness.” 369
Indeed, much suspected discontent towards the Mexican government was most
likely simply directed at local authorities whom colonists believed to be not just corrupt
or incompetent, but disloyal to Mexico, and it may even have been a result of the very
bureaurocracy put in place to combat it. Far from the center of national power, colonists
had little communication or interaction with their own national leaders. As Mexico
attempted to draw Texas closer to its national fold, it appointed magistrates with little
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familiarity or relationship with local communities and who often fell into acrimonious
relations with them. When colonists had complaints, they took them to these
“representatives” who may have very likely misrepresented them to national leaders.
Isolated on the frontier, often with limited knowledge of Spanish or Mexican law,
colonists had little recourse under such circumstances.
***
On April 5th 1830, Austin received a disconcerting letter from a Texan trader
named Edwin I. Petit, then in New Orleans preparing to return. Petit conveyed rumors,
then circulating in the North that “[Mexico] is very unsettled,” and “the States of Yucatan
and Tobasco have determined to split off unless a central Government is Established.”
Indeed the country was unsettled. Just a few months prior, Guerrero had been
overthrown by his own Vice President Anastacio Bustamante. Petit conveyed
information based on his own experience at the Port of Vera Cruz. “The present
administration are taking some high handed measures,” he wrote, “the commandant of
the Marine has been taken from his station and dismissed [from] the service without even
the form of a trial.” Furthermore, trade commissions issued to northern privateers under
Guerrero had been withdrawn. But the most disturbing news had to do with a new
federal law rumored “to stop the Emigration of Americans to Texas.” 370
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Termed the Law of April 6th, 1830, it was issued largely in response to Jackson’s
recent efforts to purchase Texas from Mexico and based on the recommendations of
Terán in the aftermath of his tour. The mastermind was Lucas Alamán, Mexico’s
secretary of state who, in his complaint to Congress, began by explaining the particular
style of US territorial advancement and what he believed to be the colonists’ role in it.
“They commence by introducing themselves into the territory they covet,” he explained.
Then they “grow, set up right, and bring forward ridiculous pretensions.” Then come
explorers and speculators who excite political unrest and then “the diplomatic
management commences.” 371
This, Alamán insisted, was precisely what had occurred in Texas where “the
majority of the population is composed of natives of the United States of the North” who
“come from all directions to settle upon the fertile lands . . . without previously
complying with the requisites of our laws, or in violation of our existing contracts.”
Meanwhile, “The Mexican population is, as it were, stationary,” while the North
American “is increasing, particularly from the number of slaves introduced by them, and
whom they retain, without manumitting them, as they should do.” All of this, Alamán
claimed, “has given them a preponderance in Texas which now hardly belongs, in fact, to
the Mexican confederacy.” 372
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From Alamán’s remarks, one might conclude that the immigration policy had
accomplished precisely the opposite of what it was intended to. The remedy, according
to the secretary, was a bold federal decree that established a series of garrisons,
particularly along its border with the US, formally terminated further immigration from
countries “lying adjacent” to Mexico. Additionally, the Law of April 6th put forth a
program to encourage the settlement of ethnic Mexican families. While it exempted
Anglo colonies “already established,” it did not specify Austin’s. For many national
leaders who looked warily upon the growing numbers of US immigrants to Mexico, the
law “provided the opportunity to remedy the infractions and abuses that have been
observed.” There seemed little room in the national discourse for opposition. “[A]ll
good Mexicans,” as Alamán put it, “should appreciate this law.” 373
But it was not appreciated. The following month, Thomas Chambers expressed
grave concern regarding rumors surrounding the new decree. “The ebullition of public
feeling in our quarter is fearful,” he wrote, since “The most violent and fatal measures are
takeing both by the states and general governments in relations to the colonies of this
department.” 374 In June, Samuel May Williams received a letter from a prospective
immigrant in New Orleans. “We in this country [the United States] have many
unfavorable reports from Texas,” he wrote, “it is universally urged that your Government
is too unsettled and Unstable.” But the rumored prohibition on immigration was the
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greatest concern. “[I]t is now reported, and pretty generally believed, that your Congress
has forbid farther settlement of Americans in texas[,] and that the Mexicans, Themselves
are quite Ripe for a Revolution among themselves.” Such rumors stood to forestall a
great number of immigrants who were otherwise eager to move. “[I]f Reports from texas
do not become too alarming you will Receive a Very considerable and Valuable
population from this Country during the Approaching Winter and Spring,” he assured
Williams. But in order for this to happen, prospective immigrants needed some
assurance of their own. “We however must believe that Texas settled by Americans must
flourish Under the Mexican Government and at some future time may obtain a
considerable influence over the General Government.” 375 Again, prospective immigrants
did not just want land, they wanted political influence in Mexico. However, given the
current direction of political affairs, this did not look likely.
Afraid that the new law would sabotage his recruitment efforts, Austin took
matters into his own hands. In a formal letter addressed to the president himself, he
pointed out that the object of the law “appears to be the complete destruction of all
happiness and prosperity of this colony.” He insisted on its unconstitutionality, declaring
that it was in violation of the pre-existing colonization laws of the republic and the state
of Coahuila y Téjas “which in direct and positive terms call for and encourage
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immigration.” 376 Austin also wrote a formal letter to Lucas Alamán, hoping to remind
him of the great benefit that the Mexican nation gained from his empressorship:
It is doubtless well known to Y.E. that I am the first empresario who undertook to
form a settlement in the wilderness of Texas, that I have devoted all my time and
personal attention to this object since the year 1821. That I have succeeded fully
in redeeming a considerable portion of this country from a state of nature overrun
by savages in which I found it, and that I have laid a foundation for the permanent
advancement and prosperity of Texas by rendering it easy to form new
settlements in consequence of the resources which may be drawn from my
colony.

Austin reminded Alamán that his “maxim has always been and now is fidelity and
gratitude to Mexico.” He then proceeded to express his confusion at such legislation and
at the increasing sense of suspicion towards Anglo settlements, seeking to correct them
and asserting that “the commercial and agricultural interests of Texas, will be more
effectively promoted by remaining under this government than under any other.” He
reminded the authorities that the colonists “became Mexicans by choice, they have been
faithful to this government since they entered this territory, [and] they wish to remain
Mexicans.” The Law of April 6th, however, would “have a fatal tendency,” for those
immigrants already on their way to Mexico, since they “would be totally ruined and the
odium would of necessity fall on the government that caused their ruin.” Austin
concluded by assuring Alamán that the immigrants he allowed to enter were “of the very
best class,” and that “the acquisition of that population would do more towards uniting
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Texas to Mexico and restoring order and tranquility than any measure that could be
adopted.” 377
Interestingly, when it came to whom to blame for the unfortunate turn of events,
Austin pointed to the United States, not Mexico. “[T]he excessive noise that has been
made in the US papers about the purchase of Texas seems to have had a much greater
weight in Mexico than a matter so unimportant ought to have had.” He even suspected a
bit of foul play, specifically, that expansionist minded agents in the North might be
attempting to incite rebellion in Texas, so as to compel a separation. “[A] train seems to
have been laid by someone, to drive this gov’t to such acts as would be most likely to
kindle discontent in Texas and at the same time sow the seeds of disgust between the two
nations.” 378
In his letters to Mexican officials, Austin blamed Jackson’s foreign minister,
Poinsett, for Mexican confusion and hostility, and did what he could to distance himself
from the intrigues of the Jackson cabinet. Austin hardly minced words in his accusations.
“[T]he falicies that have resulted can be attributed to the intrigues of Poinsett!” he wrote
to Col. Piedras, “For my part, I protest before God almighty that I have never violated the
interests of Mexico in the slightest, nor have I violated my duty as a Mexican citizen – I
do not believe that it is in the interest of texas to unite with the North.” Austin attempted
to clarify his earlier remarks, insisting that he had called for “greater Governmental
377
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regulations at the local level,” the necessity of which was “evident to anyone who knows
anything about Texas.” Austin was clear that his earlier complaints should not be
confused with rebelliousness. “In this colony there is not discontent nor has there ever
been against the Government, to the contrary all the colonists are satisfied with their
situation, but it appears that in Mexico there are other ideas.” 379 Austin insisted that
despite his criticisms, he had “entire confidence in the justice and talent of the
administration” and considered it “the Savior of Mexico from anarchy.” 380
Ultimately, Austin’s colony did receive partial exemption from the law. The
government decided to lift the ban on future immigration to his colony only, and
continued to require that all US traders pay one percent of their profits to the government.
This did little to allay settlers’ frustration. Henry Austin wrote that the taxation decree
was “in direct contravention of the Constitution.” Colonists expressed clear frustration
with a law that sought to “kill the goose in search of the golden egg.” Yet, Henry Austin
agreed with his brother that the settlers, despite their frustrations with the new regime,
were hardly contemplating turning their backs on Mexico. Of Terán, he wrote that “he
has more apprehension of a Grito for centralism in the South and a separation of those
northern states which are federal, than of the US or Texas where in fact there is nothing
to fear until outrage shall produce difficulty.” What’s more, Henry pointed out that “he
counts upon much support from Texas in such an event.” In a letter to Lucas Alamán,

379
380

SFA to Piedras, 12 July 1830, AP, Vol. II, 447-48.
SFA to Secretary of Relations, 13 July 1830, AP, Vol. II, 449-451.

226
Austin argued that, given the recent political turmoil in Mexico, colonists had every
opportunity to rebel. The fact that they had not was the best proof that they never would.
“[M]any times have I been without the support of any Government as a result of the
various changes, revolutions and internal disagreements that have agitated the Mexican
nation,” he wrote, “Forgive me sir for alluding to them and ask the question, if my
intentions, or the intentions of my colonists were not sane, quiet and peaceful what more
favorable opportunity would we have?” 381
Austin immediately set to work on damage control, publishing an editorial in the
Texas Gazette explaining the law of April 6th and attempting to quell widespread
discontent. He pointed out that it allowed Texans “open and unembarrassed” trade with
Mexican ports –“the best in the world, for the sale of cotton or other woolen goods.”
Despite his own criticisms, he adamantly defended the Mexican federal government. “In
short, all that nature and a liberal and munificent government can do has been done,” he
insisted, “and nothing is now wanting but capital, enterprise and industry.” Colonists
were again reminded that their future prosperity depended on Mexican beneficence. 382
Austin and Williams took their declarations of loyalty to the press, naming the
newspaper they founded together the Mexican Citizen. And when it came to the paper’s
motto, “Mexico es mi patria, would do better, for it will be as much as to say to people
abroad ‘we have a country and are proud of it, and we are ready and willing to defend her
381
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rights.’” Furthermore, “it will remind our home folks whom they belong to.” By the
beginning of 1831, the men were satisfied with their efforts. It seemed that they had
finally convinced Mexico of colonists’ loyalty to it. “Last spring the idea was very
general in Mexico that Texas was the Botany Bay of the US and the Gov’t of the North
was secretly encouraging the emigration of bad men and vagabonds, who were destitute
of principle, for the purpose of enciting them to rebel against the Govt.” Yet Austin
believed he had diverted such a crisis. “This Gov’t now believes that the settlers of my
colony at least, are men of principle who will respect their oaths of fidelity, and will
never forget that they have received fortunes from this Govt and favors which no other
Govt ever extended.” 383
Despite Mexico’s blatantly anti-American stance, immigrants continued to flood
into Texas. In fact, records indicate that immigration from the North actually grew after
1830. Whereas between 1822 and 1830, it had continued at a fairly steady stream of
approximately 1,000 per year, that number increased to nearly 3,000 per year after 1830,
so that Anglo-Texans would ultimately outnumber the ethnic Mexican population by 10
to 1. A temporary lifting of the immigration restriction might have had something to do
with this, or the decision to continue to allow only certain colonies such as Austin’s to
admit immigrants may have encouraged prospective immigrants to take advantage of
such leniencies while they existed. Whatever the case, unlike the first wave of
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immigrants, many from this newer generation arrived in the country at a time of profound
political instability, as Mexico was beginning to move closer to centralism. They also
tended to be more restive than the prior generation, who exhibited a stronger faith in the
Mexican political process. This brought them into conflict not only with the Mexican
leadership, but with the more established elements of the Anglo-Texan population. Men
like Austin and Williams worked tirelessly to encourage immigrants to look to Mexican
law to address their grievances, but with Mexico’s federalist promise faltering and with
growing hostility towards Anglo-Americans, this proved a difficult task among a group
of people who showed increasingly less loyalty to both Austin and the country he had
sworn to protect. 384
***
Meanwhile, Terán had diligently set to work carrying out his new orders
stipulated under the decree. He established military forts at Nacogdoches, Béxar and San
Felipe, and one at the mouth of the Brazos he called Velasco. He assigned Col. David
Bradburn, himself a Kentucky immigrant, as overseer. Terán also established custom
houses at Matamoros and Galveston where he appointed George Fisher, another US
immigrant, as customs officer. As the seven years during which immigrants were exempt
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from taxation began to expire, he ordered the collection of taxes on virtually all goods
from the North. 385
While the federal government was attempting to extend its authority into the
frontier, the state of Coahila y Téjas, in response to a petition from Austin and seventyfive other men from his colony, had appointed a land commissioner named Francisco
Madero to assign formal grants to immigrants who had not yet received them. When
Madero arrived in Texas, he established the town of Liberty, began distributing land
grants, and commenced elections for alcalde and members of the ayuntamiento. When
Terán caught wind of these activities, he ordered Bradburn to arrest Madero and halt
elections, which Bradburn promptly did to the ire of almost everyone in Texas. Madero
reacted by accusing Bradburn of disobeying his “immediate chief” and committing an
“infraction of the constitution.” 386 Terán, however, sided with his subordinate, insisting
that the new decree froze the issuance of more land grants to Anglo-American colonists
and that Bradburn was therefore fully within his bounds to imprison him.
Tensions simmered until early 1832 when, shortly after establishing a new custom
house at Anáhuac, Fisher demanded that all ships ported in Galveston clear their papers
with him in Anáhuac before being permitted to leave port. Conditions worsened when
Bradburn commenced to close all of the ports except Galveston. The order came on the
heels of a series of contraband seizures, and it was the last straw. In an angry letter to
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Bradburn, Austin called such regulations “utterly impracticable” and their execution
practically impossible. You know your native countrymen,” he continued “and you also
know that at this time the people have just causes and very many of them to complain.”
Austin warned that unless a more liberal system were adopted, “the country will be
totally broken up and all commerce totally annihilated.” Bradburn passed Austin’s letter
on to Terán, recommending that “the whole country lying within ten leagues of the coast”
be placed “under martial law.” If local authorities resisted, they would face “exemplary
punishment.” 387
The situation came to a head when the schooner Sabine attempted to run the
blockade at Velasco after its captain was informed he had to pay a fee and receive
permission from Anáhuac before he could leave port. A group of disgruntled colonists
who had recently seized the port assisted Brown in his assault. Terán was incensed.
“You want the Government to adopt a more liberal policy,” he wrote in his reply to
Austin, “You should say what liberality you long for beyond that which you already
receive.” The collection of customs duties was a fair and practically universal practice in
the Americas, he insisted, “Only in Brazoria is it believed that there is a reason for
rebellion.” Not only did Terán refuse to ease restrictions or to replace Bradburn and
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Fisher as Austin had requested, but he dispatched Col. Domingo Ugartechea with over
one hundred troops to reinforce Velasco. 388
While admitting that the actions of the colonists were wrong, Austin did agree
with their impulse. “All the people here who have anything to lose or who have three
grains of common sense oppose separation from Mexico and all disorder,” he assured the
general. In a separate letter to the Supreme Government, Austin specifically asked for
exemption from the tariff on such items as clothing, tobacco, books, and medicine.
While he did not defend the rebellion at Anáhuac, he did blame Fisher for it and
specifically asked that he be removed “and replaced by a Mexican.” Regardless of what
role Austin himself played in prompting the rebellion at Anáhuac, it no doubt gave him
some leverage in negotiating with Mexican authorities. 389
In May of 1832, a meeting was arranged in Anáhuac to discuss the new
impositions. When Bradburn caught wind of it he arrested the leaders and threw them in
jail, just as he had done to Madero. When the men were finally released, they
immediately began agitating the colonists to demand the release of other colonists whom
Bradburn had imprisoned. In mid-June, news of a recent string of federalist victories in
the interior under the leadership of General Antonio López de Santa Anna reached Texas.
The rebels declared their allegiance to the federalist resistance in a preamble in which
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they declared the “determination of Texas to repel further aggressions by the military,
and to maintain their rights under the constitution of 1824.” They complained that the
present “dynasty” had repeatedly violated the constitution, ignored the law, and replaced
civil authority with “military despotism.” They therefore expressed “feelings of deepest
interest and solicitude” in Santa Anna’s resistance “to the numberless encroachments and
infractions which have been made by the present administration upon the constitution.”
They determined to pledge “our lives and fortunes in support of the same and of the
distinguished leader, who is now so gallantly fighting in defense of civil liberty.” They
invited other Texans to join them, and John Austin, nephew of the founder, headed a
small group of men to proceed to Brazoria to collect reinforcements.
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citizens of Brazoria held a meeting in which they resolved to heed the call to join the
federalists, asserting that the existing federal authorities had “evinced a total disregard of
the constitution of the country.” It was therefore their duty, they claimed, “to declare our
opposition to the ruling dynasty and to place ourselves in the ranks of the supporters of
the constitution.” 391
The colonists then proceeded onto Velasco, one hundred and fifty strong. Father
Muldoon made a desperate attempt to avoid bloodshed by first offering himself as a
hostage in exchange for the liberty of the imprisoned Texans. When his offer was
rebuffed, he then tried to negotiate with Ugartachea himself, but the colonel was resolved
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to sustain himself against the rebels. “I do not believe that sensible men who have had so
many advantages in this land would like to lose them in a day,” the colonel stated, “but if
such should be the case, you would find me determined in everything.” 392
As tensions flared, local leadership attempted to quell ensuing disaster. In a
formal address, Ramón Músquiz reminded citizens to direct their grievances “against
measures and not men.” 393 Yet, the rebellion continued to spread, even into two
settlements in Austin’s Colony. This decision would bring the leadership of San Felipe
into direct confrontation with the more radical elements of its citizenry, as Williams set to
work counseling calm and obedience, and imploring citizens to appeal to Mexico City
rather than take up arms. “We admit wrong has been committed, but what Course does
our Constitution and our Laws point out for redress of those injuries and wrongs Whether
felt by an individual or a Community,” he asked. The answer should be obvious - “An
appeal to the Supreme Authorities of the State and Nation.” Just as they had done for the
Fredonian Rebellion, Williams and others called on the local militia to help Mexican
troops suppress their “poor, misguided fellow citizens” and ward off the evil “that
threatens not only those who are unfortunately in arms, but ourselves because if the
government be convinced that we are all in rebellion, by harvest time the colony will be
filled with troops.” Williams reminded colonists of the magnanimity of their adopted
country – “the sacrifices, bounties and benefits” of a Government “that admitted and
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encouraged your settlement.” Finally, he drew on a shared sense of national pride as he
appealed to longstanding Anglo citizens to convince their newly arrived brethren to lay
down their arms. “Are you ready and willing to permit that your Countryman, your
friends, your kindred, and your brothers shall hurl defiance at that government, and
destruction on your families,” Williams declared, illustrating the significant rift between
established settlers and the more restive, new arrivals, who had very different ideas about
how best to remedy their grievances. “[O]r will unite as one man, and use those exertions
which honorable and high minded feelings suggest, to cause a return to their home and to
their duties.” The government “now calls for acts not words,” declared Williams. And
while he acknowledged the “pecuniary nature” of the kinds of sacrifice for which he was
asking, “they should yield to the more grand and important objects of duty and
obligation.” Williams concluded his remarks with a gesture to the future
Let your movements be prompt and rapid, and join and unite with us heart in hand
to save the colony, and our fellow citizens, from the impending ruin, and let our
children have the happiness in future ages of counting their forefathers as among
those who in 1832, Saved the country from the terrible infliction of anarchy and
confusion. 394

Yet it is clear from their own words, that the rebels did not see their actions as in
any way in violation of the nation to which they had sworn allegiance. While these men
did not heed Músquiz’s advice, they nonetheless saw their efforts as in the service of, not
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opposition to, the Mexican Republic. Accusing Bradburn of violating the rights “which
we, as citizens of the Mexican republic, have considered as the rule of our civil conduct,”
they insisted that “it is with deep regret we hear of the necessity of repelling
unconstitutional encroachments.” 395
Arriving in Anáhuac on the 23rd of July, the rebels first approached Ugartachea in
peace. When asked about their mission, “they answered that they were members of an
assembly which had been formed in Brazoria,” had declared in favor of Santa Anna and
his Plan of Vera Cruz, and that they came to invite him to join them. When the colonel
refused, they requested passage. When he asked them if their schooner was armed, they
said it was but that they only wanted to fight Bradburn not him. If Ugartachea did not
consent, however, they had been ordered to “intimidate” him. The colonel refused again,
sending the men back to their camp where they prepared for an attack which commenced
late on the evening of the 27th. The Colonel reported that the rebels cried “‘Long live the
republic, the constitution and laws! Long live the supreme government!” as they
commenced their attack. Once it appeared the Mexican forces had suppressed the rebels
John Austin sent word that he wished to speak with the colonel. When the two men met,
their greeting was respectful, according to Ugartachea. “We saluted each other, and I
greeted many friends, men of prominence in the colony, whom I had not thought would
be found among them. We toasted one another, but we respected one another’s
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opinions.” According to the colonel, Austin “praised the bravery of the Mexicans” and
assured him that “notwithstanding the fact that I had fought them,” he “did not have an
enemy among all the Americans.” The rebels even attempted to persuade the colonel to
join them, offering to place themselves under his command. Although the Colonel
refused their offer, he had to surrender due to lack of ammunition. 396
Meanwhile, more citizens renounced the rebels, including the town of Bastrop
which, on July 2nd, declared “unequivocally that they have ever been, and still continue to
be loyal subjects of the Mexican Government.” Furthermore, they were “ready to obey
any order, command or requisite that may be deemed necessary.”
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Austin for his part

attempted to present the rebellion as one declared in the name of Mexico and the
Mexican Constitution, not in violation of them. “It has been said that the Colonists have
insulted the Mexican flag,” he wrote to one Mexican official. “I dare answer that it is
false,” he asserted. “[T]hose who have trampled upon the constitution, Laws, and
guarantees under the authority of that honored flag are the ones to bear the reproach of
the insult, and not the Mexican citizens who resisted such abuses of power.” Texans did
not oppose increased governmental presence in the northern frontier, they opposed the
way in which it was administered. It did seem that the more the government flexed its
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muscle, the less the colonists seemed to appreciate it. Yet, while their reaction to the
increased military presence was mixed, colonists remained generally obedient. 398
On July 18th the rebels set forth their grievances in a formal address to Col. A.J.
Mexía. They claimed that “the causes which impelled us to take up arms, have been
misrepresented, or misunderstood,” and attempted to clarify their complaints. “The
Colonists of texas have long since been convinced, of the Arbitrary and unconstitutional
measures, of the Administration of Bustamante,” which included the “fixing and
establishing” of military posts - the officers of which disregarded “the local civil
Authorities of the state”; the “interposition of a military force,” the interference of locally
elected administrators; the military commander of Anáhuac “advising and procuring
Servants to quit the service of their Masters;” and the “imprisonment of our citizens
without lawful cause”. 399
When Col. Piedras finally arrived in Brazoria he was able to establish a truce with
the colonists that included replacing Bradburn, freeing the imprisoned Texans, and
reestablishing the ayuntamiento at Liberty. In his own report he admitted, that “wisdom
and prudence have not been exercised in that place,” though of Bradburn he stated that “I
do not find him guilty of as many abuses as are imputed against him.”
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But events like those which occurred at Anáhuac had a lasting impact on TexasMexican relations. While the call for Texan independence remained a long way off, it
did reveal a growing cleavage between colonists willing to embrace armed conflict to
address their grievances, and those who counseled calm and obedience. While the rates
of immigration increased after 1830, the new wave of immigrants expressed far less of
the optimism towards Mexico’s political future that their forebears had. “I was not
deceived in the country, this is certainly a delightful part of the world,” wrote James
Perry, Austin’s brother-in-law and recent arrival to Texas. Terming Texas “the Garden
of all North America,” Perry wrote that “if full reliance could be placed in the stability of
the government and permission for emigrants to settle here[,] it would soon be one of the
most pleasing parts of the world.” Yet Perry observed that “there appears to be a strong
prejudice entertained by those holding the reigns of government against the people of the
US of the North,” thereby placing himself and other immigrants from the north “in rather
an unpleasant situation.” Despite such complaints, he remained hopeful. “[W]e still hope
to be able to remove their prejudices,” Perry wrote, and if Santa Anna succeeds it would
“be a very favorable change for Texas.” In another letter, Perry wrote that he hoped the
late revolution in the Mexican interior, would “be greatly to our advantage. We expect in
the course of one or two years that Texas will be made into a distinct state and in that
case we will enjoy many advantages over our present situation.” 400
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Statehood, in fact, was precisely what Austin had in mind. If there was one thing
he had learned from the Anáhuac fiasco, it was that Texas needed better representation
and greater influence at the federal level. Mexican leaders agreed. Even Lucas Alamán,
the leading conservative and author of the Law of April 6th, stated that “Texas cannot
flourish and grow without separating from Coahuila and becoming a territory of the
federation until it has acquired enough elements to be a state.” He suggested that Austin
lobby the state legislature to endorse this idea, pointing out that it was good for Coahuila
too. Austin concurred, stating that “The truest interest of this country remains that it
should remain united to Mexico as a State that can legislate for itself in all local and
internal matters.” While Austin warned against getting involved in the turmoil of
Mexican national politics, he wanted to see his colony receive more of the rights and
responsibilities that came with Mexican affiliation. Despite legislation like the Law of
April 6th, it appeared that by 1830 that his aims were coming to fruition. In March of that
year, Terán promised greater federal protection to both tejano and Texan settlements,
something that most of the colonists greeted enthusiastically. 401
Santa Anna’s federalist victory in spring of 1833 emboldened the push for
statehood. Mexican leaders had earlier proposed that Texas separate from Coahuila and
become a territory, but Austin rebuffed this offer. “The truest interest of this country
remains that it should remain united to Mexico as a State that can legislate for itself in all
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local and internal matters,” he wrote. Once again, however, Austin had to be cautious
lest Mexican officials misinterpret his request. Separate statehood was what they wanted,
not separation from Mexico. “The general basis which they have adopted and will most
rigidly adhere to, is to form Texas into a state of the Mexican confederation,” he wrote in
a letter to a correspondent in the north. “They do not wish to separate from Mexico,” he
insisted, “and of their own accord never will separate.” If such an “unfortunate event”
were to occur “its causes will originate in the mistaken policy of the national Govt. of
Mexico in relation to Texas and not in the desire or true interests of the people of that
country.” 402
By the middle of 1832, Texans by and large remained committed to Mexico, but
their status within it was yet to be determined. “No, sir, the people of Texas do not wish
to separate,” he reiterated, and it is not and will not be their interest to do so, unless they
should be kicked off.” Mexico’s Anglo citizens would “do their duty to” their adopted
government. But they were also ever mindful of “the duty which every man in all
communities, owes to himself.” 403 Ultimately, Texans’ loyalty to Mexico depended on
that country’s ability to deliver on what they understood to be its own promise to its
citizens.
But as Terán, Austin and others were beginning to realize, Texans’ commercial
power and influence could only go so far without political power too. As Terán noted,
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“[The colonists] eagerly await the day when they will enter into the full enjoyment of
their political rights and boast of the major influence they will have in the full
administration of the state” 404 As for Austin, he continued to believe in the ability of
Mexican leaders to repair relations with the colonists that had been compromised by its
haphazard efforts to regulate and control the frontier. Yet, if Mexico’s great appeal to
prospective immigrants was its system of government, it had to assure them that it was
secure.
As Mexico’s experiment in radical federalism seemed more and more tentative,
Austin began to play a somewhat more active role in repairing Mexico’s chaotic political
climate. In one letter he requested that James Perry “send him copies of the constitution
of Columbia, of Buenos Aires and of Chilli, of Peru and what is called the Bolivian code
or constitution.” 405 What Austin intended to do with these documents is unclear, but one
might surmise that he hoped to use them as comparative models of governance in his
efforts to negotiate with Mexican leaders. Not insignificantly, Austin chose the
constitutions of other Spanish American countries as his point of reference rather than
that of the United States. Likewise, even as he insisted that “prejudices against North
American are subsiding in Mexico,” he found it necessary to distance himself from
United States leaders who had demonstrated the acquisitive character that Mexicans like
Terán most feared, so as to mitigate the “remnants of bitter feeling left among the
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uniformed who believe that Poinsett was the U.S. government and all north Americans
were connected with his intrigues.”
The statehood question lended a new tone of optimism by the end of the summer
when the citizens of Matagorda held a public dinner in honor of a recent victory over a
band of local Indians. At the dinner’s commencement, they made a series of toasts. The
first was to “The republic of Mexico – Tho’ not first, may she be the last, in the
constellation of republics, in the new world.” The second went to “The United States of
the North – ‘The land of the free, and the home of the brave.’” Then a third gentleman
rose and toasted to Texas’ admission into the Mexican union as a state – “May Congress
patiently hear, and magnanimously decide her claims,” and to Coahuila “The co-tenant,
and co-partner of Texas – May the dissolution and division be friendly, and alike
honorable to both.” And then to “Our Country” – by which they meant their adopted one
- where “If there be a part where the institutions have made the men - there is another
portion where the men have yet to make the institutions.” And to the cause of “Santa Ana
- the constitution, and the laws - Our watchword, and textbook.” Another man lifted his
glass “to the internal- improvement-fever of the North may it cross the Sabine in a
steamboat - travel on a railroad to the waters of the Colorado, and by Subscription, raise
the wind, and sweep the raft into the Bay of Matagorda.” Then another gentleman took
the floor and toasted to “The constitution of Mexico, and sovereignty of the states - May
the laws repugnant to either be obliterated in the blood of their legislators and
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administrators.” Finally, Ira Ingram wrapped up the exhaustive succession by toasting to
the settlers of Texas who “have expelled the savage, subdued and planted the forest” so
that “The enemies of their country, may read their future history.” 406
As 1832 drew to a close, the relations between Anglo Texan immigrants and their
federal government might have been strained, but men like Austin remained no less
committed to their adopted country. But what to make of the increasing numbers of new
arrivals – sometimes hundreds a day – who seemed less aware that there even was a
federal government? And what to do about the still turbulent political landscape of
Mexico more generally? Would the federalist promise survive? If it did, what would it
mean for Mexico’s territorial integrity, especially when it came to the United States? If it
did not, what would this mean for the nation, its citizens and their future in it? These and
other questions remained unanswered by the end of 1832, but dramatic changes in the
nation’s political core were about to determine them.
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CHAPTER 5
“A Distinct Member of the Mexican Family”
Revolution and Realignment
1832-36

In late 1832, Austin received a letter from an Anglo-Texan colonist named Jonas
Harrison, describing a recent convention at which fifty-five delegates from all Texan
municipalities except San Antonio had assembled. Emboldened by Santa Anna’s
federalist insurgency, they had decided to petition the state and national government for a
series of reforms including more liberal tariffs, repeal of the ban on immigration from the
United States, and separate statehood. The last point had been a longstanding desire for
most Texans, and it was an issue that many believed the recent conflicts had made all the
more urgent. 407
Harrison complained that there had been several delegates brazen enough to
suggest Texan independence from Mexico. He did not hesitate to express his opinion on
this matter. “The idea of a separate distinct and independent government I do not believe
exists in the mind of any man of common sense in the district,” Harrison asserted, “Nor
do they want to belong to the United States of the North, there are a few exceptions to
this last opinion, but not many, scarcely one in ten.” The immigrants, after all, had “come
to the country to participate of the benefits of the Mexican Independence, and of their
liberal policy in regard to land, and they wish to continue so.” Separation from Mexico
407
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would render Texans “the most oppressed people” and only “invite aggression,”
conceivably from the North or hostile Indian tribes. Harrison insisted that a call for
greater local representation was not a call for independence. He and others like him
understood that freedom was only possible where a state presence existed to guarantee it.
“There is perhaps no person more dangerous in the formation of a new government than a
mere theorist,” he concluded. 408
Indeed, throughout the early 1830’s, Texans increasingly complained of the
Indian raids, banditry, and general lawlessness that plagued the frontier. From their
experiences they had concluded that an overly weak state was as dangerous as an
overbearing one. “[We] deprecate the idea of being independent of the Mexican
Republic,” wrote Harrison, “Their sole wish is to be dependent on it, and to afford it all
the support and protection in their power – to protect all its rights and interests, and in
return to participate of all its benefits and advantages.” If Mexico could only deliver on
its promises, not only would current settlers have a reason to renew their fidelity to it, but
Mexico might see more “Enterprising” immigrants than ever before. 409
***
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Few events have dominated scholarly and popular attention more than the Texas
Revolution. 410 For over a century, historians have pointed to it as the inevitable victory
of one civilization over its opposing and inferior counterpart - of democracy over
despotism, of Protestantism over Catholicism, of a superior white race over an inferior
brown one. 411 Beginning in the 1970’s, revisionists complicated the image of elite white
men spreading American democracy, by highlighting the experiences of Mexican Texans,
who finally received credit for their contribution to the fight for independence. 412 But
such histories, while important, did little to challenge the presumption of AngloAmerican political dominance. In fact, they merely confirmed it by showing that,
ultimately, everyone wanted to be American.
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Most recently, borderlands historians have cast the Texas Revolution as an
example of the inherent contingency of early nineteenth century nationalism. Some have
pointed to factors like the economic pull of the US or intensifying Indian raids as reasons
for Mexico’s ultimate loss of the region. 413 Andrés Reséndez correctly observes that the
Texas Revolution started out as part of a much larger Mexican movement to reinstate the
federalist Constitution of 1824 after Santa Anna’s abrupt turn towards centralism. In this
regard, it was little different from the numerous other rebellions then sweeping northern
Mexico. Indeed, Anglos entered relatively late into a conflict that had long involved
tejanos and the citizens of other northern states like Zacatecas. 414 Historians have also
been right to point to the profound lack of unity, consistency and organization that
characterized the movement. 415
Yet, while Texans certainly struggled to come to a consensus about what exactly
they were fighting for, or even if they should be fighting at all, throughout most of the
conflict the dominant aim was decisively not independence – it was, rather, for a return to
Mexican federalism. However, few historians have taken Anglo Texans’ early alliance
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with Mexican federalists seriously. 416 But when one considers Texans’ longstanding
commitment to federalism, consistent investment in the Mexican nation-building project,
and sustained opposition to joining the United States, it makes sense. If we accept
Texans’ support for Mexican federalism in 1824, then we should not so readily dismiss it
in 1836. In this sense, the revolution was hardly revolutionary at all. Far from the result
of two irreconcilable political cultures, it was inspired by a profound sense of duty to one
– Mexico’s. Loyalism, in fact, remained the primary impulse throughout most of the
conflict, for Anglos as well as tejanos. Texans’ ultimate decision to declare independence
came late, reluctantly, and for many, it never came at all.
So then why did Texans ultimately end up abandoning Mexican federalism and
making a go of it on their own despite the adamant protests of men like Harrison?
Independence, as it turns out, was largely the result of two concurrent factors, both
inspired by Texans’ own inability to fight the Mexican centralists on their own, due to
their comparatively small population and limited resources. One factor was the
unwillingness of private investors in the North to fund an internal Mexican war. The
other was the significant numbers of US recruits who flooded into Texas and, in
accordance with Texans’ long commitment to representative democracy and martial
citizenship, received the right to vote. As we shall see, these recruits had a profound
416
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impact, not only on the course of the war, but on the direction of Texas politics more
generally. These men emboldened a more radical minority largely composed of recent
immigrants themselves, who had been flirting with the thought of independence at least
since the Anáhuac crisis.
Thus, while the Texas Revolution began as a Mexican story, it would end as an
American one. Volunteers from the North, along with speculators, slaveholders, and not
to mention the Jackson administration itself, believed they had a vested interest in an
independent Texas. They, as well as the thousands of men who answered the plea to help
the fight against Santa Anna, often in return for land, were ultimately the ones to
determine that the Texas rebellion would end very differently from how it began. Yet its
outcome was hardly a testament to the enduring strength and superiority of the United
States, but rather to the power of an increasingly territorially aggressive South and to the
principles of radical federalism. In this regard, perhaps it is more accurate to say that the
Texas Revolution began as a Mexican story and ended as a Southern one.
***
The convention of 1832 constituted an illegal assembly under Mexican law,
leaving Political Chief Ramón Músquiz little choice but to annul its petition. However,
just a few months later, Santa Ana and his federalist forces overthrew Bustamante. The
Mexican states subsequently elected the hero general to the presidency and the even more
radical federalist, Valentín Gómez Farís, as his vice president. Things were beginning to
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look up for the Texans, who called for another convention to push for their desired
reforms. Once again, delegates from the Anglo colonies of Téjas y Coahuila met in San
Felipe in April of the following year to draft a formal petition requesting the central
government admit Téjas as a separate and independent state of the Mexican confederation
under the law of May 7, 1824. 417
In their memorial to the National Congress, the petitioners asked that the union
between Téjas y Coahuila “be dissolved, abrogated and perpetually cease,” and that they,
the inhabitants of Texas, be permitted to establish a separate state government “in
accordance with the federal constitution and the constitutive act,” and that it “be received
and incorporated into the great confederation of Mexico.” They pointed out that the
consolidation of the provinces had always been provisional and specifically referenced
the decree of the 7th of May 1824 which stated that, as soon as Texas had accrued the
number of inhabitants to constitute a state, it should inform Congress and receive
recognition as such. 418
Claiming that their relative isolation and lack of integration left many in Béxar
exposed to the depredations of the “faithless Comanches,” inadequate schools and
churches, and a general want of “human industry,” they complained “more of the want of
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all the important attributes of government, than of the abuses of any,” and they made it
clear that their appeal came from a desire to protect Mexico from lawlessness and
invasion, most specifically from their own native country.
Constituting a remote frontier of the republic, and bordering on a powerful nation,
a portion of whose population, in juxtaposition to hers, is notoriously profligate
and lawless, she requires, in particular and emphatic sense, the vigorous
application of such laws as are necessary, not only to the preservation of good
order, the protection of property, and the redress of personal wrongs, but such also
as are essential to the prevention of illicit commerce, to the security of the public
revenues, and to the avoidance of serious collision with the authorities of the
neighboring republic.

A more direct relationship with the central government, they insisted, would permit
Texans to better serve and protect their state and, consequently, the nation, thus allowing
Texas to “‘figure’ as a brilliant star in the Mexican constellation,” and “shed a new
splendor around the illustrious city of Monteczuma.” 419 In fact, many Anglo Texans
expressed support for separate statehood only on the condition that it would not result in
independence. Harrison himself wrote that he believed the Anglo-Texans would “gladly
embrace” a provisional government only if Texas remained “a part of the Mexican
confederation.” He insisted “that we are all Mexicans and will rigidly protect all the
rights and interests of Mexico.” 420
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Although most tejanos agreed with Texas statehood in theory, they felt that now
was not the time to ask. The nation was plagued by political polarization and crisis, the
federal government distracted, and such an appeal could be construed as a sign of
rebellion or secession. Most tejanos believed that Texans should give the state
government the opportunity to address their grievances before demanding separation.
Near the end of 1832, Austin held a meeting with several prominent bexarenos in which
he “said everything I could to induce them to concur in taking that step [toward separate
statehood] at once.” They expressed agreement with his aim, but “thought it precipitate”
before any “representations of our grievances were made to the Govt.” He conceded, and
suggested that Texans accompany their grievances “with a positive declaration that if
[they] were not fully redressed by the first day of March next, Texas would then proceed
immediately to organize a local Government.” The Béxar leadership agreed to this, but
insisted on April. 421
Yet, not even everyone agreed that the state government was deficient enough to
merit Texas’ separation. “[I]t is our duty as faithful citizens to preserve that govt, which
affords us protection so long as it is worthy of support,” wrote John A. Williams to
Austin. Such a reaction was perhaps unsurprising from the man who had led the
suppression of the Fredonian rebels. “Every man of intelligence in this section of
[the]Country that I have conversed with,” he claimed,” is “much opposed to the
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Convention and all other innovation upon the established laws of the Country.” Williams
even went so far as to question Austin’s integrity. “[Y]ou say that you are a ‘Mexican
Citizen . . . Why then advise me to violate my duty, by the performance of an act
expressly prohibited by law, and which you as a ‘Mexican citizen’ in obedeance to your
duty as such, could not, and I presume, would not perform.” He denied that Texans had
anything to be discontent about, and dismissed the notion that the colonies were growing
restive or needed a convention to quell their frustrations. “You say the late ‘convention
terminated very happily, it tranquilized, harmonized, and united all . . . But there was
nothing to harmonize and tranquilize. The people of Texas were at that time, for ought
that I know, perfectly tranquil.” 422
The call for statehood came primarily from a small but growing contingent of
Anglo Texans, most of them newcomers and many of whom had been the ringleaders of
the Anáhuac rebellion. Younger, less established, and with far more tenuous ties to their
adopted country, these men largely rejected the older settlers’ appeals for calm, patience
and neutrality with regard to the ongoing civil war. Perhaps the most vocal was William
H. Wharton, a Virginia native raised in Tennessee. Wharton’s first trip to Texas in 1827
resulted in his marriage to the daughter of Jared E. Groce, the largest slaveowner in
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Texas. The young couple spent the first few years of their marriage in Tennessee before
returning to Texas in 1830. 423
Wharton made no secret of his opposition to the old settlers, of whom he had
complained bitterly during the Anáhuac crisis. “I have received several letters from San
Felipe, breathing all the same toryish spirit and shewing that we have as much opposition
to expect from our own countrymen as from the Mexicans,” he declared before a
Brazoria Committee. Wharton’s frustration with Austin and his allies grew more intense
during the October meeting when Austin was elected over him as presiding officer. 424
It was this more radical contingent that Austin hoped to quell with the convention,
but in doing so he sparked the ire of conservatives. “I believe further that if all the people
of Texas were consulted,” wrote Williams, “and made to understand the subject in its
proper light[,] then the main Question put, Shall we obey the laws of the Country we
have adopted, or shall we not obey them, and yeald obedeance to the junto of San Felipe?
I believe Sir that would find an over whelming majority in the affirmative.” He reminded
the empresario that the convention’s resolution did not take precedence over any state or
federal law “yet according to your strange system of reasoning,” it would appear that they
were “at least equal to a Statute passed in due form by the legislative authority of the
State.” He concluded by echoing the very instructions that Austin himself had issued
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time and again to his colonists - to abandon any and all behavior that might bring them
into collision with Mexican officials. “Can it be the interest of Texas to dissolve the
legal political bonds that unite us as one society?” Williams warned Austin that he did
“not know of five men in this Munesepalety favourable to the plan you have so warmly
espoused” and that if he were to call for an election “it would be disregarded.” Even those
who supported the Committee’s resolution questioned its popularity and suggested
delaying action until some kind of unanimity could be achieved. Frustrated, by the end
of January 1833 Austin was prepared to give up on Texan politics altogether. 425
As the primary founder of the Anglo colonies and their chief representative to the
federal government, Austin found himself in a difficult position by 1833. Ever since his
colony’s establishment, he had counseled patience, obedience, and loyalty to Mexico.
But with the governments’ growth and increasing administrative presence in Texas,
coupled with a flood of new immigrants from the North after 1830 - the majority of
whom tended to be more politically restive than their predecessors, this position was
becoming harder to sustain. The Father of Texas now found himself struggling to find a
political course that suited Texas’ changing demographic and relationship with the
federal government. This was no easy task, and yet statehood was something that Texans
had long expected and generally supported, even if they did not think it was the right time
to ask.
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Despite some opposition, Austin understood that the desire for separate statehood
was strong even among some of the more established settlers such as Ira Ingram. 426 He
therefore accepted the task of traveling to Mexico City to present the document to
national leaders, albeit with some trepidation: “I enter upon this mission with great
anxiety for I am convinced the welfare of Texas depends on success,” he wrote to his
sister and brother-in-law just before embarking, “We cannot do without a State govt any
longer. It is impossible.” Although concerned that the political turmoil then plaguing the
nation might hinder his efforts, Austin remained mostly optimistic. In a letter to his
cousin he wrote, “I leave to-morrow for Mexico on the state Government mission – I go
with considerable – I may say – strong hopes of success – The course taken by the
convention, is the true one I think.” He could think of “no just reason” why the federal
government would refuse him. Regarding separation from Mexico, he wrote that there
was a “decided opposition” to it. “The people do not desire, and would not agree to it, for
they could get a State Government.” 427
Yet Austin was apprehensive. “The consequences of failure will no doubt be
war,” he confided to his nephew. Specifically, he worried about how the more radical
elements of the settler population would react. But for the time being, he chose to
remain hopeful and continue to caution obedience and calm. Austin was most concerned
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about the well-being of the “old settlers,” as he called them, if conflict ensued, either
between Texas and the federal government or among the settlers themselves. “The
settlers have earned what they have got too hard, and too many years of hard labor and
privation, to jeapordize all hastily,” he wrote in a letter to one such individual, “a war
with the nation will be ruinous to them, for they will be destroyed and overwhelmed,
eaten up by those who come from abroad to aid them in fighting their battles.” Indeed,
they had more to fear from the newer elements of their own settler population “than from
the whole Mexican nation.” Men like Wharton who had been in Texas for a far shorter
period of time, had yet to make their fortunes and, in many cases, found themselves cut
out of political and economic opportunities by Austin’s cohort. “My policy has
displeased the ardent spirits in my colony,” Austin wrote, “but I still think it was the
correct one.” Many of these men viewed such johnny-come-latelies with heavy suspicion
and did not look forward to a new government and the significant power shift that it
would no doubt entail. Indeed, as the tide of radicalism was slowly gaining steam in
Texas, Austin and his allies were struggling to hold onto power. In many ways this
mission would prove their significance and the relevance of their hereunto cautious and
deferential approach to Mexican authority. 428
***
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Austin arrived in Mexico City in July of 1833 and immediately presented
Congress with a five point petition based on the measure drafted back in Texas. He stated
that it was “The wish of the people and their declaration that they possessed the necessary
elements to sustain a State Government,” and that it was “The natural right of Texas to
occupy its station alongside of its sisters, the other States of the Confederation.” While
“[Texas] has always been a distinct member of the Mexican Family,” he insisted that the
appeal came from “the duty and the interest of Texas to cement and strengthen its union
with the Mexican confederation.” 429
This was all par for the course for Austin. But towards the end of the documents
he dared to state that, if denied, “[S]elf-preservation” would compel Texans to organize a
local government “with or without the approbation of the General Government.” Austin
assured the Committee, “that this measure would not proceed from any hostile views to
the permanent union of Texas with Mexico,” but rather, “from absolute necessity, to save
themselves from anarchy and total ruin,” referring, no doubt, to the more restive elements
of his population. At the same time, Austin acknowledged the potentially deleterious
impact that such a move might have on the relationship between Texas and the federal
government, “How such a measure would affect the union of Texas with Mexico, or
where it would end, were matters worthy of serious reflection.” Was this a threat?
Whatever the case, Austin defended his decision to add this appendage to his appeal,
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insisting that he had long “pursued conciliation as a system,” but that “my judgment is
now convinced that Texas, in this question of right to become a State, must be
uncompromising.” 430
Yet, even as he advocated forming a separate state government with or without
federal approval, Austin made it clear that the ladder was in no way a demonstration of
Texans’ disloyalty to their adopted country, much less an initial stage in their eventual
separation from it. In his letter to the Minister of Relations, Austin reiterated his
enduring belief in “The glory of the federal system” which he argued “consists in the fact
that no other form of government invented by the wisdom of men, has been able to meet
the local necessities of each angle of an immense country.” The petition of Texas was
clearly in line with this purpose. He further insisted that “There is no individual in
[T]exas who is not convinced that the greatest misfortune that could happen to him would
be the separation of that country from [M]exico.” However, statehood was so
indispensable “to the ‘welfare’ and ‘happiness’ of the people” that it could not be
delayed. Consequently, if there were no way of obtaining it without “breaking the bonds
of the union with Mexico, it would then be the interest of Texas to attempt her
separation.” 431 For the first time, Austin argued that Texans’ loyalty to the principles of
federalism ought to preempt their loyalty to Mexico, a clear departure from prior
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unconditional fealty to his adopted country, and conviction that Mexico was the only
place on earth where such principles stood a chance of becoming reality.
When Austin dared to repeat his position to Gómez Farías, the Vice President
interpreted it as a threat and had him thrown in prison. Tellingly, he did not blame the
Mexicans for his predicament. “It has been intimated to me that some enemy, I know not
who, had accused me of designs to unite Texas, with the US of the North.” Rather, the
real people responsible for his arrest, according to Austin, were those stirring discontent
in Texas. He now began to regret proceeding with the appeal. “Ever since I returned from
Bexar a year ago last December and found the convention called in my absence,” he
wrote to Williams, “I have considered myself as suspended over the alter of sacrifice.”
The measure, he believed “compromised me in the highest degree” with both the
bexarenos and his friends in San Felipe. 432
Even as he sat in his cell in the prison of the Inquisition, Austin remained
optimistic about the future of Mexican politics and, by implication, Texas’ relationship
with Mexico. “The most favorable reforms and changes are taking place in the Mexican
government and people, and a little time will put all right – there will be toleration of
religion – Texas will be a state and all will go right.” Tellingly, Austin saw the real threat
both to himself and Texas as coming from certain radical elements in the province. “I
suppose that some of my enemies in the colony will rejoice at what they may think or
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hope will be my ruin,” he wrote to James Perry. That being the case, Austin wanted to
make sure that his current predicament did not sour Texan attitudes towards Mexican
leaders. “I do not in any manner blame the government for arresting me, and I
particularly request that there be no excitement about it.” 433
On the second day of his imprisonment, Austin heard the funeral honors for the
slain Vicente Guerrero. Yet, even as he was reminded of Mexico’s troubled political
climate and complained of his solitary confinement, “shut up in the dark dungeon,” he
remained convinced that Texas belonged with Mexico. His opinions were unchanged
nearly two months later when he observed the myriad disadvantages of United States
acquisition of Texas. First, the US would be “receiving within its limits a country which
is entirely isolated from all the other states, by its geographic situation, & by all the
interests of agriculture, manufactures and commerce.” Austin observed that Texas’
rivers, as unnavigable as they may have been, linked it to Mexico “and do not enter the
Territories of the north, so as to form bonds of union, as does the river Mississippi with
Louisiana & other states adjacent.” Furthermore, Texas itself gained nothing by
becoming a part of that country as “There is no market in the North for the produce of
Texas, & there is in Mexico.” Sheer distance made such a connection undesirable since
Texas was further from Washington than Mexico City. Neither was commerce any
temptation since, in that regard, “the Mexican flag is equal to that of the North.” Finally,
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the result of an additional cotton-producing state like Texas “would be to injure all the
states south of Virginia, whose chief produce & almost the only one which is valuable is
cotton.” If Texas, however, remained a part of Mexico, its progress “would promote the
power of the Mexican Nation to a great degree” and “to the prejudice of the U. States of
the North.” “What then is the true interest of Texas?” Austin asked, “It is to have a local
government to cement & strengthen its union with Mexico.” 434
***
Those in the United States met news of Austin’s arrest with considerable interest.
But they did not necessarily share his opinion regarding Texas’ future. Southern planters,
especially, were beginning to look upon the fledgling cotton producing Mexican province
of Texas with a wary eye and to embrace the notion that, despite its distance and
geographic discontinuity, the Union would be best served by absorbing Texas rather than
letting it remain a part of Mexico. And as Jackson entered his second term, it looked like
they might have the chance.
As 1833 drew to a close, times remained hard for Southern cotton growers.
“Cotton is low and extremely dull,” wrote one New Orleans trader to Samuel May
Williams. “Times is very hard in this country and no prospect of their getting any better,”
wrote another. Texas annexation would not only supply cotton growers with more land
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for cotton production, it would facilitate a growing US monopoly of the cotton trade.
Therefore, many in the South had a vested interest in seeing relations between Texas and
Mexico worsen. One Texan trader wrote that, while he sincerely trusted “that nothing
serious will happen,” nonetheless “should anything grow out of the circumstances of a
serious nature we shall not lack friends.” 435
While Jackson remained distracted with these and other domestic concerns, his
foreign secretary, Anthony Butler, continued to scheme of ways to acquire Texas,
including bribery. Jackson rebuffed such proposals but left Butler at his post. In March
1834, Butler concocted his brashest scheme yet. He assured the president that, in light of
Santa Anna’s recent rise to power, there was “no hope of obtaining Texas by amicable
arrangement unless we first shew our strength.” He encouraged the President to follow
through on his earlier threat to establish a boundary without the Mexicans’ approval.
“[W]e will never obtain even that portion of the country to which we think we have a
clear title until we occupy it forcibly.” Butler was correct in believing that there was little
prospect of a local movement to separate Texas from Mexico and attach it to the United
States, but not necessarily for the reasons he identified. Most of the Anglo settlers were
uninterested in rebellion, much less secession. This may have been precisely what
compelled him to push Jackson to take some action himself. In perhaps his most brazen
proposition yet, Butler proposed that the President permit him to filibuster Texas, stating
435
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he would “pledge my head” to be the one to finally “possess that part of Texas which is
ours.” Such a proposal was too extreme even for Jackson who wisely decided at that
point to recall Butler from his post.436
But for Austin and most other leading Texans at this time, the current discord in
Texas had little to do with the North. Instead, they saw it as a product of the unrest then
sweeping the rest of Mexico: “The past events in Texas necessarily grow out of the
revolution in Jalappa, which overturned the constitution and produced the counter
revolution of Vera Cruz,” Austin wrote, insisting that he had done his best to keep Texas
out of the tumult. “A current was set in motion,” however, by events related to the civil
war, and “Texas could not avoid being agitated.” 437
It may have also had something to do with Gómez Farías’ decision to dispatch
Colonels José María Noreiga and Juan Nepomuceno Almonte to Coahila y Téjas for the
purpose of reviewing a series of colonization and land transfer contracts. Colonel
Almonte was assigned the specific task of ascertaining “the opinions of Anglo-Texan
colonists concerning separation from Mexico.” The order was no doubt a result of
concern ignited by Austin’s recent petition. He was also ordered to inform slaves of their
proper status as freed men and women, and to promise land to Native Americans who
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pledged their loyalty to Mexico. This “all-out nationalizing blitkreig,” as one historian
has put it, no doubt ignited the ire of many Texans, especially Anglos. 438
Yet, it also quieted certain concerns about the absence or ineffectuality of the
federal government in the region. By May of that year, many of Austin’s closest friends
continued to share his optimism and good faith in the Mexican leadership. In July,
William H. Jack informed Thomas McKinney that “Col. Almonte is here; he is
intelligent, agreeable and apparently candid. He says that Austin will be released soon”
and that he had found “the report [on the state of affairs in Texas] to be worse than false.”
The rest of the ayuntamientos seemed to fall in line behind their leader, expressing
gratitude to both the State and National Government, requesting Austin’s release from
prison, and acknowledging that most of their grievances had been sufficiently addressed.
“Since A[ustin] was dispatched to Mexico the most favorable changes have taken place
in the political affairs of Texas,” wrote the Ayuntamiento of Brazoria to Congress. The
National Congress repealed the Law of April 6th and state government has “extended its
arm of relief and applied the necessary remedy to our wrongs.” They concluded by
“tending our most cordial and heartfelt gratitude both to the Federal and State Govts.”
There remained only one more issue to be resolved: Austin’s release from prison. They
assured the government that if it complied “Texas will prove that it is ready and willing
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to spend its blood and treasure in support of the Mexican Constitution, the Mexican Laws
and Mexican Territory.” 439
When Santa Anna failed to release him in June, Austin again blamed his
adversaries in Texas for tarnishing his name to Mexican authorities. “[W]ho those
persons are I know not – it is said they are North Americans by birth,” he wrote, and
suggested that W.H. Wharton might have had something to do with it. Blaming these
men for his imprisonment may have been a stretch, but the radical elements in Texas
certainly did take advantage of Austin’s absence to advance their agenda. On February
22, John Wharton published an editorial in The People’s Advocate complaining that the
press in Texas was “muzzled, owned, supported by, and devoted to the interests of a
few.” He accused Austin and his allies of being “timid & sycophantic” and of yielding to
oppression. While he claimed to wish Austin “no harm,” he nonetheless hoped that the
Mexicans would keep him in prison, until he “undergoes radical change.” “But perhaps
the worst accusation that he leveled at the “Father of Texas” was that of irrelevance.
Wharton claimed that most Texans were “diametrically opposed to the course
recommended by him; some do not believe in his sincerity, and others disregard it all
together.” 440 Wharton’s remarks suggested that Austin was out of touch with the current
direction of Texan politics now being steered by a younger generation composed of men
like himself.
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When Austin heard of Wharton’s editorial, he was incensed. In his defense,
Austin insisted that he had “yielded to the popular opinion” and instructed his allies “to
discountenance in the most unequivocal and efficient manner” anyone who was in
“contempt or defiance of the mexican people or authorities.” I do not believe there is
any anti-Mexican party in Texas” he continued to insist, “but if there be, the adoption of
the people of the motto and rule above stated, will soon detect and mark it.” Austin
concluded his letter by reiterating his hope that the authorities of the colony “will
recognize and obey” the President Santa Anna, and proclaim “with one unanimous voice
Fidelity to Mexico, opposition to violent men or measures, and all will be peace,
harmony, and prosperity.” He then stated that he hoped the state question was dead and
would remain so. 441
Austin’s instructions seemed to take heed. Samuel May Williams assured his
friend that his advice was being dutifully executed in Texas where the people have been
“advised by the committee to have nothing to do with the State question.” In a letter
addressed to Perry, McKinney made it clear that the citizens of Brazoria were of a similar
mind, deeming it their duty to no longer permit “a few aspiring ambitious demagogues to
use our names or assume our rights.” In so doing, the people of Brazoria not only
separated themselves from those who continued to push for statehood, but also renounced
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them as effective usurpers, placing the democratic imperative back in the hands of Austin
and the Mexican leadership. 442
Meanwhile, the more radical elements in Texas fought the accusations of Austin
and his more conservative allies. Terming Austin’s letter “a bloated mass of disgusting
self conceit – of arrogant dictation and of inconsistent stupidity,” Wharton went on to
cast aspersions at his critic in terms as harsh – or more so - than those he had received.
In conclusion I pledge myself when this obeyer of instructions this man of so
many personal friends, this disinterested benefactor of Texas, this oracular
weathercock, this political Proteas this innocent victim, this maker of mottos, this
organizer of parties, this presumptuous dictator returns, to brand him on the
forehead with a mark that shall outlast his epitaph.

For the time being, however, Wharton’s threats would go unrealized, as it was becoming
increasingly clear whose side most Texans were on. When the agitators for statehood
attempted to renew their movement by calling for an election of members to a
Revolutionary Congress, the Citizens of Brazoria took the lead in renouncing the
“unauthorized call,” stating that they believed it to jeopardize “the security of our
families and our dearest rights and interests.” Accordingly, they renounced the “few
ambitious agitators of revolutionary measures,” whom they accused of an “unwarranted
assumption of authority to DICTATE to the people.” Perry reported to Austin that

442

SMW to SFA, 29 October 1834, 14-4; McKinney to Perry, 4 November 1834, 16, AP, Vol. III, 16.

269
Wharton and his allies were “as politically dead as if they were buried” and that the
people of Texas were not looking forward to any more conventions. 443
The Texans’ renewed policy of patience and obedience, Austin assured them, was
having beneficial effects in Mexico City where Santa Anna had “solemnly and officially
declared that he will sustain the federal republican system.” Even the statehood question
began to look likely again, despite the fact that Texans had by now formally abandoned
it. Almonte himself wrote to Samuel May Williams that “The president agrees with the
politics conducted by the colonists at this time,” and assured him that “When Congress
opens sessions I will let you know regarding petitions of the communities to organize a
government in Texas independent from that of Coahuila.” But the best evidence of this
change of mind among Mexico’s political leadership finally came towards the end of
1834 when Austin was finally released from prison. 444
With calm in Texas restored and his liberation achieved, Austin now turned his
attention to realizing his longstanding dream of turning Texas into a formidable and
lucrative member of the Mexican family, specifically through the cotton trade. “I hope
that a dead calm will reign all over Texas for many years to come,” he wrote Perry, “and
that there will be no more excitements of any kind whatever. Assuring his friend that
“the dark days had passed,” he insisted that “Calm, a dead calm, is all that Texas needs.”
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Austin now believed that the best means for Texas to achieve statehood was to simply
make itself an indispensable part of the Mexican federation, just as it has always
intended. Instead of wrestling with national politics, Texans’ should focus on their own
self-improvement. “[I]mmigration – good crops – no party divisions” was the order of the
day. He made it clear that establishing stronger commercial ties with the rest of Mexico
should be chief among these, and once again, he began to dream of his circum-Carribean
commercial network. 445 Texas’ bond with Mexico was stronger and more promising than
ever.
***
But change in Mexico City did come. The same month that Austin directed
Texans to expect no considerable alteration in the course of Mexican politics, Santa Ana
unleashed a vigorous centralization program. The General had spent much of his
presidency at his home in Velasco, allowing Gómez Farías to effectively run the country
for him. The Vice President took the opportunity to push a series of sweeping reforms
through congress. By spring of 1834, the two most powerful bastions of Mexican politics
– the church and army – were complaining bitterly of their own alienation. On May 25th,
representatives from these two contingents issued the Plan of Cuernavaca which called
for a reversal of the recent reforms, demanded the removal of those legislators who were
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responsible for them, and called on President Santa Anna to halt the federalist
overhaul. 446
Santa Anna complied. Not wanting to alienate the two most powerful groups in
the country. He promptly replaced Goméz Farías and began aggressively reversing his
policies. He dissolved Congress and ordered the election of a new one with whose aid he
was able to unleash a series of measures that effectively overturned the federalist
Constitution of 1824. These included dissolving state legislatures, abolishing almost all
state militias, and transforming the states into departments with federally appointed
leadership. Sensing that he had been misled by the general, in July Austin wrote to Perry
that “Congress is to meet in extra session on the 19 of this month, there seems to be no
doubt that the system of Govt will be changed from federal to central, tho it probably will
be some months before the new constitution can be framed and published.” 447
A staunch federalist opposition emerged around peripheral state governments,
most specifically Zacatecas, Guerrero, Yucatán, and of course, Téjas y Coahuila.
Reséndez writes that by 1830, “Coahuila and Texas had emerged as the staunchest
bastion of federalism throughout Mexico, the very province chosen as sanctuary by the
very highest Mexican officials, a liberal paradise.” It was therefore no surprise when the
Governor of Nuevo León, Manuel M. de Llano suggested that federalists in the state
retrench into Texas, decouple it from Coahuila and then get Anglo-Texan colonists to
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cooperate in upholding it as a separate state in accordance with their own earlier
expressed desires. 448
Governor Viesca himself, had conceived of a similar plan, setting up a war
council in response to the national Congress’ decision to order drastic reductions in the
size of state militias, which many, especially in Coahuila y Téjas, considered the greatest
guarantor of state sovereignty. Anglo Texans were, at first, reluctant to get involved,
preferring to believe Austin’s claims that Santa Anna’s new government posed no
considerable threat to federalism. But Viesca attempted to gain their support by
reminding them that the party “now in power is the same that prohibited the immigration
of North American colonists in 1830, has openly declared against all foreigners, and
secretly favors Spanish policy and Spanish despotism.” Viesca warned that if they did
nothing, they would soon see the reversal of a whole series of recent reforms, including a
reinstatement of the Law of April 30th. 449
Yet, Anglo-Texans continued to dismiss such calls to arms and insisted on calm.
John Williams issued a circular pleading with Texans to heed Austin’s advice, not
Viesca’s. “I fear that the people are now ready to plunge head long into the yawning
jaws of a hopeless civil war,” he wrote. “[The guardians of peace and order” had
“forgotten the advice of the worthy Stephen F. Austin, who but the other day told them in
the most emphatic language not to entangle themselves in the family quarrels of the
448
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Republic.” But Williams had little to worry about so long as the frontier remained largely
unaffected by Santa Ana’s reforms. One man just returned from a trip to Mexico City,
informed his fellow colonists that reports of the general’s “unfriendly disposition”
towards the colonies were false, and that if troops were ordered there, “it is for the
purpose of counteracting any insurrectionary movements that might be consequent on the
arrest of the land speculators and corrupt officers of the state government.” 450
Eager to silence the radicals and restore calm, Texan leaders decided to call for a
convention to silence the rumors, and silence “the ORIGINATORS of the disturbances.”
The peace party’s dominance had a chastening effect on the radicals. “The truth is, the
people are much divided here,” wrote William Travis, a radical who led and would die at
the Alamo siege. Yet, he conceded that, at this point, “The peace-party” were “the
strongest, and make much the most noise.” Unless the “war party” – those calling on
Texans to join the federalist resistance - could gain strength, “had we not better be quiet,
and settle down for a while?”451
Thus, town leaders throughout Texas met in the summer of 1835 to confirm their
loyalty to Mexico and the principles on which it stood. Furthermore, they flatly denied
the accusations that Texans “cherish a hostile attitude to Mexicans, or to the Mexican
government” and confirmed that “they are voluntary citizens of the same republic; have
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sworn to support the same constitution, and are by inclination and interest, as well as the
most solemn obligations, bound to cherish and sustain the liberal and free institutions of
this republic.” The town of Gonzalez went even further, protesting “against any
provisional government or organization” tending “to estrange the Jurisdiction of Texas,
from that of Coahuila.” They promised to challenge any body threatening “to interrupt
the harmony and good understanding existing between Texas and the Federal
Government,” stating that any such person deserved “the martial disapprobation and
contempts of every friend of Constitutional order in the Country.” 452
Indeed, it looked as if revolution was the last thing on most Texans’ minds in the
summer of 1835. “I discover the Planters are again in good cheer,” observed Asa
Brigham to Wharton in July of 1835. Men like Brigham, unaware of what was
happening in Mexico City, believed their adopted country was merely at a crossroads.
Yet, he did not doubt that Texans would at some point have to confront the storm that
was brewing in the interior: “In my humble opinion, there are questions nearly ripe, and
will soon be agitated; when once commenced, will flud in upon us in rapid succession.”
It was clear that Texans had no interest in war. But they were also fully prepared to
defend the principles on which their adopted country was founded if it ever came to
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that. 453 While the state question and relations with Mexico remained open, Texas began
to re-enter a period of cooperation and complacence.

It was not until Lorenzo de Zavala, noted federalist and former Vice President,
reached Texas in August that the mood began to shift. In a lengthy address to the
colonists, Zavala introduced himself as one who had “occupied in the Mexican nation the
most honorable stations.” Indeed, his credentials, as one of the leading politicians in the
nation, and perhaps the most knowledgeable man in Texas when it came to affairs
concerning the national government, leant him the authority to convince the Anglo-Texan
population that armed rebellion was necessary. Mexico, according to Zavala, was now
effectively a military dictatorship and he warned that, so long as they remained faithful to
the Constitution of 1824, Texans would soon find federal troops at their doorsteps.
Certain generals had “destroyed the federal constitution” in order “to be promoted to the
presidency of the republic,” he explained. Under such circumstances it was “inevitable
that all the states of the confederation are left at liberty to act for themselves.” While
acknowledging the colonists’ indebtedness to the “Supreme Government of Mexico,” he
reminded them that “those governments are formed of the same men who are now
persecuted, among whom I have the honor to count myself as one.” 454
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As information of Santa Anna’s vigorous centralization project began to trickle
into the frontier, a hands-off approach began to feel increasingly less feasible.
Significantly, Texans’ ultimate decision was largely the result of their consultations with
leaders in other northern Mexican states. For example, Horatio Allsbury addressed the
people of Texas in late August stating that he had “left the state of New Leon on the 10th
of this month with a request from our republican friends to say to the citizens of Texas
that our only hopes of future liberty and security depended upon our immediately taking
steps to oppose that military in their establishing a Central Government.” Indeed, Texan
leaders saw their movement as part of a much larger Mexican federalist revolt against the
centralists. “War in defense of our rights, and oaths, and our Constitutions is inevitable in
Texas!” declared one memorandum from San Augustus.
Information which is relied on has been received from the interior, that the State
of Zacatecas and Guadalajara have risen and taken up arms in defence of the
constitution of 1824, and in support of the federal system; also, that there are
insurrections in the state of Tamaulipas, in favor of the same cause, also that the
republican general, Juan Alvarez, has gained a victory over the government troops
in the south of Mexico.

As much as they understood themselves to be continuing the tradition epitomized by their
forefathers in the American Revolution, Anglo Texans nonetheless saw their action as
part of a national movement. “I do not view it as Texas battling alone for her liberties,”
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wrote one newspaper editor, “I view it as the great work of laying the corner stone of
liberty in the great Mexican republic.

455

Yet, it was not until later that month that Austin himself, having just returned
from Mexico City, joined the call for convention, demonstrating that his time in the
nation’s capital had profoundly impacted his political outlook for Texas. “I fully hoped
to have found Texas in a state of tranquility, but regret to find it in commotion;” he wrote
in a public statement. But unlike in the past, this state of affairs had “not been produced
by any acts of the people of this country,” rather “it is the natural and inevitable
consequences of the revolution that has spread all over Mexico.” For Austin, now all too
familiar with Santa Ana’s determination to transform Mexico’s government, the decision
to replace the Constitution of 1824 was a game changer. “Whether the people of Texas
ought not to agree to this change,” he continued, “and relinquish all or part of their
constitutional and vested rights under the constitution of 1824, is a question of the most
vital importance; one that calls for the deliberate consideration of the people, and can
only be decided by them, fairly convened for the purpose.” 456
Whereas, for years, the Father of Texas had found himself termed a conservative,
now he was calling on Texans to not only forcibly separate themselves from Coahuila but
engage in a civil war against the federal government. According to Austin’s logic, the
government had betrayed the Mexican constitution, and with it its social contract, not just
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with Texas, but the rest of Mexico too. The Constitution of 1824 “gave to Texas a
specific political existence, and vested in its inhabitants special and defined rights, which
can only be relinquished by the people of texas,” Austin explained. The state, therefore,
could no more forfeit their rights than the government could deprive it of them “unless
expressly authorized by the people of Texas to do so.” Austin made it clear that this
particular set of circumstances called for a change of course. “These declarations afford
another and more urgent necessity for a general consultation of all Texas,” he wrote, “in
order to inform the general government, and especially General Santa Anna, what kind of
organization will suit the education, habits, and situation of this people.” His actions
were greeted with enthusiastic approval by the more radical elements. “It is different
now, thank God!” wrote Travis to a friend, “Principle has triumphed over prejudice,
passion, cowardice, and slavery. Texas is herself again.” 457
This is how the Texas Revolution would begin – not as a movement to separate
from Mexico, nor as a desire to join the United States, but as a result of Texans’
perceived duty and obligation as Mexican citizens. In September, the ayuntamiento of
San Felipe met to discuss the recent crisis. It ultimately resolved to “support the
constitution of the Mexican Republic of 1824, to which we have solemnly obligated
ourselves” and recommended “each jurisdiction to elect five members to meet in San
Felipe on the 15th of October next,” ostensibly to discuss what collective action they
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would take to combat the impending federal invasion. Austin made it clear that whatever
they decided on, Texans must stay united. “I have received very favourable news from
Bexar and think they will send members to the consultation - in short all Texas will go
together and that makes all safe.” Indeed, the expressed support of Béxar, a place that had
historically been reluctant to oppose the central government or the state of Coahuila y
Téjas, was a meaningful accomplishment. 458
Conservatives increasingly found themselves pressed to defend a position that no
longer seemed feasible. “[M]any worthy and patriotic citizens have been opposed on
principles which they deemed sound and correct, to a rupture with the authorities of
Mexico,” wrote one individual. Yet, while their position “may have been innocent and
even praiseworthy in its origin,” he advised them “to reconsider the subject and to
enquire whether the present situation of the country does not essentially change their
ground.” A defense of Mexico now seemed to necessitate joining the war movement.
“Why halt yea between to opinions? If the constitution be the object of your allegiance
then rise up like men and support the constitution.” 459
However, a letter written by Austin the month prior reveals that independence
may have already been on his mind. Just after his release from prison, Austin travelled to
New Orleans where he undoubtedly discussed the current crisis in Mexico and the fate of
Texas with people there. Austin revealed that he was beginning to see Texas as an
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important contributor to the US national project in the way that he had once envisioned
for Mexico, “[T]exas must, and ought to become an out work on the west, as Alabama
and Florida are on the East, to defend the key of the western world – the mouths of the
Mississippi.” Although he did not call for it, Austin made it clear what he thought the
outcome of all this would be. While Texas’ politics may be more closely aligned with
Mexico, its economics and culture were bringing it ever closer to the North: “Can it be
supposed that the violent political convulsions of Mexico will not shake off Texas so
soon as it is ripe enough to fall.” And perhaps more important than anything, was Santa
Ana’s unpredictable, though rapidly deteriorating, relationship with Texas and the rest of
the federalist states of the north: “Gen. Santa Anna told me he should visit Texas next
month - as a friend. His visit is uncertain – his friendship much more so.”

460

With the current state of Mexican politics, Austin tended to see Texas, at least for
the time being, as an entity independent from both the US and Mexico. “We must rely
on ourselves and prepare for the worst. A large immigration will prepare us, give us
strength resources, everything.” And then Austin wrote the words that seemed to
contradict everything he had said since settling in Texas fifteen years prior: “If there was
any way of getting at it, I should like to know what the wise men of the United States
think the people of Texas ought to do. The fact is, we must, and ought to become a part
of the United States.” With Mexico in chaos and the future of Mexican federalism
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uncertain, the United States was, finally, beginning to look like the better option. 461
Some have pointed to these words as evidence that Austin always intended to see Texas
become a part of the US, regardless of the fact that for years he claimed the opposite.
But it is more helpful to see them as evidence of a change of mind that was a result of
the no less dramatic shift taking place in Mexican national politics and the realization
that an alliance with the United States of the North, whatever that might ultimately
mean, looked like the best option.
Still, the public’s enthusiasm for war, to say nothing of independence, fell short of
Austin’s and other Texan leaders’ hopes as evinced by militia leaders’ struggle to muster
men to the battlefield. “The orders rec’d here this morning were not agreeable to a large
number of men;” reported militia commander William H. Jack, “but they almost
unanimously determined to obey without a murmur.” Similar complaints began to
emerge from militia commanders throughout Texas. “When I wrote yesterday it was my
desire to have urged you to order on immediately because I know Militia could not be
kept in a post like this long at a time, and in this I was correct,” wrote Benjamin Fort
Smith, “[Y]ou are not upon a bed of roses.” 462
Historian Paul Lack writes that Texan volunteers “demonstrated a militia-like
tendency to turn out during crises but then dismiss themselves at apparent lull times to
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care for the needs of farms and families.” 463 Whether this signified a lack of investment
in the cause or old fashioned Texan individualism is unclear. Regardless, it appears the
threat of Santa Anna and Mexican centralism was strong enough to bring men to the
field, but not keep them there. “[O]f the little band that entered this place on the night of
the 9th, inst., many have returned home, and others say they will go in a few days,”
reported Phillip Dimmitt. R.R. Royall wrote that “the members here are like Volunteers
in Camp (Very Restless) and much is said about going home.” The men, “one by one
each plead their necessities some from the frontier are afraid of Indians on the Brazos
others to the eastward are not fully into the spirit.” For many Texans, Mexican political
affairs were but a remote concern in light of far more pressing threats. 464
Throughout the war, leaders would struggle to enforce obedience and discipline,
often fighting an uphill battle against a culture of extreme individualism and suspicion
of authority. When Austin replaced Demitt with another commander of the Goliad
forces, the men nearly mutinied. Claiming that Austin had treated them like “servile
dependents” and subjected them to “despotic command,” they accused him of violating
the very principles for which the Texas Revolution had been declared, “It is against this
that we took to the field,” and against “the imposition of degredations like this” that
“we are ready to fight again.” 465
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But indifference and disobedience were not the only concern facing the Texan
Army. Rumors of disloyalty emerged almost immediately, namely among those who had
always cautioned a more conservative position. In October of 1835 Royall reported that
John A. Williams was taking “a very active Part against the Acts of the Colonists.”
Advocating “the measures pursued by the Mexican Government,” he had “arrayed
himself with 58 followers already enrolled against our military movements.” A similar
report emerged regarding a Mr. JM Smith who, accordingly, “has always been opposed to
the cause of Freedom, he has whenever in his power, favored the Mexicans, to the
prejudice of our citizens” and was now “injur[ing] the cause of Liberty by giving all the
information possible to enemies.” The truth of these accusations is hard to confirm, but
the mere fact that they were taken seriously suggests that at least some active loyalism
existed. 466
It was concerns like these that compelled some Texan leaders to consider recruits
from the United States. They found particular enthusiasm, not surprisingly, in the
southwestern states. “[H]undreds of applications are daily making to join the Rank,” one
recruiter reported, “This movement of ours here will be followed by similar ones thru’
the whole valley of the Mississippi.” The only concern was “that more will be received
than required.” These men, unlike their Texan counterparts, had little to distract them
from the fight. They tended to be young, single and unencumbered by family and
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property ownership. They therefore had little to lose in the war and no prior connection
with Mexico. Thus, competing loyalties were not a threat among these men the way he
had been for Texans.

467

And these recruits, not surprisingly, understood the Texas fight differently from
how most Texans did, in large part due to how recruiters explained the struggle. Those
assigned to attract volunteers were often not Texan, but rather the close associates of
Texan leaders. They did not, therefore, articulate a particularly sophisticated
understanding of the conflict and often drew on racist assumptions about Mexicans then
poplar in the North. Convincing men to risk their lives for a people and place they had
no prior connection to required reminding them of the “fertile sugar and cotton lands”
that they would receive for their service, thanks to a decision by the newly formed
Provisional Council. Although the Jackson administration had adopted a policy of
neutrality, recruitment officers insisted that this should not stop individual citizens from
participating in a noble struggle to ensure democracy to their Anglo-American brethren.
After all, “wherever the rights of man are battled for, against military and religious
despotism, Americans can never look on with indifference.” However, in the process of
drawing on their shared ethnic and political heritage, recruitors characterized Mexicans as
“a cowardly, treacherous, semi-civilized people, without enterprise, workmanship, or
discipline,” as opposed to the Anglo settlers, who were “brave, hardy, enterprising” – just
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like their brethren in the North. Because few of these volunteers had any pressing desire
to leave the United States, recruitors misrepresented the struggle as one for independence,
assuring them that “Texas will no doubt become a member of this Union,” and “wave in
peaceful triumph from the Sabine to the Rio Bravo.” 468
However, when the Texans themselves convened on November 3, they hotly
debated the independence question for several days before discarding it in favor of “a
provisional government, upon the principles of the constitution of 1824.” They
reasserted their commitment to federalist Mexico and dismissed any suspicions
otherwise. They insisted they were “not the aggressor.” Rather it was their duty “to
defend our unalienable rights against all who attempt to subvert our liberties, although
citizens of the same country.” They were defending, not attacking, Mexico and its
people, and offered their “support and assistance to such Mexicans of the Mexican
Confederacy as will take up arms against their military despotism,” once again framing
their rebellion as part of the national rebellion against Santa Anna. 469
But perhaps most significantly, they made their loyalty to Mexico conditional.
They stated specifically that they would “continue faithful to the Mexican Government”
only “so long as that nation is governed by the Constitution and Laws that were formed
for the government of the political association.” Although historians have dismissed this
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move as “disingenuous” or at best “indecisive,” it is perhaps more helpful to see it as
consistent with the very principles that had compelled many to immigrate to Mexico in
the first place. According to their own logic, Texans already had the right to secede at
that moment if they chose to do so, considering that Santa Anna had discarded the
Constitution of 1824. Yet they chose at this juncture to remain. And while the
Convention revealed that Texans certainly were not united politically, the one thing they
could agree on was a commitment to radical federalism. Philip Dimitt even reported that
he had a flag made “the colours, and their arrangement the same as the old one” with the
phrase, “Constitution of 1824,” displayed in the center. 470
Their continuing relationship with Mexico, however, depended on the success of
federalists elsewhere in the country who, at least for the time being, appeared to be on the
upswing. “The Commander in chief announces to the Army information of the most
encouraging nature,” Austin wrote on October 23rd, asserting “that the Cause of the
Constitution and the Federal System is there, gaining new strength, daily.” Indeed, all of
Texas seemed to be firmly and demonstrably behind the Federalist cause.
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Just as Texans were confirming their loyalty to Mexican federalism, they
experienced a sudden influx of about “60 or 70 fine young men from New Orleans” to
assist them in the fight. “Another vessel containing many more is hourly expected,”
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wrote Royall, “Seventy five men have gone up Red River also from New Orleans,
intending to come by land from Natchitoches.” Evidently, the news of Santa Anna’s
intention “to bring the Texians under his immediate subjection excite the general and
increased interest throughout the U States in your favor with a disposition to render you
prompt and efficient aid,” wrote John P. Austin to his uncle. Accordingly, President
Jackson had “no disposition to interfere with any present aid given you by Citizens of the
US provided they do not openly violate the laws of Nations.” Indeed, Jackson chose to
turn a blind eye to a movement that he probably hoped would result in achieving his
long-held dream of Texas becoming a part of the United States of the North. But the
sudden influx of volunteers from the north with no prior experience with Mexico or its
people, many of them full of racist and self-righteous agitation, would have a profound
impact on the course of the war, beginning with Texas’ relationship with its federalist
allies. 472
Largely thanks to the efforts of recruiters, most of these volunteers failed to see
the fight they were about to join as an effort to support Mexican federalism. “We know
that you are Bone of our Bone! and Flesh of our Flesh! That none but a Republican
Government can exist over you!” wrote one northern sympathizer, “You will conduct
your affairs with the justice and courage which led our Fathers in the revolution to
establish the equal rights which we now enjoy.” Many of these men saw the movement
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in Texas as not only beginning in the same way the American Revolution had, but ending
in the same way too. 473
Perhaps emboldened by such encouragement from the land of their birth, the
Texan call for independence became more strident. William Wharton, the elected leader
of the November Convention, stated that Texan leaders were being unrealistic in
expecting to cooperate with Mexican federalists. “[B]oth parties of the Interior will unite
against us, whatever be our declaration,” he warned. Evidently still believing that he
could change Jackson’s mind, Wharton wrote that, in neglecting to declare independence,
they would “receive no efficient or permanent aid, or pecuniary assistance, from the
United States.” Thus, “we encounter all the evils of a declaration of independence,
without reaping one-tenth of the advantages of such declaration. 474
Indeed, by the beginning of 1836, it had become clear that Texas was becoming
increasingly divided over the question of independence. “It is apparent that there are two
parties in this Country who indulge all the virulence of party spirit,” wrote John Sowers
Brooks, a recruit from Kentucky. “One party is strongly in favor of an immediate
Declaration of Independence and the other desires a non-politic course. They think that a
Declaration for the Constitution of 1824 will unite the Liberal party in Mexico with them
and thus enable them to establish their independence ultimately with greater ease.”
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The pro-Independence faction gradually grew more vocal and visible, perhaps
taking advantage of the conservatives’ false sense of security. “I fear if a stand is not
taken against self dubed patriots all our labors in Texas are gone to the devil and me with
it,” warned McKinney in a letter to Austin, after finding several pro-independence
articles written “by the Same men over different signatures and finding none of our
Citizens opposing.” He claimed that he had in fact written to the publisher “in order to let
be known that we were not unanimous in that way of thinking and to get our citizens to
reflect.” But after securing his promise that McKinney’s editorial would appear in the
next day’s issue, Wharton evidently suppressed the publication and “substituted a bag of
stuff illy comporting with our present condition.” McKinney feared that Texan
politicians were “yielding the very right of thought to a wild unthinking faction.” 475
Due to their small numbers and comparably elite status, many of those in favor of
preserving the Constitution were soon deemed Tories and dismissed by some, including
many historians, as merely self-interested elitists. Most of these men were among the
wealthiest and most established members of their society. As much as Texans opposed
centralism, federalism in the hands of such men did not fare much better. “Perceived as a
landed aristocracy with shady connections to the Mexican political elite, peace party
members lost influence,” writes Reséndez, “The disrepute of the ‘speculating party’ (as
the peace party became known) allowed those who favored complete independence from
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Mexico to gain the upper hand.” 476 Brooks in fact wrote that “the peace party seems to
be actuated by a different motive than that which they profess,” and that “Their extensive
speculations in land have acquired them an influence in the mexican councils which it is
said, they have exerted to their own aggrandisement and to the detriment of the interest of
the settlers.” Their influence with prominent Mexican families, he observed, “enables
them to govern the Colony as they desire.” Indeed, just a few months prior, a handful of
powerful settlers including Samuel May Williams and Lorenzo de Zavala, had attempted
to buy up a large portion of land near Moncalva and sell its plots at inflated prices to a
group of recent immigrants. The scheme failed, but it served to aggravate pre-existing
tensions between older and newer settlers, and reinforce the notion that the older
generation had enjoyed a profound political and economic advantage over the
newcomers, who consequently greeted their calls for moderation with suspicion. 477
Brooks made it clear where he stood on the question: “I am in favour of pursuing an
open, bold, and fearless course, such as a Declaration of Independence,” he wrote. Not
only would it “ensure us the aid of every Liberal in the United States, either in men or
money,” but it would secure Texas “for the General Good of the bone and Sinew of our
Country the Actual Settlers.” 478 Most recruits stood on the issue, and as their numbers
increased, so too did the call for independence.
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As more and more men like Brooks flooded into Texas to join the revolutionary
forces, they quickly began to outnumber the more longstanding and established Texans
who had deeper ties to Mexico and more to lose in the war. Many of the volunteers’
experience with Mexico and Mexicans was forged in a time of war and shaped by notions
that they were fighting a backward and despotic people. They had nothing to lose and no
desire to be Mexican. Such men were rapidly overwhelming the older settlers and the
tejanos and, if Texas was to extend full rights of citizenship to them, they would soon be
outvoting them too.
Such suspicions went both ways. Austin himself wondered if the independence
movement had not been designed to dispose of the old settlers. “I fear that the true secret
of the efforts to declare independence is that there must then be a considerable standing
army, which, in the hands of a few, would dispose of the old settlers and their interests as
they thought proper,” he wrote. He accused Wharton and others of recruiting volunteers
from the North for the specific purpose of adding to their pro-independence constituency:
[W]hat ought the owners of the soil, the old settlers of texas, who have redeemed
this country from the wilderness and made it what it is, think of men who will
collect the signatures of persons on their first landing, who had not been here a
day, or only a few days in the country, and attempt to impose a paper thus signed
upon the world as the opinion of the people of Texas. 479
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Austin transmitted these sentiments to the Provisional Government, stating unequivocally
that he was opposed to any measure that would give the central government “any
foundation to say that the Texan war, is purely a national war against foreigners and
foreign invaders.” He confirmed his stated belief “that Texas should rigidly adhere to the
leading principles of the declaration of the 7th Novr” in “strict conformity with the basis
on which the federal party are acting.” Although “the dissolution of the social compact”
gave Texas “the right of declaring herself an independent community,” it was not in her
best interest to do so. It appears that the primary source of Austin’s hesitancy at this
juncture was that he knew that independence would expose “the old settlers and men of
property in this country to much risk.” Furthermore, “it will turn all parties in Mexico
against us” and “bring back the war to our own doors.” While Austin seemed to think that
this natural current was in the Federalists’ favor he left no question about what he thought
Texans should do if the federalists were not successful: “[I]f they fail, Texas at any time
can resort to her natural rights.” 480
Independence remained a last resort dependent on the actions of the Mexican
government itself. In his final correspondence with the Provisional Government dated
November 30th, Austin stated that the declared cause should continue as it was originally,
for it was in defense of the federalist constitution of 1824 that had prompted them to join
in the first place. However, he qualified his remarks by stating that “[S]hould these be
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destroyed in mexico,” the volunteer army would “do their duty to their country.” Austin
made it clear that such government actions would leave the people of Texas no choice but
to call for independence. Anything else would mean violating “the first law which God
stamped upon the heart of man, civilized or savage, which is the Law, or the right of selfpreservation.” 481
But a trip to the Brazos Valley would, however briefly, change his mind. On the
ride back, after having evidently consulted with several of the older settlers, Austin
reversed his opinion. “I am more and more convinced every day,” he wrote, “and
especially on calm reflection during a solitary ride down here, that the political position
of Texas, should continue as established by the declaration of the 7th November last.”
Any change in their position would “injure us abroad by giving an idea that we are
unstable in our opinions and it would paralyze the efforts of the federal party which are
now in our favour.” Rather than threatening independence, Austin insisted that “Texas
ought therefore to adhere rigidly and firmly to the declaration of 7 Novr,” disregarding
“the opinions of excited moments, no matter by whom expressed.” Austin was not ready
to abandon the Federalists or Mexico just yet. “I think the situation of Texas, may in a
great degree, depend on adhering to the declaration of 7 Novr and on enlisting the federal
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party in our favor – I repeat this idea so often, because I am satisfied much depends on
it.” 482
However, as long as leaders struggled to convince Texans to join the fight for
longer than a few days or weeks, they would continue to have to rely on northerners like
Brooks whose political vision differed significantly from their own. While it continued
to receive large numbers of recruits from the North throughout the early part of 1836, the
Provisional Government struggled with enforcing obedience and loyalty to the
revolutionary movement among Texans themselves, many of whom demonstrated the
proven Texan tendency to prioritize individual concerns over collective ones. “[O]ut of
more than four hundred men at or near this post, I doubt if twenty-five citizens of Texas
can be mustered in the ranks,” wrote the colonel. “[N]ay, I am informed, whilst writing
the above, that there is not half that number.” Thus, the fight for Texas was by and large
conducted by US citizens who issued “just complaints and taunting remarks in regard to
the absence of the old settlers and owners of the soil.” 483 Fearing the fate of he and his
men, Fannin wrote that he hoped that soon “the people have risen and are marching to the
relief of Bexar and this post.” But if the worst were to happen,
on whose head should the burthen of censure fall – not on the heads of those
brave men who have left their homes in the United States to aid us in our struggle
for Liberty – but on those whose all is in Texas and who notwithstanding the
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repeated calls have remained at home without raising finger to keep the enemy
from their thresholds.

In another letter to a close friend, Fannin confided, “I have not as much confidence in the
people of Texas as I once had.” Although he had called on them for weeks to join his
men “not one yet arrived.” 484
Indeed, as the revolution progressed, Texans showed a greater propensity to avoid
battle, forcing commanders to rely ever more heavily on recruits who, by the end of the
Revolution, formed a significant portion of the Texas Army. Lack observes that, whereas
at least 1,100 of the 1,300 men who rushed to arms in October and November were
Texan, about three quarters of the over nine hundred soldiers who defended Texas
between January and March of 1836 emigrated after October, and only about one-fourth
as many Texans came out. “Just as virtually every class and locale in Texas had
supplied volunteers in the fall,” writes Lack, “so did Texans of varied conditions stay
away from the army during the winter.” 485
***
In addition to manpower, Texas needed finances to participate in a civil war
against Mexico, and so the Provisional Government decided to send a team north for that
purpose. In an attempt to sufficiently represent the various factions in Texas, the
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Provisional Government decided to send Austin and his chief rival, Wharton. Austin did
not look forward to it. However, upon arriving in the United States and meeting with
northern capitalists, he would finally become fully and permanently convinced of
Wharton’s position. The reason? Northern financial support for the Texans was
premised on one thing: “independence immediately - it will give us the aid of men of
capital and high standing and character who wish for a more extensive field, than a mere
party war in Texas.” Admitting that “My own feelings and impulses inclined me to this
course long ago,” Austin made it clear that his visit to the Low Country had compelled
him to temporarily deviate from his convictions. Regretting that he had allowed “the
warm and even violent feelings of some of my friends did at the time to a certain extent
precipitate me into party feelings,” Austin now made it clear where he stood on the
independence question, especially now that he understood how essential is was to gaining
northern aid. “I go for Independence for I have no doubt we shall get aid, as much as we
need and perhaps more so.” 486
Furthermore, the set of reports that Austin was receiving regarding events in
Mexico, seemed to suggest that casting their lot with the federalists no longer made
sense. Relying on reports that “the federal party has united with Santa Ana against us”
Austin determined that remaining loyal to the Constitution of 1824 “does us no good with
the Federalists, it was also “doing us harm in this country, by keeping away the kind of
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men we most need.” In a letter to his sister, Austin suggested that recent events in
Mexico left Texas no other option. According to the logic they had laid down in the
November convention, “The Texans may, therefore, for the future, be considered an
independent people, entirely separate from Mexico.” Finally, with federalism all but
eviscerated, Austin made it clear that Texans would have to look to another power for
moral and political guidance. “We are young to set up for ourselves, but we are the sons
of that great nation which has astonished the world by its deeds, and progress in the cause
of liberty[,] light[,] and truth.” 487
Indeed, by early 1836 it appeared that Santa Ana had all but crushed federalism in
every other state of the Mexican republic. He had turned Zacatecas into a territory and
outlawed its militia. For reasons not entirely the fault of Mexican federalists, Texans, for
the first time in their nation’s history, faced Mexico City alone. 488
Austin, knowing that his change of heart would not be well greeted by a number
of his closest associates, insisted that Texans had to declare for independence if they
were to stand any chance against the centralists. “There is but one sentiment all over the
US which is in favor of Texas and of an immediate declaration of independence,” he
explained. “We have negotiated a loan on the terms of the enclosed contract. This was
obtained on the belief that Texas would declare independence in march – it could not
have been had otherwise.” As far as the federalists were concerned, “The accounts from
487
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Vera Cruz and Tampico are that the federal party have united with Santanna against
Texas.” Anticipating McKinney’s opposition, he wrote, “I know what reply you will
make to this – but my object is the country, our country, it is, or ought to be the
paramount object of all.” After having once worked so feverishly to unite Texans against
independence, Austin now scrambled to gain unanimous agreement to the contrary: “The
country ought to go unanimously for independence. Public opinion all over the U.S.
expects and earnestly calls for it.” 489
But McKinney who, like Austin, had dedicated years to developing Texas under
Mexico and expressing his devotion to Mexican federalism, was simply unwilling to
accept this change of course. Over a month would pass before he finally replied to
Austin’s letter, but when he did, he made it clear how he felt about his friend’s recent
change of heart and where their relationship stood as a result. “I have intended answering
your letter to me from N. Orleans but have really been at a loss,” he wrote. “[Y]ou and I
must sever totally in anything of a political character . . . my confidence in you is I think
forever at an end.” He was not Austin’s enemy, he assured him, “but at the same time, I
am now fully convinced that you cannot be anything but an injury to your country.”
McKinney, in fact, could not even find the words to describe his reaction: “your illusions
and remarks in that letter to me from N. Orleans are - - -.” Not only did McKinney make
it clear in no uncertain terms that he objected to Austin’s decision to call for
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independence, but he also suspected that few Texans would support it, concluding that
“You will very probably find yourself unsustained in your pledges for Texas declaring
Independence.” 490
But Austin did not have time to lament the loss of his friendship or, for that
matter, permit his longtime friend to change his mind. He made it consistently clear, that
any and all financial assistance from the North depended unequivocally on independence.
He and Wharton greeted each day hoping for news that the convention had offered up a
declaration. “We are disappointed at not hearing from the convention before now, and
expect the declaration of independence dayly.” Texan leaders on both sides of the border
found themselves in a near desperate situation, as morale in Texas began to flag without
aid from the North and northern capitalists held their fists tight. 491
As Austin struggled to hold investors’ interest, he continued to remind northerners
of their kinship with the revolutionaries and of the familiarity of their cause. In a letter to
Nicholas Biddle, Austin declared it “the cause of freedom and of mankind, but more
emphatically of the people of the United States, than any other.” Austin flattered himself
“that you view it in the same light,” and would therefore “give to it the attention which its
importance merits.” 492 In his remarks to Senator L.F. Linn, he referred to the conflict in
Texas as “A war of extermination,” no less than a race war “of barbarism and of despotic
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principles, waged by the mongreal Spanish-Indian and Negro race, against civilization
and the Anglo-American race.”
Austin, who had for years presented his efforts to settle the region as part of a
wish to serve the national interest of Mexico, now reversed course, and insisted that all of
his work had been in the service of his native country, not his adopted one. “For fifteen
years,” he claimed, he had been “laboring like a slave to Americanize Texas” forming “a
nucleus around which my native countrymen could collect and grow into a solid body
that would forever be a barrier of safety to the southwestern frontier” and serve as a
beacon-light to the mexicans in their search after liberty.” The man who had once argued
that Mexico was the safe haven of true republicanism and the natural home of all
freemen, now renounced the country he had adopted and insisted that his settlement was
exceptional in a land far less enlightenend than its neighbor to the east. But now the
Anglo-American colonies, “this nucleus of republicanism,” were to be destroyed and
their place “supplied by a population of Indians, Mexicans, and renegades, all mixed
together, and all the natural enemies of white men and of civilization.” Terming Mexico
“a usurper, a base, unprincipled, bloody monster, who sets the laws of civilization and of
humanity at defiance,” he insisted that Mexico’s “war of extermination” would “crimson
the waters of the Mississippi, and make it the eastern boundary of Mexico.” 493
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Such polarizing language was particularly evident in Austin’s appeal to Andrew
Jackson. “It Appears that Santa Ana has succeeded in uniting the whole of the Mexicans
against Texas by making it a national war against heretics,” he told the President. He
went on to characterize the conflict in the most simplistic and racialized terms he could.
It was a war “of barbarism against civilization, of despotism against liberty” and finally,
although not entirely accurately, “of Mexicans against Americans.” Austin hoped to give
his cause a national appeal even as he attempted to play down its evident sectional
character. As Austin employed much of the same logic in his efforts to gain US support
as he had done in his efforts to gain Mexican acceptance a decade and a half prior, he had
the added benefit of a shared origin and heritage to draw upon.
Will you, can you turn a deaf ear to the appeals of your fellow citizens in favour
of your and their countrymen and friends who are massacred, butchered, outraged
in Texas at your very doors? Are not we, the Texians obeying the dictates of an
education received here: from you the American people, from our fathers, from
the patriots of ‘76 – the Republicans of 1836? 494

Austin understandably expected to receive most of his support from slave-state audiences
where, according to his biographer, he delivered a distinctly southern “paean to Manifest
Destiny.” At stake in the Texan struggle for independence was not just liberty but
protection of the “southern frontier – the weakest and most vulnerable in the nation” from
“mistaken philanthropists, and wild fanatics” who “might attempt a system of
intervention in the domestic concerns of the South, which might lead to a servile war, or
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at least jeopordize the tranquility of Louisiana and the neighboring States.” 495 To ignore
the conflict in Texas would simply be in direct violation of the best national interests of
the south. “[W]hat I have been the means of effecting towards the Americanism of
Texas, is of more real service to the protection of Louisiana, Arkansas, and Missouri,
than the expenditure of thirty millions of dollars on the fortifications of that frontier.”
Such language is undoubtedly surprising coming from a man who had for so long
praised Mexico and its people, and in fact counted Mexicans among some of his closest
friends and allies. But by spring of 1836, Austin no doubt understood that if Texas was
going to gain any support at all from the North, it was going to come from Jacksonian
Democrats and their southwestern base. Thus it was their racist language that he
adopted. 496 Austin was willing to admit that he had once held very different feelings
towards Mexico - “I have, in times past, had more kind and charitable feelings for the
Mexicans in general, and have been much more faithful to them than they merited.” But,
“sad and dear bought” experience had taught him that it was “in vain to hope for any
good from mexican institutions, or Mexican justice.” 497
Indeed, Austin and Wharton received a remarkably cooler reception in the north,
where donations were a mere fraction of what they were in the South and West. The New
York Herald, even as it expressed sympathy with the Texan cause, lamented to see “the
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glorious cause deposited in the hands of stock gamblers in Wall Street.” The rough and
tumble gentlemen often selected for recruitment and funding campaigns “solicited a
broad laugh” from New York investors, many of whom saw the Texas cause as at best
futile and at worst destructive to national interests of the United States. 498
Meanwhile, back in Texas, they prepared for another Convention. But this time,
independence was no longer the preferred path of a radical minority. The primary factor
determining this shift, was the Provisional Government’s decision to allow volunteers in
the Texan Army the right to vote, specifically, for delegates in the upcoming convention.
In February, a group of northern volunteers petitioned the government for this privilege.
“We consider ourselves as citizen soldiers having a common interest with every citizen of
Texas,” their petition stated, “We are equally anxious for its prosperity” having “fought
and aided in repelling the mercenary troops of the enemy from its border.” Indeed, these
men had done more to protect Texas than many Texans. Yet their politics, motivation
and experience were significantly different. When their petitions were denied, the
volunteers often turned to physical intimidation. In Nacogdoches, a group of forty
Kentucky volunteers drew their guns and advanced on election quarters, their colonel
declaring that “he had come to Texas to fight for it and had as soon commence in the
town of Nacogdoches as elsewhere.” 499
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recruits were determined to see that Texas delivered on its promise to them. But first,
they had to defeat Mexico.
The man to do it was a charismatic young commander from Tennessee who
claimed a personal friendship with Andrew Jackson. Sam Houston had arrived in Texas
just two years prior, escaping a failed political career and personal scandal. 500 Despite
devastating defeats at the Alamo and Goliad, the six foot two inches tour de force insisted
to his soldiers that he could lead the Texans to victory and encouraged them to elect
representatives who would call for independence. “It is the duty of the army to send
several representatives,” Houston stated, “and I hope that my comrades will elect only
men who will vote for our independence, will fearlessly proclaim our separation from
Mexico, and what they decide upon, comrades, we will defend with our arms.” 501 With
the politicization of volunteers from the North coupled with the defeat of Mexican
federalists in the interior, the revolution became, in the words of one historian, “more
openly anti-Mexican,” although these sentiments had been evident earlier. For example,
when Governor Viesca and General Mexía visited a camp of volunteers in midDecember, Austin admitted that they “scarsely escaped insult.” Given the current climate
in the camps and among the Texan volunteers, especially those from the North, Austin
predicted that Anglo-Mexican relations would only get worse: “These things however are
not carried to anything like the extreme they will be. I say, fear they will be, because
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some outrage upon justice and hospitality may be committed by our excited patriots, as
they call themselves, that will do no credit to Texas” 502
His prediction was correct. When the hope of an anticentralist uprising in the
interior failed, Anglos began to express “both open hostility towards tejanos and a belief
that fundamental cultural-political differences dictated the need for independence.” 503
“My opinion is that Texas ought, at the next convention, unless a great and mighty
change takes place in the policy of Mexico, to declare itself independent of that nation,”
wrote Gail Borden,
It is true, that at the beginning of the present struggle, we aimed not at separation
from the Mexican people: in the late battles we cried and fought for the
constitution of 1824, and, I believe, it was the wish of a majority of our citizens,
to see the federal party prevail. But the federal constitution, as we see by the
decree of the General Congress of the 3rd of October, is dead; centralism is
established, and we are threatened with annihilation.”

As for the continued reliance on relief from the interior, the only people the Texans could
rely on at this point was, ironically, the very nation they had abandoned. The “mass of
the Mexican people” were deemed, “ignorant, bigoted, and supersticious: they do not,
neither can they understand the true principles of a republican form of government; and
consequently a dictatorial form is best suited to their education and habits.” All ties of
political affinity between Anglos and the rest of the country were dead, according to
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Borden. “[A]s a naion I look upon [all Mexicans] as our enemies.” Democracy was
now the purview of the United States, Mexicans had proven themselves incapable of it.
Appropriately, Borden closed his letter with a quote from John Adams, “Independence
now, and independence forever!” 504
***
But the call for independence did not, in fact, come so readily to tejanos. Zavala,
whose appeal was crucial in organizing Anglo resistance to the centralists, advised
withdrawing from Mexico on tentative terms only, promising to rejoin if and when it
returned to the social contract defined in the 1824 constitution. If Mexico failed to do so
after a defined period, Texas would consider itself permanently independent. As for the
Mexican federalists, themselves, they continued to believe that the Anglo colonies were
their allies as late as December 1835, dismissing rumors to the contrary. 505
On March 2, 1836, a new Convention in every sense commenced in San Felipe.
Only thirteen of the fifty-nine delegates who attended it had been present the past
November. Only seven were veterans of the 1832 and 1833 conventions. Only eleven
had held office during the period of Mexican rule. They tended to be younger (averaging
37 years), had been in Texas significantly less time, with almost a quarter having
immigrated in only the past year and nearly half having been in Texas for two years or
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less. They had distinguished themselves through military rather than political experience.
In a place plagued by a lack of military enthusiasm, forty percent of these men had
answered the call to take up arms against Mexico. And only a handful of them were
ethnic Mexicans, including Zavala and José Antonio Navarro, who, as much as he wanted
to see Texas free, was said to have “trembled at the thought of having to sanction with his
signature the eternal separation of Texas from the mother country.” All of these factors,
according to Lack, “made the delegates aptly qualified to carry the Revolution to its more
radical conclusion.” 506
Furthermore, much had changed in the political landscape of both Texas and
Mexico in the past few months. The federalists in the interior were defeated. Texans
stood alone in their fight against the centralists. Austin, who had always councelled
patience and obedience was now eagerly pushing for independence, insisting that
northern funds were dependent on it.

Those delegates who had sworn to support the

Constitution of 1824 sensed that they were in the minority and mostly kept silent.
The forty-one delegates unanimously voted for independence and drafted the
Declaration that Austin had been urging for months. Effectively, the people of Texas
had no choice but to declare for independence “When a government has ceased to protect
the lives, liberty and property of the people, from whom its legitimate powers are
derived, and for the advancement of whose happiness it was instituted.” The document
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went on to cite all that the immigrants found most repugnant about the new government –
the concentration of power in the hands of the military and the Church, the arrests, the
suspicion. But they also made clear that their decision rested with a principle that
transcended national loyalty
When, in consequence of such acts of malfeasance and abduction on the part of
the government, anarchy prevails, and civil society is dissolved into its original
elements, in such a crisis, the first law of nature, the rights of self-preservation,
the inherent and inalienable right of the people to appeal to first principles, and
take their political affairs into their own hands in extreme cases, enjoins it as a
right towards themselves, and a sacred obligation to their posterity, to abolish
such government, and create another in its stead.

Mexico had proven incapable of protecting their rights and, consequently the contract
they had formed with it was null and void. The “natural” principles of republicanism
surpassed any and all national loyalties. This was precisely the logic that had propelled
these people to leave the United States sixteen years earlier and had compelled their
fathers and grandfathers to declare independence from Britain sixty years earlier. Yet,
one thing made the Texas Revolution different. Texans did not stop at renouncing
Mexico, they renounced Mexicans themselves as a people incapable of exercising or
protecting these principles. The last lines of the document made this clear. “We
appealed to our Mexican brethren for assistance: our appeal has been made in vain;
though months have elapsed, no sympathetic response has yet been heard from the
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interior. We are therefore, forced to the melancholy conclusion, that the Mexican people
have acquiesced in the destruction of their liberty.” 507
Whereas their forefathers had broken away from a people of “kindred blood,
language, and institutions,” Texans were now separating from “a people one half of
whom are the most depraved of the different races of Indians, different in color, pursuits
and character.” With the federalist defeat in the interior and the failure of most tejanos
to support independence, Houston now felt comfortable declaring that “the vigor of the
descendants of the north [will never] mix with the phlegm of the indolent Mexicans, no
matter how long we may live among them. Two different tribes on the same hunting
ground will never get along together.” 508
Texans adopted a Constitution modeled after that of their native country but
which contained certain elements of the Spanish-Mexican legal traditional. They
included a specific Declaration of Rights infused with Jacksonian sentiment that, among
other things, disallowed monopolies as “contrary to the genius of a free government” and
prohibited laws of primogeniture or entail. The document also forbid imprisonment for
debt. This right, predictably, did not extend to all men. Just as those who had founded
the United States of America sixty years before, the Founding Father of Texas flatly
denied citizenship to people of African descent and included a slave code designed to
507

“The Texas Declaration of Independence,” 2 March 1836 in Ernest Wallace, David M. Vigness and
George B. Ward, eds, Documents of Texas History, (Texas State Historical Association: Austin), 2002, 989.
508
Lack, 86-7.

310
ensure that all blacks held in bondage under various contracts maintained their chattel
status. The document set forth the “social compact theory of government in which all
authority derived from the people,” according to Lack. All citizens retained “equal right”
and permission to “alter their government,” thereby effectively permitting future
revolution. In a decision that would not only determine the military future of Texas, but
perhaps its political one as well, Article VI, Section 8 stipulated that “All persons who
shall leave the country for the purpose of evading participation in the present struggle, or
shall refuse to participate in it, or shall give aid or assistance to the present enemy, shall
forfeit all rights of citizenship, and such lands as they may hold in the republic.” 509
Texans who had avoided military service up to this point now had a crucial choice to
make – either join the cause or risk losing everything.
Indeed, Texan leaders’ first line of order would be to assert control over military
affairs. One of the first administrative offices they established was that of commander
general with authority to subordinate all units of the army. Declaring that “It is the
bounden duty of every man who asks of the country protection of his person and property
to stand forth in such a crisis as its defense,” the Provisional Government conscripted all
able-bodied men between seventeen and fifty and called for punitive measures against
anyone who resisted, making it clear that the success of the Revolution took priority over
individual rights. Officials were appointed to conduct thorough registration in every
district. Men would be chosen for service based on a rotating lottery and, if selected,
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called to duty by the chief executive at any time. Those who failed to appear or hire a
substitute would be court-marshalled at risk of losing their citizenship and up to half of
their personal property. 510
David G. Burnett, a late convert to the independence movement who had been
absent from the March Convention was appointed interim president. He would claim
later that he had merely “consented to be a candidate.” His opponents had resided in
Texas for only a few months, making Burnett’s victory, in many people’s eyes, the lesser
of two evils. After a rather grandiose inaugural address, Burnett set to work
implementing the policies of the Convention, the first of which was to declare martial
law. He made an appeal to the people of Eastern Texas, a portion of whom “under the
influence of idle and groundless rumors are leaving their homes and by the circulation of
false news may prevent others of their countrymen from repairing to the standard of their
country.” Thus, a renewed military vigor did not seem to accompany the declaration of
independence. “I conjure you my countrymen to repair to the field forthwith to deafen
your ears to all rumors from whatever quarter they may come,” pleaded Burnett, “to the
field then my countrymen, to the standard of liberty and defend your rites in a manner
worthy of your sires and yourselves.” 511
A couple weeks later, he issued another proclamation, this time to the whole of
Texas, “Your country demands your aid,” it began, “The enemy is pressing upon us,
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families and wives and children of your neighbors, are driven from their firesides and
compelled to take shelter in the woods and forests, while the enemy draws confidence
and audacity from every disaster we encounter.” His words reveal that Texas still faced
many of the military problems that it always had. Even following a declaration of
independence and imminent defeat by Santa Anna, “too many citizens are lingering in
idleness, and lethargy, or ingloriously [fleeing] before the enemy, whom we have
heretofore effected to despise.” He went on to invoke a sense of national shame that
again likened the Texans’ struggle against Mexico to the Anglo-American colonists’
struggle against Britain: “Is it possible that the free citizens of Texas the descendent of
the heroes of ’76 can take panic at the approach of the paltry minions of a despot, who
threatens to desolate our beautiful country.” All else failing, Burnett sought to draw on
Texans’ sense of self-interest to inspire them to pick up arms, “Let every man able to
poise a rifle or wield a sabre fly to the army, and soon, very soon, your families will be
safe.” Ultimately, Burnett adopted much of the racist rhetoric employed by Houston and
others of the pro-independence faction, referring to Mexicans as “minions of despotism,
the panders of priestly ambition” who were “waging a merciless and exterminating war
upon us.” There being no more time for waffling or indecisiveness, those who did not
join the fight for independence would be considered enemies of Texas - “Those who are
not for us are against us.” Burnett proclaimed null and void all previous exemptions from
armed service under the new government and ordered every able-bodied man to the field.
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“Let no man hope for exemption. All are interested, all must abide the same fate. The
law makes no distinction, none will be made.” 512
In his Executive Order, Burnett specifically referenced the trouble that he was
having getting Texans to join the cause. “Experience has demonstrated that an entire
unity of action cannot be had from the Law,” he wrote, “that many men are found among
us who are willing to rest quietly at home.” He went on to warn of the consequences it
would render, not just in terms of trouble defeating the Mexicans, but of the wellbeing of
Texas once it achieved independence. Texas, according to Burnet, “must be made
[independent] by the united exertions and the common sacrifices of her citizens. To
depend upon volunteers from abroad is no less dangerous than disgraceful.” 513
Burnett’s appeals mostly fell on deaf ears, however. Furthermore, the
government’s threatening and ultimately inconsistent efforts to enforce conscription only
served to alienate more Texans. The army failed to militarize on the local level as the
plans for conscription were somehow never instituted effectively. A group of
Nacogdoches leaders wrote on April 11 that “there is no organization of the physical
force of this community, and we are without a head.” 514 Other municipalities simply
refused to comply. A few inhabitants were even seen “still daring to express sympathy
with the cause of Mexico.” Burnett’s appeals grew increasingly desperate. “Texans, have
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you no pride?” he pleaded, “Will not the finger of scorn be pointed at you should you
leave the country without an effort to retain it? What will the world think of your boasted
declaration of independence when you flee at the sight of the first enemy that makes his
appearance. Texans’ reluctance to fight was particularly shameful given the large
numbers of northern volunteers who arrived daily, ready to take up the call.
[M]any brave soldiers who has magnanimously left his home and country to aid
your cause, have been sacrificed through your supineness already. The time has
arrived that every man must do his duty. He must defend the soil that he expects
to reside on. He must fight for the privileges if he expects to enjoy them.

Anyone who refused his order would be forced to surrender their citizenship, forfeit their
land, “and form henceforth treated as an alien and a foreigner.”
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As the Battle of San Jacinto approached, military leaders scrambled to muster as
many men as they could to reverse the course of the war. In their efforts, they directly
accused Texans of a shameful indifference, unworthy of their heritage: “Are you
Americans? Are you freeman? If you are, prove your blood and birth by rallying at once
to your country’s standard!” 516 As Santa Anna’s front approached, Texas neared
anarchy. Help needed to come from somewhere. 517
***
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News of the declaration finally reached New Orleans a few weeks later.
Publications all over the country quickly filled with praise and support for the brave and
courageous republicans carrying forth the age-old banner of individual freedom and
personal liberty. And when news of the bloody siege at the Alamo reached the North,
sympathies poured forth for the fallen heroes. “They sold their lives dearly, and that
barbarian, Santa Anna, and his savage hordes, will long remember the terrible fight of
Bexar, and the voice of fame, when she proclaims in future times, the names of the
illustrious who died in glory’s arms,” wrote the Cincinnati Daily Gazette.

518

Even the New York Herald published an article placing Texans in a republican
lineage that dated back to the ancient Greeks. “What Thermopalae was to ancient Greece
– what Bunker Hill has been to the United States – so will Bexar be to Texas.” It went on
to remind the reader of the common heritage shared by Texans and the citizens of the
North, perpetuating the very notion that the conflict was, effectively, a race war. The
Mexicans had massacred “bone and flesh of our flesh.” The article simply dismissed the
complex and variegated causes of the conflict. “It is idle – utterly so – futile –
completely so, to enter into an examination of miserable technical points in the affairs
between Mexico and Texas.” Suffice was to say that, “Under the form of an illegitimate
war, Santa Ana has perpetrated deeds more atrocious than those of the pirate on the high
seas – of the wandering houseless Arab of the desert.” Just as the author expressed
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solidarity with the Texans based on a common ethnic and national heritage, so it
castigated the Mexicans as a “race of miscreants” who, it suggested, were not even worth
negotiating with. Mexico simply was no match for the proud and just Anglo-American
family. “The blood of our murdered brethren call to high heaven for instant and
immediate vengeance. 519
The Grand Gulf Advertiser flatly denied that the Texans were ever really
Mexican: “‘Tis true they left their country, but they were still American citizens. They
only left one confederacy of states for that of another - the protection of the parent for the
protection of the friend.”

It was merely economic advantage that the immigrants had

sought. They had never intended to turn their backs on their country of origin.
Furthermore, by characterizing the Texans as brothers of the North and one-time friends
of Mexico, the author invoked a sense of natural belonging ironically just like the one the
Texans themselves had once employed to describe their relationship with Mexico. That
nation had once aspired to be like the US, but aspiration was all it could achieve, as
republican freedom was a biologically inherited quality. The article, of course, failed to
mention that the Mexican Constitution demonstrated a deeper commitment to federalism
than that of the United States and one grounded in a specifically Hispanic political
tradition. Furthermore, it completely ignored the fact that these settlers were in fact
Mexican citizens and instead represented them as ambassadors of the Anglo world.
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“They were still, however, free, still citizens of a free country – still the sons of the
heroes of ’76, emigrating to add light to the dawning of liberty in the new world.”
Publication in the US, particularly the South, rushed to claim Texas and its cause as their
own in a way that completely erased Texans Mexican identity and status

Resolved, That they are our countrymen and brothers, born to the inheritance of
liberty, and inspired by the same heaven – born feeling which animated our
fathers in ’76 – that the blood of those martyred patriots, which crimsons the wall
of the Alamo, cries aloud for retribution justice, and appeals to every American
freeman for vengeance. 520

Sympathy for the Texans quickly translated into the largest volunteer surge yet.
One sympathizer offered to bring two regiments from Tennessee, although he wished to
bring four. The surge of US immigrants eager to earn citizenship in the new country,
prompted a national debate over the diplomatic propriety and repercussions of thousands
of US men flooding into a region whose status as an independent republic was still
debatable, to fight in a conflict in which the US had declared neutrality. “The policy of
our Government is doubtless not to interfere with foreign nations, or infringe the
recognized law of nations,” wrote the Cincinnati Republican and Commercial Register,
“But it is not the policy of government of free and independent people to stifle or
suppress public sentiment, no matter how manifested or expressed.” The Register deemed
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it “unnatural” for Americans not to participate in the struggle, treating the fight for liberty
as if it were a biologically inherited trait. 521
If the United States embodied democracy and freedom, then Mexico embodied its
antithesis – tyranny, oppression, and greed. The Register declared that it was the
Mexican centralists’ aim “to sweep from the nation every vestige of civil liberty, and to
establish upon the ruins of a Federal Constitution, an absolute military and ecclesiastical
despotism.”

Liberty was the purview of the United States of the North and something

that Mexicans hated. 522 Reports of the horrors of Mexican oppression filled the pages of
northern newspapers. One recruiter reported that he had “seen forty squads of 300 men
each, impressed against their own protestations, and those of their wives and children into
the armed services of the country.” As if oblivious to Texas’ most recent conscription
laws, he continued,

I have seen 300 men chained with not a rag on to hide their nakedness, up to the
middle in the common sewers of the city, guarded by half as many soldiers who
besides their arms, carried large switchen, with which they unmercifully lashed
the poor prisoners . . . I have seen the doors of private citizens and of public
officers, and of the National Assembly, guarded by bodies of armed men. Yet
this is called a republic”

The speaker, of course, made no mention of the obvious similarities to chattel slavery in
the United States. In a stroke of irony and perhaps blind privilege, US critics of Mexico
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attacked it for committing many of the very same injustices that characterized their own
nation. 523
The fact that volunteers were promised land in exchange for their service did not
seem to compromise their lofty ideals. Indeed, appeals to prospective volunteers’ material
desires were often included in solicitations, “It is truly and emphatically the Italy of
America, combining agricultural and commercial advantages in a most eminent degree,
with a delightful and healthy climate,” reported “A Voice from Texas.” The solicitation
continued, “All then who are desirous of participating in the glorious struggle for
freedom, and uniting their destinies with this interesting country, would do well to
embrace the present opportunity.” 524
As news of the atrocities at the Goliad and Alamo streamed into the United States,
Texas came to represent nothing short of a humanitarian crisis. In response to the Jackson
administration’s neutrality, the Cincinnati Gazette declared that “It is always noble to
assist any people who are overwhelmed with calamity” The paper proceeded to point out
that “When Greece, of classic renown, was struggling for her liberty” from “the ruthless
Turk” the United States had rushed to her aid” Yet it was now a crime to assist Texas –
“what law, sir, forbids such sympathies; and what law forbids us to emigrate – and what
law forbids us to aid the distressed, an feed the hungry.” 525
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But not everyone agreed with the sudden rush to join the Texas cause. “Those
who undertake to engage soldiers in a foreign country, without permission of the
sovereign,” declared another contributor, “violates one of the most sacred rights of the
prince and of the nation” and should be considered a crime of the highest order. “For
our citizens then, to commit murders and depredations, on the members of nations at
peace with us, or to combine to do it” was “as much against the laws of the land as to
murder or rob, or combine to murder or rob.” The war in Texas was not about
democratic principles, it was about opportunism and greed. 526
Meanwhile, despite their efforts, Texan military leaders largely failed to coerce
Texans themselves to the field and continued to receive reports of insubordination. One
such document claimed that “John Durst and many of his disciples had proclaimed
against independence, on grounds that “the colonists has sworn false by departing from
the Constitution of 1824.” Contrary to Eugene Barker’s claim that “it was the ‘old
settlers’ who did, almost unaided, all the effective fighting,” Lack shows that over 1,800
of the men who fought at the most decisive battle of the revolution, San Jacinto, arrived
in Texas after Santa Anna had defeated the federalists. The median date of emigration
was 1834 and a significant number had arrived so recently that its was their first Texas
battle. Indeed, more than nine hundred men who responded to the initial call to arms in
1835, simply failed to enroll the following year. The most significant battle of the Texas
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Revolution would be fought and won by men with almost no connection to the place for
which they were fighting. 527
***
After months of low morale and consistent defeat by the Mexicans, the war in
Texas would take a fateful turn at the Battle of San Jacinto in which the Texans would
not only defeat but capture Santa Anna. But once they had the general there was no
clear consensus about what to do with him, introducing one of the first disagreements
between Texas and its newly declared “parent republic.” While many in the US believed
Santa Anna should face extradition to their country, Texan leaders disagreed. Burnett
explained that if the federal party ascended to power, recognition of Texan independence
would become impossible in accordance with the very terms on which the Texans had
declared independence. “But, the sovereign power, under a Central Constitution would
find it equally facile and advisable to get rid of the obstreperous republicans, and
practical federalists of Texas, by severing her from the empire.” Indeed, Santa Ana’s
capture and the Texans’ ultimate decision to allow him to return to Mexico City to
reclaim power, was the nail in the coffin of their alliance with the rest of the federalist
states, and their relationship with Mexico itself. As Burnett astutely observed,
The federalists of Mexico are the enemies of Santa Ana. By detaining him here,
we give to them the reins of government, and deny to ourselves all hope of a
formal recognition. But letting him depart in time to sustain his authority at
527
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home, we assure to ourselves a certainty that our independence can be recognized
and at least a probability that it will.

The Texans would ultimately release Santa Ana and he would return to Mexico City as
the national leader. But Burnett’s prediction was not entirely correct. Santa Anna and
the Mexicans would not accept Texan secession, leaving the new republic in a deeply
vulnerable and precarious position. Opposition to its recently achieved status as an
independent republic came from virtually every corner – from Mexico, from opponents in
the North and, perhaps most importantly, from many Texans themselves.
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CHAPTER 6
“Free, Happy and Independent”
The Imperial Republic of Texas
1836-1845

Scholars have tended to see the period of Texan independence as a brief,
unwanted, and ultimately doomed attempt at nation building. Considered an economic
and political fiasco, the independent Republic of Texas failed to achieve peace or
recognition from Mexico, effectively secure and protect its borders, or attain anything
close to economic self-sufficiency. As one historian put it, for the full nine years of its
independence, Texas “was virtually impoverished. Its internal transportation system still
was largely primitive. Many of its plans for achieving rapid economic maturity came to
nothing.” 528 The fact that Texans voted almost unanimously to seek annexation to the
United States immediately after defeating Santa Anna supports the premise that they
never really wanted to be independent. Furthermore, the scholarly and popular tendency
to fixate on Sam Houston as the dominant figure in post-revolutionary Texas has fueled
this interpretation, since Houston – an unfailing US patriot and unionist - made
annexation his primary aim during both presidential terms. “The Lone Star flag flew
proudly and perilously over Texas for ten years, but not through Texans’ choice,” writes
T.R. Fehrenbach in his once definitive tome. The reason why Texas remained
independent for so long? - “[T]he political situation that had developed within the past
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half-dozen years inside the United States.” 529 In other words, Texas’ fate – and that of
much of the rest of the continent - had more to do with politics in the north than with
Texans themselves.
Yet, histories that view annexation as a fait accompli of the independence
period, and one that was ultimately dependent on the political course of the United States,
overlook the extent to which Texans not only took their independence seriously, but
earnestly pursued other geopolitical and diplomatic arrangements. Not only did these
other options mean rejecting the United States, but they often meant bringing Texas into
direct competition with it. As annexation began to look less likely, many Texans not only
began to embrace independence, but to entertain the idea that their young republic might
one day become a formidable empire of its own, replacing both the US and Mexico as the
politically and economically dominant nation in the northwestern hemisphere. The chief
advocate of this view was Texas’ second president, Mirabeau Buonaparte Lamar.
The historiography has largely dismissed Lamar’s presidency as “nothing more
than a deviation from” Houston’s policies of caution and retrenchment. 530 Since it was
Houston’s early vision of seeing Texas joining the United States that eventually bore
fruit, it is easy to see why. But the aims of Lamar and his followers, who included a large
number of both early and newer settlers, were much more consistent with Texas’ “long
history.” They envisioned a vibrant and independent Texan empire with closer ties to
529
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England, France and federalist Mexico, and imagined Texas extending its dominion all
the way to the Pacific. While such a goal may strike us as little more than delusional
today, it was not all together unimaginable, and much more in line with how Texans
thought of themselves both before and after independence. Whatever problems Texas
faced as an infant nation, its star was rising.
Texan independence was nearly impossible, however, without the recognition and
friendship of its southern neighbor. Indeed, as soon as he came into office, Lamar
immediately prioritized diplomacy with Mexico over the United States. While Houston
directed his diplomatic efforts at the North, recalling the shared heritage of Texas and the
United States while often speaking disparagingly of Mexico and its people, Lamar often
highlighted the two countries’ shared commitment to republican democracy. Lamar
believed, quite rightly, that the health of Texan independence depended much more on its
relationship with Mexico than with the United States. But pursuing a diplomatic course
with Mexico in the 1840’s was complicated. Sometimes it meant attempting negotiations
with Mexico City and other times it meant achieving recognition and peace from its
federalist rebels in the North – some of whom were pursuing independence themselves –
and could act as a critical buffer between Texas and the Mexican centralists.
There was also a small but no less influential minority in Texas who questioned
whether it should not rejoin Mexico, especially when it looked like the federalists might
return to power. This group included many tejanos and some members of the first cohort
of Anglo-American immigrants. These men actively entertained the idea of returning
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Texas to Mexico, and, in at least one case, nearly caused it to happen.

Knowing that

Texas could not realistically exist on its own, and not wanting to see it absorbed by the
very nation they had turned their backs on years ago, they introduced the possibility of a
third geopolitical arrangement, one that would undo one of the most pivotal events of the
early nineteenth century.
***
Texas entered a fragile and precarious independence, lacking formal recognition
from any nation-state and significantly divided. Many established Texans had only
tenuously embraced independence and now found themselves surrounded by recent
arrivals whose politics, experiences, and worldview differed markedly from their own.
“Texas has more to fear from internal dissensions, or want of harmony than from the
Mexicans,” wrote John P Austin. 531 John P. Ramage agreed. Even as he relished that
“never in my opinion has Texas stood upon the same high ground in the [estimation] of
civilized nations than she does at this moment,” he had to confess that he had his “doubts
and fears” arising “not from your external foes but from your enemies within.”
Specifically, Ramage worried about the post-independence population’s lack of unity,
community, or direction. “[Y]ou have a class of people thrown among you, who when
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the excitement ceases which collected them, will exhibit the evils attendant on ill
organized minds and unbridled passions.” 532
Texan demographics and politics changed dramatically after Santa Anna’s defeat.
In August of 1836, it had approximately 30,000 Anglo residents up from about 25,000 in
1834. Many of these men were recruits from the North who had answered the
revolution’s call for volunteers, as well as their families and slaves. Their numbers
dwarfed the mere 3,470 ethnic Mexicans, and many would end up settling in the western
sections of the state near or in territory claimed by Mexico, bringing them into regular
conflict with that country as well as the Kiowa, Comanche and other nomadic Indian
groups that still dominated it. The number of slaves from the North also increased
dramatically from approximately 2,300 in 1834 before the revolution to 5,000 by the end
of the revolution. The independence period would see an even more dramatic population
influx from the North, as Anglo-Americans, as well as a significant number of German
immigrants, flooded into the republic. By 1847 Texas had about 102,961 citizens - only
about 12,000 to 14,000 of whom were Mexican – 38,753 slaves and 295 free blacks. 533
Indeed, Texas not only became increasingly Americanized over the course of its
independence, it became increasingly “southernized.” Most of those who immigrated
were white southerners and their slaves, strengthening the institution’s presence in the
young republic. They brought with them a southern culture, worldview, and political
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disposition. Meanwhile, tejanos, many of whom had once served as powerful political
brokers when Texas was still a part of Mexico, now found themselves marginalized and
subject to suspicion.
But this does not mean that we should see Texas as a mere extension of the South
or any part of the United States. While the majority of Anglo-Texans wanted to return to
the US, a powerful and well established minority opposed annexation and even continued
to question independence. This, of course, begged the question of what, exactly, would
become of Texas. Would it remain independent? Would it join the United States or
would it return to Mexico? Texans found themselves faced with several geopolitical
possibilities. But for the time being, they would have to assert themselves as an
independent republic. Many countries, not least of which was Mexico, still did not
recognize Texas independence. If Texans wanted to annex themselves to the US, they
would first have to prove that they did not constitute a significant burden or danger to that
country, specifically, that they were capable of defending themselves against Indian and
Mexican incursions. Ironically, Texans would have to prove that they were capable of
independence in order to achieve annexation.
Given the profound disunity that plagued Texas at this time, this was no easy task.
The first formidable nation-building challenge that Texans faced, was picking a
president. Austin was ill and declining, wartime disagreements had all but destroyed
many of his former allegiances. The Wharton party put forth Sam Houston, the Hero of
San Jacinto, who, despite his battlefield heroics, was not particularly popular among
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many of the old settlers, including Austin. Yet, with the old guarde divided or
indifferent, there were few other options. Running against an exhausted Austin and
reluctant David Burnet in a nation now dominated by men like him, Houston won by a
landslide. His constituency was composed mostly of men who had been attracted to
Texas by promises of land in exchange for their military service, had little sense of
belonging or Texan nationalism, little relationship with the new republic or understanding
of its past, and little interest in engaging in the hard, self-sacrificing work of nationbuilding. And many, including Houston himself, hardly shared the admiration for early
Mexican politics that many of the original settlers had. When he first arrived in Texas, he
wrote in a letter to Andrew Jackson that Mexicans were dishonest and uneducated, and
predicted that Texas would eventually break away from Mexico and join the United
States or Great Britain.

534

This made him an ideal man to lead the campaign for Texas annexation to the
United States. Indeed, many believed that the only way that Texas could save itself from
social strife and anarchy was to join a more powerful protectorate – and for many there
was only one clear option. Even the venerable Father of Texas embraced annexation
because it seemed “the most effectual and speedy mode of procuring for its inhabitants
that security and civility in civil Govt which alone can compensate them for their past
sufferings.”
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for president. It passed by an overwhelming majority, thereby becoming the new
presidents’ chief aim. Asserting that the people of Texas had, with a “unanimity
unparalleled, declared that they will be reunited with the great republican family of the
North,” Houston turned to what he deemed, “A circumstance of the highest import,”
predicting confidently that the United States would “hail us welcome into the great
family of free men.”

536

Upon his inauguration, Houston promptly dispatched a diplomatic mission to the
United States with a frank letter to his most probable supporter. “My great desire is that
our country Texas shall be annexed to the U States and on a footing of Justice and
reciprocity to the parties,” he wrote to Andrew Jackson. Although the recently elected
president of an independent republic, Houston confided to his friend, “It is policy to hold
out the idea (and few there are who Know to the contrary) that we are very able to sustain
ourselves, against any power, who are not impotent, yet I am free to say to you that we
cannot do it.”
But in their formal declaration to Congress, the delegation presented a very
different explanation for their desire to join their mother country. “[Texas] claims
annexation by the kindred ties of blood, language, institutions by a common origin, by a
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common history, and by a common freedom.” 537 This, of course, was a dramatic shift
from the time when Anglo-Texans attempted to emphasize their political and cultural
similarities with Mexico, while turning their backs on the nation of their birth.
But not all Texan leaders were as eager for annexation as Houston. “It should be
borne in mind that Texas makes a great sacrifice by agreeing to the annexation at all,” 538
Austin wrote to John Wharton, then leader of the Texas envoy in the United States. He
cautioned Wharton against forfeiting too much, insisting that Texas should only accept
annexation “on the broad basis of equitable reciprocity.” He reminded Wharton of the
rights that Texans had acquired “under the laws of the former and present governments,”
all of which “must be duly respected and secured beyond the possibility of a doubt.” 539
Austin believed that the near unanimous vote to annex Texas to the US was “more
the result of attachment to the native government” and “ties of the kindred,” than “of
mature reflection, on the future glory, interest and prosperity of Texas.” Unlike the
newer cohort of immigrants, for Austin and many of the older settlers, annexation carried
with it the threat of greater loss than gain. These men had consistently imagined a world
apart from the United States and the thought of returning to it, however pragmatic, did
not necessarily appeal to them. Furthermore, as Austin hoped to remind Wharton, they
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had other options: “In the event therefore of discovering any such disposition in the
government of Congress of the United States, you will have full and free conversations
with the British, French and other foreign ministers, on the Texas question.” For such
nations, association with a cotton-producing Texas, promised “great commercial
advantages,” including a market free of the kind of onerous tariffs that northern cotton
producers faced. If Texas were to enter the United States, Austin insisted that it enter as a
state “without passing through the intermediate stage of a territorial government,” that
there be no restriction whatsoever on slavery, and that the land titles of “bona fide
settlers” be honored “so as to secure them from the heartless grasp and persecution of
speculators.” 540
Southern cotton growers, however, immediately recognized Texan annexation as
a political and economic boon. The annexation of a vast cotton-producing region
promised an end to the great shortages and fluctuations that had plagued the South.
Politically, it would fortify the region by adding considerably to its representation and
population. As Wharton himself observed, if Texas were admitted to the Union “the
preponderance of political power will very soon depart from the North and permanently
reside in the South and West.” 541 Not to mention that Jackson had dreamed of acquiring
Texas for decades.

540
541

Ibid.
Wharton to SFA, 6 January 1837, DCT, Vol. II, 168-72.

333
Yet, it was not to be. Several formidable obstacles convinced Jackson that
annexation, as much as he wanted it, was not worth the cost. First, it would contribute to
growing sectional rivalry on the eve of a presidential election. Second, Mexico already
blamed his administration for the Texas fiasco, and annexation would further damage an
already fragile relationship between that country and the United States, potentially
tarnishing the latter’s image abroad. Finally, and perhaps as a result of Houston’s letter,
Jackson knew that the cost of defending such a sparsely populated and impoverished
region would most likely fall on the federal government, thereby making the burden of
absorbing Texas outweigh the benefit. According to his biographer, “It was very
important to Jackson that the rest of the world see any exchange of territory as an
honorable and proper transaction.” That being the case, Jackson refused to annex Texas
and advised Congress to “stand aloof” on the question, at least until “Mexico herself, or
one of the great foreign powers, should recognize Texas first.” Doing so, Jackson
argued, would “secure to us respect and influence abroad and inspire confidence at
home.” Congress did, however, succumb in part to the vigor of the Texas commissioners,
and on March 1, 1837 recommend to the president the formal recognition, but not
annexation, of Texas. 542
To some in Texas, this came as a relief. Many questioned the United States’
claim and investment in Texas. If the US had, since the signing of the Adams-Onís
542

For a full discussion of the United States’ recognition of Texas independence see Robert V. Remini,
Andrew Jackson and the Course of American Democracy, 1833-1845, Vol. III, (New York: Harper and
Row, 1984), 357-68; Remini quoted on pg 366, Jackson quoted on page 363-64.

334
Treaty, claimed the region as its own, why had it not intervened sooner? Why had it not
come to its aid in its war with Mexico? Mexico, many assumed, would surely have
consented to sell Texas to the Americans if they had offered the proper price. “But what
would the people of Texas be likely to think of such a consummation of their
revolutionary struggle?” asked the Weekly Houston Telegraph, “They have already
purchased the soils at a price more costly than its mines could pay – the blood of those
who fought and fell at San Jacinto.” Regarding Texas’ previous desire to attach
themselves to the US, the Telegraph asserted that “the sentiments of her people are
believed to have undergone a change since the vote of 1836.” And for good reason.
“[T]he United States would be the greater, if not the sole gainers, both politically and
commercially,” the paper asserted, “We would be subjected to all those financial evils
from which the United States have labored from first to last” and Texas’ “fertile regions”
would only serve “to fil the pockets of northern manufacturers and monopolists.” 543 Why
return to the same onerous impositions from which many Texans had fled? Why become
the peripheral corner of a vast and extractive empire when you could become one
yourself?
Rejected by the Jackson administration and losing its appeal among Texans,
Houston decided to abandon annexation and put forth a plan to make Texas a viable
independent nation. “Recognized as we have been, by the United States, a free,
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sovereign and independent nation, it becomes our imperious duty, to pursue such a course
of policy and legislation, as will at once command the policy and respect of other
nations.” Of paramount importance was addressing the nation’s embarrassed finances.
“A boundless revenue to the country will arise from the opening of the land offices,” he
informed Congress. Furthermore, Texas needed an organized militia and functional
Navy. “There can be no doubt but that the enemy will avail themselves of every
advantage by sea.” Texans must therefore not only “make preparation to meet them, but
to maintain active operations by sea and land.” Yet, despite its financial insolvency,
insecure borders and woefully underdeveloped infrastructure, there was one thing that
Houston was certain Texas would never succumb to: “It is vain to suppose that Mexico,
imbecile as she is, and distracted by internal factions, can ever reconquer the fair region
of Texas, and maintain her conquest. The same spirits who have subdued the wilderness
and have repelled the boasted invincibility of Mexico, yet live.” 544
Consequently, annexation became increasingly less attractive to a president who
had almost made acquiring Texas his life mission. But it also began to look less
appealing to Texans themselves. “Annexation with respect to ourselves alone is now a
question of more embarrassment than heretofore,” wrote Texas Secretary of State, Robert
A. Irion, “From indications evinced by members of the late session of the Texan
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Congress[,] the people are becoming less anxious for the success of the measure.” 545 A
month later Irion stated that pushing further for Texas annexation was “useless” and
would be “derogatory to ourselves. If the United States decided it wanted Texas, “the
proposition should come from them.” Texas’ policy from here on out would be “to
appear indifferent upon the subject.” 546 No matter how fragile their independence might
be, Texans insisted to themselves and the rest of the world that they could stand alone.
Indeed, even as Texans complained of their poverty and lack of resources, many
of them embraced independence as an opportunity to enrich themselves and their new
republic unhindered by the North’s onerous regulations and tariffs. “There never has
been such a universal feeling in favour of raising cotton in texas,” Thomas McKinney
wrote to Samuel May Williams in February 1838. Whereas, just six months earlier, he
had bemoaned “how many disappointments necessarily occur in a country so poorly
organized [in all] her commercial relations,” McKinney now cheerfully informed his
friend that he had “received orders for Six Gin stands.” He now believed Texas was in a
position to produce five times the amount of cotton it had the previous year, and that
“There are a great many persons now emigrating from the United States to this country”
who “will doubtless produce a revival of lines and business.” 547
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Indeed, when Jackson finally decided to kill the annexation bill for fear that it
would send his nation further into sectionalism and threaten its already delicate
relationship with Mexico, not a few Texans were relieved. “How glorious will Texas be
standing alone, and relying upon her own strength,” wrote Anson Jones, the republic’s
new minister to the United States. 548 And although the South had almost unanimously
supported annexation, there were a few southern leaders who agreed. McKinney wrote of
a few “friends” of Texas from Louisiana[,] Mississippi[,] Kentucky[,] etc” who “opposed
our annexation on the grounds that a brighter destiny now awaits Texas.” Whereas, if
Texas were to join the United States, it would be subject to the same perceived
oppression that the rest of the South experienced, namely “high Tariffs and other
Northern measures,” and may even be “driven to nullification, secession etc and be thus
involved in a worse revolution than we are now engaged in.” Texas was emerging as a
beacon of hope for an increasingly disgruntled South, at least some of whose leaders
encouraged the young nation to “go on as we have commenced conquering and to
conquer and never pause until we had annexed all or the best portion of Mexico to
Texas.” In so doing, Texas might establish “an independent government that would rival
[the United States] in extent, resources and population.” 549 Texans, for the time being,
were prepared to take their advice.
***
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Houston’s term ran out at the end of 1839 and since the Texas constitution did not
allow consecutive terms, it is impossible to know if Texans were satisfied enough with
his presidency to re-elect him. But the man they did elect was about as far from Houston,
personally and politically, as one could get. Where Houston was charismatic and
extroverted, Lamar was bookish and unimposing. Whereas Houston pursued a policy of
caution and retrenchment, hoping to see Texas become a US state, Lamar hoped not only
to preserve independence, but to turn Texas into a formidable empire of its own that
extended all the way to the Pacific. In this regard, Lamar’s policies were far more
consistent with Texan politics up to that point. Indeed, as early as December 1836,
shortly after they had organized a formal government, the committee on the state of the
republic adopted a bill incorporating an entity known as the “Texas Railroad, Navigation,
and Banking Company.” Its aim was to establish railroad communication and
transportation between the Rio Grande and the Sabine.
But some had even bigger dreams for the project. Texas Congressman Thomas J.
Green envisioned a pattern of railroads and canals that connected New Orleans to the
Gulf of California, thus making Texas a gateway to Asia and India. Green predicted that
“a combination of political events must soon happen, which will place Texas no longer in
a frontier position to the States of the North.” He envisioned adding a country west of
Texas “as large as the original thirteen States.” 550 But in negotiations with the Jackson
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administration, Texan officials soon learned that if they wanted to gain recognition, they
would have to claim far less territory than even their most modest ambitions entailed. By
claiming the Rio Grande as their western border, the Texan congress, many believed,
encroached on Mexican territory, including Santa Fé. The boundary question never
really came up, in part because knowledge of the sheer size of Texas would prompt many
to withhold recognition.
Yet the failed attempt at annexation had emboldened imperially-minded Texans
such as Memecum Hunt, Irion’s successor as Texas’ representative to the United States.
Hunt asserted that Texans would continue to push their western boundary, “pursuing the
destiny indicated to us by that significant and beautiful emblem of our nationality, the
evening star,” thereby adding “star after star to our Banner,” just as the United States had
done.
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When asked by John Forsythe, secretary of the United States, how far Texas

aimed to extend its western boundary, Hunt boldly replied “As far as the Pacific Ocean.”
As an independent republic, Texas would take the mantle of Anglo expansion in the
Northwestern hemisphere. But Texans did not simply adopt US expansionism, the notion
of Texas resting at the heart of a vibrant transnational economy and community was
something Austin himself had expressed, albeit in the service of Mexico. In many ways,
independent Texas attempted to pursue many of the same ambitions that it had expressed
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under Mexico, placing it at odds with both that country and the United States. Texas
went from soliciting the United States to competing with it.
Lamar laid out his vision for the young republic in his inaugural speech delivered
in December 1838. Of annexation, he claimed “I have never been able myself to
perceive the policy of the desired connexion, or discover in it any advantage either civil,
political, or commercial, which could possibly result to Texas.” On the contrary,
annexation “would produce a lasting regret, and ultimately prove as disastrous to our
liberty and hopes, as the triumphant sword of the enemy.” Lamar made it clear that,
unlike Houston, who had attempted to rejoin the union at his first opportunity, he was a
Texan through and through, and would remain so. Although he claimed “no irreverence
to the character and institutions of my native country,” he insisted that “the land of my
adoption must claim the highest allegiance and affection.” 552
Lamar explained that becoming a part of the United States would mean
surrendering the very freedoms that had attracted so many to Texas in the first place and
that they had fought so ardently to defend in the recent war with Mexico:

When I reflect upon the invaluable rights which Texas will have to yield up with
the surrender of her Independence – the right of making either war or peace; the
right of controlling the Indian tribes within her borders; the right of appropriating
her public domain to purposes of education and internal improvements; of levying
552
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her own taxes, regulating her own commerce and forming her own alliances and
treaties – when I view her divested of the most essential attributes of free
government; reduced to the level of an unfelt fraction of a giant empire. . . I
cannot regard the annexation of texas to the American union in any other light
than as the grave of all her hopes of happiness and greatness.

Annexation, as far as Lamar saw it, was the worst thing for Texans’ happiness and
prosperity. It would place Texas on the periphery of a vast and extractive empire whose
center of power was located thousands of miles away and controlled by men whose
interests did not at all coincide with their own. Lamar emphasized Texans’ natural
wealth, which included “the most delightful climate and the richest soil in the world,” and
he insisted that if it remained independent, Texas would “have no rival; with the whole
world for her market.” In fact, through various ingenuity and improvement measures,
Texas might supply an “example in free trade” to other nations, “emancipating it from the
thralldom of tariff restrictions and placing it upon the high grounds of equitable
reciprocity.”
Language like this reminded Texans of precisely the frustrations with US society
and politics that had initially compelled them to leave that country for Mexico. While
Houston and the pro-annexationists had emphasized Texans’ similarities with the North,
Lamar reminded Texans of their differences. He referred to Americans as “another
people,” even “remote and uncongenial.” 553 Texans and Americans, despite their
common heritage, were not the same. Annexation, Lamar insisted, would return Texans
553
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to the same state of poverty and disempowerment that they had fled as citizens of the
North. Independence would finally give them the opportunity that they had sought in
Mexico and defended in the recent revolution. The by now decades long search for
political and economic utopia was still within reach, but only if Texans remained
independent from both the US and Mexico. Texas would not permit itself to become
some peripheral part of a vast empire – it would become one itself. 554
With the failure of annexation, Texas turned to another imperial power for
assistance and tutelage – Great Britain. In light of the geopolitical circumstances of the
1830’s and 1840’s it made perfect sense. The growing power and influence of the slave
South had made Britain nervous, and thus they had an interest in bringing Texas within
their sphere of influence. For Texans, aligning themselves with Britain permitted them to
compete with the United States, rather than become beholden to it. “We are about to
separate from our fatherland forever,” declared Lamar. “No longer with light hearts
swiftly shall we seek the old homestead – we track the broad Atlantic but it is for the
white cliffs of England.” For men like Lamar, the promise of Texas’ greatness rested in a
very different kind of relationship with the US. “We become the rivals of the United
states in the production of her great staple. [A]nd if we become a commercial people, her
rivals in everything.” 555
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Such language did not go unnoticed in the North where, as Jackson himself
observed, a Texan alliance with Great Britain could mean more than simply the loss of
the region forever. All of this was taking place at the same time that Great Britain and its
former colony were laying competing claims to the Oregon Territory. The acquisition of
both Texas and Oregon would permit Great Britain, as Jackson explained, to “form an
iron hoop around the United States, with her West India islands.” 556 In light of these
concerns, Texan annexation was all the more crucial to US security.
Indeed, Texas had its own imperial ambitions when it came to the Pacific
Northwest. In early 1840, Secretary of the Treasury Richard Dunlap reported that “The
Congress of the United States have a proposition before it, for the establishment of a
territorial Govt at the mouth of the Columbia.” He argued that this constituted a concern
for the Government of Texas, for “If this port shall pass into the possession of the United
States, it will be forever out of the reach of Texas, and will certainly circumscribe her
growing power, and cripple her means for future advancement. 557 Texan leaders also
aspired, just as they had done under Mexico, to divert trade between Santa Fé and the
Caribbean through Texas. Texans envisioned replacing the United States as Cuba’s chief
supplier of “mules, Horses, cattle, Beef, cotton Etc.” Meanwhile “the coffee, Sugar,
cigars, Tobasco fruit Etc, of Cuba” could be furnished to Texas at reduced rates.
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Rendering St. Louis all but obsolete, Texans believed that their ports would provide “a
cheaper more direct and expeditious route.” 558
But even as the newly forged nation distanced itself from the United States, it
served as a source of inspiration for certain of her citizens. “If then infatuated Fanaticks
ever drive us to separation,” wrote one admiring Southerner to Lamar shortly after his
inauguration, “I look to Texas as a Country to fall back upon, & whether a new
Confederation with the Southern States shall be effected, or not, the Southern Country
will find a powerful ally in that new, & I trust I may soon add powerful
Commonwealth.” 559 As southerners began flirting with the idea of secession, many
looked to Texas as their inspiration - A group of die-hard agrarian federalists committed
to regional sovereignty and free trade who had successfully seceded from a centralizing
republic.

Yet, before it could become an empire, Texas had to achieve some degree of
security, one of the most serious threats to which came from the United States or, more
specifically, its displaced Native Americans. During the ten years that Texas existed as
an independent nation, it faced constant incursions by Indian groups who, with little
regard for national boundaries, often crossed from the United States into Texas and
northern Mexico to conduct raids. This prompted reciprocal attacks from Texans. Thus,
almost as soon as discussions of annexation with the US ended, arguments over whose
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responsibility it was to police Texas’ borders began. Texas argued that the US still had an
obligation under an earlier treaty with Mexico to restrain Indian incursions against
them. 560
Indeed, even as they insisted that Texas was not only a viably independent nation,
but capable of expansion, Texans complained that their country was too poor and weak to
police their frontier, pressuring their leaders to appeal for US assistance. 561 In a letter to
the US Secretary of State, AP Upsher, the head of the Texas Legation to Washington DC,
Isaac Van Zandt formally requested that the US government “aid, and cooperate in every
measure necessary to control these people,” referring to its recently displaced Indians. 562

As relations with the North cooled, Texans began to turn their attention to
achieving recognition and amity from their southern neighbor. While Lamar often
receives attention for his exclusionist policies regarding Native Americans, it was during
his administration that Texas made the greatest progress towards improving its
relationship with Mexico. It did so by first turning to Britain for assistance in hashing out
a peace agreement. Bernard E. Bee, the Texan secretary of state, went to Mexico City in
a special envoy with only two provisions – sign no treaty that does not recognize the
unconditional independence of Texas, and sign no treaty that does not place the
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international border at the Rio Grande. 563 Lamar attempted to initiate diplomatic talks by
highlighting the affinity between the two nations. In a letter to the vice president,
Valentín Gómez Farías, Lamar expressed his assurance that “in you are to be found a
concentration of all those liberal principles and enlightened views which tend to the
promotion of civil and religious liberty.” Despite the two countries’ current state of
hostility, Lamar hoped that he would find a sympathetic ear in “one who has so long and
through so many trying scenes maintained the character of a consistent statesman and
devoted patriot.” 564
Because of his previous relationship with Mexican leaders, Lamar recruited
Thomas McKinney to prepare a separate letter introducing Bee to the Bustamante
administration. However, McKinney, always one for frankness and less effusive than
Lamar, took the opportunity to remind the Vice President of his true feelings regarding
Texan independence:
You well know that I opposed the declaration of independence of Texas and even
now do not have reason nor motive to change my opinion[,] but the obvious has
passed and God desires a good result from the trip of Col. Bee and that it
establishes good relations between Texas and Mexico.565

Whether or not McKinney’s letter had anything to do with the failure of Bee’s mission
we will never know. Suffice is to say that when he arrived in Mexico City, Bee met with
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an intransigent Mexican leadership that would accept nothing less than Texas’ return to
Mexico. Mexican leaders insisted that such was necessary to the continued sovereignty
and peace of their country. “General Victoria says that the acknowledgement of our
Independence is out of the question,” reported Bee, “that Zacatecas, Sonora etc would
soon be asking the same thing.” When Bee attempted to sway him by pointing to
Texans’ racial and cultural distinctiveness, he was dismissed. Instead, the General urged
“that Texas should at once propose to be reunited with Mexico,” and that she would “be
received with open arms.” When Bee brought up the two nations’ political
incompatibility because Mexico was a central government and Texas “attached to a
Federal,” the general replied that Mexico “was a Representative Republic [and] that
Texas as a Department would have a right to be represented etc etc.” When Bee brought
up the issue of slavery, Victoria replied, “that can be got over.”
For Victoria, Texans’ ethnic, cultural or even institutional differences did not
make them incompatible with the rest of Mexico. They were not even unique in their
decision to secede. Even slavery could be dealt with. As for the Texans themselves, they
pursued a somewhat inconsistent diplomacy that both highlighted their affinity with
Mexico while at the same time demanding recognition based on this affinity. Mexican
leaders must have found this confusing. Furthermore, Texans seemed to believe that
ethnic and cultural homogeneity were essential to a functional republic in a way that
Mexican leaders did not. Perhaps nothing more eloquently highlighted the difference in
these two men’s political vision than the general’s closing remarks that would have rung
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much truer to a Texan of the 1820’s than one of the 1840’s. As Bee left the meeting,
Victoria told him to remember that “Mexico is the finest country in the world; avail
yourself of its advantages, at a future day your son may be at its head.” 566
With the failure of the Texas Republic’s first formal attempt to gain recognition
from Mexico, Britain intervened in the form of Sir Richard Pakenham, the British
minister to Mexico, who saw Texas’ offer to purchase its territory from Mexico as means
to secure Mexican payment of debts owed to Britain. Lamar appointed James Treat to
issue a second offer to Mexico, but this one would entail a request for even more
territory. Treat was to insist on the same boundary line along the Rio Grande that Bee
had, but first he was to “feel” out the Mexican authorities regarding their amicability
towards a line that would extend to Paso del Norte and from there westward “to the Gulf
of California and along the southern shore of that gulf to the Pacific Ocean.” Alas,
Treat’s efforts met with no more success than Bee’s had, so that, in the words of one
scholar, by the end of 1840, “Texas had secured no definite results on the question of
extending her jurisdiction to the Rio Grande” - not from the US and not from Mexico. 567
The latter still did not even recognize Texas independence.
Some welcomed the failed negotiation as an invitation to war. “I had liked to
have said I was glad of it,” wrote one official to Lamar, “We shall be forced to treat the
recent tyrant in a Manner that will advance us in a National point of view and make us as
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a nation[,] one of the most powerful in the world eventually.” To those who shared this
view, another war with Mexico meant another opportunity for Texans to prove their
chops as a formidable new power. “My voice is for war and as Bustamante has
expressed his determination to invade us the sooner we are ready the better for our
interests,” declared Hunt. 568 The President, however, understood that his new republic
was in no condition for such a conflict and strictly forbid any official or unofficial
invasion of Mexican territory by Texan citizens. 569
Lamar also strove to remind Texans of their affinity and shared history with
Mexico, advocating peace and cooperation with a nation that many Texans had once
called home. “Adverse as I am to our protracted state of affairs with Mexico,” he
explained, “I have nevertheless thought it due to ourselves, and to the enlightened
opinions of the world, to show that we have no vindictive feelings to gratify, but are
willing to meet her in a spirit of forbearance” and “establish a basis for a future
intercourse which shall be equally beneficial to both nations.” Lamar, however,
understood the complexity of Mexican politics, and that diplomacy with the country
might require a dual approach. While Texas had failed to gain the recognition and
cooperation of Mexico City, Lamar suspected he would have better luck with the
Mexican federalists just south of his country, who were in a position to protect Texan
independence and interest. Mexico was, as Lamar observed, “divided into two parties”
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and one of these parties, “chiefly occupying the northern provinces,” had already “made
overtures to [the Texas] Government, indicating a desire to cultivate friendly relations by
establishing reciprocal trade and commerce.” 570 Lamar intended to take them up on their
offer.
Indeed, leaders of the northern states of Tamaulipas, San Luis Potosi, Zacatecas,
Jalisco, Nuevo León, Coahuila, Durango, Sinaloa, Chihuahua, New Mexico and the
Californias sought an agreement with Texas in which it would supply two thousand
troops in exchange for a formal recognition of independence from a successfully
established Republic of the Rio Grande. 571 In fact, Lamar had received a formal
correspondence from General Canales, leader of the northern federalists, just after his
election in December 1838. Canales, reporting that “On the 3rd of last month these
towns of the North declared for the Federal States. The movement has progressed very
rapidly and uninterruptedly, and I doubt not the Republic will follow it in a few days.”
Canales reported that a recent string of victories in the interior had revived the federalists.
“The cause of liberty must infallibly triumph,” he assured Lamar, and once it did “those
towns and yours will again very shortly be united in bonds of former amity.” Having
congratulated the president on such a prospect, Canales requested “protection in your
Republic, which interests (imperiously demand) that we . . . take up arms.” 572
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Texans received another appeal a few months later from one of Canales’ federalist
allies then in New Orleans. Pointing to the United States’ failure to either absorb or
defend Texas against its enemies, the author gestured to the great and necessary benefit
that Texas would gain from aligning itself with a federalist north – “those states
containing the greatest mass of the population, of the territorial riches, and of the moral,
scientific, and political abilities amongst the Mexican people.” The author credited Lamar
for having “opened a commercial intercourse” between Texas and northern Mexico, but
pointed out that the two countries “have still a common enemy to reduce.” They must,
therefore, also establish a “political intercourse” which would “cause the hordes of
Centralists, now advancing to the stroke of a whip, to fall back terrified and their
government to be struck with sudden death.” 573
But such alliances, while tempting, threatened to derail Texan negotiations with
Mexico itself. As Bee had reported from Mexico City, the recent federalist revolt was the
primary reason why Mexico refused to acknowledge Texan independence. In light of
this, Texan leaders decided that it was not in their best interest to formally align
themselves with Mexican federalists. But this was not the preferred policy of many
Texans themselves. In April of 1840, a group of citizens of western Texas wrote to the
President that they had “Resolved that such terms and conditions be authori[zed] to [be]
made with the Federal Mexicans as may secure their friendship not compromitting the
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Honour and character of the Texian Government.” 574 One gentleman writing from west
Texas echoed their sentiments, declaring that “The feeling here in regard to the Federalist
is of the kindest character: - the sympathy displayed in their cause is as warm as it is
possible for it to be.” He spoke admiringly of the federalist commander and described a
dinner that local leaders held in his honor during his recent visit. Plummer claimed that
“The crowd was so great that many of them had no room for seats,” and he assured
Lamar that “The Conduct of the President are those of a gentlemen of the highest order and his talent seems to be of the highest cast.” But Texans, of course, had more than
simply ideological kinship with Mexican federalists. In many ways, they understood
their own national security to depend upon Federalist success. Texans were as deeply
invested in the political situation in Mexico as they had always been, and, in some cases,
pleaded with their president to lift his neutrality and permit them to join their federalist
allies

Once we join the Federalist and Texas will never stand in need of hereafter
spending one dollar in fighting Mexicans.- Americans will flock there by
thousands and join the Federal Cause - We will get clear of a large number of
useless population – we can loose no wealth.- We make a warm friend of a
neighbor & you put down all Centralism in Mexico at the very first advance in the
Federal cause. 575
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Regardless, Lamar’s policy did not stop private Texas citizens from cooperating with the
federalists. But such behavior often only served to sabotage Texan diplomacy in Mexico
City, and therefore received heavy criticism from the administration which struggled to
find a way to compel its citizens to stop violating its own neutrality. “I know not how it is
that an alliance has been made between the Federals and the Texians,” wrote one member
of Bee’s envoy, “but let this be as it may, The Government of Mexico seems to be
convinced that the Government of Texas has an active part in the invasion of Mexico and
will strain every nerve to retake that colony.” 576
Texan leaders, for their part, often attempted to exploit the Mexican civil war to
their advantage wherever they could.

Insisting that they explicitly forbid, and in fact

had done a decent job of prohibiting, cooperation between their citizens and the federalist
rebels, they nonetheless employed the threat of such cooperation to gain leverage in their
negotiations with Mexico. 577 “You are no doubt aware, that repeated overtures have been
made by the Federalists of the Northern and Southern provinces of Mexico, accompanied
by the most alluring offers, to induce the people of Texas to unite with them in a war
against their Government and to make common cause in forcing an acknowledgement of
our and their Independence,” wrote one envoy to Packenham, “and you are no doubt
equally aware that all of these overtures have been rejected on the part of my
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Government.” This was done with the understanding that Mexico “would change her
policy in reference to us.” 578
Unfortunately, this had little impact on the Mexicans. Yet, Lamar would continue
trying to achieve Mexican recognition until, after three failed attempts, he finally gave
up. For Lamar, establishing peace and diplomatic relations with Mexico had been “the
polar star of all my policy” and “the great foundation of our future prosperity, wealth, &
happiness.” He termed Mexico “a country of unsurpassed, I may say unequal fertility
and beauty” and its population “hardy, enterprising and industrious.” 579 Despite
declaring official neutrality in the Mexican conflict, Lamar did take steps to open up
trade and commerce with Mexico’s northern provinces, and insisted that he remained
“assured of the acknowledgement of our independence in the event of the success of [the
Federalists].” One cabinet member declared that the president, despite his refusal to
formally declare in their favour, had always considered, “the Northern States of Mexico
as of immense importance, not only to our entire western frontier, but to the whole
country at large.” He especially looked forward to “a safe and friendly commerce with
that portion of the Mexican territory.” 580 Some have pointed to this as evidence of
Lamar’s efforts to impose Texan authority over northern Mexico. In fact, some members
of Lamar’s cabinet unabashedly looked forward to the day when Texas would absorb
much of northern Mexico. As Lamar himself put it, with such conditions achieved, the
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northern Mexican provinces “would easily be brought to form a portion of our nation, in
sentiment, in feeling, even in interest.” 581 Others agreed. “The people on Rio Grande are
much divided in opinion,” wrote one of Lamar’s advisors, “much of their patriotism is
lost” and they “think that they would live just as well under the Federal Government or
Texian as they do now under the Central Government.” 582 Ultimately, however, the
Lamar administration would determine that they did not have the resources to annex that
much territory, nor could they afford the diplomatic cost with Mexico.
The federalists, in fact, did finally manage to establish a provisional government
they named the Republic of Rio Grande. And one of their first policy decisions was to
recognize Texan independence and the Rio Grande as its formal border. Federalists also
solicited military advice from the Texans. “Whatever commands you have for our camp I
will bear with pleasure,” wrote General M.J. Carbajal in July 1840, asserting that his
“talents and good fortune” had placed the president “in a situation to immortalize your
name beyond the reach of envious and vindictive enemies, of ensuring at little cost the
prosperity and happiness of the Country over which you preside, and making to yourself
millions of admiring and grateful friends in Mexico.” 583 These men’s attitude toward
Texas should not be surprising given their own historical commitment to federalism and
current relationship with Mexico which did not differ much from Texas’ relationship with
that country just a few years prior. It is clear, in fact, from General Canales’ formal
581

Lamar, “Address at a Public Dinner,” ? 1840, LP, Vol. III, 476-480.
Wright to Bryan, 27 December 1839, DCT, Vol. II,
583
M.J. Carbajal to Lamar, 27 July 1840, LP, Vol. III, 424-25.
582

356
address to his troops in February 1840 that Mexican federalists saw their fight as part of a
much broader hemispheric struggle to preserve federalism, of which Texas was a leader.
In fact, Mexican federalists specifically referenced the young republic as a source of their
inspiration. “Citizens. The hour has struck, The most extreme of the last colonies
founded by the Spanish government have thrown down the gauntlet. The liberty and
happiness of the republic is already very near. Let a part of it organize themselves
promptly, and the others will follow your example.” 584
Given this affinity for Texas, it should not be surprising that when the federalists
faced a series of military setbacks beginning in mid-1840, they did not hesitate to appeal
to their allies in Texas for refuge. In his letter to Lamar, asking that he and his troops be
allowed to retreat to Texas, Cardenas wrote that “The government of the northern frontier
of the Mexican republic has always recognized in Texas, because of the generous conduct
and the philanthropic ideas of that government and all its inhabitants, a land of refuge in
the event of an unfortunate occurrence.” But it was not just a place to rest and recuperate
that Cardenas asked for. He requested “the establishment of peace and commercial
relations” between the two countries “in order that this government may rescue the war
against the government of Mexico.” In so doing, he specifically referenced “the
sympathies which unite this country and yours,” and “similarity of the cause which both
sustain.” 585 Cardenas’ overtures were warmly welcomed by Lamar and his advisors, one
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of whom described the general as “a gentleman of high intelligence and character,”
whose “generous & liberal conduct towards our frontier citizens & traders will entitle
him to your friendly attention.” 586 At the end of his stay, Cardenas warmly thanked the
President for his gracious hospitality and warm support, and assured him that the “high
favours” he and his men had received “shall never be effaced from the hearts of the
Mexicans of the Frontier of the North.” 587
***
The Lower Rio Grande was not the only part of Mexico that the Lamar
administration had its eyes on. In February of 1840, the president received a letter from
his secret envoy in Mexico, James Treat, regarding the federalist movement in the
southern province of Yucatán. He reported that “the revolution that has been on foot
therefore some time is making serious headway, and it is feared the whole department
may concur in the grito for federation.” While Treat regretted the news, stating that it
would only render the Mexican government “more timid” and less willing to recognize
Texas, Lamar and his administration saw a golden opportunity. 588
A few months later the Morning Star reported on the fall of Campeche, “the last
hold of the centralists, in the Yucatan” and stated that the event “may be regarded as the
first step in a political movement that is destined to revolutionize” the country. “The
population in Yucatan are, from all accounts, the proper ingredients to constitute a
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republic,” the author asserted, “They are a people of simple and laborious habits addicted
to the pursuits of industry and much better educated and informed on political subjects
than the great mass of the Mexicans.” Chief among the province’s most admirable
qualities, was its dedication to a standing militia. “The utmost jealousy is manifested
against military power and sacerdotal influence. Standing armies are repudiated as
dangerous to freedom. Every citizen is required to bear arms.” It was this, according to
The Star that “will deliver Yucatan from a power that now holds the rest of Mexico in
chains.” 589 Upon news several months later that Yucatán had joined with Tobasco and
Compeche to form an independent confederation, Lamar determined that Texas “should
ascertain the position which they [the newly confederated yucatecanos] intended to
occupy towards us.” He assured the Senate that “we have reasons to be gratified with the
spirit that prevailed among the public authorities of these provinces, as well as among the
people, in favour of our Independence, which they were ready to acknowledge so soon as
their own should be established.” 590
Throughout 1840, Texas took proactive steps to establish friendly relations with
Mexican federalists, even going so far as to appoint an envoy to Yucatán to this end. In
July of 1841 Lamar wrote a formal letter to the Governor stating that

It has been my earnest desire to establish with the States of Yucatan, Tobasco and
such others as may throw off the Yoke of Central Despotism in mexico, relations
of amity and friendship, and to show the disposition of this Government to
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reciprocate in the fullest manner, every evidence of good will manifested by the
Federalists of Mexico towards this country, I hereby have the pleasure of
declaring to you and of making known to your Citizens, that the Ports of texas are
open to the vessels and Commerce of Yucatan upon the same terms as we extend
to the most favoured nations. 591
The governor welcomed Lamar’s overtures and replied that “Yucatan desires to extend its
relations with the people of texas, and to unite with them to sustain the cause of liberty
that they have proclaimed in contrast to the oppressive government of Mexico.” 592 The
two nations soon drafted a treaty in which Texas agreed to supply Yucatán with $8,000 to
fund their continuing fight aginst Mexico City.
But it was the large swath of unincorporated territory to its west over which Texas
was most intent on asserting its claims. New Mexico and its chief town of Santa Fé had
rested on the very edge of the Spanish Empire and later Mexican Republic for
generations. Its inhabitants traded mostly with the United States and often struggled to
survive amidst Indian incursions. The Lamar administration knew that Texas could not
very well embark on a mission of territorial expansion without first successfully
establishing its jurisdiction over territory already claimed. It was in his annual message
of 1839 that Lamar first expressed his interest in establishing “a correspondence and
intercourse with the people of Santa Fe.” 593 In fact, Austin himself had envisioned
diverting trade from Santa Fé to Galveston as early as 1829, and in 1837 George S. Park,
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a Texan who had been kidnapped by the Comanches before escaping to Santa Fé, wrote
that if the trade from there would go through Texas it would bring thousands of dollars in
silver, allowing the young republic to secure “that important position in the interior of
North America – that key which will unlock that enterprise of North Americans[,] the
valuable country of California on the shores of the Pacific.” 594
Lamar insisted that the people of Santa Fé were effectively citizens of Texas who
had not yet had the opportunity to establish an appropriate relationship with their
government, “and it is believed by those best acquainted with their character and habits,
that it is only necessary that they should be correctly informed of the nature of our
government, and of its free and liberal institutions.” Not only was Santa Fé technically
part of Texas, argued Lamar, but its chief cultural and commercial ties had always been
with the North. “Though Mexican in their origin and language,” they had enjoyed a
“long intercommunion and trade with the western portions of the United States” and had
thus “lost many of their natural prejudices against strangers, and if not already prepared
to identify their fortunes with ours, would, it is thought, readily become so.” All they had
to do was educate the nuevomexicanos on the virtues of Texan government. 595
This would be easy, since politically, too, they had more in common with Texas
than with Mexico City, whose longstanding neglect had rendered their region
impoverished, underdeveloped and vulnerable. “That their predilections are not in favour
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of the present Government of Mexico is certain,” claimed Lamar, “and that they are
attached to the principles which gave rise to our revolution is equally so.” 596 Given the
current political climate in Mexico and the attempts of adjacent Mexican provinces to
break away and establish ties with Texas, Lamar was not delusional in expecting that the
inhabitants of Santa Fé would allow Texas to absorb them. Furthermore, simple
geography, Lamar believed, would be inducement enough. “The immense difference in
the distance between the trading points of the two countries would alone secure to this.”
Indeed, “the inducements for bringing it here will be too powerful to be resisted by any
which can be offered elsewhere.” 597
Texas would in fact attempt three times to convince the people of Santa Fé to
accept their authority. The first attempt occurred in late 1838, at the peak of Texan
nationalism. Reporting on the cavalcade’s departure from San Antonio, The Weekly
Houston Telegraph described how “[T]he banner of the Single Star was unfurled, and
spreading its glorious folds to the breeze, seemed to shine forth and the harbinger of
brighter days.” A gentleman witness stated that “it was one of the proudest spectacles
that he had ever beheld” and The Telegraph predicted that “ere long we trust the terrible
din of their rifles will burst like a thunder bolt upon the terrified earls of Armijo and his
minions.” 598
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But this was not to be. The New Mexicans rebuffed the Texans twice. Despite
their frustrations with Mexico City, they did not wish to join a young, fragile and
increasingly Anglo-dominated republic that would almost certainly fare no better than
Mexico did at protecting its people. Lamar’s third and final attempt would employ the
assistance of José Antonio Navarro, the son of a well-established tejano federalist family
who had fought in the revolution and played a significant role in the establishment of the
republic.
Indeed, the expedition provided Mexicans in Texas with a crucial opportunity to
prove their patriotism and loyalty to a nation that, despite their sacrifice in its war for
independence, treated them with suspicion and contempt. The ominous presence of
Mexican troops just across the Rio Grande, Mexico’s steadfast refusal to acknowledge
Texan independence, and the fact that most Anglo-Texans by this point had little or no
prior experience with or relationship to the tejano community, all contributed to growing
suspicion of their new neighbors. Tejanos, in some cases, were even suspected of being
spies for the Mexican government, prompting some frontier residents to advocate a
“vigilant scrutiny by the citizens [of Texas] into the character and habits of all resident
and transient Mexicans.” Although the writer admitted that these “disguised Mexicans”
no doubt enjoyed the cooperation of similarly “disguised Americans,” he wrote that “Of
the latter I am glad to believe there are but few.” 599
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Bexarenos, whom the Anglo-Texan community had once trusted and respected as
their political allies and brokers, now rested in a precarious position. They found little
immediate relief in Houston whose answer to their perceived threat was to order San
Antonio evacuated and destroyed. This prompted alcalde Nicolás Flores to issue an
impassioned plea to Juan Seguín in which he declared that “The resulting evil is almost
the same as taking their lives.” 600 The latter swayed the captain who, the following day,
“determined to totally suspend execution” of the order and ultimately convinced Houston
to spare the town. 601 Established and well connected as they were, Seguín and other
tejano elites assumed critical roles as “cultural brokers” between tejanos and the Anglodominated government, advocating for their communities and vouching for the character
and integrity of other tejanos. 602
But growing language and cultural barriers made this role increasingly difficult.
As early as September 1836, John A Wharton, then acting Secretary of War, directed
Seguín, who spoke little English, to begin writing all of his reports in that language
instead of his native Spanish. 603 Language barriers and a lack of familiarity with USderived laws posed a formidable problem for tejanos after independence, and scholars
have observed that this made them the victims of fraud and manipulation, especially
when it came to land purchases and inheritance. “My constituents have, as yet, not seen a
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single law translated and printed; neither do we know when we shall receive them,”
Seguín stated in a formal address to the Senate in 1840. “[T]he dearest rights of my
constituents as Mexico-Texans are guaranteed by the Constitution and the Laws of the
Republic of Texas; and at the formation of the social compact between the Mexicans and
the Texans, they had rights guaranteed to them.” He reminded Texan leaders that “The
Mexico-Texians are among the first who sacrificed their all in our glorious Revolution,
and the disasters of war weighed heavy upon them, to achieve those blessings which, it
appears, they are destined to be the last to enjoy.” 604
However, as at least one historian has observed, Lamar, “understood that the
involvement of tejanos in the [Santa Fé] expedition was crucial, as they would be able to
identify more readily with nuevomexicanos.” 605 To this end, he managed to recruit José
Antonio Navarro to head the expedition. Navarro was ordered to read to the citizens of
Santa Fé a formal address from President Lamar himself: “[The Texas] Government reclaims jurisdiction of the territory in which you now live and it offers you the protection
and advantages that the Government of Mexico can never extend.” Lamar admitted that
it was “not so long ago” that Mexico had inspired trust in all those allied to liberty,”
promising to “evolve brilliantly among the civilized nations.” But “what a deceptive hope
it turned out to be,” he declared. Meanwhile Texas, “with the innate vigor of a Hercules,
rose from its very birth, invincible, and you see now how well established it is, secure
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and impervious.” Lamar assured his audience that “The day is not far when you will see
it become the richest, most powerful nation in America.” His decision to choose a
Mexican Texan to deliver the address, reinforced his promise that nuevomexicanos had
nothing to fear in joining a country now dominated by people from another country.
“Take a look at our Constitution and our laws, under which now live a large number of
Mexican-Texans, who are your brothers, having blood, language and religion in common
with you.” 606 Lamar of course failed to mention that in joining Texas, the people of
Santa Fé would be attaching themselves to a government that was even less effectual than
Mexico’s, he wrote, especially when it came to protecting the rights of ethnic Mexicans.
Regardless, Navarro never got a chance to deliver his message. The men were ill
prepared for the trek, having failed to pack enough food and other provisions, and soon
succumbed to hunger and exhaustion. Receiving news ahead of time that the Texans
were on their way, the Mexican commissioner detached a portion if his army who
encountered the men unprepared for a fight, arrested them and sent them on a long,
arduous, and for many, deadly march to Mexico City. Lamar’s failed effort to extend
Texan jurisdiction westward might be dismissed as little more than unchecked hubris and
at worst desperation. Yet, given what was happening in other parts of Mexico at the
time, it is easy to see why Lamar and his supporters believed they would be successful.
The Texans and their revolution had in fact inspired a series of similar secessionist
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attempts throughout Mexico. But just because Mexicans admired Texas, and in many
cases hoped to imitate its success, this did not mean they wished to become a part of it.
Although a massive administrative failure, the Santa Fé Expedition was premised
on the notion that Texas could nevertheless become a vibrant, multi-ethnic empire that
protected and served the interests of Mexicans as well as Anglos. But its failure, as
Andrés Reséndez observes, “exoticized Mexicans, hereafter associating their character
with treachery, cruelty, and servility.” 607 This is not to say, however, that Texans were
prepared to embrace Houston’s vision of a smaller, more homogenous republic.

As

dismal as the Lamar administration’s expansionist efforts had been, Texans were
reluctant to let go of the hope that their fledgling republic might one day dominate much
of North America. At the very least, Lamar had compelled Texans to take their
independence seriously.

By the end of his term, Texas was a different place than it had

been when it first entered independence. Indeed, shortly after the expedition, Congress, in
reaction to the injustices suffered by the captives of the Santa Fé expedition, attempted to
pass a bill pushing the boundaries of Texas past its southwestern border with Mexico to
absorb California, New Mexico, Chihuahua, Sonora and parts of various other northern
provinces.
Houston promptly vetoed it, arguing that it would appear curious “that a people
destitute of means to meet their most pressing wants should assume to govern a country
possessing a population of more than thirty-one million.” In addition to refusing to
607
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entertain Texans’ imperial ambitions, Houston also withdrew support for Mexican
federalists.
Yet, while Houston continued to pursue annexation, he did so in a much more
strategic way than he had during his first presidency. If there was one aspect of Lamar’s
presidency that did carry over to Houston’s second, it was the tendency to take Texan
independence seriously. Texans by now had a much better sense of what their national
interests were and how best to purse them. Attachment to the United States was only
desirable if that country could sufficiently serve and protect them. They also had an
astute awareness of what would be the cost of failed negotiations. If Texas forewent
negotiations with Mexico to pursue annexation to the US to no end, Texas would be left
in perhaps an even worse posture than it had been originally. “[I]t would not be politic to
abandon the expectations which now exist of a speedy settlement of our difficulties with
Mexico, through the good offices of other powers for the very uncertain prospect of
annexation to the United States,” wrote Secretary of State, Anson Jones. 608 Thus,
Houston would not pursue annexation until he was certain of the United States’ earnest
desire to absorb Texas.
But with the way things were going in the North, he might not have to wait for
long. By the time the Tyler administration re-opened the question of annexation in 1843,
Texas was, in the words of one scholar, emerging as “the most critical front in the AngloAmerican cold war over slavery.” Increasingly internationally-minded Southern leaders,
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intent on expanding and strengthening their institution abroad, saw in Texas a critical ally
and one that shared a strategic border with the United States no less. As such, many
Southern leaders believed that the young republic required US support and protection, if
not absorption. They were particularly concerned about the British influence in Texas.
If the young republic were forced to turn to England, it might have to abolish slavery,
placing the institution in a more precarious position internationally. As Matthew Karp
explains, Southerners feared an “Anglo-Mexican chain” choking the Mississippi Valley
and Lower South. 609
Yet annexation no longer held the appeal for Texans themselves that it had in
1836. Most Texans may have abandoned their imperial dream, but they had not
necessarily abandoned the belief that independence, no matter how vulnerable it made
them, was less preferable to annexation. Whereas their initial vote might have been
unanimous, by 1843, the Texans were largely split over the question of annexation. “The
editors of the Civilian and the Planter differ very much in their opinions relative to the
desire of the people of Texas for annexation,” reported the Telegraph. The former
reporting that the majority opposed annexation and the latter reporting that they
supported it. 610
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This would remain the case for the next year and half as Houston, following his
reelection, recommenced negotiations with the North. Again, the nation’s press reported
conflicting opinions. Those in favor of joining the US, pointed to the shared economic
benefit and the fact that it would fulfill the founders’ hope of a united Anglo confederacy.
Reflecting the Manifest Destiny notion then gaining prominence in the North, one author
wrote that “The framers of the Constitution [had] signified their desire that the whole
Anglo-American settlements and colonies should at some future day become a part of the
future confederacy.” In a manner that completely disregarded Texas’ Mexican origins,
the author continued, “Why then should Texas, which is the offspring of Anglo American
States, be excluded?”611 Yet eight months later, the same publication seemed content to
accept permanent independence if Texas was again rebuffed by the US. “We concur in
the sentiment expressed in the Times that, on failure of Annexation, our best destiny will
be to continue as we now are, dependent only on our own resources.” 612
Indeed, as he reopened negotiations with the United States, Houston was
determined to play his cards differently. Rather than abandoning talks with Mexico to
pursue negotiations with the US, he embarked on a policy of dual diplomacy, choosing to
solicit US protection and annexation, while at the same time attempting to achieve
Mexican recognition. In a letter to the US Secretary of State, Houston assured him that
“Texas can become sovereign and independent, founded upon her own incalculable
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advantages of situation, and sustained by European influences without the slightest
compromital to her nationality.” In fact, Houston claimed, “every day which passes only
convinces me more clearly that it is the last effort at Annexation that Texas will ever
make.” 613 And he did not hesitate to remind the United States that Texas had other
offers. “Texas alone can well be sustained,” Houston assured Van Zandt, “and no matter
what sincere desire we may well have entertained for a connection with the Govt, and the
affectionate enthusiasm that has existed in us towards it, we will be compelled to
reconcile ourself to our present condition, or to assume such attitude toward other
countries, as will certainly look to our Independence.

614

Texas was unwilling to re-open negotiations with the US without further
assurance that it would be successful. Furthermore, the United States would need to first
prove itself capable of protecting Texas. As Jones put it, “The subject of most pressing
and immediate importance, is that of the aid and protection to be rendered this country by
the United States in the event of a resumption of active hostilities by Mexico.” If the
government of the United States was unwilling or unable “to fulfill all of those pledges in
the most ample manner and to protect us both by sea and land,” it would “of course have
a very considerable influence in determining the future policy of Texas in reference to
annexation.” 615
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***
In the meantime, Texas continued negotiations with Mexico which, if successful,
might render the need for annexation obsolete. Acting on information from the chargé de
affairs in London that the British were hatching a plan to abolish slavery in Texas, the
Tyler administration jumped into action. Andrew Jackson re-entered the debate from his
home at the Hermitage. “Great Britain enters into an alliance with Texas - looking
forward to war with us,” he asserted, hypothecating that the British would use Texas as a
base from which to launch an invasion of the United States. He predicted as many as
twenty or thirty thousands troops who, “when furnished with all supplies, and equit for
active service” would cross into the US and excite “the negroes to insurrection.”
Meanwhile, Britain would dispatch “an army from canady along our western frontier to
cooperate with the army from texas.” Only US acquisition of Texas could prevent such a
horror from occurring, he insisted. Texas “Settled to the Rio grande and up to our
southern boundary and along that to the pacific,” would make the United States,
according to Jackson, “invulnerable from a combination of the whole European world
against us.” 616
As southern leaders scrambled to come up with a scheme to keep Texas out of the
ominous British sphere of influence, Texans themselves moved forward on all fronts. In
January 1844, Houston dispatched Samuel May Williams and George W. Hockley to
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Mexico to meet with Santa Anna. Houston chose them, presumably, because of their
preceding relationship with the Mexican federalist government. But Houston made it
clear that he had to formally approve any agreement reached between the Legation and
the Mexicans before it could be considered legitimate. They agreed to the mission, but
only if Houston halted negotiations with the United States first, arguing that it was
disingenuous to pursue both, and that if Mexico found out it would “at once terminate the
armistice, halt official negotiations for peace and again threaten or commence.” 617
But Houston ignored this advice, and as the two attempted to hash out a treaty
with Mexico that would secure peace for Texas, he continued to court annexationists in
the North. In April 1844, Houston assured the US Congress “that should the annexation
be consummated, the same will receive the hearty and full concurrence of the people of
Texas.” Yet, he warned them that this was their last chance, and that “be the decision
whatever it may,” it would “forever decide the question of annexation – a question, the
continued agitation of which has prevented [the Texas] government from pursuing
vigorously any other policy.” This last part, of course, was not really true since, at that
very moment, Texan representatives were meeting with Mexican authorities near the
Sabine. 618
What exactly happened during the Legation is unknown, but the result was
something that few in Texas were willing to accept. Williams and Hockley returned from
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the Sabine and placed in Houston’s hands a document that effectively re-established
Texas as a “department” of Mexico. Not surprisingly, Houston swiftly rejected it. The
Texan Democrat, while agreeing that the commissioners “had not authority to
compromise the integrity of our territorial limits,” speculated that the Mexican
authorities, becoming aware of Texas’ negotiations with the US, “withdrew their original
draft as proposed,” and substituted it with one “which regards Texas as a Department of
Mexico.” But why would Williams and Hockley sign such a document? The newspaper
speculated that “Perhaps they preferred independence to annexation.” It is entirely likely
that the men, both early settlers who perhaps knew that Texas could not stand on its own,
would have preferred to see it return to Mexico than the United States. “[A]nd if they
did[,] it must have been a matter of sore disappointment to them to see it snatched from
their grasp” by such “desperate folly” on the part of Congress, wrote the Democrat, in
reference to the annexation agreement. 619 Williams himself would write years later that
they were “required to exert themselves to produce a cessation of hostilities with a hope
that future negotiation” might produce a more favorable agreement. He criticized
Houston for at that time entering into negotiations with the United States for annexation,
stating that “it produced a very hostile feeling in Mexico towards Texas” and “the
commissioners were looked upon as endeavoring to further the negotiations by
entrapping Mexico into an armistice.” 620
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But Houston agreed with the Democrat’s conclusion. In a correspondence with
Anson Jones, he speculated that theirs was a calculated move intended to sabotage
negotiations with the US. Houston explained that “in exceeding their powers and
acknowledging Texas to be a ‘Department of Mexico,’ they committed a serious and
double error, which was well calculated to do us great harm.” 621Alas, Houston made it
clear that no such arrangement would ever result. In his final correspondence with
Mexican authorities, he wrote that the president’s decision to designate Texas “a
department of the Mexican Confederacy” was “highly obnoxious” and consequently
would not receive his approval. 622 The only nation that Houston would even consider
annexing Texas to was the United States, and to this end he had been working even as the
commissioners were meeting with the Mexicans.
But the ultimate offer from the United States was not to his or most Texans’
liking. While the language of the treaty emphasized the mutuality of such an
arrangement by stating that it would provide for Texans’ “security and prosperity,” it
nonetheless insisted that they enter the US as a territory. 623 Such language was
unpalatable to a people who had dedicated their new republic and, in many cases their
lives, to securing regional sovereignty. To return to the United States as a territory felt
like a precise reversal of all that they had worked so hard to achieve over the past two
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decades. Furthermore, some Texans who had once supported annexation, were by now
used to thinking of themselves as an independent people who might even one day rise to
hemispheric dominance. “[A]s to the United States as a government – we had ceased to
make explication to her and were growing indifferent when she came around to the
proposition of annexation,” wrote one immigrant. 624 If Texas was going to be annexed to
the US, it was going to have to be that country, not Texas, that did the soliciting – only
then could Texans be virtually assured of the future success of their negotiations. This
attitude even extended to Houston who decided to adopt a much coyer stance to the
annexation question. “They are too well acquainted with the history of our origin and
progress,” he said of the United States,

to suppose, for an instant, that we would, under any circumstances, surrender one
jot or tittle of that liberty and right to self-government which we achieved in the
sanguinary conflicts of our revolution, or give up a single privilege secured to us
by our laws and constitution. They do not ask it – they do not expect it – we
would not give it.

Houston reminded his audience that he had similarly rejected the previous year’s treaty
with Mexico “disregarding as it did every ordinary courtesy, even between beligerance,
and descending into the vilest and most unmerited abuse of the people of Texas.”
Houston echoed the sentiments of Lamar and the many Texans who had by now begun to
question whether or not Texas needed to attach itself to any country at all. “Our Indian
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affairs are in as good condition as the most sanguine would reasonably have anticipated,”
he asserted, “completely pacified and in regular friendly intercourse with our friendly
trading establishments.” Houston did not deny that disorder still existed on the frontier.
“[T]here are among the Indians, as among our own people, individuals who will
disregard all law and commit excesses of the most flagrant character,” but, he insisted,
they constituted only “a few desperados and renegades.” Whatever challenges of
governance Texas was facing, they were hardly unique and might not be remedied by
annexation to any country. “Other governments of far superior resources for imposing
restraints upon the wild men of the forests and prairies, have not been exempt from the
infraction of treaties and the occasional commission of the acts of rapine and bloodshed.”
As for the finances of the country, Houston insisted they were “in the most healthy and
prosperous condition.” 625
He made it clear, that Texas’ policy for the next year would be to move forward
as if independence was permanent. If the United States wanted to annex the country, it
would have to court them. The sincerity of Houston’s remarks, however, are debatable.
Some historians have suggested that it was mere coyness on Houston’s part, pointing out
that, while he might have spoken optimistically about an independent Texas, the fact that
he continued to negotiate with the US means that he never really took it seriously.
Campbell’s suggestion that Houston played the United States and Great Britain off each
other, reminding each nation of the other’s continued interest in Texas was his way of
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achieving his ultimate goal of annexation to the United States on desirable terms. 626
Houston’s suggestion of annexing California, New Mexico, and Oregon can also be seen
as a means of goading United States expansionists by threatening to absorb those regions
before they could. Yet, many Texan leaders did in fact oppose annexation. If nothing
else, Houston’s seemingly dual diplomacy evinced a growing rift in Texas politics
between those who supported joining the United States and those who wanted Texas to
remain an independent republic or even, ultimately, an empire of its own.

***
One such individual was Houston’s Secretary of State and fourth president of the
republic, Anson Jones. Jones had been an early supporter of independence when he
served as representative to the United States during its first failed attempt at annexation.
But by now he was more realistic about his country’s ability to sustain itself as an
independent nation. By the time Jones came into office, Texas had attempted for nine
years to establish a viable domestic economy, secure its borders, and achieve peace with
its Mexican and Indian neighbors. Even so, Texan annexation to the United States was
still not a foregone conclusion.
Yet, many Texans, especially tejanos, believed that a peaceful treaty with Mexico
was still well within reach. Seguín acknowledged the inherent desire to keep Texas
independent, but he also felt that if Texas was going to be absorbed by another country,
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better Mexico. “I know that the true happiness of Texas, according to the general
direction its question has taken, consists in preserving its independence from any power
other than Mexico.” Seguín, having spent some time in Mexico since Houston’s
rejection of the last treaty, insisted that the country now “understands that it behooves it
to avoid a war that would bring upon itself great devastation,” and that it had “therefore,
resolved to recognize the independence of Texas by way of treaties to which (As you
may know) England and France have offered themselves as guarantors.” With the treaty
of annexation to the US now dead, Seguín encouraged Jones to give Mexico another go.
“So fortunately, if it sends its commissioners with its proposals to this government, I am
sure that they would be heard, and our difficulties would be over in a manner greatly
beneficial to both countries.” 627 Opposed to annexation himself, but knowing that it was
popular among Texan voters, Jones was faced with the difficult task of trying to prevent
annexation without looking like that was what he was doing. 628
He received help from Great Britain which, not wanting to see Texas return to
Mexico, attempted one last time to draft just such a treaty in May 1845. The treaty not
only recognized, but stipulated that Texas remain independent and that she was “not to
annex herself or become subject to any country whatever” though it also stated that she
“remit disputed points respecting territory, and other matters, to the arbitration of
umpires.” It is unclear as to why exactly this treaty was never accepted or enforced.
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Perhaps Seguín was mistaken and Mexico was not ready to accept Texan independence.
What is more likely is that Jones, knowing how popular annexation was among Texans,
felt that it was his duty to at least pursue it one last time before accepting such an offer
from Mexico. Acknowledging that Texans’ once “fond hope” of annexation to the US
had been “checked and deferred,” he admitted that such an arrangement, “effected upon a
proper basis” and ensuring “mutually and reciprocally to the benefit of both countries,
will ensure to Mr. Tyler the lasting gratitude of the people of Texas.” However, Jones
warned that, “Should the present session of the Federal Congress pass by without fixing
upon some definite, tangible and eligible mode for carrying into effect the projected
scheme of annexation,” it was “highly probable” that Texans “would feel compelled to
consider their connexion with the measure dissolved.” 629
The United States would not only agree to annex Texas but it agreed to virtually
all of its provisions, namely that “the territory properly included within, and rightfully
belonging to the Republic of Texas, may be erected into a new State,” with all rights and
privileges as such. Yet, there was also a peculiar additive. Texans could either remain a
part of a single state or break up into smaller states if they chose and had sufficient
population. This was an agreement that both appealed to the desires of most Texans’
commitment to local autonomy and was designed to appease reluctant anti-slavery
legislatures who had steadfastly opposed Texan annexation for fear that it would enhance
the pro-slavery lobby. The treaty continued that “such states as may be formed” out of
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the portion of territory lying south of the Missouri Compromise “shall be admitted into
the Union with or without slavery, as the people of each state asking admission may
desire.” 630 Despite it being a compromise, these were terms that most Texans could
accept. Yet, the legation that had helped hash out the agreement, reminded the United
States Congress that annexation remained not yet a foregone conclusion, for only the
people possessed “the right to abolish our form of government and erect another in its
stead.” Thus, “Texas maintains her independence and separate attitude, and will continue
to do so until the final consummation of the measure of annexation.” 631 Legislatures were
sternly reminded that they were still dealing with an independent nation. Furthermore,
this was not the only option Texans were entertaining. They by now had two offers on
the table - recognition from Mexico on the condition that Texas never annex itself to the
United States, or annexation to that country on terms that honored Texans’ federalists
impulses. Jones decided to submit the decision to Congress, which unanimously
accepted the latter. Jones’ biographer, however, insists that the Senate voted this way
because it was “too afraid of the people.” 632
Whether this is true or not, we can conclude that Texas joined the US against the
wishes of Great Britain, Mexico, and many of its own most prominent citizens. One such
individual was Guy M. Bryan, the nephew of the late Father of Texas, who later wrote
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that he and many others wept “at the sad feeling of the death of the republic, to which, for
so many years, our hearts clung.” 633
Furthermore, the domestic and foreign fissures that emerged around the
annexation debate would only get worse. Indeed, when Tyler ordered Texas to recall its
foreign minister following the placement of federal troops along the Rio Grande, insisting
that Texas had by that point “become in fact, if not in form, one of our States,” 634 Texans
swiftly reminded him that “During these proceedings past[,] present and to come, Texas
maintains here independent and separate attitude and will continue to do so until the final
consummation of the measure of annexation.” The United States may have “sent a
portion of its army into that country[,] but it was by invitation of the representatives of
the owners of the soil[,] the people of Texas.” The annexation of Texas would usher in a
new era for both that country and the United States, but in many ways, its new
relationship would be no more seamless than the long road to annexation had been.
Texan rights, and indeed the sovereignty of all southern rights, would be a source of
considerable debate in the years to come. For now, the Texan representative was content
to remind his new overseer that Texan sovereignty would never be lost, “it will only flow
in a different channel.” 635
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CHAPTER 7
“We Are Not Yet What We Ought To Be”
Statehood, Secession and America’s “Adopted War”
1845-1861

On February 28, 1845 John Quincy Adams recorded in his journal that “the
heaviest calamity that ever befell myself and my country was this day consummated.”
He was referring to the passage of a Senate resolution to adopt Texas as a state of the
Union. Despite the fact that over forty years prior he had gleefully predicted the day
when the citizens of his young nation would spread across the entire hemisphere, Adams
bemoaned the recent acquisition of Texas as “a signal triumph of the slave
representation” and an “apoplexy of the Constitution.” 636 Indeed, by 1840, western
expansion had taken on a decidedly sectional character as the slave South desperately
attempted to acquire new territory with which to perpetuate its peculiar institution and
strengthen its political standing. Northern Whigs, however, saw western expansion as
anathema to building national cohesion and authority. Abolitionists like Adams knew
that the survival of slavery depended on such expansion. Almost no issue fueled this
debate more than the question of whether or not to annex Texas to the United States. The
strongest opposition to secession came from the anti-slavery lobby of which Adams was
a member, and who saw the potential acquisition of such a large slave state as a massive
setback. But the fear that Texas would align itself with Britain and cut off North
636

John Adams, Diary of John Quincy Adams, 1794-1845, Allen Nevins ed., (New York: Longman’s
Green, and Co., 1929), 574.

383
American access to the Pacific was real enough to keep the annexation debate alive, and
fuel a rising tide of sectionalism. 637
David M. Potter has written that the 1840’s represented a high-point of national
unity, a period when the United States “showed a considerable degree of homogeneity
and cohesion.” But this could be illusory when it came to Texas, where a strong tradition
of localism and hostility to the North seethed under a nationalistic veneer. The
absorption of Texas would spark an intense debate in Congress over the appropriate size
and extent of a republic and whether or not it should permit slavery to extend into newly
acquired territory. In fact, the slavery debate often manifested in the question of
territorial expansion throughout the 1840’s, so much so that, in 1843, Adams even
threatened northern secession if Texas were annexed. The following year, John C.
Calhoun threatened southern secession if it were not. 638
The debate came to a head in the 1844 presidential campaign between Henry Clay
and James K. Polk, a die-hard southern expansionist who campaigned on a promise to
“re-annex” Texas and “re-occupy” Oregon. Polk won in large part due to the fervor of
pro-expansionist public sentiment then sweeping the nation, and shortly thereafter
Congress voted to annex Texas. Sam Houston was one of two gentlemen elected to
represent Texas in the House, and during his tenure there - which lasted until his seceded
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from the Union in 1861 - he not only remained a staunch unionist, but he presented a
biased and often inaccurate perspective of his state, its history and people.
Houston represented Texas’ “return” to the US as basically inevitable due to the
two countries’ shared racial and political heritage. He roundly dismissed early Texans’
relationship with Mexico as eternally fraught due to cultural incompatibility and Mexican
political incompetence. But Houston also proffered a strong narrative of Texan
exceptionalism, arguing that his state served a crucial role as the United States’ gateway
to the West and beacon of unadulterated republicanism. Houston became one of the
strongest advocates of US acquisition of Mexican land, effectively transferring Texas’
territorial ambitions to the United States. Having twice served as the president of Texas,
Houston knew better than anyone that Texas needed a strong central government and
infrastructure. However, his pro-annexationist, pro-unionist, anti-Mexican positions were
not universal, although they may have been popular during the brief time that Texas was
a US state, just before the Civil War. In many ways, this period represented more of a
blip in the long history of Texas where localism and states’ rights almost always trumped
nationalism and federal consensus. Texas’ secession from the US, compelled by many of
the same motivations that had prompted it to secede from Mexico, was far more
predictable than its annexation. And at the very moment that the United States appeared
strongest, it was in fact paving the path for its own destruction.
***

385
Texas annexation and its attendant wave of US expansionism was central to
Polk’s election, and the ultimate dream of spreading US dominion to the Pacific was a
capstone of his campaign and presidency. Polk’s first earnest efforts towards this end
happened in November 1846 when he dispatched John Slidell on a diplomatic mission to
renew relations with Mexico, in the words of one historian, “under the assumption that
the annexation of Texas was a fait accompli.” The chief aim of Slidell’s mission was to
convince the Mexicans to sell California and New Mexico to the United States for a price
to which both nations could agree. Mexico rebuffed the offer. Having failed
diplomatically, Polk determined to succeed militarily. He ordered US troops to occupy
several points along the still contested territory of the Rio Grande, setting the stage for
what many in the United States would call a clear act of provocation. When a minor
disagreement with Mexican troops resulted in a skirmish, Polk declared immediate war
on Mexico. American troops rapidly advanced across a region long weakened by Indian
raids and political rebellion. It took American forces only ten months to seize control
from Matamoros to San Francisco, and as far south as Saltillo. Assuming that the
Mexicans could now be convinced to surrender the territory for a “generous” cash
payment, he offered such. When Mexican leaders refused, Polk ordered American troops
to advance all the way to Mexico City. 639
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David Pletcher has claimed that seizing California was Polk’s primary objective
in inciting the war with Mexico. 640 But it would not have been possible without the
annexation of Texas, and Texas never could have waged such an assault on Mexico by
itself. Thus, as the war progressed, many in the South began to question, as Adams had,
the wisdom of annexing a region that Mexico still considered theirs. It was Houston’s
job to allay such fears. At a speech at Tammany Hall during the height of the war, he
assured a skeptical audience that, whatever they thought of the ensuing conflict, the
benefit to the United States was well worth it. Annexation had helped the US even more
than it had Texas. “[T]he best of the bargain was yours.” He, in fact, insisted that “you
ought to be satisfied,” not only “in the extent and richness of soil” but “in the blessings of
those institutions we possessed.” Houston claimed Texas as the beacon of unadulterated
American democracy – more American than America itself and a true testing ground of
the United States’ most cherished institutions and values. Texans, according to Houston,
“had nothing to learn.” 641
Houston contributed in no small way to the burgeoning “Texas Creation Myth”
that, as historian Brian DeLay writes, provided “a historical precedent for the belief that
Anglo-Americans could do what Mexicans could not.” 642
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conquering and subduing their Indian population, as DeLay points out, but protecting and
extending republican democracy. Mexico, instead of the political Promised Land that it
had once been, became, in the eyes of many Americans, a political failure, and the United
States its savior. The Texas Revolution, therefore, was re-cast as a conflict between
noble-minded democrats and a despotic and racist regime: “The object of Mexico, in her
system of despotism and oppression exercised against us, was, if possible to sweep us
from the soil, to annihilate the whole race of us, and not to suffer one, of the Saxon blood
to leave the impress of his foot upon the soil which we inhabited.” Houston portrayed the
Revolution as basically a race war and, in support of this claim, he effectively dismissed
the crucial role that Mexican federalists had and still were playing in fighting the
centralists. “We continued hoping that the Mexicans themselves would rally to support
us, and redeem the country from despotism, violence, and oppression,” Houston declared.
But this was not to be.
By dismissing Mexican federalism as inept and ineffectual, he highlighted the
necessity, not only of Texan annexation to the US, but of America’s need to save Mexico
– all of Mexico - from itself. Texans’ experience with Mexico became the best
justification for the rising tide of Manifest Destiny then sweeping the nation.

As surely as to-morrow’s sun will rise and pursue its bright course along the
firmament of heaven, so certain, it appears to my mind, must the Anglo-Saxon
race pervade the whole southern extremity of this vast continent, and the people
whom God has placed here in this land spread, prevail, and pervade throughout
the whole rich empire of this great hemisphere.
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The prospect of an independent federalist republic in northern Mexico, had no place in
Houston’s vision. Indeed, Mexican federalism itself had no place in Texas history,
effectively erasing the very thing that had attracted so many Americans to Texas in the
first place, thereby making their annexation to the US seem all the more inevitable. 643
In a way profoundly different from how Austin and the early settlers had, Houston
characterized Mexicans as unable to make anything of their territorial riches nor even to
protect themselves from the ravages of uncivilized Indians. In fact, the Mexicans were
little more than Indians themselves. Therefore there was “no reason why we should not
go on in the same course now, and take their land.” The northern part of Mexico would
benefit the most - the vast desert region “where only a few thousand souls are living in
such wide dominion - where the wild Indian extends with impunity his ravages, and,
unchecked he penetrates into the heart of Mexico.” The United States, Houston insisted,
were the only people who could tame the wild Mexican North, and they would be doing
it as much for the benefit of the Mexicans as for themselves. “Let the white man – let the
American interpose- let him say to the Indian, ‘Stay, savage, we will protect these
helpless people. We will do it!’” Mexicans had proven themselves “incapable of selfgovernment.” 644
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But not only was the spread of United States’ dominion across the continent
inevitable and justified, according to Houston, it was virtually impossible without Texas.
Indeed, in many ways this was Texas’ war. The United States’, by declaring war on
Mexico, had done little more than simply absorb a conflict that Texas had been engaged
in since its independence. “So, sir, I must say that annexation did not bring about the war.
In fact, by the annexation, the United States adopted the war.” Houston effectively
dismissed the notion, prevalent in the United States, that the war with Mexico was
essentially a border skirmish blown out of proportion. In this way, he reclaimed the war
for Texas, but also, inadvertently for Mexico. If we follow Houston’s line of reasoning to
its logical end, and accept that what Mexican leaders were really reacting to was what
they believed to be US encroachment of their territory, then we must also conclude that
the United States’ war with Mexico was hardly a coterminous event that lasted eighteen
months. Rather, it was the United States’ first intervention into a foreign civil war. 645
But Texas was perhaps most important as a strategic gateway to not only the rest
of the continent but the world. Texas “was the link that coupled the Union with
California, and connected it with Asia.” Texan annexation enabled the United States to
become the grand continental empire that many of its Founding Fathers had envisioned –
“That is the soil of America, the treasure is that of America, and the commerce beyond
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that is extending to the Pacific, and will give us that of the world is that of America, in
my opinion, if we remain a united people.” 646
Indeed, all of this was only possible if the republic remained unified. Ironically,
the very thing that promised to make the US the greatest nation in the Western
Hemisphere, also threatened to tear it apart. Yet, as Houston insisted, the North and the
South needed each other and only together formed the geographical cohesion necessary
to properly take advantage of the continent’s riches. But perhaps the best reasoning that
Houston put forth for why United States should remain united was, in his mind, because
its citizens shared a common racial identity: “Why should we not remain united? Are we
not homogenous? There is one language, there is one altar, there is one religion, for
every man worships God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and there is a
common Lord and a common Savior. What is there to distract us?” But when it came to
Texas, this of course meant erasing its Hispanic past and prior differences with the
United States. As far as Houston was concerned, white Americans were ultimately of the
same mind and therefore ought to share the same country.

“Have we not unity of

interest from the North to the South, from Bangor to Point Isabel? Go from the Atlantic
to the waves of the Pacific, pass the mountains that have been deemed impassable, and
that now interpose no barrier, and you will find a unity of interest that is inseparable.”
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Houston effectively placed Texas at the center of the emerging Manifest Destiny rhetoric.
Texas was precisely what had made a cohesive Anglo-Saxon continental US possible. 647
Granted , Houston did acknowledge a few “dissentiate men” in Texas who
departed from his characterization. Men “who went about preaching the doctrines of
fools, and avowing that the country was given away without a recompense.” Dismissing
them as “perverse in disposition” and claiming that their “moral ubliquity ought to be
branded with eternal shame,” these men would dissolve the Union. But they were not to
fear, for none had “ever bared his arm to the enemy, or raised a hand to strike for liberty.”
Thus, loyalty to the Union was the consummation of everything Texan, according to
Houston. To betray it would be to betray the precise principles for which the Texas
Revolution had been fought. Yet, as the national political discourse would show, many
disagreed with him. 648
***
As US forces stood in the Halls of Monteczuma, United States leaders stood in
the Halls of Congress debating how much of Mexico they would take. Some advocated
claiming all of the country, others insisted that the US should pursue no territorial claims
west of the Rio Grande. As one historian writes “No national government had ever faced
such a range of apparent possibilities for extending its territory and reshaping itself on
such a scale.” Polk himself wanted to annex both Californias and all of Mexico. He was
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supported by a number of pro-expansionist, mostly southern, senators including Houston.
649

In addition to his assertion that Mexico’s people were “mad with anarchy and
misrule,” desperate for political guidance, Houston looked forward to the acquisition of
Mexico mostly for what it would mean to his state specifically. If Mexico were
absorbed, her people civilized, and her commercial intercourse developed, Texas may
very well replace New York as “the Empire State of the Union.” Most specifically, he
foresaw such an acquisition fitting nicely within his aim for a Southern Continental
Railroad that would run right through Texas:

Situated as we are at present, her trade is of little benefit to us. Remove the
present obstacles in its way, and immense benefits must accrue to Texas.
Accessible now by ocean communication, the wants of trade would demand
railroads penetrating from our borders into the heart of her territory.

All of this, according to Houston, presaged the United States’ ultimate dominance on the
world stage. With possession of nearly the entire northwestern hemisphere, Houston saw
his country becoming “a shining light to the nations of the earth, to guide them onward to
the path which we have chosen.” 650
But such propositions sparked debate about the proper size and extent of a
republic. The United States was not a monarchical empire, opponents insisted, and had to
remain territorially limited if it was to achieve both sufficient regional sovereignty and
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federal control- indeed, if it was going to remain united at all. Many believed that a vast
continental nation, spanning from sea to sea, was simply anathema to a republican form
of government. “I would ask, sir, what is the honorable gentlemen’s standard extent for a
republic? Does it require a continent . . . Does the Godess of Liberty require a vast
expanse of impenetrable mountains and inhospitable deserts for her sustenance? . . . Mark
you, sir, liberty depends upon the qualities of men, not upon expanses of geography.” 651
In a series of predictions that now seem prescient, many argued that the addition
of such a large expanse of Mexican territory was both unnecessary and potentially
problematic. “[W]hat was it wanted for?” inquired Reverby Moorehead, “Have we not
enough not only for the men of the present day, but for hundreds and hundreds and
hundreds of millions, that may come into existence hereafter?” He predicted, not entirely
inaccurately, of the problems that such an acquisition might render - “civil war with all its
inconceivable evils, or the disruption of this Union. The cement which keeps us all
together, in a union which dispenses to all everything that any contrivance of human
society can dispense, is to be dissolved.” As John C Calhoun himself put it, “Let us not
push the territorial limits of this Government to such an extent as to bring upon us a
collision of interests and feelings which will shake the very foundations of the
Government.” Besides the territory, there was also the added population. Interestingly,
anti-Mexican racism offered one of the best arguments against the acquisition of
Mexican territory – namely the conviction that Mexicans as a people could not be
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sufficiently integrated into the US republic. Declaring Mexicans “an ignorant, a fanatic,
a disorderly people” having “none of the elements of character in common with the
people of this country,” opponents asked

What are you to do with them? Are you to govern them as you do your slaves in
those States which now tolerate the institution of slavery? Are to treat them as
serfs belonging to the land which you acquire, attached to the soil? Or will you
put them on a level with the people of this country? Will you give them the
privileges which your people enjoy, and enable them to regulate and control the
destinies of your Government?

This last option seemed particularly unlikely given that “it is now universally accepted
that the people of Mexico are entirely destitute of the capacity of self-government.” 652
For those who opposed annexation, the republic’s functionality depended on its ability to
sustain a sense of homogeneity and cohesion, both in terms of geography and population.
Although the inherent inferiority and political ineptitude of the Mexicans seemed one
thing that both the pro and anti-expansionists could agree on, only those opposed to
annexation seemed genuinely doubtful about the ability to integrate ethnic Mexicans into
the national fold.
While expansionists, and especially Texans, tended to place most of the blame for
Mexico’s unfortunate state of affairs at the feet of its leaders, anti-expansionists tended to
blame the Mexican people. “[I]t may be that,” continued the Senator, “in displaying those
elements of character which render them now the most unstable, unsettled, inefficient
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population on the face of the globe, you may have the same difficulty in governing them
that the authorities in Mexico have.” In fact, American leaders would experience the
same difficulty, but it would not come from its newly acquired Mexican population. It
would come, rather, from their own southern white population. 653
The geopolitical composition of the northwestern hemisphere remained a hotly
contested issue throughout the late 1840’s and into 1850’s. Even Zachary Taylor, the
great Mexican War hero, by 1849 informed Polk that he thought “California and Oregon
were too distant to become members of the Union, and that it would be better for them to
be an Independent Gov[ern]ment.” 654 But by 1850, this view was becoming increasingly
less popular. 655 Dismissing Taylor’s opinion as the “exceedingly ignorant” thoughts of a
“well-meaning old man,” Polk himself expressed “serious apprehensions” about what
“would be lost to the union by the establishment of an Independent Government” in the
Far West. This is why, once he became president, Polk pushed to make Oregon and later
California a part of the United States. 656
And Texas was his greatest ally. Houston took the lead in spearheading the
Oregon campaign, demanding the United States take an activist role in acquiring the
region from its continental rival, Great Britain. Speaking from his own experience as the
former president of a weak republic without the resources or infrastructure to protect its
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settlers, Houston knew how crucial a strong state was to the vision of Anglo-American
geopolitical proliferation. Of Oregon, he wrote that “Numbers have already migrated
there, and numbers more have it in contemplation to follow there. Until something is
done as an evidence for our regard for these pioneers, their situation must be exceedingly
infelicitous, as well as insecure.” Houston reminded his fellow senators that great
empires rarely slept, so that the assumption that Anglo-American settlers could slowly
and quietly take over foreign territory, as many imagined would be the case, was simply
unrealistic. Houston rejected the Jeffersonian notion of Anglo-American political
proliferation through settlement alone. “What sort of policy would it be?” he asked, “It
has been said that we have induced them to go there. If so, should not their situation
claim our peculiar regard?” In short, Houston understood Anglo westward expansion as
a specifically state project, “I cannot conceive how the United States can extend to them
personal protection, and, at the same time, withhold political protection; for without
political, personal cannot be extended.” 657 He suggested that without the presence of a
strong state, settlers would simply be absorbed by whatever culture and institutions
already existed, ignoring the fact that, as in the case of Texas, that was precisely what
they wanted.
Indeed, what Houston offered was a profoundly shortsighted and incomplete
understanding of the complex series of events that led to Texas becoming a part of the
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Union. He simplified the aims of Texas leaders and its people by failing to acknowledge
that there were some who preferred independence to annexation and put forth no small
effort in seeing this actualized. Annexation failed, according to Houston, because “Texas
was treated with coldness, reserve, or palpable discouragement.” It was this reaction
from the United States, not a desire to preserve its independence or even rejoin Mexico,
that prompted Texas to turn to Great Britain. According to Houston, the period of Texan
independence was nothing more than a bump on the road to the ultimate and inevitable
end, absorption by the US. And the ultimate decision to annex was now playing a crucial
role in the politics and leadership of the United States, where “like Aron’s rod, it
swallowed the rod’s of all political sourcerors.” 658
Houston’s representation of the situation in Oregon implied a very different
history for Texas. At the core of his Oregon speech rested the assumption that AngloAmerican settlers needed and in fact wanted the protection and presence of the US state
in order to carry out their mission of perpetuating Anglo-American institutions, laws and
culture. But it departed from earlier expansionist language advanced by Henry Clay and
John Adams who saw these individuals as doing most of the imperial work themselves.
Adams himself stated that he envisioned the pre-ordained push westward as resulting in
many republics based on Anglo-American political tradition and structure. 659
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But Houston had his affect. In 1849 the United States annexed Oregon. Thus,
between 1846 and 1850, that country grew by approximately 1.2 million square miles. It
was impossible not to be impressed, as superintendant of the US Census James DeBow
certainly was, when he surveyed the changes:

The territorial extent of the Republic is, therefore nearly ten times as large as that
of Great Britain and France combined; three times as large as the whole of
France, Britain, Austria, Prussia, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, Holland, and
Denmark, together, one-and-a half-times as large as the Russian empire in
Europe; one-sixth less only than the area covered by the fifty-nine or sixty
empires states, and Republics of Europe; of equal extent with the Roman Empire
or that of Alexander, neither of which is said to have exceeded 3 million square
miles. 660

Indeed, the country’s recent acquisition ushered in an era of profound national pride.
How could it not? In only a few years the United States had grown by approximately
64%. It had replaced Mexico as the politically and geographically dominant region in the
Western Hemisphere. 661 However, the exact form and nature of this republic, was still
unresolved. Specifically, the question of who would be considered under this rubric of
liberty and who would not began to emerge. And where would federated selfgovernment end and centralized national government begin? Despite the contemporary
mood of national pride and political arrogance, the great accomplishment ushered in a
period of profound sectional disagreement as the United States began, almost
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immediately upon the signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, to confront the very
same set of challenges that Mexico had, how to hold together a modern federated
republican empire.
***
The vision that men like Houston and Polk shared of a strong and unified
continental republic lasted for about ten years, and it largely ignored the very real
sectional divide concerning slavery and state’s rights that seethed throughout the 1850’s.
Houston himself actively denounced the first signs of impending crisis by adamantly
renouncing John C Calhoun’s 1849 nullification efforts. In a letter to a close friend he
bragged that “Rusk and myself smoked Johnny and would not indorse for him. We are
not done with him yet – but I think he has nearly done with himself.” Of all the US
politicians who had come before him, Houston was the most admiring of Andrew
Jackson – populist, anticentralist yet unfailingly unionist. He accused the South
Carolinians of acting out of self-interest and ambition. “You know that I am as unifier as
General Jackson was, and cannot look with one grain of allowance upon any fanatical
project while selfish and unholy ambition is to be gratified at the expense of the Union of
the Republic. We are among the last to come into it, and being in, we will be the last to
get out of it.” He also recognized quite rightly that Texas, the most western state in the
Union, had far more to lose from secession than wealthier and securer seaboard states
like South Carolina which, “from her central position, the sea upon one side, and a
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cordon of slave states between her and danger, has had but little reason for
apprehension.” 662
When the southern states considered holding a convention in early 1851 to discuss
secession, Houston roundly denounced them, insisting that it amounted to an admission
that their rights were not protected under the Constitution.663 Houston believed that
Texas was far better served by staying in the Union than separating from it. Despite his
states’ rights sentiments, Houston believed that federal funding was absolutely crucial to
Texas’ economic survival and chief among his schemes to develop and enrich the region
was a transcontinental railroad.
But not all Texans were as steadfastly committed to unionism as Houston. As
one prominent scholar has argued, during the 1850’s Texans experienced a constant and
unrelenting tension between their commitment to localism and their sense of loyalty and
obligation to their newly adopted nation. But localism, if not stronger, was more broadly
felt and had a much longer tradition in Texas than almost any other part of the Union.
Walter Buenger writes that “Lincoln’s election and the ascendency of the Republican
Party made Texans question as nothing had before the ability of the United States to
function as an American nation should function.” This, however, overlooks the
circumstances surrounding the first Anglo settlements of Texas which were founded on
the belief that the United States had failed as an experiment in democratic republicanism.
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By the time the Civil War came, Texans’ had been questioning the US efficacy and
integrity for some time. 664
Although they constituted a minority, there were strong and vocal proponents of
Texas secession very early on, not least of which was the former president of the
Republic of Texas and Houston’s arch-rival, Lamar. While Houston was calling for a
larger more expansive Union that stretched across the continent, Lamar was urging
southerners to consider withdrawing from it. Indeed, it was the battle cry of many
Texans who had opposed annexation. In an 1850 letter to a group of southern leaders in
the wake of the nullification crisis, Lamar wrote that

The course then, gentlemen, which I would advise the South to pursue in the
present crisis is plainly this – she should say to her northern brethren – ‘your
continued aggressions upon our rights, peace, and safety, can no longer be borne –
the institution of slavery which you seek to destroy is identified with our
existence; it is to us a matter of life and death; and if you do not forever and
immediately abandon your purpose of wresting it from us, and reducing us to utter
ruin and despair, we shall consider the confederacy as resolved by your act, and
will protect ourselves accordingly.”

Just two years after Texas had joined the Union, Lamar was calling for it to separate
again. “This appears to me the only alternative left to the south,” he declared, “We see
that the northern states are bent upon our destruction; that all their movements tend that
way; that they are determined to force us into the abolition of slavery, and of
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consequence to plunge us into greater horrors than ever befell a civilized people.” While
union seemed natural to Houston, it was impossible to Lamar. 665
And where Houston saw it as the key to the industrial and commercial success of
the South, Lamar saw it as the primary obstacle. In his address to the Southern
Commercial Convention, Lamar complained that the southern states had “failed from the
operation of improper legislative action, or from a culpable neglect of concerned action,
to keep pace in the great progressive march of the age. We are not yet what we ought to
be,” asserted Lamar, “either in thought or act, as members of our great confederacy.”
Throughout the 1850’s Lamar counted himself among a growing number of southern
elites who saw in their states the promise of unrivaled commercial and cultural
dominance – a promise that it appeared was being increasingly sabotaged by a restrictive,
onerous and northern-dominated federal government.

We want our highways and thoroughfares linking all parts of the country in one
prosperous whole, expediting commerce and intercourse, with the velocity of
Steam. We want our great lines of ocean steamers channeling the sea and making
it a pathway for direct communion from our own now neglected ports to the
emporiums of the older world. We want a full employment and development of
the vast resources of commerce and commercial grandeur and opulence, that are
concentrating from every zone and longitude – from the islands of the deeps –
from Amazonian territories – and from the new found Pacific world, into the
bosom of our own Gulf of Mexico, and making tit the Mediterranean of the
West. 666
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Secession offered a perfect remedy to annexation- a chance to return to independence and
all of the promise that Texas once possessed.
Like their leaders, Texans remained split over the question of annexation. The
Galveston Weekly, in response to South Carolina’s convention, wrote that, unlike the first
time that had threatened secession in 1776, “the perils of secession are now greater,” and
“the causes less urgent.” 667 Yet the San Antonio Ledger, in response to Texans’
frustrations toward the federal government’s inability to provide sufficient frontier
protection and deliver on promised internal improvements, wrote that Texas “quietly
provides for placing herself exterior to the Union” and looked forward “to resuming her
place once more among the nations.” If such an act ever became necessary, the Ledger
asserted, Texans would “rely confidently on the assistance of all that portion of the
citizens of the other states who contend that secession is a rightful remedy.” 668
Yet, most Texan leaders fell somewhere between Houston and Lamar. George
W. Smythe, who served in the US House of Representatives from 1853 to 1855, while
sympathizing with states’ rights proponents, cautioned against extreme interpretations of
the Constitution from both sides. “Two errors almost equally fatal with regard to our
Constitution have found advocates among us,” Smythe wrote in one of his speeches,

The one represents us as a great national consolidated republic. The other as a
mere assemblage of independent, sovereign communities bound together by a
league, treaty or contract which they or any of them, have a right to abrogate
667
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whenever an accession of sufficient importance presents itself, of which, they are
to be the inclusive judges. These two errors are equally fatal. The latter destroys
our system as completely by attenuation as the former does by consternation. 669

Like Houston, Smythe focused most of his energies in office on internal improvements
such as a national railroad and understood that a state like Texas perhaps had more to lose
than gain by separating itself from the Union. And as frustrating and imposing as the
federal governments’ presence was when it came to such projects, he assured his
constituents that it was well worth it, for Texas could hardly accomplish them by herself
or as the member of a southern confederacy.
Lamar, for his part, knew that his views were “too unpopular and startling to be breathed
in the lowest.” Yet, he remained confident “that they will be finally triumphant.” Lamar
believed he knew Texas better than Houston, indeed better than most Texans knew
themselves. 670

He might have been right. As the decade progressed, Texans became increasingly
frustrated with a federal government that not only proved increasingly hostile to the slave
South, but failed to deliver on its promises for internal improvements and – particularly
important to Texans – border security. Leading this growing contingent of Texans was
Houston’s co-senator, Thomas Jefferson Rusk. In August 1856 the two men held a
public debate in Nacogdoches in which Rusk “spoke in a very feeling and eloquent
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manner of the feelings that had existed between him and his colleague for the past 20
years.” But that was the limit of their courtesies. Rusk adamantly defended the KansasNebraska Bill which Houston had many times denounced, pointing out that “agitation
had existed on the slavery question ever since the Passage of the Ordinance of 1787 and
had never been resolved.” He attacked Houston for not sufficiently enforcing the Fugitive
Slave Law and allowing potentially hundreds of slaves to escape through Texas to
Mexico. Rusk also condemned the Missouri Compromise for granting Congress the
right to legislate on slavery both in the territories and the states, an objection which
Houston had repudiated. Finally, the senator claimed that, while he was “for the Union,”
he also believed that “if a state of things should ensure that equality which is guaranteed
to the South by the Constitution will be destroyed, and the rule of a fanatical majority
usurp its place, he would strike back.” 671
Throughout his career, Houston remained a steadfast unionist, making every
effort to keep Texas out of the sectional debates of the 1850’s and reminding Texans that
they had “entered not into the North nor into the South, but into the Union.” Whereas
men like Lamar and Rusk highlighted similarities between Texas and the seperatis South,
Houston emphasized their differences – differences which made Texas far more
dependent on the federal government that most other states. 672
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Yet, throughout most of the 1850’s the federal government largely failed to
protect Texas from Mexican and Indian incursions, a fact which even Houston could not
deny. 673 As a result, his popularity, much of which relied on his image as the “Hero of
San Jacinto,” began to plummet as the decade progressed. Meanwhile, Texas saw the
emergence of a group of young radical leaders, who were friendlier to secession. One of
these was Guy M. Bryan, the nephew of the late Father of Texas. The son of Austin’s
sister, Emily, and his business partner James Bryan, Guy was born on the Missouri
frontier the same year his grandfather obtained his first colonization contract from Spain.
His family moved to Texas ten years later, following the death of his father and his
mother’s remarriage to Stephen Perry. He was a teenager during the revolution and
attended Kenyon College in Ohio before returning to Texas. In 1846 Bryan, on behalf of
his family, complained in a letter to George Burnett that “The ‘old settlers’ – those who
founded and they who labored with the founders of our country to bring it into existence
and build it up” were “being forgot.” Meanwhile, “the eleventh hour men” - those who
had arrived with the “‘heat and burden of the day’” - were receiving “all credit and all
reward.” Despite his youth, Bryan made it clear where his identity and allegiance rested.
“[T]o me and to every ‘old settler’ this must be cause of deep regret.” The entire source
of his family’s grievances were not made evident, but it is clear that Bryan feared that his
uncle’s generation were being misrepresented in the public memory, and he appealed to
Burnet to rectify the wrong. “It is due to the dead and to the living that a fair and honest
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statement of the past should be made,” he wrote. “[Y]ou knew [my uncle], his nature, his
character his deeds, and devotion to his country.” In order to correct such misperception,
Bryan requested that Burnett author a biography of his uncle. “[O]ur family are anxious
that you should write his life . . . without which no correct history of Texas can ever be
written.” 674 Bryan was not specific about what aspects of his uncle’s memory he found
objectionable, but considering that the letter came soon after Texas’ annexation – an
event that Bryan opposed - it likely had something to do with how Texans of the 1850’s
imagined Austin’s hopes for them.
Bryan, however, would have his chance to re-direct the course of Texas politics.
In 1847 he was elected to the State House of Representatives where he served until 1853.
He then served four years in the Senate until 1857, at which point he was elected to
represent the Western District of Texas in the United States Congress. By the time Bryan
had made it onto the national stage, Texas and the rest of the South were beginning to
move decisively away from the unionist politics of men like Houston and Smythe.
Bryan, like many successful politicians at this time, was not shy about taking a more
explicitly pro-southern line, and this made him popular among his constituency which
had by now grown tired of a federal government that, over a decade after annexation, still
failed to deliver on its promises of frontier defense and internal improvement. Reporting
on the national congressional election in spring of 1857, the Texas State Gazette reported
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that Bryan “is well known to the people.” He is an old Texian” with “considerable
brilliancy of mind and great industry, and will doubtlessly faithlessly attend to the
interests of his constituents.” 675
Bryan soon became associated with a young and aspiring group of politicians
who, by the end of the 1850’s, were beginning to vocalize the states’ rights platform.
One of these was H.R. Runnels, the lieutenant governor who had entered state politics in
1847 as a representative to the state legislature for Bowie County. In 1859, Runnels
made a bid for Governor. Shortly thereafter, Houston entered as his opponent. In a
lengthy address to the Texas House of Representatives that was then published in the
Gazette, Runnels insisted that the federal government “derived its just powers from the
consent of the governed, and when it shall have ceased to fulfill the object of its creation,
and only then, will arise a sufficient cause for its dissolution.” Runnels concluded,
“Equality and independence in the Union, or independence outside of it, should be the
motto of every southern state.” 676
But it was the Son of Texas who most eloquently compared the plight of the
South under the current “Black Republican” administration with that of the Texans under
Santa Anna. “Centralization of the power in the hands of the ‘Agent’ caused Texas to
appeal in 1835 to the state of the Mexican union, on behalf of the violated constitution of
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1824.” When the appeal was “disregarded” by their states, Bryan explained, Texas
declared independence “in the same spirit as that which influenced the declaration made
on the 4th of July 1776.” Bryan drew a straight line from the founding of the Union to the
founding of Texas to what would soon be the founding of the Confederacy, all of which,
he seemed to insist were motivated by the underlying principle of “state sovereignty.”
Yet, Bryan also acknowledged Texas’ differing status from the other states “in
consequence of her position before annexation” and “the contingencies and manner of
annexation.” 677 Texas, according to Bryan, had entered the Union under circumstances
different from the rest, on a conditional consent that could be revoked at any time.
Texans found his line convincing and as the state democratic convention drew near, the
Southern Intelligencer reported that “From indications of public sentiment, not so plainly
seen as sensibly felt, the Hon. Guy M Bryan will be the nominee of the Houston
Convention.” Of Bryan and his friend Matt Ward, another descendent of the early
settlers, the Intelligencer wrote, “The shades of the uncles . . . must have been gratified at
the singular phenomenon, exhibited by the overtopping grandeur of these lineal
desendents of the deceased.”
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[W]hen Sam Houston comes around, if he must, to wean the democracy of Texas
from their allegiance to principles, by reciting the story of his suferings and
service in the revolution and by pouring forth the melting strains of his wizard
voice in depicting the days of ‘auld laude syne,’ there is one hat that will not
waive and one hat that will not vociferate his cheers.” 679

Indeed, in light of Houston’s struggles to compel the federal government to invest more
of its attention and resources to frontier defense and his accompanying refusal to back the
rest of the South, his political currency as an old war hero began to wane. The San
Antonio Ledger reported that Houston was losing in Nacogdoches, Corpus Christi and
much of the rest of the east. “Everywhere Old Sam goes now he loses votes,” the paper
reported, “Many of his old friends are entirely disgusted with the old toothless lion, and
even the ass gives him an occasional kick.” 680
In September, Houston and Bryan engaged in a debate in Hempstead where, the
latter “took issue with General Houston on the Kansas Nebraska Bill, as well as the
Missouri Compromise, sustaining the action of the Democratic Party and the South.”
While Houston struggled galliantly through the debate, “It was evident that [Bryan’s]
sentiments received an endorsement of a large majority of the meeting.” 681 When
Houston failed to muster the votes to return to office, the Gazette cited his position on the
Kansas-Nebraska Bill, which has “shown us clearly the northern identity of his political
association.” The evidence was clear, according to the paper, “and the result shows that
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the people of Texas repudiate the course pursued by Sam Houston on this Southern
question.” 682 Ultimately, Houston lost the election to Runnels by a vote of 32,552 to
28,678. 683
Houston returned to Washington in December to resume his term as Senator.
Relations with the Indians, however, only worsened as the decade drew to a close.
“Everyday brings us intelligence of new murders upon the frontier,” Houston wrote in
March 1860, “[I]f we cannot propitiate the Indians then what shall we do?” Houston,
then the governor, continued in vain to call for a treaty clarifying that a violation against
Texas was a violation against the United States, and eventually he had to admit that
federal efforts to defend the frontier had failed miserably. “The army is in fact inefficient,
a few nights since the Cavalry at Camp Cooper amounting to some seventy horses were
unhorsed by the Indians and the men left with their saddles, spurs, and accoutrements,
prepared for a spring campaign. So you see how things work,” he wrote to US official.
684

Conditions had become almost intolerable. “Our frontiers are at this time in a truly

alarming condition,” he wrote. 685
Relations with Mexico had also grown increasingly strained and Houston found
himself reprimanding a group of Texan militia who had gathered at the border in
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preparation for a Mexican invasion. He warned them that their expeditions “would not be
received in the service of the United States and their movements at this time are
calculated to excite erroneous impressions as to the design of Texas, and thus defeat the
Call.” Just as Austin had done before him, Houston struggled to assert his authority over
increasingly frustrated and rogue citizens whose regard for the federal government was
conditional. Despite his own lack of confidence, Houston insisted that the public
continue to refrain from taking matters into their own hands, assuring them that the
authorities would deliver on their promise. Incursions by private citizens only invited
further aggression. “The most calamitous disasters that have befallen Texas, have grown
out of expeditions not sanctioned by Law, and indisobediance to order,” he argued.
Houston then informed the federal government of what their continued inaction might
render. The Texan frontier citizens, “Notwithstanding all his moderation,” may soon “be
required to resort to the indefeasible right of self-defense to protect his fellow-citizens.”
Houston’s warning indeed amounted to a threat if matters were not immediately
addressed.
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Eventually, however, Houston had to admit Texans should be allowed to do the
job instead. In a letter to the Secretary of War, he wrote that “The misfortunes to which
we have been subject, since annexation have, I think, demonstrated the fact that it is
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entirely useless to think of rendering protection to Texas by the regular army.” He
proposed instead that the government permit the Texas Rangers to take over. 687
Yet, despite acknowledging the United States’ ultimate failure to defend Texas
against Indian and Mexican incursions, Houston continued to denounce secession and to
insist on the inherent superiority of the Anglo-American political system. Houston stated
that he had arrived in Texas with the “belief that the Constitution and the Union were to
be perpetual blessings to the human race,” and “that the success of the experiment of our
fathers was beyond dispute.” He hoped “that these bright anticipations should be
realized” and that the US should continue as “not only the proudest nationality the world
has ever produced, but the freest and most perfect.” Houston continued to insist that all
of Texans’ freedom ultimately depended on remaining a part of the Union. Not only was
American politics and society superior, but they were destined to sweep across the rest of
the continent, encompassing a nation broader and more diverse as any democracy before
it. “In its onward march, sweeping the valleys of California, and leaving its pioneer
waves in the waves of the Pacific,” Houston declared of his rapidly expanding republic,
“I have seen this might progress and it still remains free and independent. Power, wealth,
expansion, victory, have followed in its path, and yet the aegis of the union has been
broad enough to encompass all. Is not this worth perpetuating?” For Houston, the
United States’ recent expansion was the best proof of its superiority – not martial
prowess, or violence, or a weak neighbor. This, if nothing else, justified its cohesion. If
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Texans thought they had it bad now, Houston warned them that it would be far worse if
they ever went their own way.

Will you exchange this for all the hazards, the anarchy and carnage of civil war?
Do you believe it will be dissevered and no shock felt to society? You are asked
to plunge into a revolution; but are you told how to get out of it? Not so; but it is
to be a leap in the dark – a leap into the abyss whose horrors would even fright the
mad spirits of disunion who tempt you on.

Yet, for many Texans, secession and independence were far from shots in the dark.
Houston’s appeals to Anglo solidarity and his insistence on the inherent superiority of the
United States was, of course, not universal.
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***
As 1860 drew to a close, talk of secession began to sweep the South, including
Texas, the views of men like Bryan and Runnels echoed in the state newspapers. “The
States (each in itself) are sovereign,” wrote the Gazette, “The federal government is the
creature of the States; it is the agent, and whenever the agent shall usurp power not
delegated in the agreement, the principals to the compact are released from it, and are no
longer bound.” 689 In December, John Wharton announced for secession. 690 That same
month the Dallas Weekly Herald declared “Let Texas declare her independence, and let
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her never consent to pass homage to an administration, the chief of which, in days past,
laughed over the destruction of the lives and property of her citizens.” 691
As for Houston, his steadfast defense of unionism made him subject to harsh
condemnation from Texas newspapers and increasing alienation from his constituency.
Yet he continued to defend his position, insisting that he had Texans’ best interest at
heart. The Flag reported on a speech he gave in Nacogdoches during his recent campaign
in which “he alluded to his history, and stated that it was not disconnected with that of the
country, and trusted that its future pages would vindicate him.” 692 The Flag came to his
defense. “There will be many false charges and doubtless a black record manufactured
and circulated against the Old General.” Yet, the paper reminded its audience that
“almost every act of his life notwithstanding has been that of the greatest devotion to his
country.” Of Runnels, the paper wrote, “what acts of his life shall we look to as
designating him as the man for the position to which he aspires?” Regarding the
common accusation that Houston “endorses the measures of the present administration
which we oppose,” the Flag conceded that “we regret it as much as any one. We expect
not perfection in this life knowing that it is human to err and will take him for the good
he has done.” 693
Yet, a contributor to the San Antonio Ledger and Texan had a different opinion.
“I am one of those who have always been a friend to, and voted for, Gen Houston,” yet,
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“I have been mistaken in the man.” Regarding frontier security, his policy was “not
acceptable,” especially concerning his behavior towards the militia, whose autonomy he
was accused of imposing upon. “If General Houston respects the rights of the dear
people as alleged by him, then how is it that he makes and unmakes companies in
proportion as they elect officers to suit his dictatorial will?” asked the author, “[I]s not the
law explicit that the militia have the exclusive right to elect these officers?” 694
Indeed, Texans had an additional reason besides states’ rights compelling them to
secede. In March of 1861, the Herald reported that “the Confederate Congress already
stands pledged to give protection to our exposed Frontier.” Furthermore, it would
facilitate rather than hinder local efforts to police the frontier. “If the State will call out a
permanent force, it will be recognized by the Southern Congress, and liberal
appropriations made for its support, as soon as Texas joins the Confederacy.” 695
As much as Houston wished otherwise, he had to admit that Texas was heading
decisively towards a convention and to try and prevent such would be political suicide.
In December, he clarified his position once again, denying that he “would use my
executive powers to thwart the will of the people of Texas.” Houston cautioned against
reaction to Lincoln’s election and clarified that he in fact supported a Convention
composed of representatives of the people – how could he not as their governor? But he
also expressed confidence that whatever resolution said Convention rendered, it would
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not be secession. “Let the people at the ballot-box select men to reflect their sentiments
in a convention of Southern states, and no one can complain. As one, I cannot believe
our troubles are beyond remedy, and am willing therefore to see the wisdom of the entire
South assembled to devise some means for their settlement.” 696
On January 28, a group of elected representatives from throughout the state of
Texas convened in Austin. Chief among their duties was “to determine what shall be the
future relations of this State to the Union, and such other matters as are necessarily and
properly incident thereto.” 697 The historical importance of what they were doing was not
lost on the President who declared that they had convened “to consider and dispose of
questions equally as momentous and more varied than those that were solved by our
revolutionary forefathers of ’76!” At stake was “not only the right of self government,”
but “the immemorial recognition of the institution of slavery wherever it is not locally
prohibited” and, as had been the case in their earlier conflict with Mexico, “the true
theory of our general government as an association of sovereignties.” 698 Indeed, the
legacy of the Texas Revolution loomed heavily over the entire Convention, especially on
January 30th when it was resolved that veterans of the conflict be invited into the House
to observe the proceedings “provided they are in favor of another revolution.” 699
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That same day the Convention issued a Joint Resolution, the first section of which
expressed objections eerily similar to the complaints lodged against Santa Anna’s
government fifteen years prior.

[W]hereas the action of the Northern States of the Union, and the recent
development in federal affairs, make it evident that the power of the Federal
Government is sought to be made a weapon with which to strike down the
interests and prosperity of the Southern people, instead of permitting it to be as it
were intended our shield against outrage and aggression.

The delegates pointed to the federal government’s failure to meet their specific needs
and interests as justification for their secession. They declared annexation “hereby
repealed and annulled” and Texas “absolved for all restraints and obligations incurred by
said compact” and declared it “a separate sovereign State.” 700
Frustration over the loss of their imperial dreams also played a role in the
delegates’ decision. They attacked the federal government for excluding the southern
states “from all the immense territory owned in common by all the States on the Pacific
Ocean, for the avowed purpose of acquiring sufficient power in the common government
to use it as a means of destroying the institutions of Texas and her sister slave-holding
states.” This was particularly offensive since they saw themselves as the United States’
gateway to the West. 701
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But Texas also had the additional grievance of experiencing the federal
government’s neglect when it came to its own frontier protection. The Federal
Government, they claimed, “while but partially under the control of those our unnatural
and sectional enemies,” had for years “almost entirely failed to protect the lives and
property of the people of Texas against the Indian savages on our border, and more
recently against the murderous forays of banditti from the neighboring territory of
Mexico.” Thus, the burden of border security had largely fallen on Texan shoulders,
pointing out that “when our State government has extended large amounts for such
purpose, the Federal Government has refused reimbursement therefor.” Texas, they
claimed, had been rendered “more insecure and harassing than it was during the existence
of the Republic of Texas.” 702 Meanwhile, the Confederacy had “positively assured that
their protection would be far more perfect” under its jurisdiction. 703
Even as they highlighted their commonalities, representatives from other southern
states admitted that the Texans were unique among the Confederate states. “We are not
unmindful of your illustrious history when fresh from the fields of victory and glory in
which you established your own independence,” wrote Confederate leaders in a welcome
letter to the Texans.

[Y]ou presented a spectacle unexampled in the history of the world. With a
territory sufficiently extensive for empires, with a soil rich in the production of
everything necessary for the happiness of man, and with a climate as lovely as can
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be found on any spot of the habitable globe, without money and without price,
you united your destiny with a sisterhood, whose duty it was to foster and protect
you

The Texans were victims of a “common enemy,” but unique in that they suffered
specifically from “neglect and insult.” 704
The authors concluded by emphasizing the specifically southern heritage of most
Texans. “The hearts of Southern fathers and Southern mothers, of Southern brothers, and
sisters, relatives, and friends have followed you to this distant land, and though saddened
by the wide interval between you and them,” they looked forward “to the time when all
will again live under this same form of government, and be protected by its strong arm.”
Unlike Houston, who denied that Texas shared more in common with the South than with
the rest of the nation, delegates of the Convention stated that “Their interests, their
pursuits, their laws, their institutions, their customs are the same and the same destiny
awaits each and all.” 705
Indeed, as Texans emphasized their ties to the rest of the slave South, not only
did they see direct parallels between their secession from Mexico and their secession
from the United States, but they now understood their relationship with both countries to
be effectively the same. “The Mexican yoke could not have been more galling to ‘the
army of the heroes’ of ’36 than the Black republican rule would be to the survivors and
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sons of that army at the present day,” declared one delegate. 706 And they expressed the
conviction that Texans would be no less willing to pick up arms against their North
American oppressors than they had against their Mexican ones. “I trust the guns will
soon be again upon the soil they so nobly assisted in rescuing from Mexican tyranny,” 707
one delegate confidently predicted, and concluded that “The possibility of settling our
difficulties by a reconstruction of the Union” would receive “about the same
encouragement as a proposition to re-annex Texas to the State of Mexico.” 708
Indeed, the specific principles on which Texans’ based their rights to secede from
the Union were, almost to the word, those on which they declared their right to withdraw
from Mexico. “All political power is inherent in the people, and all free government are
founded on their authority, and instituted for their benefit, and they have at all times the
inalienable right to alter, reform or abolish their form of government in such manner as
they may think expedient.” Their decision to secede from the United States, just like their
decision to secede from Mexico, was compelled by their enduring pursuit of extreme
federalism.

When permanently successful, such a remodeling of government, embracing our
complicated system of reserved State rights and delegated Confederate authority,
may give a better guarantee than all history that our people at least are capable of
instituting and maintaining free government.

706

Ibid. 122.
Ibid., 206.
708
Ibid., 94.
707

422
Finally, in true Texan form, leaders attempted to impose their new system over those
territories they believed rested under their jurisdiction, recommending “to the citizens of
the Territory of Santa Fe or New Mexico the propriety of immediately proceeding to
form a State constitution recognizing the institution of slavery,” and requesting “for
admission into the confederacy of Southern States.” 709 Texans’ territorial and imperial
ambitions would receive renewed vigor under a new alliance.
***
The United States was not alone as it faced a rising tide of sectionalism that
threatened its existence as a unified republic. As a country that had struggled since its
inception to achieve some semblance of national cohesion, Mexico continued to find
itself plagued by civil war throughout the 1850’s. But the South’s decision to secede
from the Union, and especially Texas’, had a critical impact on questions that had
plagued the Mexican nation for decades – specifically the question of northern secession.
Mexico had an even harder time holding itself together after it lost two-thirds of its
territory to the United States. The northern states of Nuevo León, Tamaulipas, Durango
and Coahuila proved particularly problematic, especially with the rise of several
federalist movements with strong separatist impulses and, not surprisingly, close ties to
Texas. In fact, in 1847 Lamar called on the northern Mexican states to do something that
they had been attempting for a decade - declare themselves an independent republic.
“The remote and exposed situation of these States has prevented their enjoying equal
709
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advantages with the other sections of the union,” he wrote in an editorial for La Bandera,
a federalist newspaper based in Matamoros. “On the contrary, they have been wholly
neglected by the General government.” Lamar promised that “If these States, tired of
their injuries, which they have suffered for so long a time, should desire to liberate
themselves from the tyranny of the General Government, to rise from their present
humiliations and to place themselves on an equality with the other esteemed nations[,] I
cannot deny my most lively support.” Just as Lamar would emphasize the cultural,
economic and political disparity between the northern and southern United States, so he
made a similar distinction between the Mexican north and the rest of the country. “The
states of the north of Mexico have no interests in common with those beyond the Sierra
Madre. Neither have they any reasons for involving themselves in the present war
between Mexico and the United States; and even less of submerging themselves in the
civil disputes that are continually occurring in that nation.” Lamar imagined the Sierra
Madre as a border, akin to the Mason-Dixon Line, which “Nature seems to have
designed” as “a great national boundary” extending all the way to the Pacific, and
forming “a great republic whose prosperity and illustrious institutions would be the
admiration and envy of the world.” But just as he emphasized the differences between
the northern and southern states of both countries, Lamar highlighted the similarities
between the southern US and northern Mexico: “It is very natural and right that I, in
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common with thousands of others, should have a lively interest in the prosperity and
welfare of these States, considering their proximity to my own country” 710
Lamar ultimately argued that northern Mexico should follow the course that he
advocated for the southern US and that, ultimately, that country would follow. The
northern Mexican states, declared Lamar, had “the opportunity of erecting a temple of
liberty that might surpass in firmness, beauty and duration any that have preceded it.” 711
In Lamar’s opinion, Mexico still held all the promise that the earliest settlers had seen in
it, but it now rested principally in the northern states and could only be realized with an
independent northern republic. Mexican secession, like southern secession, was an
attempt to return to the founding principles and original promise of the early republic.
But Lamar’s claims were not the isolated voice of an arrogant, and perhaps even
implicitly imperialistic, Anglo-Texan. The notion of northern secession had been
circulating since prior to the Texas Revolution, and in the wake of the war with the US it
reached its zenith, finding expression in the form of the charismatic Santiago Vidaurri.
Much about Vidaurri’s origin and early life remain a mystery. But we do know that he
rose to political prominence in 1837 when he was appointed chief assistant to the
conservative governor of Nuevo León. In 1841 he became the secretary to the newly
appointed liberal Governor Manuel María de Llano. That same year he became
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acquainted with Texas when, ironically, he served there as a spy for General Arista on the
eve of the Santa Fe Expedition. 712
Despite his service to the centralists, in 1855 Vidaurri joined a group of liberal
reformers trying to rid their country of what they believed to be a corrupt, inept and
despotic central government responsible for Mexico’s humiliating defeat by the United
States. Most of these men had been born after independence, raised under the
Constitution of 1824 and aimed to restore many of its liberal principles including
renewed state’s rights and less church influence. Their aims culminated that spring when
Vidaurri seized Monterrey and issued the Plan de Restaurador de la Libertad which
called for the return of full state sovereignty (including locally controlled militias)
throughout Mexico, as had been established in the 1824 Constitution.713 The official
organ of Vidaurri’s movement declared that

Nuevo León, Coahuila and Tamalulipas are cooperating to restore the power to
live under the protection of the law, under rules defined and derived from the will
of the nation and not under the pressure and influence of armed force as has been
the case in the last two years. Remember that this is truly Mexican, and that
enough has been sacrificed to the caprice of a man, the fate of this noble and
magnanimous nation, as well as the brilliance that comes from the praiseworthy
army.

Vidaurri did not stop there. In a particularly bold move reminiscent of the Texas
Revolution, he declared Nuevo León independent until the restoration of federalism.
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“The State of Nuevo León resumes its sovereignty, liberty and independence,” declared
El Restaurador, while the national Congress is called in conformity with the Convocation
of December 10 1841, establishing the system and form of Government that should rule
the republic.” The paper concluded that “Despotism cannot exist in Mexico.” 714
Not surprisingly, Texans greeted Vidaurri’s victory with glee and encouraged him
to go a step further, declaring Nuevo León completely independent, thereby creating a
buffer zone between the US south and Mexico that would protect them from centralist
incursions and allow them to retrieve escaped slaves. But Vidaurri was uninterested in
this and easily repelled Texans who crossed the border. This gained him favor in the
eyes of Mexico City liberals who, when they returned to power in 1856, allowed his state
to absorb Coahuila. In August of the following year, Vidaurri issued a revised
constitution for Nuevo León y Coahuila which, among other things, outlawed slavery.
But he proved an unreliable military chief when he refused to follow the order of
President Juárez in suppressing conservative forces in the north, after determining that it
would mean almost certain defeat for his militia. Before long, Vidaurri found himself
alienated from national liberals who ultimately believed that he cared more about his own
power and security than the rest of the nation. 715
Faced with imprisonment or worse, Vidaurri went into exile in Texas where he
made several important contacts, including José Augustín Quintero. As for the Texans,
714
El Restaurador de Libertad, 25 May 1855, Benson Center for Latin American History, University of
Texas at Austin.
715
Tyler, 21-32.

427
they received this “fine looking, intelligent man” with “distinguished consideration,”
according to the San Antonio Herald, which reported that “his object is to study our
government, and to rest from the labors of war.” 716 Indeed, Texas had long served as an
inspiration for the Mexican federalists, and, during his time there, Vidaurri realized,
according to one biographer, that “his goals and aspirations for Nuevo León y Coahuila
more nearly resembled those of Texas than southern or central Mexico.” 717 As Vidaurri’s
relationship with the Mexican central government deteriorated, Texas would become
more important, not only as political inspiration, but as a critical, if not clandestine,
trading partner.
When the US Civil War commenced in 1861 the two regions’ economic
codependence became indispensable as southerners soon found themselves faced with the
almost certain prospect of a northern blockade of their ports. Additionally, southerners
wanted Mexico’s promise that it would not allow the Union to launch an invasion
through northern Mexico. After a botched attempt at establishing diplomatic relations
between the CSA and Mexico by John T. Pickett, who wound up insulting liberal
officials, the State Department sent Quintero to Monterrey to meet with Vidaurri. The
two men had met in Austin during Vidaurri’s exile two years prior, and now convened for
what they called a “confidential intercourse.” Vidaurri graciously agreed to police and
secure the border and to allow the CSA desperately needed access to weapons,

716
717

San Antonio Herald, 23 November 1859.
Tyler, 36.

428
ammunition, and other wartime necessities. While he acknowledged that he lacked the
authority necessary to negotiate on such a subject since he was not a federal authority, he
pointed out the exceptionality of the case and, convinced that the Supreme Government
would support an arrangement designed to achieve peace and friendship with foreign
nations, concluded that he would “constitute [him]self an official organ of the
Government to assure your Excellency that this sane principle [of non-aggression] is
being observed by the Mexican Government, its representatives, and its people.”
Vidaurri concluded his correspondence by assuring “Peace between the two neighboring
countries and the condemnation of any hostility from every side.” 718 In May of 1861,
The Dallas Weekly Herald reported that a Mexican counterpart “renews the assurances of
Gov. Vidaurri’s desire to be on good terms with Texas, and his determination to punish
parties coming into Texas on marauding purposes. 719

Vidaurri’s assurances led

Quintero to state in his letter to Texas Governor Edward Clark that “I have been entirely
successful in my mission” and that “the Southern Confederacy has made a powerful ally
on this frontier by securing the friendship of the state of New Leon and Coahuila.” In
addition to security and friendship from northern Mexico, Quintero also confirmed that
“we could buy any quantity of powder and lead we might desire” from their southern
neighbor. “Should you think proper to send an order it will be immediately filled.” For
Vidaurri, the mission was a success because it allowed the northern states a virtual
718
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monopoly on the Texas market and opportunity to solidify his position in the North once
again in the face of the centralizing Juárez government. 720
But Vidaurri’s aims did not end there. He had also expressed to Quintero the
possibility of annexing his state to the Confederacy. In mentioning his reasons for this he
stated that he had always admired American federalism and the South possessed the
technology and labor force necessary for the proper exploitation of northern Mexico’s
limitless resources, namely its mines. Furthermore, the Confederacy could provide
northern Mexicans with the protection and security that they had long demanded but
failed to receive from their federal government. Davis, however, believed that it would be
an “imprudent and impolitic” move for the South and promptly dismissed the proposal.
For one, such an act would have almost certainly lead to war with Mexico as well as
prevent intervention and recognition by Europe. That point aside, the president of the
Confederacy believed, quite rightly, that the South already had its work cut out for it. 721
While the CSA’s absorption of Nuevo León never came to fruition, it nonetheless
demonstrates the enduring power of federalism both north and south of the border, and
the variety of geopolitical arrangements still available well into the nineteenth century.
Indeed, if the South had won the Civil War, the result would have been a Confederate
States of America that included, not just the slave South, but recently acquired Mexican
land to its west and south - a massive republican empire based on forced labor and

720

Tyler, 45-52, Quintero quoted on pg. 51.

721

Ibid., 52-57, Jefferson Davis quoted on pg. 56.

430
states’ rights, with a far smaller and less effectual United States to its north and Mexico
to its south. The North American continent would have looked very different indeed, and
the relationship between the United States and Mexico perhaps even more so.

431
EPILOGUE

“If he who, by conquest, wins an empire, (and) receives the world’s applause,
how much more is due to those who, by unceasing toil, lay in the wilderness the
foundation for an infant colony, and build there upon a vigorous and happy state!” 722 So
wrote Henderson K. Yoakum in his 1856 tome on the history and early settlement of the
most recent addition to the United States. The acquisition of Texas paved the way for the
US’s imperial rise by the middle of the nineteenth century. Henderson’s remarks, of
course, refer to that first generation of early Anglo settlers who, according to many, made
it all possible. But not only were these early settlers far from the forbears of US
westward expansion, but the long road to United States continental domination was
replete with contingencies, ironies and missed opportunities.
The United States’ continental empire would collapse just fifteen years after its
consummation, torn asunder by the very impulses that had compelled Austin and others
to come to Mexico in the first place. White American men would make one more
attempt at a loosely confederated republic, committed to the principles of states’ rights,
racialized slavery and martial citizenship. But they would fail. Just like Mexico and
Texas had. The Civil War taught the Confederacy the same lesson that Mexico’s painful
and protracted civil wars had taught that country – the limits of regional sovereignty and
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racial exclusion and the necessity of a strong central state to modern republican
governance. 723 While Mexico struggled to condense and rebuild itself, and the
Confederacy’s political experiment was eviscerated, the United States of the North would
emerge larger, stronger and more unified than ever, finally able to absorb, contain and
control its sprawling young empire.
Yet the story of the United States’ ultimate imperial rise after the Civil War is not
entirely one of democracy triumphant. Certainly, the end of the war enabled the Union to
liberate four million slaves, but it also accelerated the extermination and confinement of
native groups throughout the West. In another stroke of historical irony, Texans ended
up owing their livelihoods to the very government that they had waged war against. It
was the post-war US military that finally, in 1867, moved the thousands of southern
plains Indians, who the Texans had been fighting for decades, out of their state and onto
reservations. 724
And it was the post-war US government that would manage to deliver the
numerous internal improvements that Texans craved and needed, namely the long
dreamed of Southern Pacific Railroad, transforming Texas society and economy,
solidifying its ties to a country that it had always seemed not quite a part of. Meanwhile,
many ethnic Mexicans who had remained in the Southwest after the signing of the Treaty
723
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of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, managing to preserve or carve out a place for themselves among
the region’s commercial class, now found their once central role significantly undermined
by the Railroad Company which, as Karl Jacoby explains, “Almost overnight, ruptured
the long-standing circuits of exchange in the region, shifting the dominant flow of trade
from its north-south axis to its east-west orientation.” 725
But perhaps nothing served to undermine the once fluid and cooperationist
relationship between Anglo Americans and Mexicans, and symbolize the strength and
cohesion of the Reconstructed United States than its southern border. Beginning with the
first battles of the Mexican revolution in 1910, the once natural boundary line between
the United State and Mexico along the Rio Grande became the stark physical barrier that
we know today, rising up out of a stark desert and bisecting the former direction of trade,
politics and belonging. Perhaps ironically, it was the Union victory and subsequent
federal policies that ended up hardening the racial divide between whites and non-whites
in the new American Southwest. As Rachel St. John writes, the US-Mexico border
became “not just where two nations met, but where two nations were divided.” 726
As the United States began closing its border and transitioning from a territorial
empire into a political and cultural empire, the popular myth of Texas and its righteous
revolution as an emblem of Anglo-American democracy triumphing over Mexican

725

Ibid., 209.
Rachel St. John, Line in the Sand: A History of the Western US-Mexico Border (Princeton: Oxford
University Press, 2011), Chapter 5, quote on page 145.
726

434
despotism and dysfunction would fuel the national and imperial imagination of America
as an exporter of a universally preferable and transferable system of government. The
United States would not only carry the banner of democracy and freedom into the
Caribbean and the Pacific at the turn of the nineteenth century, but into Southeast Asia in
the mid-twentieth, and the Middle East in the late twentieth and early twenty-first
centuries. Supporting this national myth of political self-righteousness is the story of
Texas – a story that, as most understand it, is about a group of freedom-loving Anglo
frontiersmen defending their political ideals against a corrupt and despotic regime, and
proudly helping to turn the United States into the most powerful nation in the world. Yet,
it is far more complicated. It is just as much about a small group of white propertyowning US citizens who saw the profound limits of their nation’s political capacity less
than forty years after its founding.
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